The atlantic coast
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LINE NO. 3
ARMOR-PLATED VESSELS.
1After the 4th of March, 259 officers of the navy resigned their commissions or have been dismissed the service (Report Secretary Navy, July 4, 1861). Many others, belonging to States that had already seceded, had previously resigned 2 Richmond, November 1, 1861. Governor Pickens, Columbia, S. C.: I have just received information which I consider entirely reliable, that the enemy's expedition is intended for Port Royal. J.P. Benjamin, Acting Secretary of War [Same telegram sent to Generals Drayton and Ripley.]-Vol. VI., p. 306, Official Records of the War of the Rebellion. 3 This plainly indicates that the Department had left to Dupont the selection of the point of attack, to be agreed upon, however, with General T. W. Sherman, whose orders, dated August 2, 1861, areas follows: "Yon will proceed to New York immediately, and organize, in connection with Captain Dupont, of the navy, an expedition of 12,000 men. Its destination yon and the naval commander will determine after you have sailed." . . . The " confidential " order of October 12th, to the flag-officer, says: " In examining the various points upon the coast, it has been ascertained that Bull's Bay, St. Helena, Port Royal, and Fernandina are each and all accessible and desirable points for the purposes indicated, and the Government has decided to take possession of at least two of them. Which of the two shall thus be occupied will be committed to your discretion after obtaining the best information you can in regard to them." . . . 4 These two demonstrations were known at the time, in the fleet, to be intended to weaken the defenses at Fernandina, particularly by withdrawing the guns for the defence of Savannah. Whether they only drew the attention of General Lee to the impossibility of defending Fernandina with the rear approach unguarded, is of little import. The guns at St. Simon's and at Jekyl Island had been previously sent to Savannah, and those at Fernandina were in process of removal when the expedition reached that point. The troops on board the transports remained in Warsaw Sound until they left for Fernandina. 5 Commander Rodgers's report. 6 Commander Rodgers's report. 7 Prentiss's report. 8 Confederate reports say “she dropped anchor and unconditionally surrendered.” No surrender of a vessel has coem to the knowledge of the writer that was not unconditional. January 31st the McDonough reports the Isaac Smith “still on shore at th4e same place. She must have been injured below the waterline or else they would certainly have goten her off at high tide this morning.” 9 "Their artillery force was composed entirely of field and siege guns brought down and concealed in the bushes " (report of Lieutenant Conover). 10 See Le Roy's Report. 11 Since writing the above, one of their former lieutenants, whose opinion and statements may be relied on, states: "They were well-constructed vessels, covered with four inches of iron, and would steam about seven knots. They drew twelve to thirteen feet, and were each armed with two Brooke rifled 80 pounders, and two 64-pounder shell-guns." He has no recollection as to where the enginery was made. From the experience in the capture of the Atlanta, it may be regarded certain that their casemates would not have resisted XV-inch shells. 12 The title of flag-officer had been changed by law to that of Rear-Admiral since the operations of the preceding year. 13 One officer was killed, seven men wounded, and one gun disabled. Colonel R. H. Anderson, commanding Fort McAllister, in his report of this action states: " The enemy fired steadily and with remarkable precision. At times their fire was terrible. Their mortar firing was unusually fine, a large number of shells bursting directly over the battery." 14 Conferderate report. 15 The officer commanding on this occasion, now Rear-Admiral Worden, regards the destruction of the Nashville, under the attendant difficulties, with more professional pride than the engagement between the Monitor and the Merrimac, which gave him a worldwide reputation. 16 The XV-inch guns first put on board of the monitors were too short to fairly clear the port; to avoid the counter-blast of powder in the turret, a " box " was fastened with screws to it; a better substitute was found in a cylindrical casting somewhat larger than the bore, which was fastened by bolts around the muzzle of the gun. 17 It was formed of very heavy timbers crossing at right angles, bolted together, about fifty feet in length, shaped not unlike a boot-jack, the bows of the vessel propelling within the notch. The after-ends or jaws of the raft were secured by chains to the bow of the vessel. The wave-motion acting on this cumbrous mass was quite different from that of the monitor. It proved to be a battering ram, and loosened the armor plating on the bows of the weehawken. 18 Confederate accounts state that no monitor approached nearer than 600 yards to the rope obstructions, which is probably an error, as they turned inn line, and at such distance as in a strong tide seemed necessary to clear them. They estimated the nearest approach of the Ironsides at 1,800 yards. 19 This change in the turret fitments could only be effected by direct orders from he Navy Department, and yet Admiral Dupont was held derelict in not having the monitors within Charleston bar, and for failing to give co-operation to General Gillmore, who writes on June 80th: 1. My preparations are nearly completed, but I can do nothing until Admiral Dupont's successor arrives and gets ready to work. The admiral has no instructions, and does not feel at liberty to put his vessels into action on the eve of relinquishing his command." General Gillmore, however, was not ready to operate until July 10th, or four days after Dahlgren was in command. 20 Although irrelevant, the above is introduced as information valuable in itself, and pertinent to show personal relations and official appreciation. 21 The above is a transcript from the official report of the Admiral. It seems entirely admissible, in view of the facts presented, to suppose that he was not very favorably impressed with the endurance of the monitors. Captain Rodgers reports "that the deck has been entirely broken through in four places, two of these sufficiently large to admit large quantities of water, requiring shot-plugs. . , . The hull was struck on the port quarter, completely shattering all the plates." Two engineers and several firemen were prostrated by the intense heat in the fire- and engine-room. The distance from the fort, it will be remembered, was given as 1,200 yards. Admiral Dahlgren's Memoirs, seen since writing the above, says, "her armor was very much hurt. The sides of the pilot-house bulged through, and I just escaped the end of a bolt that was dislodged." 22 The Secretary of the Navy appeared before the "Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War" and assumed that because " the Department was not informed of the fact" no vessels ran the blockade; actually twenty-one vessels ran in after the ruin of Sumter until the evacuation of Charleston. 23 Had the -vessel gone ahead instead of backing, when she slipped her cable, there is a reasonable probability that she would have escaped destruction. 24 Admiral Dahlgren’s report. 25 Number 16, Professional Papers, Corps U. S, Engineers, contain full descriptions of these harbor obstructions, etc. 26 Captain John Rodgers and Commanders Daniel Ammen, George W. Rodgers, D. M. Fairfax, and John Downes, were the signers, and the letter afterward seen by Captain Drayton and Commander Worden was concurred in by them. 28 The army followed the scattered forces of the Confederates,, and on the northern part of the island received the surrender of a considerable number, making a total of 2,677, including the wounded. A considerable number had effected their escape at Nag's Head. The army loss was 41 killed, and 181 wounded. The loss of the enemy was considerably less, as he was well protected. 29 Commander Rowan's Report. 30 Rowan's Report. 31 The reader will find the armaments of these vessels in the Appendix, and has doubtless already perceived that they are generally the same vessels that five weeks earlier had acted so effectively in the capture of Roanoke Island. 32 Rowan’s Report. 33 Rowans Report. 34 Murray's Report. 35 Report of Wells, commanding the Miami. 36 Febiger’s report. 37 Report of commander of the Mattabesett. 38 The quotation marks are in Cushing’s words. 39 Admiral Porter’s report. 40 Extract of letter of General Butler to Admiral Porter, dated December 25, 1864: "Admiral-Upon landing the troops and making a thorough reconnois¬sance of Fort Fisher, both General Weitzel and myself are fully of the opinion that the place could not be carried by assault, as it was left substantially unin¬jured as a defensive work by the navy fire. We found seventeen guns protected by traverses, two only of which were dismounted, bearing up the beach, and cov¬ering a strip of land, the only practicable route, not more than wide enough for a thousand men in line of battle. . . . I shall therefore sail for Hampton Roads as soon as the transport fleet can be got in order. My engineers and officers re¬port Fort Fisher to me as substantially uninjured as a defensive work." 41 General Whiting, in answer to inquiries by General Butler, states that the gar¬rison was 667 men on the 18th. On the 23d, 110 veteran artillery, 50 sailors, and 250 junior reserves were added. Total, 1,077. On the 24th the fleet disabled five guns; on the 25th four guns, two of them being on the left, looking up the beach, and nineteen in position, and mines (for explosion) undisturbed. He doubts the success of an assault at that time. In the official report of General Whiting, dated December 30th, is found the fact that the " Junior Reserves" and others had to be coaxed out of the bomb-proofs, one might say, on the 25th, to repel a possible assault. This report concludes as follows: " Whatever the power of resistance of the fort, and it is great, no doubt, the delay due to the heavy weather of Wednesday and Thursday after the arrival of the fleet was its salvation. . But we cannot always hope for such aid from weather, or the blunder of the enemy, manifest here for his not landing and occupying the work before the com¬mencement of his bombardment, and I trust the lesson will not be lost." The reader can now form his own conclusion whether General Butler could or could not have taken Fort Fisher. 42 Belknap’s report. 43 Captain Breese’s report. 44 Admiral Porter’s report. 45 Captain Breese’s report. 46 NORFOLK, VA., January 15, 1879. CAPTAIN JAMES PARKER: Dear Sir―In reply to your recent letter, I would state that I was colonel in command of the Confederate garrison of Fort Fisher, North Carolina, upon the occasion of its assault and capture by the United States forces on this day fourteen years ago. The attacking column of the army was hid and protected by the river bank as it approached the left flank of the work, but the naval column came up the open beach upon our center. As its success would have been disastrous, I concentrated all available gnus upon this column, and met its assault with the larger portion of my men, posting them upon the ramparts so as to fire down upon the sailors and marines. I particularly noticed in the assault an officer who seemed to lead the column, and who was almost recklessly brave, and directed my men to pick him and other officers off, to discourage the assailants. When we afterward met on board the steamship California, at Old Point Comfort (where you had come to see if you could be of service to me in my wounded condition), you can imagine my surprise, after I had described this officer's dress to you, to learn that you were he, and the pleasure it gave me to know that so brave and gallant a foe had escaped. With best wishes, yours very truly, WILLIAM LAMB. 47 Vessels appearing above the Isaac Smith were built for war purposes; the Smith and subsequent vessels were purchased. 48 Table compiled from official reports. 49 Appendix Sections V-VIII omitted, as they detail Union and Confederate Army troop strengths in the Departments of North Carolina and South Carolina/Georgia/Florida throughout the war. 50 Flagship of Captain Melancton Smith Download 1.74 Mb. Share with your friends:
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