The fifty states of the United States should



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***Aff A2 States***



2AC States bad theory




Reject the counterplan –

presumes an illogical mode of comparison,

fosters contrived research, unfairly skewing lit

utopian thinking hurts education

interp: single-government-actor counterplans resolve


States solvency deficits




Predictability – National programs are reliable, allow better coordination than States


John Creighton, Seattle Port Commission and Washington State Freight Mobility Strategic Investment Board, and the advisory board to the Seattle Convention and Visitors Bureau, August 17, 2010, Patchwork projects won't cure our freight-mobility problem, http://crosscut.com/2010/08/17/transportation/20062/Patchwork-projects-wont-cure-our-freightmobility-p/

One big question is whether we should have separate funding regimes for freight projects on federal and state and local highways, or a unified funding program at the federal level with allocations to state and local roads. The latter is the better choice, in my view. Having a national program provides consistency and predictability for businesses and prevents one jurisdiction from being at a cost-competitive disadvantage from the next. It also would allow for better planning and coordination of freight mobility projects on a national, system-wide basis.



Funding – states could never fund without federal help


American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, “Transportation invest in our Future” 2010 http://www.transportation1.org/tif4report/execsummary.htp

AASHTO has taken the position that every state should be given all options possible in the areas of tolling and public–private ventures so those states can determine for themselves what is in the best interests of their citizens. It has also embraced a bold goal of increasing toll-supported projects to 9 percent of the total nationally. What must be understood by the Commission, however, is that while the increased funding made possible through tolling will help states and local governments generate funds needed, it in no way offsets what will be required from the federal level.



State action will be uncoordinated and inefficient – in no way capable of handling the oil market


Energy Policy Information Center 3/08/2012, “You say you want a devolution; transportation policy and energy security,” http://energypolicyinfo.com/2012/03/you-say-you-want-a-devolution-transportation-policy-and-energy-security/

That’s an interesting idea, but misguided. States do determine their own transportation priorities today, except when Congress earmarks — DeMint and others are right in their opposition to that practice. But in general, construction priorities aren’t dictated to the states — but national needs and priorities are given additional national funding that the states then spend in accordance with those needs. And while Senator DeMint is correct when he says that the system “is plagued by thousands of wasteful earmarks, bureaucratic red tape, and outdated funding formulas that pick winners and losers,” that’s a good reason to reform the system, not throw up our hands and just let individual states decide our national transportation policy through 50+ disparate and uncoordinated efforts. This is especially the case given the huge macro and microeconomic toll inflicted by our transportation-driven dependence on petroleum. While there are others, that’s reason enough for a national transportation policy and reason enough to be wary of seductive calls for devolution.


Credibility – States are not able to cooperate on transportation infrastructure and their failures are perceived


John A. Kitzhaber, M.D Governor of Oregon, 1995 – 2002 Chair, Board of Directors National Policy Consensus Center, 2005 or later, http://www.policyconsensus.org/publications/reports/docs/TransportationSolutions.pdf, Transportation Solution: Collaborative problem solving for states and communities.

Increasingly, conflicts over all aspects of transportation planning and development raise concerns about growth management, economic development, neighborhood quality of life, environmental justice and a range of other issues. The inability of state and local officials to successfully deal with these concerns weakens government credibility at a time that we can least afford to have this happen. As government leaders, we need tools and governing models that can help us work in new and innovative ways to successfully address these multiple perspectives and regain the public trust in our ability to solve problems.

Distraction – federal action is key to sustain investment


Freemark 12 – journalist who writes about cities and transportation. He created and continues to write for the website The Transport Politic, and has also contributed to Next American City, The Atlantic Cities, Planning, and Dissent (Yonah, 02/16, “Clearing it Up on Federal Transportation Expenditures,” http://www.thetransportpolitic.com/2012/02/16/clearing-it-up-on-federal-transportation-expenditures/)

For one, as I have noted above, states and municipalities have no clear record of choosing to invest in better projects when they are fully in charge of collecting the revenues to do so. States have too often proven a complete disregard for public transportation investments when they’re left fully in charge — see state infrastructure banks as evidence for that fact. While federal investments in transportation have been far from perfect, they have nonetheless provided for the significant expansion in transit offerings we’re now seeing. From the 1980s on, the Congress has maintained a steady stream of funding for transit from the fuel tax revenues it collects. How many states, which collect a huge amount of fuel tax revenues themselves, can say the same? But the most important role of the federal government in transportation financing is to ensure that funding is maintained during economic downturns. The Obama Administration actually increased spending on roads and transit projects following the 2008 recession, despite a decline in federal fuel tax revenues, because it was able to use its power of deficit spending (an authority state and local governments do not have**) to maintain investments when the country needed them. Devolution is overrated.




States could never match federal oversight and policy capabilities***


Kavinoky 12 – executive director of transportation and infrastructure at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Janet, 02/16, “5 Answered Questions about Federal Transportation Infrastructure Investment,” http://www.freeenterprise.com/infrastructure/5-answered-questions-about-federal-transportation-infrastructure-investment)

Some members of Congress want to eliminate federal transportation programs altogether and leave the responsibility to states. Is that a good idea? Absolutely not. States need a strong federal partner to ensure that interstate commerce, international trade policies, interstate passenger travel, emergency preparedness, national defense, and global competitiveness are adequately supported by the nation’s infrastructure. Without federal support for an interconnected transportation system, several large, less-populated rural states would be unable to afford the costs of sustaining their roads and bridges. Many of our nation’s conservative visionaries, including Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Dwight Eisenhower, and Ronald Reagan, understood the proper role of the federal government in meeting these needs, as Pete Ruane, president of the American Road and Transportation Builders Association, notes in today’s Washington Times. Even today, some of the most vocal opponents of federal spending recognize the importance of transportation investment. Rep. Paul Ryan points out in A Roadmap for America’s Future that transportation is a core government responsibility: “Governments must provide for a limited set of public goods: they must build roads and other infrastructure, foster the protection of property rights, and maintain internal and external security… this ‘core’ government spending tends to foster economic growth.

A2 Federalism



Non-unique – highway funding has already locked in federalist inequities


Roth ‘10 (Federal Highway Funding “Federal Intervention Increases Highway Costs” June 2010 by Gabriel Roth, civil engineer and transportation economist at the Independent Institute http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/highway-funding)
Some states persistently receive more federal highway funding than they pay into the federal Highway Trust Fund. The Federal Highway Administration publishes Highway Statistics each year, showing the amounts the fund receives from each state and the allocation paid to each state from the fund. Supporters of federal highway financing use these figures to demonstrate how supposedly beneficial the current system is to all states. 

However, the receipts-and-allocations data presented in Highway Statistics are misleading. The FHWA divides the dollar amounts of the apportionments and allocations for each state by the amount of revenue paid into the fund by each state. A better way of showing the inequities between the states is to compare each state's share of money taken out of the highway trust fund as a ratio of the share it paid in. If a state's receipts were 3 percent of the whole, and its contribution 2 percent, the share ratio would be 1.5. I have presented such calculations elsewhere and found that there are substantial winner and loser states from the Highway Trust Fund.

Similarly, a recent analysis by Ronald Utt found that half of the states are shortchanged by the current highway trust fund allocations. The Congressional Research Service notes that struggles over recent highway bills have focused on these interstate inequities (rather than on ways to make federal expenditures more productive), with the donor states tending to be in the South and Midwest and the donee states tending to be in the Northeast, Pacific Rim, and West.

Finally, note that these analyses do not take into account the increased costs in every state from federal regulations and administrative costs. If these were taken into account, road users in very few states would derive any net benefits from federal highway financing.


Perm solves federalism




Cooperative Federalism is being solved by HR 2018 in the Transportation Committee


Mica 11 (John Mica, Florida Congressman, Chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives, http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/singlepages.aspx/1287)
The Transportation Committee is working to achieve a common sense, balanced approach to federal regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), rather than heavy-handed federal regulatory overreach that stifles economic growth and ignores the proper rulemaking process. H.R. 2018, the "Clean Water Cooperative Federalism Act of 2011," is bipartisan legislation to amend the Clean Water Act (CWA) to restore the long-standing balance between federal and state partners in regulating the nation's waters, and preserve the system of cooperative federalism established under the CWA in which the primary responsibilities for water pollution control are allocated to the states. The bill was introduced by Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman John Mica (R-FL), the Committee's Ranking Member Nick Rahall (D-WV), Water Resources and Environment Subcommittee Chairman Bob Gibbs (R-OH), and others, and the bill passed the House on July 13, 2011.

The attitude of practicality makes infrastructure cooperation feasible


Katz 12 (Bruce Katz, Vice President and Director of Metropolitan Policy Program, “Remaking Federalism to Remake the American Economy”, February 16, 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/02/16-federalism-katz, PS)
While Washington dithers and delays, metros and their states are embracing the next-economy model and innovating in ways that build on their distinctive competitive assets and advantages: With federal innovation funding at risk, metros like New York and states like Ohio and Tennessee are making sizable commitments to attract innovative research institutions, commercialize research and grow innovative firms. With the future of federal trade policy unclear, metros like Los Angeles and Minneapolis/St. Paul and states like Colorado and New York are reorienting their economic development strategies toward exports, foreign direct investment and skilled immigration. With federal energy policy in shambles, metros like Seattle and Philadelphia are cementing their niches in energy-efficient technologies, and states like Connecticut are experimenting with Green Banks to help deploy clean technologies at scale. With federal transportation policy in limbo, metros like Jacksonville and Savannah and states like Michigan are modernizing their air, rail and sea freight hubs to position themselves for an expansion in global trade. What unites these disparate efforts are intentionality and purpose. After decades of pursuing fanciful illusions (becoming “the next Silicon Valley”) or engaging in copycat strategies, states and metros are deliberately building on their special assets, attributes and advantages, using business planning techniques honed in the private sector. The bubbling of state and metro innovation is pervasive and viral—crossing political, regional, jurisdictional and sectoral lines. It offers an affirmative and practical counterpoint to a Washington that has increasingly become hyper-partisan and overly ideological and gives the next President an opportunity to engage states and metropolitan areas as true, working partners in the quest to restructure the economy.

Cooperative federalism can be very effective due to redundancies


Snyder and Binder 09 (Jared Snyder, Assistant Commissioner for Air Resources, Climate Change and Energy in Department of Environmental Conservation, Jonathan Binder, Managing Director, Chief Investment Officer of Consilium Investment Management, “The changing climate of cooperative federalism: the dynamic role of the states in a national strategy to combat climate change.”, 2009, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+changing+climate+of+cooperative+federalism%3A+the+dynamic+role+of...-a0207323880, PS)
State programs that reduce the demand for carbon-containing energy through measures such as state efficiency programs and standards, improved land use and transportation planning, renewables deployment and cap-and-trade (35) will reduce the cost of federal allowances by lowering the demand for such allowances. (36) Reduced federal allowance prices will result in reduced consumer price impacts and reduced costs for other covered entities outside of the state. Because costs of compliance and consumer price impacts are both significant political variables in policy design, these effects could create the political opportunity for the federal government to further ratchet down the federal cap over time. In other words, aggressive state action, even if it is more expensive for the state, can lead to additional benefits by facilitating more stringent federal action. Certain redundancies that result from an overlapping cooperative federalism approach are actually desirable. Many federal laws contain some form of redundancy in authority among the different levels of government. Although such redundancy may not be perfectly efficient, it is sometimes more effective than a less redundant approach. (37) Other approaches--including those that are more purely federal, exclusively state-controlled or more precisely divided between the two levels--have certain benefits, but also notable flaws. A cooperative and sometimes redundant approach still realizes these benefits--including a reduced overall cost of a given level of national GHG emission reductions--while also avoiding most of the costs. (38)

If states don’t cooperate, the agency is more effective


Bulman-Pozen and Gerken 09 (Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Yale Law School, Heather Gerken, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law at Yale Law School, “Uncooperative Federalism”, 1-1-2009, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1344&context=fss_papers, PS)
Perhaps the strongest reason to value the power of the servant is that it ensures that state contestation occurs in the vast regulatory swaths where states are not autonomous policymakers but instead carry out federal law. Call it the “administrative safeguards of federalism.”103 Joint regulation embeds within the Fourth Branch a set of bureaucrats who are at least partially beholden to the states. These would-be dissenters wield influence over their federal bosses because the federal government depends on them to carry out its programs, and ties between federal and state officials develop over time. State bureaucrats are not the only ones who support these administrative safeguards—the state legislators and executives who consider how to respond to federal mandates are also important. Because states respond to federal policy through varied channels, including their own laws and executive orders, the integration of state and federal regulation introduces politicians as well as bureaucrats into the realm of administration.104 The bureaucrats who shaped Wisconsin’s welfare policy and determined California’s Clean Air Act emissions standards were engaged in dissent, but so too were Governor Thompson and the California legislature. Some acts of rebellion sound largely in politics, as with state challenges to the Patriot Act. Others take a far more technocratic form, as with state resistance to the inspection and monitoring mandates of the Clean Air Act. Uncooperative federalism does not just complement the autonomy model of state contestation in terms of coverage. It also reveals an additional set of leverage points that state officials can use to push their agenda. Federal dependence on state administrators should matter not only when state and federal officials are bargaining over how to fill in the gaps of statutory mandates, but also when federal policy is made in the first place.105 After all, bureaucrats are a critical part of the policymaking process. Administrators often help set policy at the statutory level through their interaction with members of the executive and legislative branches. Because federal bureaucrats depend on state actors, uncooperative federalism ensures that state interests are pursued through not only political channels, but also administrative ones. Uncooperative federalism, in short, ensures that the political safeguards of federalism are buttressed by the administrative safeguards of federalism.

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