The nuclear weapons of the united states navy 1945 – 2013 Don G. Boyer Haleiwa, Hawaii March 2013
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- The Bureau of Ordnance Atomic Rocket (BOAR)
- Regulus I (SSM-N-8, changed in 1963 to RIM-6) (and the Regulus II)
- Talos Missile (SAM-N-6, later RIM-8)
- Terrier Missile (Terrier BTN, later RIM 2D)
- Tomahawk Cruise Missile (BGM-109)
- Part 9: Ballistic Missiles
| Part 8: Rockets and Missiles
This section covers the nuclear-capable rockets and missiles developed by the United States navy. While the early development of nuclear weapons following the end of WWII focused on air-dropped bombs, all the US military services were also planning to marry nuclear weapons with missiles as fast as technology would allow. The development of the V-1 and V-2 by Germany late in WWII had laid the groundwork for what would become the missile programs of both the Soviet Union and the United States as soon as the end of the war allowed both nations to get their hands on the German missile technology and the scientists and engineers that went with it. It was probably fortunate that the United States seems to have acquired the best of the scientists and tecnicians, due primarily to the intense dislike these individuals had for being absorbed into the Soviet system. While the V-1 "buzz bomb" created havoc and killed many people (almost all civilians, of course), it was more of a pilotless bomb than a smart missile, and because of its relatively low speed, low altitude and poor accuracy could be dealt with (barely) by the weapons available to the Allies at the time – fast aircraft and radar-controlled antiaircraft weapons. The V-2, however, was the weapon that scared the epaulettes off the military and the pants off the diplomats. Once launched, it was undetectable and unstoppable, a true "terror" weapon in that respect. Although it also had very poor accuracy, anyone with an engineering degree and a slide rule could figure out that it would not be hard to greatly improve the V-2's accuracy with minimal effort, to say nothing of increasing the range and payload. Ignoring the Soviet efforts here, the US immediately began work to develop both the V-1 and V-2 into "Americanized" weapons following the close of the war. Although the nuclear bombs of this period were large and heavy, the continuing design work at Los Alamos had already made it clear that with more engineering and scientific development, weapon sizes would be greatly reduced within a few years, and could then be easily carried by a good rocket or missile to long ranges. The US navy first developed a version of the V-1 called "Loon" (LTV-N-1) and modified two Balao class submarines to carry this slightly more advanced version of the missile (with a pulse jet built by the Ford Motor Company and better guidance). Tests with the modified USS Cusk and Carbonero, that carried the Loon in a water-proof cylinder mounted behind the bridge, proofed the weapon and also made it obvious that it wouldn't be a prime candidate for a nuclear warhead, although basic design work on a nuclear warhead for this missile was begun at Los Alamos and then cancelled. Range, accuracy and speed were all problems with this weapon, in addition to simple reliability issues. The navy was also not enamored with carrying liquid fuels of any kind for missiles on board submarines for obvious reasons, although in the case of the Loon the fuel was not any different than the normal aircraft fuel carried aboard aircraft carriers. Probably the biggest drawback to the submarine-launched missile concept at the time was the fact that the submarine had to surface for the time-consuming process of breaking out the missile, loading it on its launch rails and then firing it – putting the launching submarine at great risk of detection by removing its greatest asset – stealth. The Loon was a short-lived program, being replaced by the two versions of the Regulus missile which is where the US navy's real nuclear missile program began. (The US navy tested a V-2 missile launch from the flight deck of the USS Coral Sea around this time as well, a one-time shot to prove it could be done, with no program behind it to make it a deployed weapon on any ship, and no nuclear warhead design for it in the pipeline, again due primarily to the liquid fuel problem and the enormous logistical requirements and time-intensive preparation of the missile for launch. It is also obvious that a liquid-fueled missile of that size stored aboard a carrier would represent a huge danger to the ship, nuclear warhead or not.) Before the guided missiles came along in their first versions however, the navy did develop a tactical atomic rocket for launch by aircraft, and this section begins with that weapon. The Bureau of Ordnance Atomic Rocket (BOAR) The BOAR grew out of the expansion of American nuclear weapons into the "tactical" role following the Soviet's first nuclear test in 1949 – the Soviet test, enormously aided by espionage, had come much earlier than US intelligence sources had predicted, which put the American weapons development programs into high gear. While the US navy had methods of strategic strike with nuclear bombs, including a "penetration" weapon, they did not yet have a good method of delivering a tactical nuclear device (relatively low-yield) against ships at sea, since high-altitude bombing was probably out of the question due to the rapid development of fire control and fighter-direction radars; low level bombing at that time would not allow for the escape of the delivery aircraft, which is hard on pilot morale and airplanes to say the least. The navy's solution revolved around advanced versions of the WWII "Bat" radio-controlled glide bomb (itself a spin-off of the German weapons of the same kind) which had taken a heavy toll on Japanese vessels at the end of the war while allowing the attacking aircraft to remain out of range of the air defense systems of the day. The Bat was similar in tactics and effect to the kamikaze, minus the idiocy of killing one of your own simply to hit a target. Combining this "stand-off" capability with a nuclear warhead provided the early solution to the problem of attacking fleets at sea with minimum warning and a higher degree of safety for the launching aircraft. In 1952 the navy's Bureau of Ordnance tasked the Naval Weapons Test Center at China Lake, California with developing the "30.5 inch Rocket, MK-1" which became known as the BOAR. (The weapon also was developed with a conventional warhead and was known as the "Bombardment Aircraft Rocket," – also "BOAR" in this configuration – thus the common confusion surrounding the acronym.) This weapon lacked the radio guidance of the Bat, but this type of guidance, necessary to put a small explosive package onto a small moving target, was not needed for a nuclear warhead aimed at a fleet of ships. Designed for delivery using the low-altitude lofting technique that later became known as LABS, the development of the BOAR was relatively quick, with field testing in 1953, production beginning in 1955 and the first units in the fleet in early 1956. The BOAR was equipped with the MK-7 warhead with a yield of 20 kt. Weighing 2000 lbs. all up, the rocket was 15' 3" long and 30.5" in diameter with small 4' 6" stabilizing fins. Using a 15,000 lb thrust double-base solid fuel rocket motor, the sub-sonic (480 mph) weapon had a range of about 7.5 miles from the launch point. Although intended as a short-life interim measure, the BOAR actually remained active in the US fleet until 1963, undergoing several upgrades intended to improve performance, particularly range, during that time. The BOAR had all the disadvantages associated with the MK-7 warhead, including prep time and shelf-life, but was quite adequate for its intended role. Delivery was primarily assigned to the AD (A-1) but it could also be carried by the A-3 and several of the early navy fighters, including the F2H Banshee. The last BOARs were removed from the fleet in 1963. Around 225 nuclear BOARs were built. Regulus I (SSM-N-8, changed in 1963 to RIM-6) (and the Regulus II) Design work on what would become both the navy's first nuclear-capable missile and the first submarine launched missile was initiated in October of 1945 via a contract with the Chance-Vought Aircraft Corporation (makers of the legendary F-8 Crusader fighter). The basic Regulus missile, looking like a small fighter minus a canopy, was first tested in 1948, with an operational missile ordered by the navy in May of 1950. The Regulus was developed from the preceding Loon missile program and was a considerable improvement over that early effort. The navy planned for it to be launched primarily from submarines, although some heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers would eventually also be Regulus-capable. As with the Loon, the launching submarine would have to surface, extract the missile from its hanger, and then prep the missile for launch from short launching rails, a dangerously time-consuming process. And the missile could not be prepped in very foul weather or sea conditions, a definite drawback in its eventual operating areas in the far north Pacific. (It should be noted that the Soviet's similar development, the P-5 Pyatyorka, known as the SS-N-3 Shaddock in NATO terminology, had a much more efficient launch system in which the missile tube also served as the launcher, although the submarine still had to surface to launch the weapon. This also made the missile more amenable to launch in foul weather. This missile served on 69 Soviet conventional and nuclear submarines – Whisky Twin Cylinders, Julietts, Whiskey Long Bins and Echo I and IIs.) The Regulus was originally designed with a conventional 4000 lb high-explosive warhead in mind, but by 1949 the decision had been made to fit a nuclear warhead, and the Regulus only deployed in the nuclear configuration. Live tests of the full missile package, minus nuclear warhead, began in 1957 with a launch from the heavy cruiser Helena (CA-75) with guidance being passed from the Helena to two different submarines enroute to the target. The missile could use several different types of attack routes from treetop level to about 40,000 feet and would then dive onto the target. The Regulus was first equipped with the Mk 5 warhead with yields from 10 to 45 kt. Later the missile was upgraded with the much more powerful Mk 27 thermonuclear warhead with a yield of 2 MT, a yield more appropriate to the intended targets such as Vladivostok. The Regulus 1 became operational in May of 1954 on board the submarine USS Tunny (SSG-282). Four heavy cruisers and eight Essex-class carriers also operated the Regulus, but the regular deterrent patrols with this weapon were all by submarines, two converted Balaos (Tunny and Barbero, SSG-317) two purpose-built Diesel boats (USS Growler and Grayback, SSG-574 and 577) and one nuclear submarine, the USS Halibut (SSGN-587). The Regulus was the navy's first forward-deployed nuclear missile constantly maintained at sea in operational areas; between October of 1959 and July, 1964 one or two submarines with Regulus missiles were usually on patrol in the North Pacific. Apparently, throughout this period the missiles and warheads themselves were forward-deployed to a base on Chichi Jima in the Bonin group of islands south of Japan. Regulus missiles were removed from the Essex class carriers by 1956 with the advent of better tactical bombs and the aircraft to deliver them. The heavy cruisers carried Regulus for a few years longer. 228 nuclear-capable Regulus missiles were produced in all with the last delivered in late 1958. The Regulus was removed from service by July of 1964 and the navy would not have another cruise missile in the inventory until the advent of the Tomahawk in 1982. The Regulus was 34' 3.75" long and 4' 2" in diameter with a wingspan of 21'. Weighing 13,485 lbs. the missile was powered by an Allison J33 turbojet with 4600 lbs of thrust. Launch was aided by two Aerojet 2KS boosters with 16,500 lbs of thrust each. The Regulus had a range of about 575 miles at high subsonic speed. Although there are extensive records of Regulus tests of one kind or another launched from surface ships and submarines, I can find no record of any full-up nuclear test of a Regulus. Since the Regulus was around in the era of massive weapons testing, it is possible, but on the other hand, both Regulus warheads were originally bomb warheads that had been tested, so it may not have been necessary to test a nuclear Regulus. (There is a list of all nuclear tests directly related to various deployed weapons systems in the late Chuck Hansens's "Swords of Armageddon" CD.) The Regulus II missile was an advanced and larger land-attack upgrade of the Regulus I that would have been supersonic (1320 mph – Mach 2) and with increased range and accuracy. Intended to carry the same W-27 2 MT warhead as the Regulus I, the missile would have been carried primarily by submarines as with the Regulus 1. The first Regulus II test flight took place in 1956 with the first submarine launch (from the USS Grayback) in 1958. The missile was intended to be fully operational in 1960, but the Regulus II program was cancelled by the Secretary of the Navy in December of 1958 so the funding could be applied to the much more important Polaris program. Submarines intended to carry the Regulus II retained the Regulus I until that weapon was retired. (The nuclear powered USS Halibut, with its missile bays designed for either Regulus was later converted into the navy's first "bottom feeder" spy vessel with special equipment and a moon pool in the former missile bays for retrieving objects from the sea bottom and scanning the ocean floor for discarded Soviet tidbits such as missile re-entry vehicles. It was the Halibut that located the remains of the Soviet K-129 ballistic missile submarine in the Pacific northwest of Hawaii, initiating the CIA-sponsored effort to recover the submarine under Project Azorian using the purpose built Glomar Explorer.) Even before the cruise missile program that produced the Regulus, the US navy had initiated a large program called "Bumblebee" in late 1944 to develop ramjet-powered missiles suitable for the anti-aircraft role, a direct response to the kamikaze threat. Without going into the long development scenario that began at the Applied Physics Laboratory of John Hopkins University, the program eventually produced the long range ramjet Talos, the solid-fueled medium range Terrier and the short range Tartar missiles, all of which went through many teething troubles before reliable production versions could be carried aboard ship. Both the Talos and Terrier had a nuclear capability and both had a limited ship to surface capability. The other member of the “T” triad, the short-range Tartar, would eventually morph into the current Standard series of missiles used by the navy. Talos Missile (SAM-N-6, later RIM-8) Talos was the second product of the Bumblebee program, but there was a long period of developmental testing of the proposed ramjet engine before a real missile emerged from the program in 1950 with the first tests of a full-up Talos type missile. Intended to be a very long range missile, testing continued from 1950 to 1957 before a missile was developed that had the speed and range the navy required. The Talos entered service with the US navy starting in 1958 and because of its size was only carried on seven cruisers – three Galvestons (Cleveland class light cruiser conversions) three Albanys (Baltimore class heavy cruiser conversions) and the nuclear-powered Long Beach. The Talos missile was 38' long and 28" in diameter with a 9' 2" wingspan and weighed 7800 lbs with its Mk 11 solid propellant booster. Prime propulsion was with a Bendix ramjet which gave the missile a speed of Mach 2.5 and at least a 70 mile range to 80,000', making it capable of intercepting aircraft before they could launch their anti-ship missiles. The Talos guidance system was beam-riding with semi-active terminal radar homing using the AN/SPG-49 target illuminators and tracking radars. The nuclear version carried the W-30 warhead with yields of .5 kt (Y1) and 5 kt (Y2). The warhead was 4' long and 22" in diameter weighing between 438-490 lbs depending on yield. Some 600 W-30s were produced for The Talos as well as for a tactical atomic demolition munition and the Talos nuclear version was available from 1959 to March of 1979 when the last active system was retired on the cruiser Long Beach. The W-30 warhead is reportedly the first to use the “zipper” type of initator, and external nuetron generator that replaced the older polonium/beryllium intiators in use since the Fat Man weapon was developed. The Talos was a highly successful missile with long-range conventional warhead kills recorded during the Vietnam War and also was very successful in a modified version that had an anti-radar capability, reputedly shutting down the North Vietnamese radar system for a considerable period. Talos also had a limited surface to surface capability in the nuclear version. After the Talos system was retired, the remaining missiles went on to serve as high-speed targets under the designation MQM-8G Vandal, used mostly to test the various Standard missiles and the Aegis radar fire control system. Terrier Missile (Terrier BTN, later RIM 2D) The Terrier was the medium range member of the "T" triad of missiles that emerged from the navy's Bumblebee program. Produce in several variants, the nuclear version was designated as the RIM-2D. Terrier missile installations were aboard 3 aircraft carriers (the USS Kitty Hawk and her two sisters, which did not carry the nuclear version) and 38 cruisers during the missiles lifetime. (Two other ships also carried a Terrier installation, the missile/gun test ship USS Mississippi and the destroyer USS Gyatt, neither of which were capable of handling the nuclear version of the missile.) The nuclear Terrier was modified to provide a long-range tactical surface to surface capability in addition to carrying a nuclear warhead. This capability did not interfere with the missile's surface to air role. The Terrier entered service in 1956, but the nuclear version did not appear until 1958, with full operational capability in 1962. Nuclear Terriers were in service from then until 1989. The missile was 38' long with booster and 13" in diameter, weighing about 3000 lbs. The Terrier used both a solid propellant booster and sustainer motor, giving the missile Mach 3 speed and a range exceeding 20 miles with a capability of reaching 80,000' altitude. Like the Talos, the Terrier was a radar beam rider with semi-active terminal homing. The nuclear warhead developed for the Terrier was the W-45 Mod 1, also adapted with different Mods for a medium atomic demolition munition and for the Bullpup-B and Little John rocket. The warhead was 27" long and 11.75" in diameter and weighed 150 lbs. Yield was variable up to 15 kt, indicative of its alternate surface to surface role. About 750 warheads were produced specifically for the Terrier. The Terrier's nuclear version remained in front line service until 1987 as it was the most effective missile of its type, being able to stop large waves of enemy aircraft and intercept anti-ship cruise missiles. The Terrier's successors, the Standard (SM) family of missiles derived from the earlier Tartar does not have a nuclear capability, although such a missile was requested by the navy as the SM-2(N). Developmental funding was provided for this missile, using the W-81 1kt warhead (a modified Mk 61 bomb primary) but the program was canceled in 1985. It has been reported that the W81 would have had advanced radiation capabilities. Additionally, the Bullpup missile in its Bullpup-B variant carried the W-45 warhead, but this version of the missile was only used by the US Air Force. Navy Bullpups were all conventional. Tomahawk Cruise Missile (BGM-109) The Tomahawk cruise missile in its conventional land attack and anti-ship version is currently active in the US navy on a variety of ships from destroyers to the recently-retired Iowa class battleships and is also now carried by the four modified Ohio class Trident submarines converted from SSBNs to SSGNs. The Ohio's can carry up to 154 Tomahawks. Nuclear attack submarines can carry Tomahawks in the torpedo bays and in the newer vertical-launch cells mounted in the ship's bow. A nuclear variant of the Tomahawk, designated BGM-109A was developed and deployed from 1987 to 1992 but, due to the various nuclear weapons treaties now in effect, these have been withdrawn from service, although some 300 nuclear-capable missiles are still stored at strategic weapons facilities in Bangor, Washington and Kings Bay, Georgia and the warheads remain available to date. The Tomahawk warhead was the W-80 Mod 0, a modification of the B-61 bomb warhead with yields between 5 and 150 kt. This weapon uses specially-designed plutonium warhead components designed to lower intrinsic radiation levels for personnel protection aboard submarines – a safety feature that it has been reported the SUBROC did not have. The warhead was 31" long and 11.75" in diameter and weighed about 290 lbs. Around 1850 warheads were produced. Part 9: Ballistic Missiles The US Navy was quick to notice the potential for marrying missile technology and nuclear warheads with submarines; initial planning for such weapons systems was underway by 1946 – the obvious advantage of a "stealthy" delivery vehicle capable of getting close to enemy territory undetected before launching nuclear weapons was not lost on the navy's planners. Focused at first on the easiest attainable goal, the "cruise missile," the eventual development of far more sophisticated ballistic missiles remained only on the drawing boards during most of this period, due to the high level of technical difficulties involved in getting a reliable ballistic missile into a small submarine frame with minimal danger to the launching submarine. Technical and scientific advances were needed before this program could come to fruition. Even the concept of placing these missiles in larger surface ships faced many engineering difficulties. The concept of marrying a ballistic missile with a submarine was originally based on the plans of the German navy to develop a submersible "barge" capable of carrying V-2s under tow by a submarine. This would have been an extremely complex situation, but at least would have separated the submarine from the dangerous liquid-fueled rockets themselves. The US pursued similar programs on the drawing board, but nothing came of it while the cruise missile program was being developed, first with the "Loon" version of the German V-1; 351 Army-produced JB-2 versions being purchased by the navy and designated as the LTV-N-2 for deployment on two specially modified fleet submarines, the USS Cusk and Carbonero. Cusk fired the first Loon missile in February of 1947 and the missile age began for the US submarine force (with of course, a tip of the hat to the WWII exploits of the USS Barb under her innovative captain, Commander Eugene Fluckey, who conducted shore bombardments of Japanese coastal towns using a 5" unguided rocket and launching rails modified from those used in various landing craft). The Loon was carried in a two-up pressure-proof cylindrical hanger mounted abaft the submarine's sail. The submarines were equipped with a 50' launching rail and all the needed fuel facilities and checkout/launch equipment. The Loon's main drawback for operational submarines was the necessity for the submarine to remain on the surface while the missile was removed from its container, set up on the launching rails, fueled and prepped for launch. Additionally, the missile was controlled by command radio guidance, which required the launching submarine to track the missile and provide guidance (which could be passed off to another submarine) while submerged at periscope depth with a radar mast deployed. Both of these factors greatly reduced the submarine's ability to remain undetected. The Loon had an effective range of about 135 miles, and was never deployed with a nuclear warhead. Design work on a warhead for the Loon was begun, but cancelled with the advent of the more advanced Regulus missile. Despite its drawbacks, the Loon was capable of demonstrating that missile-equipped submarines posed a real threat both to land and sea targets. During fleet exercises in 1948, three Loon missiles were launched at an "enemy" task force. None of the missiles were shot down even though the task force was aware missiles would be launched, and were also aware of the general location of the launching submarines. With the potential for the Loon to have been carrying a nuclear warhead, the lesson was obvious. The Regulus program developed a much better cruise missile that did carry nuclear warheads (both nuclear and thermonuclear – see the previous section on guided missiles) which was carried on the modified fleet submarines USS Tunny and Barbero, as well as the purpose-built USS Grayback and Growler and the nuclear USS Halibut. Regulus also required the launching submarine to be on the surface, and then at periscope depth to provide tracking and command guidance to the missile (which, like Loon, could be passed off to other submarines – while only the five submarines carried Regulus, many fleet boats carried the necessary command guidance and tracking equipment needed to assume control of a Regulus and guide the missile to a target.) During this period, the navy's interest in developing ballistic missiles for submarines lagged, the main reason for this being the necessity at the time for any such missile to be liquid-fueled, something the navy opposed tooth and nail. This was especially the case after the navy conducted special tests at White Sands Missile Range in 1948 to test the "missile accident" scenario in Operation Pushover. The operation was simply designed to see what would happen if a liquid-fueled missile were to collapse or topple over during launch in a shipboard environment. The damage caused by the fully-fueled V-2 test missile was devastating, showing clearly that no submarine could survive that kind of accident. With this ammunition in hand, the navy resisted any and all attempts to base ballistic missiles at sea, although they were more or less forced to cooperate with the US Army's Jupiter program with an eye to developing a submarine that would carry three liquid-fueled Jupiters in and extended sail launch capsule similar to the Soviet's K-129 boats. This was more the result of this program being the only one available at the time that would produce a missile small enough to be contained within a submarine rather than any expectation on the part of the navy that this would actually occur at some point. Fortunately for the navy, several factors came together that would allow for the rapid development and deployment of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) from a nuclear submarine (which would be designated as "SLBMs" for Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile regardless of the missile's range). The program would eventually evolve to where the submarines would carry the long range "big brother" version, the Trident II D-5 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) now currently the only ballistic missile in the navy's inventory. The prime scientific and engineering advancement that allowed the navy to seriously consider ballistic missiles for submarines was the development of large, powerful and very reliable solid-fuel rocket motors and sustainers, followed by the development of inertial guidance systems for missiles that did not depend on radio transmissions and radar tracking during the course of the missile's flight. Additionally, the nuclear weapons labs were on the verge of producing high-yield, low-weight thermonuclear warheads ideal for mounting on a missile. With these developments coming out of the labs, the navy was quick to drop out of the Jupiter program and pursue the goal of a submarine-launched ballistic missile of its own design. The driving force behind this development was the appointment of Admiral Arliegh Burke as the Chief of Naval Operations. A brilliant leader, administrator and war-fighter, Admiral Burke was without a doubt the most competent Admiral since Nimitz, and he was as committed to seeing the ballistic missile program become a major navy contribution to national defense as he was in seeing the navy into the nuclear powered age. One of his first steps was to put a stop to the intra-service bickering between the navy's Bureau of Aeronautics and Bureau of Ordnance over who would control ballistic missile development – he took the responsibility away from both bureaucracies by placing the program entirely within a "Special Projects Office" answerable only to the CNO and secretary of the navy. Admiral Burke assigned Rear Admiral W.F. Rayborn to head this office. Rayborn was a genius when it came to getting the job done, and with the weight of the CNO behind him, was able to put a nuclear submarine to sea on patrol with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles by 1960, at first the relatively short-ranged Polaris which would be followed by the ever more capable missiles in the Poseidon and Trident programs. Four nuclear submarine classes would eventually be produced to carry ballistic missiles, beginning with the George Washington class, the first of which completed in December of 1959. The George Washington fired its first missile in July of 1960 and departed on the first deterrent patrol on 15 November 1960. The early SSBNs were built by modifying and existing Skipjack class nuclear boat with a 130' center section added to hold the 16 missile tubes and the launch and control equipment. Later submarines were purpose-built to this design. The deterrent patrols of SSBNs continue to this day and now represent a major portion of the United States' remaining nuclear capability. Briefly, the four ballistic missile submarine classes were: Directory: History History -> Developed for the Ontario Curriculum History -> A chronology 1660-1832 The Restoration Settlement History -> History and Social Science Standards of Learning Enhanced Scope and Sequence History -> Evolution of the National Weather Service History -> Chronological documentation for the period through 1842 Copyright Bruce Seymour blio, Cadet Papers of Patrick Craigie History -> History of the 14 History -> History of the ports in Georgia History -> That Broad and Beckoning Highway: The Santa Fe Trail and the Rush for Gold in California and Colorado History -> Capitol Reef National Park List of Fruit and Nut Varieties, Including Heirlooms Prepared for the National Park Service through the Colorado Plateau Cooperative Ecosystems Studies Unit by Kanin Routson and Gary Paul Nabhan, Center for Sustainable Download 182.12 Kb. Share with your friends:
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