The [first/next] off-case position is the india da: First, us-india relations are high and driven by mutual distrust towards China

Relations aren’t zero sum- no effect on Indo-US or Indo-Sino relations

Although the first three requirements of a strategic triangle are met, we cannot say that, between China, India, and the US, each bilateral relationship has significant effects on the third party. The China - India - US relationship is not like the China - Sovie t - US strategic triangle formed during the Cold War , because, at that time, both the Sino - Soviet and Soviet - American bilateral relationships were actually in situations of cold or hot military confrontation. A change in any one of the bilateral relationship s would have had a material influence on the national security or national economic interest of the third party. The China - India - US triangle is, however, no copy of the China - Soviet - US strategic triangle. The reason is that each of the bilateral relations hips has only weak implications for the third party. For a long time, the core issue between China and the United States has been the Taiwan issue, but India has no interest in Taiwan. Now, though, with more and more global issues intruding on the bilatera l relations of China and the United States, some of India’s national interests have also become involved. As for China - India relations, the most important aspects are the border problem, Sino - Pakistani relations and the Dalai Lama issue ; but these issues only have indirect connections with the United States. In Indo - US relations, the focuses are nuclear co - operation and anti - terrorism. T he India - US nuclear agreement drew some attention from China , because India claimed that it tested nuclear weapons to pr otect itself from the so - called China threat in 1998 . T he India - US nuclear agreement , however, is only a small part of the interest taken by China in Indo - US relations. If there is any significant connection among the three countries, it is that both China and India take their relationship with the United States as the most important in their external affairs. But it is obvious that there is no evident linkage mechanism a mong the three bilateral relationships. Thus, we can say that the relationship between China, India and the United States has some characteristics of a strategic triangle, but is, in essence, more a trilateral relationship.

US-China coop operates independently of US India Coop

Raghuvanshi 16—Vivek Raghuvanshi, India Bureau Chief at Defense News, 2016. (“Skepticism Persists in Strengthened US-India Ties,” Defense News, June 11^th, Available Online at http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense-news/2016/06/11/skepticism-persists-strengthened-us-india-ties/85644480/, Accessed 07-20-2016, aqp)

"The US administration is really pulling out all stops to make India a part of major world groupings, such as the NSG, and this exemplifies the personal investment made by both heads of state in strengthening the bilateral relationship. With India's imminent inclusion in the MTCR fold, several US technologies and platforms could be made available and India will have to decide on them sooner rather than later," Ankur Gupta, defense analyst with E&Y India.

The warming up of ties with US under the Modi regime is likely to evoke concern from Moscow, one of the traditional and main suppliers of weapons and equipment to India

"Moscow has conveyed Russian apprehensions in no uncertain manner to the Ministry of External Affairs and the government of India," says Karnad.

However, Chwshish says, "There is no question why Russia should be miffed at the warm welcome accorded to Prime Minister Modi in the US.” India's relations with the US “are independent of our relations with Russia, just as US's relations with China are independent of our relations with China," he added.

Relations aren’t zero sum

Jha and Xijin 15 (“Relations between India, US and China not a zero sum game,” Prashant Jha is an Associate Editor for the Hindustan Times, Hu Xijin is the editor-in-chief of the Communist Party-run mouthpiece, Global Times, in Beijing, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/relations-between-india-us-and-china-not-a-zero-sum-game-global-times-editor-in-chief/story-w350aFxSxSWfsQD7px5A3H.html) aj

President Obama visited India recently and Delhi and Washington signed up to a joint vision for Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean region. How do you see this, especially in the backdrop of the Chinese foreign ministry reacting to the vision? Do you think Beijing’s rise was an underlying motivation in India and US signing this?

It is imperative that India and US will step up their cooperation with each other. This is bound to happen. China is not perturbed. I can’t say it has had no influence on China, but I can say for sure that it has not had a big influence on China. This is because China and US have good relations too. Obama visited China two months ago. Xi visited India. Modi will pay a visit to China. It is not that if your ties with America are good, China’s ties with US are bad. In the current world situation, all countries have good relations with each other. This is not a zero-sum game. We have self confidence and we know we can deal with the situation very well. I have never thought that when I would visit India, so many people would ask me about Obama. It is a genuine question, but I am surprised that everyone is asking me this. In China, we paid attention to the Obama visit but we really did not pay as much attention as some Indians thought.

In the paper you edit, there was an article that warned India against falling into the western trap. What is this trap? Is there a view in China that such ties between Delhi and Washington will endanger regional stability?

As I said, there was some influence of the visit but not very big. The West really wants that China and India have a big competition, competition which is more than normal. We always read such articles which come in the western media about the rivalry between dragon and the elephant. But the competition between us is not as critical as some want and seek.

China has developed and is developing by itself; India is developing by itself. We did not disturb each other. Today, China’s power is much bigger than India. We don’t view a threat from India. We consider India as a partner. Your task and our task are common. We want to develop, our people want a good life; you have a similar task. We have no reason to hit each other. The border problem is historic but we should not fight each other because of this historic problem. I don’t think and I don’t believe India wants to fight with China. I can tell you China and its people do not want to fight with India.

India-China relations not zero-sum

Maini 3/13 — Tridivesh Maini, New Delhi based Policy Analyst, senior research associate with The Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonepat, Haryana, former IPRYLI Fellow, former Public Policy Scholar with The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, 2016 (“What the US Gets Wrong about India’s Relationship with China,” The Diplomat, March 13, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/what-the-us-gets-wrong-about-indias-relationship-with-china/, Accessed 07/22/16, JZ)

Neither India nor the United States should look at Sino-Indian relations as a zero-sum game. Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao wisely stated that the world is big enough for both India and China to grow. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has emphasized that India and China will need to work jointly in the 21st century. China and India both understand the need for connectivity. In this context, both countries seem to have made some progress on the Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor, an important component of China’s One Belt, One Road project. A number of U.S. analysts told me that India should focus on the BCIM Corridor instead of worrying over China’s investment in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Efforts are also being made to increase connectivity between both countries by increasing the number of flights.

Empirically relations aren’t zero-sum – even if they are it’s inev

Jaishankar 16 (Dhruva Jaishankar is a Fellow for Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution India Center in New Delhi, “Deepening Security Ties With the US a Sign of India’s Growing Confidence,” http://thewire.in/27721/deepening-security-ties-with-the-us-a-sign-of-indias-growing-confidence/) aj

A second line of criticism is that India is deepening cooperation with the US – and against China – at Washington’s behest and not in accordance with Indian interests. “The US is making no secret of the fact that it wants to position India in its plans for China,” Mehta writes. “But it is not in India’s interests to become a frontline state in that emerging faultline.”

There are several problems with this line of reasoning. One is that a privileged relationship with Washington in no way thwarts cooperation with Beijing. In fact, over the past twenty years, as Indo-US defence relations have strengthened, India has also deepened military contacts with China, as part of important confidence building measures. More recently, India has also joined a number of Chinese-led multilateral initiatives, from the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Additionally, the Indian government has increasingly sought investment from China, widening the bilateral economic relationship. There is no reason to believe that the foundational agreements with the US, which even the likes of Singapore and Sri Lanka have signed, narrow India’s options with China. Quite the opposite.

Besides, India may not want to be a “frontline state” against China, but it already is one, not because of Washington’s exhortations, but because of Beijing’s intentions and actions. These include China’s building up of defence infrastructure on its border with India, its occasional attempts at altering the territorial status quo, its military support – including its history of providing nuclear and missile technology – to Pakistan and its growing military reach in India’s neighbourhood. In fact, the situation is rather reminiscent of India’s position in the evolving international system of the late 1960s and early 1970s. At the time, it was not India’s desire to create a rift with Washington, but the US’ instrumental relationships with Pakistan and China that necessitated the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. Today, China’s opacity, military modernisation and strategic intent mean that India must reconsider its security posture rather than persevere with much-vaunted but illusory notions of great power neutrality.

Relations don't spillover and are based on self-interest

Blackwill et al 15 — Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy, David Rockefeller Studies Program, Council on Foreign Relations; Former U.S. Ambassador to India (2001-2003), Alyssa Ayres, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, U.S. Department of State (2010-2013), Stephen P. Cohen, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution; Former Member, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State, and John D. Negroponte Vice Chairman, McLarty Associates; Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State (2007-2009), 2015 (“What to Do About U.S.-India Relations,” CFR, February 4, Available Online at http://www.cfr.org/india/do-us-india-relations/p36084, Accessed 07-20-2016, PAM)

NEGROPONTE: Yeah. We have just a few more minutes of discussion between us and then we turn it over—open it up for questions. But I wanted to ask about the relationship with China. India's—I mean this is a big relationship for important—they've got unresolved border disputes. They fought a war in 1962. So where does that stand at the moment and to what extent is their concern about China a feature in their relationship with us? BLACKWILL: They are concerned about China, but I would put it in this context—I think Modi foreign policy is carefully, carefully formulated and implemented with—as Alyssa said earlier—the prime preoccupation in every foreign relationship of how that relationship can contribute to Indian domestic economic growth. That's number one on Modi's list. That's number five on Modi's list. That's number ten on Modi's list. And it applies to China as much as it does to the United States. So the way I think about it is that these bilateral relationships are like stovepipes and—and Modi is trying to strengthen each of those stovepipes, each of those bilateral relationships to contribute to Indian economic growth, and therefore, he will avoid as much as he can, having U.S.-China differences infect China's relationship with either the United States— sorry, India's relationship—with either the United States or China. He will try to have good relations with both Iran and with the United States, not letting the differences between the United States and Iran contaminate India's relationship with them and the same with Russia and—and so forth. I close with this, for those who are enamored with the importance of the invitation of the president to go to the Republic Day ceremony, I wonder if you would think this represents a tilt if next year's guest at the ceremony is Xi Jinping? Because that would not be surprising at all given, as I say, Modi's preoccupation with keeping China's economic incentives to contribute to Indian domestic growth, unaffected by their concern, their long term strategic concern, about the rise of Chinese power. One last point, I want to reaffirm something that Steve said. It sounds like that state department communique.

No Tradeoff to US-Sino & US-Indo Relations

Ryan 15 — John Ryan quoting Shivshankar Menon, Shivshankar Menon is an Indian diplomat, who served as National Security Adviser to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. He had previously served as the Foreign Secretary, the top diplomat in India. Prior to that he was Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, and Sri Lanka and ambassador to China and Israel. John Ryan completed his Master’s in Asian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, concentrating on Chinese foreign policy, Indian foreign policy, and US foreign policy in Asia. John was a a Research Analyst at CENTRA Technology, Inc., in Political and Security Affairs at The National Bureau of Asian Research, and a Research Intern at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi. June 26, 2015, China and Indo-U.S. Relations: An Emerging Triangle? An Interview with Shivshankar Menon, http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=582 @yangtri 7/19/16

India and the United States have increasingly similar conceptions of Asian security: both want cooperation with China in building a network of relationships with the other significant powers in East and Southeast Asia, while neither wants China to emerge as the dominant regional power. While this strategic convergence will continue, India does not fit simply into U.S. Asia policy, given India’s policy of “strategic autonomy.” How can policymakers promote a closer U.S.-India relationship without triggering either Chinese concerns about containment or Indian concerns about entrapment? In this Q&A, Shivshankar Menon (Brookings Institution) argues that despite increasing convergence between the United States and India on China, a strategic triangle has not yet emerged. He maintains that China is not a key driver of Indian engagement with the United States and that the deepening Indo-U.S. relationship has not caused a Chinese response. Ambassador Menon discusses options for strengthening bilateral Indo-U.S. cooperation and initiating new trilateral dialogues. Although China is not the primary issue in the India-U.S. relationship, there is a growing strategic convergence between the United States and India on this subject. John Garver of Georgia Tech, for instance, identified a weak U.S.-China-India triangle emerging (as opposed to the strong strategic triangle of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States in the Cold War). Do you agree? Is India in a period of strategic vulnerability vis-à-vis China? How can India engage China while hedging against its rise? I am not really sure you can think of the relationship between India, the United States, and China as a triangle, weak or otherwise, for several reasons. First, there is an evident asymmetry in the relationships and relative power between the three. Second, both China and India are more comfortable talking to the United States. India is not a major issue in China-U.S. relations, and I do not think China is a key driver of India-U.S. relations, although it is an issue discussed bilaterally. While security is a subjective concept without an absolute metric, I do not see the next ten years as a period of strategic vulnerability for India; in fact, I believe Indian vulnerability has reduced over time in every respect. From the Indian point of view, India-U.S. relations primarily are about bilateral actions and the ways this relationship assists in the transformation of India. Nonetheless, there is no question that there is increasing strategic congruence—India and the United States share fundamental values, including the desire for an open and inclusive security order in Asia. All that is true, but I do not see a U.S.-India-China triangle yet.

India Likes China

India actually wants to unite with China – key to developments including climate change interests

Liu 12 — Dr. Zongyi Liu, FDI associate, 2012 (“The China-India-US Relationship: Where Will It Go?” FDI, http://futuredirections.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/FDI_Associate_Paper_-_17_April_2012.pdf, April 17th, accessed 7/15/16) WP

For India’s military, the growth of China’s military power causes big headaches; although the main aim of China’s military build-up is not India. It is obvious that the 1962 border conflict left India with nightmares. Also, by emphasising an immediate threat from China, India’s army, navy and air force can get enough money from the parliament. India’s jealousy and fear of China is exaggerated by its mass media. To boost ratings, the media frequently reports “military invasions” by the Chinese Army and economic or political competition between China and India. Also, the Indian Government sometimes feels it necessary to demonstrate to the United States its usefulness as a counter to China, all of which makes ordinary people think that the relationship between China and India is very strained. In fact, India understands well that, instead of taking sides, it is better to be a swing state in the global balance of power, particularly in the China-India-US equation. Several factors help India make such a choice: first, India could take a free position in the grand game between China and the United States, if that game were to take place someday, and India could gain benefits from both sides. Second, India has a tradition of nonalignment. Third, India has some bad memories from its own past experiences of co-operation with the United States, and is afraid of being fooled. Last, and maybe most importantly, India and China have a very large common interest; that is, both countries need a peaceful and stable periphery to allow them to peacefully emerge as world powers and develop smoothly. China and India also have a lot of common interests, for example: in the multi-polarisation of the international structure; reform of the international financial system; and climate change. Their co-operation in these fields may not be welcomed by the United States.

India-US relations are declining now while India is seeking peace with China – you authors are simply reflective of US attempts to create conflict between India and China.

Wang 16 — Wang, Dehua, writer at Global Times, 2016 (“India unwilling to advance US ambitions,” Global Times, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/971075.shtml, February 29th, accessed 7/21/16) WP

India's Ministry of External Affairs dismissed the claims in early February that New Delhi was in talks with Washington to conduct joint naval patrols in the South China Sea. India's refusal is not surprising, as joint patrols will not conform to its national interest. The New Delhi government pursues pragmatic diplomacy and strives to reach a balance between the US and China. Some interpret New Delhi's refusal as retaliation against Washington's approval of weapon sales to Islamabad last year. This may be true. Yet, the fundamental reason is that New Delhi understands the significance of a sound China-India relationship to the nation's development. India cannot afford to lose China's support, which serves as an economic engine for the nation's growth. In addition, New Delhi has officially taken over the presidency of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) from Moscow last month and will host the eighth summit in a few months' time. A friendly atmosphere is significant for the upcoming summit. Under this situation, conducting South China Sea patrols in an attempt to court the US is inappropriate. By refusing the US proposal, India is taking a stand and showing goodwill to China. In fact, the likelihood for India to station its naval forces in the South China Sea remains quite low. Yet it may strengthen its military presence in the Indian Ocean. For instance, there is Indian Navy's ambitious Project Seabird, which pursues the construction of facilities to berth the nation's aircraft carriers. In addition, it may also cooperate with Vietnam by selling equipment to Hanoi, conducting military drills, regularly visiting Hanoi's ports, inspecting ships and so forth. Maintaining a close military bond with Vietnam conforms to India's Act East strategy. New Delhi is wise to say no to Washington. The White House is just maneuvering India for its own interests, and will not stop supporting Pakistan as a repay to India. The US administration is following a "divide and rule" policy. Wary of India's rise, it is attempting to instigate conflicts between New Delhi and Islamabad by approving the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. From US perspective, China, Russia and India are all threatening its status as a superpower. The US does not want to see a stronger India. Meanwhile, India and the US share disparities on a number of issues such as climate change. While Washington calls for a cap on New Delhi's carbon emissions, the Modi government, aspiring for economic growth, wants developed countries to provide more carbon space to developing nations. Strengthening its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is the ultimate purpose for the US to propose US-India joint naval patrols. Washington believes that Beijing, which has already broken through the first island chain, is challenging its maritime hegemony. Thus the US, attempting to strangle China's development, is hyping South China Sea disputes. Freedom of navigation is never an issue in the region. The White House is just finding excuses to enter the waters and even attempting to station its forces in Philippine naval bases. Apart from drawing countries outside the region, such as India, Japan, South Korea and Australia, the US is also inciting South China Sea claimants to stir up trouble in the region. Over time, these countries will realize that it is the US, rather than China, that is militarizing the South China Sea and destroying the peaceful and stable environment there. Facing Washington's provocations, it is wise for Beijing to remain calm. China can warn and even expel the US warships if necessary. Beijing has maintained friendly ties with ASEAN countries and nations outside the region. They have no desire to pick sides between Washington and Beijing. Expecting to cooperate with China for economic benefits, these nations have no intention to offend China. The US will eventually suffer the consequences of its provocations.

No Link — India wants peaceful economic relations with China.

Joshi et al 13 — Sunjoy Joshi, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors, Ph.D., writers at Heritage, 2016 (“Beyond the Plateau in U.S. – India Relations,” Heritage, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-us-india-relations, accessed 7/15/16) WP

While U.S. policymakers may have initially assumed that shared concerns about China would pave the way for more robust U.S.–India military engagement, Indian officials appear to be formulating a more complicated response to deal with the uncertainties surrounding a rising China. Indian officials calculate that it is in their interest to expand defense ties in certain ways that meet their interests and under specific circumstances; however, they will not be receptive to every U.S. overture in the cause of presumed common geopolitical interests. In an effort to minimize the chances of provoking Beijing or disrupting India's close defense ties with Moscow, New Delhi will move cautiously in deepening defense ties with the U.S. American officials must temper their expectations of India accordingly. India is pursuing a robust diplomatic strategy vis-à-vis China, emphasizing peaceful resolution of its border disputes and growing trade and economic ties, and at the same time embarking on an ambitious military modernization campaign and deployments with clear implications for its rivalry with Beijing. India has watched Chinese behavior in the Western Pacific over the past several years with wariness. There have been a number of incidents in which Chinese naval or paramilitary vessels and aircraft have challenged or harassed American, Japanese, Vietnamese, and Philippine vessels in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea far beyond China's territorial limits. The U.S. Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, told a Senate committee in January 2012 that “we judge that India is increasingly concerned about China's posture along their disputed border and Beijing's perceived aggressive posture in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region.”[10] Indian officials also have concerns about Chinese efforts to strengthen its military infrastructure in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) over the past decade and more. The Chinese have also stepped up the level and complexity of their military exercises and extended rail and road networks and constructed airfields in the region—steps that could potentially facilitate Chinese military operations against India in Arunachal Pradesh if a border conflict were to erupt. To meet these challenges, India is steadily building up its naval capabilities, paying particular attention to enhancing the Eastern Naval Command's role in India's overall naval strategy. India is currently constructing two aircraft carriers and a second nuclear submarine, which will be commissioned within the next decade. The U.S. should help to build India's capacity to monitor and protect maritime routes in the Indian Ocean and beyond. There are signs that India is growing more comfortable with the idea of a U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean region, which could facilitate greater U.S.–India operational cooperation.[11] India has also set ambitious plans to modernize and strengthen its air force. The Indian Air Force plans to procure more than 800 fighter jets in the next two decades. It is raising four more squadrons of SU-30 MKI fighters, two for the eastern sector and two for the western part of the country. While India relies mainly on the Russians, Europeans, and Israelis for its fighter aircraft needs, New Delhi and Washington should discuss in greater depth India's air fighter needs and whether the U.S. has a role to play in facilitating India's strategic objectives. The U.S. is working with India to meet India's other aircraft needs, including completing contracts for the sale of C-17 and C-130 transport aircraft and P-81 maritime reconnaissance aircraft. India also intends to purchase Boeing Apache attack helicopters for $1.2 billion as well as Chinook heavy-lift helicopters. Like the Bush Administration before it, the Obama Administration posits the convergence of U.S. and Indian strategic interests. Yet Indian leaders' aversion to close military partnerships and continued suspicions of the U.S.—especially within India's political left—will limit the pace and scope of the burgeoning U.S.–India defense relationship. For this reason, the defense partnership between the two countries may not follow a traditional path and may contain more hurdles than U.S. policymakers originally envisioned; however, their mutual security interests, the unpredictable implications of China's rise, and the desirability of American-made weaponry makes growing defense cooperation likely.

Link Turn

Turn---fear of China causes countries to strengthen relations with the U.S.

Sears 16---Nathan, Professor of International Relations at the Universidad de Las Américas, Quito-Ecuador. His research focuses mainly on strategic studies, international security, and international relations theory, April 27, 2016, (“China, Russia, and the Long ‘Unipolar Moment”, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/china-russia-and-the-unipolar-moment/, Accessed 7/25/16, Schloss)

However, instead of undermining U.S. influence and forcing states to “bandwagon” with China, Chinese revisionism is actually strengthening the U.S. alliance system in East Asia. The United States is in the process of upgrading its strategic cooperation with several of its longstanding allies, such as Japan, the Philippines, and Australia. The Obama Administration’s “Pivot to Asia” policy has sought to reassure U.S. allies of its enduring political commitment and military presence in the region. Recent evidence of the Pivot includes a number of port visits by the U.S. navy to its allies (e.g. Manila in March 2016), some high profile arms sales (e.g. the $1.8 billion arms deal with Taiwan in December 2015), and even new force deployments to the region (e.g. the plans to deploy long-range bombers in Australia and to gain access to five military bases in Philippines). Second, the United States is developing new strategic partnerships in East Asia, which could become full-fledged U.S. allies in the future. Anxiety about China’s rise is leading a number of ASEAN member states—such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia—to increasingly look toward the United States for security. Together, Singapore and Malaysia represent a geostrategic pivot for exercising control over the Straits of Malacca and thus their entrance into the U.S. alliance system would represent a major constraint on Chinese power. Perhaps the most surprising of the United States’ new security relationships is with Vietnam. In a manner consistent with the realpolitik maxim that in international politics “there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests,” the diplomatic rapprochement and security dialogues between the United States and Vietnam demonstrates the extent to which Chinese revisionism is pushing China’s neighbors toward the United States. Yet the most important strategic development is the trilateral relationship that is gaining steam between India, Japan, and the United States. A trilateral alliance between India, Japan, and the United States would be for China what the “Grand Alliance” was for Nazi Germany—the containment of China would become, in the words of Winston Churchill, “merely the proper application of overwhelming force.” The U.S.-India relationship has grown in recent years, with the United States’ de facto recognition of India as a legitimate nuclear power and the agreement on a new U.S.-India Defense Framework. The India-Japan relationship has also grown, with defense ministers agreeing to expand strategic cooperation in 2014. Yet the clearest symbol to China of the potential for a trilateral alliance is no doubt the Malabar naval exercises between India, Japan, and the United States. In 2015, Japan became a permanent member of the annual naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal, which had previously been a bilateral exercise between the U.S. and Indian navies. The Malabar naval exercise was an overt attempt to blunt China’s growing naval capabilities and its presence in the Indian Ocean. Of course, the movement toward a formal trilateral alliance will depend on the extent of the perceived threat from Chinese revisionism.

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