1 See, for example, Rebelo and Mendes (1999), Mendes and Rebelo (1999).
2 Along with the getting big argument, reputation-building incentives could be thought of as possible explanations for mergers. If greater ability is necessary to (successfully) run a bigger bank, then engaging in merger activities should benefit manager reputation as well as executive compensation. On the other hand, if market agents perceive large banks to be too big to fail, then incentives to increase size may exist.
3 We assume that u follows the half-normal distribution.
4 Banco Hispano is not included.
5 But not necessarily more profit-efficient.
6 All but three small private foreign banks were nationalized following the April 25, 1974, revolution. At that time these three small banks had a combined market share of 2% approximately.
7 The reason is that whenever we consolidate interbank operations the result is smaller than the sum of parts.
8 The rationalization of the branch network, with the closure of overlapping branches is another possible source of increased efficiency. Hence, we can interpret our results as a lowerbound to efficiency effects of these mergers.
9 According to Kwast (1999), in the USA 75% of households’ checking, savings, credit line, and other services are obtained at financial institutions located within 25 km of their workplace or home. Survey data also shows that 98% of households and 92% of small businesses use local banks.