The effect of bank m&As on efficiency: the portuguese experience victor Mendes


Annex 4: Cost-inefficiency indexes – SFA method, with endogenous inefficiency effects



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Annex 4: Cost-inefficiency indexes – SFA method, with endogenous inefficiency effects


Bank

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Average

1

0.005

0.006

0.006

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

2

0.302

0.302

0.295

0.268

0.008

0.007

0.259

0.115

0.195

3

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

4

0.006

0.006

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

5

0.155

0.298

0.151

0.134

0.145

0.122

0.117

0.111

0.154

6

0.199

0.005

0.207

0.005

0.006

0.181

0.174

0.005

0.098

7

0.286

0.284

0.285

0.273

0.278

0.273

0.271

0.107

0.257

8

0.189

0.188

0.187

0.181

0.179

0.177

0.170

0.167

0.180

9




0.033

0.033

0.029

0.030

0.029







0.031

10

0.198

0.194

0.190

0.185

0.055

0.052

0.048

0.045

0.121

11

0.304

0.296

0.137

0.128

0.131

0.127

0.122

0.118

0.170

12













0.030

0.031

0.029

0.027

0.029

13

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.186

0.187

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.050

14

0.299

0.299

0.131

0.124

0.127

0.124

0.122

0.115

0.168

15

0.321

0.166

0.166

0.154

0.152

0.127

0.113

0.121

0.165

16

0.203

0.190

0.060

0.057

0.060

0.058

0.052

0.047

0.091

17













0.028

0.026

0.029

0.022

0.026

18







0.133

0.130

0.127

0.127

0.123

0.122

0.127

19













0.134

0.126







0.130

20

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

21

0.147

0.149

0.152

0.144

0.145

0.141

0.139

0.134

0.144

22

0.307

0.155

0.159

0.150

0.133

0.127

0.122

0.117

0.159

23

0.219

0.207

0.063

0.063

0.055

0.047

0.042

0.044

0.093

24










0.137

0.135

0.178

0.126

0.120

0.139

25

0.302

0.300

0.296

0.283

0.181

0.118

0.114

0.109

0.213

26













0.005

0.005

0.005

0.004

0.005

27

0.304

0.009

0.282

0.132

0.133

0.126

0.123

0.118

0.153

28

0.006

0.006

0.006

0.005

0.005

0.194

0.005

0.005

0.029

29




0.006

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.057

0.051

0.019

30

0.165

0.160

0.157

0.147

0.149

0.147

0.140

0.135

0.150

31

0.006

0.006

0.005
















0.006

32













0.034

0.029

0.026

0.023

0.028

33

0.006

0.006

0.006

0.005

0.006

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

34

0.005

0.006

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.004

0.005

0.005

0.005

35

0.301

0.295

0.293

0.124

0.129

0.126

0.121

0.114

0.188

36
















0.023

0.022

0.021

0.022

37




0.004

0.004

0.004

0.005

0.004

0.004

0.004

0.004

38
















0.114

0.113

0.107

0.111

39













0.132

0.143

0.113

0.134

0.130

40













0.141

0.129

0.126

0.111

0.127

41

0.006

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

0.005

42
















0.004

0.004

0.004

0.004

43




0.152

0.147

0.138

0.137

0.027

0.025

0.023

0.093

44

0.197

0.005

0.186

0.177

0.182

0.178

0.167

0.155

0.156

45

0.298

0.297

0.148

0.118

0.125

0.121

0.115

0.108

0.166

46
















0.004

0.004

0.004

0.004

Average

0.164

0.123

0.115

0.103

0.088

0.080

0.079

0.065

0.098




1 See, for example, Rebelo and Mendes (1999), Mendes and Rebelo (1999).

2 Along with the getting big argument, reputation-building incentives could be thought of as possible explanations for mergers. If greater ability is necessary to (successfully) run a bigger bank, then engaging in merger activities should benefit manager reputation as well as executive compensation. On the other hand, if market agents perceive large banks to be too big to fail, then incentives to increase size may exist.

3 We assume that u follows the half-normal distribution.

4 Banco Hispano is not included.

5 But not necessarily more profit-efficient.

6 All but three small private foreign banks were nationalized following the April 25, 1974, revolution. At that time these three small banks had a combined market share of 2% approximately.

7 The reason is that whenever we consolidate interbank operations the result is smaller than the sum of parts.

8 The rationalization of the branch network, with the closure of overlapping branches is another possible source of increased efficiency. Hence, we can interpret our results as a lowerbound to efficiency effects of these mergers.

9 According to Kwast (1999), in the USA 75% of households’ checking, savings, credit line, and other services are obtained at financial institutions located within 25 km of their workplace or home. Survey data also shows that 98% of households and 92% of small businesses use local banks.




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