The Resolution

*** TOPICALITY IMPACTS

Framer’s Intent Good

Framer’s intent is the basis of predictability --- without it, it’s impossible to interpret the topic

Second, it is not possible to interpret even a single word, much less an entire text, without knowing the purpose of the statute. 123 To take Hart's "no vehicle in the park" example, if local patriots were to wheel a truck used in World War II on a pedestal, would this qualify as a core case? This example illustrates that meaning of language in a statute cannot be divorced from an inquiry into the purpose that a rule serves. When courts are offered competing interpretations, they must choose the one that is most sensible in connection with its legislative purpose, 124 and makes the statute "a coherent [and] workable whole." 125 Moreover, the purpose of a statute is not static, but through interpretation, courts engage in a process of redefining and clarifying the ends themselves. 126 As Fuller puts it, courts must "be sufficiently capable of putting [themselves] in the position of those who drafted the rule to know what they thought 'ought to be.' It is in the light of this 'ought' that [they] must decide what the rule 'is.'" 127

Legislative intent of the resolution outweighs limits

Clements 5 – Judge Jean Harrison Clements, Court of Appeals of Virginia, October 25, 2005, Bryan David Auer v. Commonwealth of Virginia – Court of Appeals of Virginia, http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opncavtx/0851041.txt

Consequently, the fact that the statute does not expressly enumerate a particular item implies that the item "falls outside of the definition." Highway & City Freight Drivers, 576 F.2d at 1289; see County of Amherst Bd. of Supervisors v. Brockman, 224 Va. 391, 397, 297 S.E.2d 805, 808 (1992) (holding that the courts "may not add to a statute language" that the legislature intended not be included therein). Because the word "include" is susceptible to more than one meaning and because it is not immediately clear from the word's context which meaning is meant to apply in Code 19.2-295.1, we conclude that the statute's provision that "[p]rior convictions shall include convictions . . . under the laws of any state, the District of Columbia, the United States or its territories" is ambiguous. See Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985) (noting that words are ambiguous if they admit to "being understood in more than one way" or lack "clearness and definiteness"). See generally Liverpool v. Baltimore Diamond Exch., Inc., 799 A.2d 1264, 1274 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (recognizing that "the term 'includes,' by itself, is not free from ambiguity" because it "has various shades of meaning," ranging from enlargement and expansion to limitation and restriction); Frame v. Nehls, 550 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Mich. 1996) ("When used in the text of a statute, the word 'includes' can be used as a term of enlargement or of limitation, and the word in and of itself is not determinative of how it is intended to be used."). "Therefore, we are called upon to construe this statutory language in a manner that will ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's intent." Herndon v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 266 Va. 472, 475, 587 S.E.2d 567, 569 (2003). In seeking to resolve the ambiguity in the statutory language and discern the legislature's intent, we apply established principles of statutory interpretation. See Va. Dep't of Labor & Industry v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 233 Va. 97, 101-02, 353 S.E.2d 758, 762 (1987). Consistent with such principles, we interpret the statute so as "to promote the end for which it was enacted, if such an interpretation can reasonably be made from the language used." Mayhew v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 484, 489, 458 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1995). Thus, the "statute must be construed with reference to its subject matter, the object sought to be attained, and the legislative purpose in enacting it; the provisions should receive a construction that will render it harmonious with that purpose rather than one which will defeat it." Esteban v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 605, 609, 587 S.E.2d 523, 526 (2003). Furthermore, although "[i]t is a cardinal principle of law that penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the [Commonwealth]" and "cannot be extended by implication, or be made to include cases which are not within the letter and spirit of the statute," Wade v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, 122, 116 S.E.2d 99, 103 (1960), "we will not apply 'an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute' that would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein," Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 581, 562 S.E.2d 139, 144 (2002) (quoting Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 250 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979)).

Framer’s Intent Bad

Framer’s intent is arbitrary and should be considered secondary to the best interpretation

Weaver 7 (Aaron, Ph.D. Candidate in Politics and Society – Baylor University, “An Introduction to Original Intent”, Fall, http://www.thebigdaddyweave.com/BDWFiles/originalism.pdf)

Discovering the “original intent” behind the religion clauses of the First Amendment is much more difficult than Edwin Meese, Antonin Scalia or any other 21 Ibid, originalist wants to admit. Contrary to the revisionist history being pushed by originalists who desire extensive government accommodation of religion, the founders did not always agree with one another. We simply can not determine with sufficient accuracy the collective intent of the Founding Fathers and the Framers of the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Those scholars in search of “original intent” have returned with strikingly inconsistent accounts of original intent. Thus, the originalism of Scalia, Meese, and Rehnquist is ambiguous at best and downright dishonest at worst. We do not know nor can we be expected to accurately determine the intent or understanding of what the First Amendment meant to each person who cast their vote. After all, delegates to the Constitutional Convention were voting on the text of the First Amendment, not Madison’s writings or the private correspondence of the Framers. The text of the First Amendment reigns supreme. Authorial intent must take a backseat to the actual text. Justices should examine the text first and scour it for as much meaning as it will generate before turning to extrinsic evidence of intent. However, original intent is hardly irrelevant but simply subordinate to the text. Extrinsic evidence does not control the text. The text controls the text.

No impact to “intent”. The framer’s knowledge was far more limited than the community’s after months of research. Their standard is outdated and prevents informed and progressive understanding.

Moore 85 (Michael, Professor of Law – University of Southern California Law Center, “Interpretation Symposium: Philosophy of Language and Legal Interpretation: Article: A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation”, University of Southern California, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 279, January, Lexis)

My conclusion is that the text has a better claim to being called the "choice of the legislature" than do any legislative materials. The political ideals of democracy and of institutional competence are thus better served by a court working from the text alone and not from some "second text" unofficially adopted by some supposed, silent consensus of legislators. That being so, and liberty and fairness also being better served by looking to the other ingredients in the theory of interpretation, I conclude that legislative intent has no role to play in interpretation. This conclusion has been defended solely by using the rule of law virtues as our normative guidelines. This conclusion is supported by the other set of considerations relevant here, namely, the kinds of effects an intent-oriented theory of interpretation produces. Such a theory produces worse effects than its competitors because it imposes old ideals upon us. In constitutional law this consideration is so compelling that it swamps all the others in importance. Better that we fill out the grand clauses of the Constitution by our notions of meaning (evolving, as we have seen, in light of our developing theories about the world), by our notions of morals, and by two hundred years of precedent. What the founders intended by their language should be of relevance to us only as a heuristic device to enable us to think more clearly about our own ideals. The dead hand of the past ought not to govern, for example, our treatment of the liberty of free speech, and any theory of interpretation that demands that it does is a bad theory. This argument applies to statutory interpretation as well, although with somewhat diminished force. For guiding one's statutory interpretations by legislative materials will be to judge by ideals as old as those [*358] materials. In the Keeler case, for example, a 1970 decision was predicated on an 1850 statute, recodified in 1872. Using nineteenth-century ideas of personhood to decide whether a fetus is a person is not a good idea in the twentieth century. We have thought more about the problem, and we know more factually and morally than those who drafted the commission report concluding that fetuses were not human beings. And even if we do not know more than they, we are as entitled to live under our ideals of personhood as we are to live under our ideals of free speech. For old statutes, thus, the consequentialist arguments against looking to framers' intent are as strong as they are for the Constitution. The meanings of words, the direction of precedent, and the nature of goodness are all items about which we can have developing theories. Our admittedly imperfect knowledge of each of these things can get better. A theory of interpretation built out of these materials thus can accommodate change and development in our law by court interpretation. A theory emphasizing the enacting body's intention, on the other hand, is glued to the past. Change can only come by constitutional or legislative amendment. Even apart from the rule of law virtues, an intentionalist theory should be disfavored on this ground alone.

Directory: file -> view
view -> Western Europe after wwii
view -> Author study: paul fleischman
view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide
view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg
view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh
view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce
view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy
view -> Table of Contents Lesson #
view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad

Download 0.49 Mb.

Share with your friends: