Terror Defense No Al Qaida Terror

Yes/No War

No War

No great power war—domestic preoccupations and independence—at worst it will be proxy wars

In sum, power is now more evenly distributed in the international system. As a result, there is rising geopolitical competition among great powers. But the nature of the competition is limited by two significant factors: their domestic preoccupations and their dependence on each other for economic growth. Conflict is therefore most acute along the periphery of great powers that are least integrated into the Western-led political order. Rising geopolitical competition usually happens through proxies rather than direct confrontation Ukraine, North Africa, and the Middle East are examples. The East China Sea is currently the only area of direct confrontation between two major powers. Competition among great powers has extended to the sea lanes that carry the world’s energy and trade and is visible in the naval buildup by all the major powers that we see today—a buildup over the last ten years which is unmatched in scale in history. At the same time, the prospect of conventional war between major powers remains low—victory in a major war is no longer a meaningful objective for any major power. The Consequences We should expect several consequences of the growing geopolitical competition among great powers: Following Edward Luttwak, we will give war a chance. In a series of regional crisis after crises, the great powers neutralize each other and avoid the hard political work needed to solve the crisis. Expect Libya, Syria, and other crises to continue to fester. The great powers’ ability to make systemic changes in the world order will remain in considerable doubt. For all the need to restore geopolitical balance where it has been upset, as in the Middle East, or to create a new open inclusive security architecture in the Asia-Pacific, there is no great power or group of great powers stepping forward to restore or create balance or to negotiate the balance of interests in troubled regions. On international issues, the level of productive cooperation among great powers is at an all-time low as demonstrated by the declining efficacy of the United Nations and other multilateral institutions. On global issues like climate change and trade talks, great powers are pursuing ad-hoc and regional pacts rather than the global solutions that confident major powers sought in the past. Regional powers will have more space to pursue their own ambitions, and take matters into their own hands. The fact that power is more evenly distributed among states, and even within states, means that the major powers’ ability to enforce peace or stabilize conflict is also limited. In cases like Yemen and Afghanistan, the major powers have no alternative but to relying on regional or local powers. Where there is no agreement among the regional powers as in Syria, the major powers are unable to impose their will or even agree on desirable outcomes. 

No great power war—5 key warrants

Conventional war wisdom doesn’t apply

Increase in democratic governments

Increase in quality of life

Multilateral agreements

Taboo against nukes

Cohen 14 [Michael, fellow at The Century Foundation, “THE FUTURE OF WAR: LESS IS MORE”, War on The Rocks, Feb 13 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/the-future-of-war-less-is-more/] AW

If one embraces the task of understanding the ways in which the nature of war is changing, a good place to start would be to acknowledge the fact that war, as a feature of international relations, is disappearing. Here, for example, are some of the facts we know about modern war – but that the Future of War project at NAF has, to date, failed to integrate into its thinking: War is Declining: In 2012 there were only six conflicts that caused more than 1,000 battle deaths in a calendar year. That’s the twelfth straight year that the number of such wars has been in single digits – which represents an historic decline over the past several decades. Great Power War Is No More: The world is now in its seventh decade of no major power conflict – the longest such period in the post-Westphalia era. Inter-State War Is Virtually Non-Existent: Wars between countries are, for many, the defining element of global relations, and certainly global history. Yet they almost never occur any more. After a seven-year period of no inter-state wars, 2011 and 2012 saw only two such conflicts – one between Cambodia and Thailand and the other between Sudan and South Sudan, two countries that were recently one. But by and large countries simply do not go to war against other countries. In fact, even the proxy wars that defined the Cold War era have gone the way of the dodo bird. War Is Far Less Deadly: We have not reached a point where war has disappeared completely, as the current bloodletting in Syria reminds us. But when wars do occur, they tend to be intra-state, contained within national borders and far less deadly than they were in the past. In fact, approximately 90 percent fewer people die in wars today than was the case in the 1950s. According to estimates from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program the battle-related death toll in 2012 was between 37,175 and 60,260 – a slight increase from the year before, but nonetheless representative of the dramatic fall in the deadliness of war. These facts are far more important to the future of war than the advent of new technologies with which to wage conflicts that are highly unlikely to occur. The reasons for this seismic shift are many and multi-varied: the decline in usefulness of territorial conquest as well as the growing adherence to a set of global norms dictating the use of force; the rise in political freedom and number of electoral democracies, which is strongly correlated to a diminished national ardor for war (the United States being a notable exception); improvements in national prosperity and human development as well as greater economic and political integration between nations, all of which is correlated to a decline in conflict; the role of the United Nations – and in particular UN peacekeeping – as well as regional organizations in preventing and resolving conflict and enforcing peace agreements; and finally, the development of nuclear weapons has certainly chilled the military ambitions of potential adversaries. All of this has an impact on the decision-making of political leaders, which is why the long-term trajectory of military spending is heading downward (military expenditures in Asia look to be a possible exception).

No war great power war—globalization, information technology, interdependence, and population consensus

Barrett 14 [Clark, Colonel in the national guard and civilian engineer for defense contractors, “Future of War (16): War will become less likely, but those that happen will be total”, Foreign Policy, March 12 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/12/future-of-war-16-war-will-become-less-likely-but-those-that-happen-will-be-total/?wp_login_redirect=0] AW

As mankind proceeds into the 21st century, four factors will drive modern states back toward a form of warfare resembling total war. Those four factors are: the cultural impacts of globalization, the continuation of the information age, financial trends, and populations’ involvement in war, or lack of participation. Yet these four factors will also, counter-intuitively, require a more moral form of warfare. Theory on the ways of war is the realm of both scholar and warrior; it is important that they study and understand the changing nature of war. In reference to globalization, the interdependencies created by the global trade market, will make it increasingly difficult for the United States to engage in war with current and potential trade partners. The geopolitical concerns of Mackinder, Ratzel, and Haushofer have all but dissolved as the world moves closer to a one-world community and one market. Modern trade, travel, and communications allow near-instant interaction and interdependency. Thomas Friedman argues that "the world is flat" and uses the example of the dizzying number of 45 suppliers required to fabricate one Dell laptop computer. Global corporations that straddle multiple countries are likely to temper hostilities and force interstate cooperation. Globalization thus will prevent the small, limited wars of the recent past. There will have to be a true casus belli, a high hurdle to leap, for any nation to enter into a war; therefore, however, those wars will most likely be total in nature. The Clauswitzian trinity demands a rational logic. "Subject to reason alone," small affronts might be overlooked, but great affronts, if they are to be answered at all, may be answered with total war. In conjunction with globalization, the continuing rise of the information age will impact nations and prevent the breakout of interstate wars, and it may propagate internal wars within dictatorships. The Arab Spring of 2011 and the impact of technology — specifically Google and Facebook — demonstrate the political mass effect of the Internet and social media. Arguably, these tools were both the impetus and information suppliers required for the put-upon people of North Africa to rise up against their oppressors. Such interconnectivity threatens dictatorships, but established nations are much less likely to go to war with neighbors as a result. Many reasons for past conflicts are disappearing; miscommunications are corrected in moments instead of months and information is shared. Information is power, and shared information, as exemplified by the One Laptop per Child program, allows the world’s less fortunate to capitalize on global knowledge and improve their condition. These programs aim to set the conditions for mutual success and reduce the competition for scarce resources and resulting war within and among developing nations. The third reason for the decline of warfare, and especially of limited war, is financial. Beyond the globalization and trade concerns, war has simply grown too expensive, especially for the United States. In the future, only the most severe reasons for war will justify the expense. Limited wars will not justify the expenditure, and thus will not be waged. Finally, there is the matter of popular involvement. Very few people per capita serve in the U.S. military. Indeed, many decry an increasing disconnect between the military and the people they serve. Bernard Brodie notes that American support for prolonged, limited wars is fleeting, and why should it not be? When nothing is asked of the polis, nothing should be expected. If ever there were a justification for modern total war, September 11, 2001, supplied it. More so than Pearl Harbor, a military target, the al Qaeda attacks and the ensuing Global War on Terror likely deserved a total response. Unfortunately, nothing was asked of the American populace. There was no call for conservation, no call for a war tax, and no call for conscription. Instead, at the request of the government, Americans went to the mall. Thus the nation must better select the wars it fights, by selecting only those wars it must fight. Total wars demand utilization of all the resources of the nation, and so are the ultimate disincentive to entering into conflicts. In the future, modern states, like the United States, will avoid secondary efforts such as limited wars. When nation-states engage in total wars, the state ensures the engagement of the populace by demanding something of them.

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