The Nov. 26 Mumbai Attack

At least two teams entered the city by watercraft, breaking up into smaller groups as they made their way to the Taj Mahal hotel, Oberoi-Trident hotel complex and Nariman (also known as Chabad) House, a Jewish center in the same area of Mumbai. These tactical teams dispersed across the city, attacking prominent sites where foreign VIPs were sure to be present. They infiltrated the hotels through back entrances and kitchens, thus enhancing the element of surprise as they opened fire on guests in the dining areas and atriums of the hotels.

Beyond killing people and holding hostages in Mumbai’s most prestigious hotels, other attack teams assaulted additional strategic sites in Mumbai, creating a sense of chaos and confusion over the whole city. Mumbai’s main train station, Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, as well as Cama Hospital, offices of The Times of India newspaper, restaurants, a theater, and bars frequented by foreigners also were attacked. The attackers’ excellent coordination — the multiple attacks took place nearly simultaneously — thus ensured maximum confusion and chaos, frustrating police responses. This could explain in part why operations like those at Nariman House and the hotels lasted for more than 48 hours.
Similarities between New York and Mumbai
The similarities between the Landmarks plot and the Nov. 26 Mumbai attack are quite obvious. In symbolic terms, as the Mumbai attack unfolded, many onlookers said that an attack on Mumbai is to India what an attack on New York is to Americans. In more concrete terms, the targets, methods, weapons and geography involved were similar (if not identical), and the unconventional style of the attacks points to a common author.

U.S. counterterrorism forces in 1995 detained Landmarks plot mastermind Abdel Basit (aka Ramzi Yousef), who remains in U.S. federal prison. But his ideas obviously did not stay behind bars. This illustrates how a plan’s initial failure does not mean the threat has been eliminated. Indeed, STRATFOR observed in 2005 that the 1993 Landmarks plot (among others) should not be discounted, as al Qaeda or other terrorist groups are known to return to past targets and plot scenarios.

The similarities between the Landmarks plot and the Mumbai attack exist at several levels. The first relates to the target set. Both New York and Mumbai are the respective financial centers of their countries and home to their nations’ major stock exchanges. In both cities, the planners had picked out high-profile soft targets — sites that have less security personnel and countermeasures than, say, a military installation or key government building. Softer security means gaining access to strategic assets and people is easier. STRATFOR has long stressed the importance of maintaining vigilance at soft targets like hotels that cater to international guests, as these are likely targets for militant Islamists. Both plans also involved infiltrating hotel staff and booking rooms in the hotels to gain inside information and store supplies.

The second similarity involves how both plans included peripheral targets to cause confusion and chaos and thus create a diversion from the main targets. In Mumbai, transportation infrastructure like the city’s main railway station was attacked, and militants detonated explosive devices in taxis and next to gasoline pumps. Meanwhile, roving gunmen attacked other sites around the city. In a country where coordination among first responders is already weak, the way the attackers fanned out across the city caused massive chaos and distracted security forces from the main prize: the hotels. Attacking Cama Hospital also sowed chaos, as the injured from one scene of attack became the targets of another while being rescued.

A third similarity exists in the geography of the two cities. In both plots, the use of watercraft is a distinctive tactical similarity. Watercraft gave militants access at unconventional locations where security would be more lax. Both Mumbai (a peninsula) and Manhattan (an island) offer plenty of points where militants can mount assaults from watercraft. Such an attack would not have worked in New Delhi or Bangalore; these are landlocked cities where militants would have had to enter by road, a route much more likely to encounter police patrols. Being centers of trade and surrounded by water, both Mumbai and New York have high levels of maritime traffic. This means infiltrating the area from the water would raise minimal suspicions, especially if the craft were registered locally (as was the case in the Mumbai attack). Such out-of-the box tactics take advantage of security services, which often tend to focus on established threats.

A fourth similarity lies in transportation. In addition to using watercraft, both plots involved the use of deceptive vehicles to maneuver around the city undetected. The Landmark plotters used taxis to conduct surveillance and planned on using a delivery van to approach the hotels. In Mumbai, the attackers planted bombs in taxis, and at least one group of militants hijacked a police van and used it to carry out attacks across the city. Using familiar vehicles like taxis, delivery vans or police vans to carry out surveillance or attacks reduces suspicion and increases the element of surprise, allowing militants to stay under cover until the moment of attack.

Here we see more evidence of the existence of an ideological or strategic battle space that exists in the radical Islamist world, which has been greatly influenced by al Qaeda. Like a contingency plan that might sit on the shelf for years or decades before it is useful, terrorist plots (especially good ones) can have a long shelf life and be applied in various scenarios. In fact, plans that sit on the shelf longer might actually be more effective as security officials focus their attention on evolving threats and forget old ones.

Just because a plot has been disrupted, the threat has not been eliminated. Once terrorists happen upon a successful model, they are likely to follow that model. This can be seen in al Qaeda’s return to the World Trade Center in 2001, eight years after the initial truck bomb attacks in 1993. It can also be seen in the fact that Mumbai has been the target of multiple attacks and threats, including train bombings in 2006 that killed approximately 200 people. Though the tactics might have differed, the target set remained the same. Various parts of the attack cycle can change, but rarely does an attack occur that is completely novel.

Ultimately, the biggest difference between the Landmarks plot and the Mumbai attack is that the Mumbai attack succeeded. The failure of the Landmarks plot probably provided key lessons to the planners of the Mumbai attack, who were able to carry out the stages of the attack without detection and with the full element of surprise. Gauging by the success of the Mumbai incident, we can expect similar strategies and tactics in future attacks.

Jihadism in 2009: The Trends Continue

Jan. 7, 2009
For the past several years, we have published an annual forecast for al Qaeda and the jihadist movement. Since the January 2006 forecast, we have focused heavily on the devolution of jihadism from a phenomenon focused primarily on al Qaeda the group to one based primarily on al Qaeda the movement. Last year, we argued that al Qaeda was struggling to remain relevant and that al Qaeda prime had been marginalized in the physical battlefield. This marginalization of al Qaeda prime had caused that group to forfeit its position at the vanguard of the physical jihad, though it remained deeply involved in the leadership of the ideological battle.

As a quick reminder, STRATFOR views what most people refer to as “al Qaeda” as a global jihadist network rather than a monolithic entity. This network consists of three distinct entities. The first is a core vanguard, which we frequently refer to as al Qaeda prime, comprising Osama bin Laden and his trusted associates. The second is composed of al Qaeda franchise groups such as al Qaeda in Iraq, and the third comprises the grassroots jihadist movement inspired by al Qaeda prime and the franchise groups.

As indicated by the title of this forecast, we believe that the trends we have discussed in previous years will continue, and that al Qaeda prime has become marginalized on the physical battlefield to the extent that we have not even mentioned their name in the title. The regional jihadist franchises and grassroots operatives pose a much more significant threat in terms of security concerns, though it is important to note that those concerns will remain tactical and not rise to the level of a strategic threat. In our view, the sort of strategic challenge that al Qaeda prime posed with the 9/11 attacks simply cannot be replicated without a major change in geopolitical alignments — a change we do not anticipate in 2009.
2008 in Review
Before diving into our forecast for the coming year, let’s take a quick look back at what we said would happen in 2008 and see what we got right and what we did not.

What we got right:

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  Al Qaeda core focused on the ideological battle. Another year has passed without a physical attack by the al Qaeda core. As we noted last October, al Qaeda spent a tremendous amount of effort in 2008 fighting the ideological battle. The core leadership still appears to be very intent on countering the thoughts presented in a book written in 2007 by Sayyed Imam al-Sharif, also known as Dr. Fadl, an imprisoned Egyptian radical and a founder (with Ayman al-Zawahiri) of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Al-Sharif’s book is seen as such a threat because he provides theological arguments that counter many of the core teachings used by al Qaeda to justify jihadism. On Dec. 13, an 85-page treatise by one of al Qaeda’s leading religious authorities, Abu-Yahya al-Libi, was released to jihadist Web sites in the latest of al Qaeda’s many efforts to counter Dr. Fadl’s arguments.
  

• 
  Pakistan will be important as a potential flashpoint. Eight days after we wrote this, former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was assassinated. Since then, Pakistan has become the focal point on the physical battlefield.
  

• 
  The November 2007 addition of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) to the global jihadist network will not pose a serious threat to the Libyan regime. The Libyans have deftly used a combination of carrots and sticks to divide and control the LIFG.
  

• 
  Jihadists will kill more people with explosives and firearms than with chemical, biological or radiological weapons. We saw no jihadist attacks using WMD in 2008.
  

What we got mostly right:

• 
  The Algerian jihadist franchise, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), will be hard-pressed in 2008, but not eliminated. AQIM succeeded in launching a large number of attacks in the first eight months of 2008, killing as many people as it did in all of 2007. But since then, the Algerian government has been making progress, and the jihadist group has only conducted two attacks since August 2008. The Algerians also are working closely with neighboring countries to combat AQIM, and the group is definitely feeling the heat. On Dec. 23, 2008, the Algerian government reportedly rejected a truce offered by AQIM leader Yahia Djouadi. Djouadi offered that al Qaeda would cease attacks on foreigners operating in oil fields in Algeria and Mauritania if the Algerian security service would cease targeting al Qaeda members in the Sahel region. The group is still alive, and government pressure appears to have affected its operational ability in recent months, but it did take a bit longer than we anticipated for the pressure to make a difference.
  

• 
  Syria will use Fatah al-Islam as a destabilizing force in Lebanon. We had intelligence last year suggesting that the Syrians were going to press the use of their jihadist proxies in Lebanon — specifically Fatah al-Islam. We saw a bit of this type of activity in late May, but not as much as anticipated. By November, Syria actually decided to cut ties with Fatah al-Islam.
  

• 
  Jihadist operatives outside war zones will focus on soft targets. Major terrorist strikes in Islamabad and New Delhi were conducted against hotels, soft targets STRATFOR has focused on as vulnerable for many years now. Other attacks in India focused on markets and other public places. While most of the attacks against hard targets came in war zones like Iraq and Afghanistan, there were a few attacks against hard targets in places like Pakistan, Yemen and Turkey. Granted, the Sanaa and Istanbul attacks were unsuccessful, but they were attacks against hard targets nonetheless.
  

What we missed:

• 
  The jihadist franchises in Yemen resurged, and the al-Shabab in Somalia found success. While we quickly picked up on these trends in April and May respectively (and beat most others to the punch with some very good analysis on these topics), we clearly did not predict them in December 2007. We knew that the influx of fighters from Iraq was going to impact countries in the region, but we didn’t specifically focus on Yemen and Somalia.
  

As long as the ideology of jihadism survives (it has been around since the late 1980s), the jihadists’ war against the world will continue. It will continue to oscillate between periods of high and low intensity. In the coming year, we believe the bulk of physical attacks will continue to be conducted by regional jihadist franchise groups, and to a lesser extent by grassroots jihadists.

With the lack of regional franchises in North America, we do not see a strategic threat to the United States. However, as seen by the recent convictions in the Fort Dix plot trial, or even in the late October case where a U.S. citizen apparently committed a suicide bombing on behalf of al-Shabab in Somalia, the threat of simple attacks against soft targets in the United States remains. We were again surprised that no jihadist attacks occurred in the United States in 2008. Given the vulnerabilities that exist in an open society and the ease of attack, we cannot rule out an attack in 2009.

In Europe, where AQIM and other jihadist franchises have a greater presence and infrastructure, there is a greater threat that these franchises will commit sophisticated attacks. It must be recognized, though, that they will have a far harder time acquiring weapons and explosives to conduct such attacks in the United Kingdom or France than they would in Algeria or Pakistan. Because of this, we anticipate that they will continue to focus on soft targets in Europe. Due to differences between the Muslim communities in the United States and Europe, the grassroots operatives have been more active in Europe than they are in the United States. The May 22, 2008, attempted bombing at the Giraffe Cafe by a Muslim convert in Exeter serves as a good reminder of this.

Meanwhile, though Iraq is far calmer than it was a few years back, a resurgence in jihadist activity is possible. One of the keys to calming down the many jihadist groups in Iraq was the formation of the Awakening Councils, which are made up of many Sunni former Baathist (and some jihadist) militants placed on the U.S. payroll. With the changes in Iraq, responsibility for these Awakening Councils has been passed to the Iraqi government. If the Shiite-dominated government decides not to pay the councils, many of the militants-turned-security officers might return to their old ways — especially if the pay from jihadist groups is right. Intelligence reports indicate that Baghdad plans to pay only a fraction of the approximately 100,000 men currently serving in the Awakening Councils. The Iraqi central government apparently plans to offer the bulk of them civilian jobs or job training, but we are skeptical that this will work.

Elsewhere, Pakistan is once again the critical location for the jihadists. Not only is Pakistan the home of the al Qaeda core leadership as its pursues its ideological war, it also is home to a number of jihadist groups, from the Afghan Taliban and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in the northwest to Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed in the northeast, among several others. The coming year might prove to be pivotal in global efforts against the jihadists in Pakistan. Pakistan already is a country in crisis, and in some ways it is hard to imagine it getting much worse. But if Pakistan continues to destabilize, it could very well turn into a failed country (albeit a failed country with a nuclear arsenal). Before Pakistan becomes a failed state, there are a number of precursor stages it probably will pass through. The most immediate stage would entail the fall of most of the North-West Frontier Province to the jihadists, something that could happen this year.

This type of anarchy in Pakistan could give the jihadists an opportunity to exert control in a way similar to what they have done in places like Afghanistan and Somalia (and already in the Pakistani badlands along the Afghan border.) If, on the other hand, Pakistan is somehow able to hold on, re-establish control over its territory and its rogue intelligence agency and begin to cooperate with the United States and other countries fighting the jihadists, such a development could deal a terrible blow to the aspirations of the jihadists on both the physical and ideological battlefields. Given the number of plots linked to Pakistan in recent years, including the Nov. 26 Mumbai attack and almost every significant plot since 9/11, all eyes will be watching Pakistan carefully.

Al Qaeda: The Insignificance of bin Laden's Latest Message

Jan. 14, 2009
In his first audio message since May 2008, al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden issued an audio recording through As-Sahab, al Qaeda’s media arm, on Jan. 14. The message comprised statements about the ongoing Israeli operation in Gaza and warnings to U.S. President George W. Bush’s successor about the challenges of inheriting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the message, bin Laden focuses on Bush and his cooperation with Israel in its operation against Hamas in the Gaza strip, and he urges Muslims to support the mujahideen with “money and men.” He goes on to link the world’s economic troubles to the United States’ missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, saying that if the next U.S. president “withdraws from the war, that would be a military defeat, and if he goes on with it, he’ll drown in economic crisis.”

Bin Laden and the core al Qaeda leadership (known as al Qaeda prime) do not matter much anymore, beyond their symbolic power. The continual release of statements without attacks means that these tapes are falling on deaf ears. Al Qaeda prime has failed to pull off an operation since the London bombings in 2005 — and even that attack appears to have involved only a tangential link to the grassroots jihadist network behind the plot. Even in South Asia, where al Qaeda is active, it relies heavily on local and regional allies for cover. Bin Laden has become an old revolutionary who refuses to retire though his time has passed.

While the tape’s content appears to indicate that it was made recently, it has not yet been confirmed that it is an entirely new communication. From what STRATFOR has read of the statement so far, bin Laden does not even mention two of the incidents that have occurred to strengthen al Qaeda since his last message: the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai and militants’ gains in northwest Pakistan. Some other strange omissions include the failure to mention U.S. President-elect Barack Obama by name (bin Laden refers only to “Bush’s successor,” although he does reportedly directly quote Vice President-elect Joe Biden) and the absence of the online advertising and hype that usually precede such a release from bin Laden.

The fact that bin Laden spent most of the message railing against the United States and Israel for the actions in Gaza does not mean that the tape is recent. Israel has constantly been involved in Gaza operations, and this subject has been one of bin Laden’s main grievances on which he has spoken frequently. Compared to the message released Jan. 6 by Ayman al-Zawahiri (bin Laden’s deputy), which commented specifically on Obama and on Egypt’s failure to intervene in the Israeli strikes against Gaza, this message appears to go into much less detail.

Regardless of the content of bin Laden’s message, the fact remains that the connection between these tapes and attacks carried out by al Qaeda prime is very weak. This is the seventh tape (counting both audio and video) bin Laden has made since 2007 with no significant attack to back it up. In recent years, al Qaeda prime has really posed a physical threat only to South Asia — an area of operations whose size hardly corresponds to al Qaeda prime’s frequent calls for global jihad.

Without attacks to back it up, rhetoric appears to be bin Laden’s sole remaining weapon. And meanwhile, other militant Islamist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, and countries like Iran, are gaining much greater prestige as they confront their traditional enemies, like Israel, head-on. Without the street credibility of being a legitimate revolutionary threat, bin Laden and al Qaeda prime lose the ability to attract recruits and money — and bin Laden’s appeal to supporters for both in his latest message is evidence of his declining stature.

Some of the omissions surrounding the tape also indicate al Qaeda prime’s struggle to stay alive. If al Qaeda were healthy, a mention of the Mumbai attacks and the gains militants have made against the government in northwestern Pakistan would have been expected. However, al Qaeda prime’s inability to capitalize on those gains shows just how much U.S. airstrikes have pinned the group down. The failure to advertise the message and hype its release indicates that al Qaeda prime faces a significant risk in getting an original tape from the source and distributing it online. Tipping off the United States that a tape would soon be released could compromise communication networks already worn thin by U.S. strikes in northwestern Pakistan.

Bin Laden (and other al Qadea prime talking heads) will continue to make these tapes and, given that the al Qaeda leader has orchestrated successful attacks in the past, some will continue to listen to him. But without a major action to back up his threats, bin Laden’s influence over the militant Islamist movement will fade. However, this does not mean the militant Islamist movement itself will fade. As the actions of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah (and Hezbollah’s patron, Iran) show, plenty of people are prepared to become the world’s top Islamist militant.

Algeria: Al Qaeda and the Plague

Jan. 21, 2009
On Jan. 18, the British tabloid newspaper The Sun reported that some 40 al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) members died from an outbreak of the plague in the Tizi Ouzou province of Algeria. According to The Sun, the epidemic forced the group to turn its base into a mass grave and flee. Other sources such as the Washington Times have picked up on the story and are reporting that U.S. government sources say the incident occurred but have not confirmed the number of deaths or the agent involved in causing them.

STRATFOR is carefully watching these reports to see if first, they are true (remember that the first story is quite often not the correct story), and second, precisely what occurred, in an attempt to determine if this was a natural outbreak of plague, or if it was an instance of the group experimenting with biological warfare.

Plague (sometimes referred to as the Black Death) is a naturally occurring disease that is caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis. This bacterium is found in rodents and fleas that infest them and exists in many parts of the world, including the western United States. According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, there are some 1,000 to 3,000 cases of plague diagnosed in humans every year; between five and 15 of those cases occur in the United States.

Y. pestis can infect humans in three ways. The bacteria cause pneumonic plague when inhaled, though pneumonic plague can also occur when plague bacteria from another form of transmission infect the lungs. Bubonic plague results when the bacteria enter through a break in the skin (such as a flea bite), and septicemic plague occurs when the bacteria multiply in the victim’s blood (usually after being infected by one of the other types). In general, a flea bite is the primary form of infection, and if the infection is left untreated, it can evolve into a case of pneumonic or septicemic plague.

Bubonic and septicemic plagues are not normally spread from person to person. Pneumonic plague can be contagious if a person inhales respiratory droplets containing the bacteria from an infected person, which usually requires close contact with the infected individual. Y. pestis is a fragile bacterium and does not last long in sunlight or after it is dried. Plague is treatable with antibiotics, which are especially effective if administered early. Wearing a simple surgical mask can protect a person from pneumonic plague infection.

Algeria is one of the many areas where plague occurs naturally, and the country experiences periodic outbreaks of the disease. In 2003, there was an outbreak of plague in Algeria’s Oran province. In that outbreak, there were 11 confirmed and seven suspected cases of plague. All the cases in that episode were bubonic, indicating it was likely spread by fleas.

Plague has long been of interest as a biological warfare weapon, from the reports of Tatars catapulting plague-infected bodies at Genoese sailors in the City of Caffa in the Crimea in the 14th century, to Japan’s efforts to drop clay pots of plague-infected fleas over Manchuria, to the Soviet weapons programs during the Cold War (and perhaps beyond.) While the Tatars and Japanese used the bubonic form of the plague, according to former Soviet scientist Ken Alibek, the Soviet program focused on an aerosolized form of the bacterium designed to cause pneumonic plague.

Like many biological agents, there are great challenges associated with producing and employing large quantities of a virulent biological agent. Certainly, plague can be obtained from the environment in a place where it occurs naturally, such as Algeria, but taking that bacterium and producing a large quantity of it in a virulent form and then disbursing it in an efficient manner is another matter entirely. According to Alibek, the huge Soviet biological weapons program was able to overcome these obstacles, but it would be difficult for a small organization to do so.

That said, it is possible that AQIM members were experimenting with plague as a weapon, and plague could be employed on a limited scale by infecting some suicide operatives with pneumonic plague and then sending them around to hopefully cough or sneeze on victims, or perhaps to release some infected fleas against a target area. However, either scenario is unlikely to produce mass casualties. Y. pestis might be effectively delivered against a smaller number of people. The early symptoms of pneumonic plague can be mistaken for the flu, and if the victims do not seek immediate medical attention the disease can be fatal.

The alternative is that the plague outbreak was a naturally occurring event that was result of the AQIM members living in close contact with each other and with rodents in an unsanitary and perhaps enclosed space, such as a cave complex.

STRATFOR will be watching future reports on the incident to see if the cases were bubonic as opposed to pneumonic, as we believe bubonic cases are more likely to be an indication that the outbreak was natural. STRATFOR will also be looking to see if there are reports of laboratory equipment and literature at the abandoned camp — an indication that biological warfare experimentation was occurring.

Algeria: Taking the Pulse of AQIM

It was the deadliest attack of any type in Algeria since an Aug. 19, 2008, suicide vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attack against a line of job applicants outside a police academy in Les Issers that killed 48 and injured another 45. AQIM regularly launches armed ambushes and roadside IED attacks in Algeria, and ambushes were frequently used by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) before it announced in September 2006 that it had become part of al Qaeda’s regional franchise — AQIM. Indeed, we have seen four other ambush and IED attacks since May 20, 2009, but the death tolls in such attacks have usually been smaller than the June 17 attack.

In light of this anomalous attack, we thought it would be an opportune time to take the pulse of AQIM and try to get a sense of where the group stands today and where it might be going over the next few months.