Motivations for Foreign Aid

Related to the analysis of the influence of domestic political forces on foreign aid is the analysis of the motivations for providing foreign aid. The analysis of the motivations for (bilateral) foreign aid also includes analysis of government executive objectives and geo-strategic concerns. As is evidenced in, for example, Stokke (1989), Lancaster (2007a), Pratt (1989), and Hook (1995, 1996), foreign aid is deployed for a number of reasons and in pursuit of a number of goals. Whether it be to present an image in the international community of generous nation or to appease commercial interest groups domestically, whether it be for humanitarian and moral reasons or in the interests of national security and regional dominance, whether it be to encourage the recipient nation to adopt more democratic forms of government and respect human rights or stimulate regime change, foreign aid is always deployed for a reason or a mixture of reasons. This bibliography contains a number of publications which present and analyze the different motivations, and combinations of motivations, for aid and various aid allocation priorities.

An early analysis of the donor interest⁵ and recipient needs models of donor aid provision motivation was conducted by Maizels and Nissanke (1984). They find that while aid from multilateral institutions is provided on a recipients’ needs basis, bilateral aid from different donors is provided to greater or lesser degrees in support of their own political, economic and security interests (ibid.). In the periods they studied the authors find that there were shifts in the relative emphasis on donor interest in aid allocation, with trends towards more consideration for recipient needs during the early and mid-1970s, with a reversal of these trends in the latter half of the decade (ibid.). The authors attribute this trend to shifts in bilateral aid budgets during the 1970s away from donor interest, and an increased emphasis on multilateral sources (ibid.). Maizels and Nissanke state that the reversal of this trend is explained by two factors. Firstly, donor contributions to multilateral organizations were cut during the 1970s (ibid.). Secondly, a number of donors, most notably the US, have been more overtly using bilateral aid as a foreign policy instrument, or tying their aid allocations to their export orders (ibid.).

A later study by Berthélemy (2005) also concerning the donor interest and recipient needs models of donor aid provision motivation confirms Maizels and Nissanke’s findings that donor interests take precedence in the aid allocations of certain nations. He finds that while most donors provide at least target some of their aid to their most significant trading partners, they do so to varying degrees, and most provide at least at part of their aid to the neediest recipients (ibid.). Furthermore, Berthélemy (2005) indicates that on average aid is provided to recipients with better governance indicators, for example, the absence of violent conflict or more democratic political and economic systems (ibid.). He identifies Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and Switzerland as being more altruistic than other donors, while Australia, France, Italy, Japan and the US are more egotistic (ibid.). The Chinese government emphasizes recipient ownership and aligns its foreign aid with the national priorities of recipient governments (Davies 2007). This differs from traditional donor concepts of ownership and alignment which emphasize broad based participation (ibid.). Regardless of which concept of ownership and alignment is taken, the above mentioned approaches and findings of Maizels and Nissanke (1984) and Berthélemy (005) concerning the recipient needs and donor interest models provide useful measures against which to evaluate the foreign aid practices of China and other emerging donors.

In the same vein of the recognition of the interdependent relationship between the global North and the South, Cassen et al (1982) analyze the terms in which it is in the interests of the North and South promote and develop their interdependence. They state that there is no clear or simple set of conclusions which emerges from their study (ibid.). The authors argue that the interests and concerns vary both within and across developed nations, creating a complexity which they find difficult to summarize (ibid.). One general characteristic that they are able to identify is the absence of any effort in the North to construct a new form of interdependence or North-South interdependence on different terms (ibid.). Cassen et al argue that economic interactions among states of the North are considered to be real economic issues, while those between the North and the South are regarded as political diplomacy (ibid.). They propose that the findings from their case studies show that in actual fact the Third World is of economic importance, there are areas of mutual interest that can be pursued to stimulate global economic activity, and structural adjustments facing the North with regard to energy, trade and finance, and food production have given it greater incentives to engage in new forms of economic relations with the South (ibid.). However, Cassen et al also state that they see little evidence of economic gain from relations with the poorest developing nations, arguing that continued relations with these states should be based on notions of common humanity, poverty eradication and other humanitarian grounds and not on arguments of economic self-interest used to garner domestic political support (ibid.). Additionally, the authors find evidence of class stratification and class consciousness among nations, preventing the rich nations of the North entering alliances with groups of Third World countries (ibid.). Cassen et al conclude by questioning the ability of world order at the time of study to provide a truly equitable interdependent relationship in which Third World needs are truly taken into consideration (ibid.). The observations and conclusions of Cassen et al’s study provide an impetus for analyzing the strengthening South-South relationship, especially with consideration as to how this will affect the international political and economic order and whether or not this has the potential of initiating the process of establishing a more equitable world order, or whether it will perpetuate a world order of dominators and dominated where a number the players have merely changed roles.

In his analysis of the determinants of debt forgiveness Neumayer (2002) finds that one powerful determinant is the recipient’s need for debt forgiveness, while political interests, excluding US military interests, are not significantly influential in the allocation debt forgiveness. However, he also indicates that good governance in general is not a clear determinant for debt forgiveness, rather a number of aspects of good governance are seen to have a greater influence than others, though the influence is still modest (ibid.). These aspects include: respect for democratic rights; accountability of the recipient government; and the extent to which the recipient government does not impose burdens of businesses through burdensome economic policies. He concludes that debt forgiveness has not often been used to reward good governance (ibid.).

The above discussions on the determinants of debt relief, and grant-concessional loan ratios are particularly relevant to emerging donors. There are fears that the emergence of new creditors such as China and India, will endanger the debt sustainability efforts of traditional donors (see for example AFRODAD 2008; Dahle Huse & Muyakwa 2007). China has granted debt relief and debt reductions to a number of developing countries (AFRODAD 2007; Davies 2007; McCormick 2008; MoFAPRC 2006), as has India (McCormick 2008). Investigations into the determinants of these debt relief and debt reduction policies, as well as the grant-concessional loan ratio determinants, of China and other emerging donors should provide fruitful comparisons to the determinants of similar traditional donor policies.

Arguably one of the more seminal papers on the effects of donor motivations for aid on aid effectiveness is that of Alesina and Dollar (2000). They analyzed the different motivations for aid of a number of countries, finding that while US and Nordic countries targeted poverty, democracy, and openness, with the US placing an emphasis on the Middle East, France was more concerned with former colonies and not with democracy or poverty, and Japan was more concerned with investment and trade relationships (ibid.). The authors conclude that the patterns of aid flows from donor nations are one the reasons for the only partial success of foreign aid in promoting growth and reducing poverty (Alesina & Dollar 2000). The influence of donor motivation for providing foreign aid on aid effectiveness is a theme that permeates much of the literature on the politics of foreign aid provision (see for example Bearce & Tirone 2009, Burnside & Dollar 2000 and 2004, Kilby & Dreher 2009 and McGillivray 2003, 2004). In light of the above finding that the patterns of aid flows from traditional donors are responsible for the only partial success of foreign aid in promoting economic growth and reducing poverty, it is pertinent that the patterns of aid flows from emerging donors such as China and India need to be evaluated and considered in comparison to those of traditional donors. This should provide indications of similarities and differences that will help to highlight areas that need particular attention in order to discovers mechanisms that will truly help to promote economic growth and reduce poverty in recipient countries.

Cold War & Post-Cold War Politics of Aid

Although the Cold War clearly had an influence on the nature of foreign aid relations, the strategic and security interests of aid played a greater or lesser role for different nations. Unsurprisingly, strategic and security interests played the dominant role in US aid provision during this period (Lebovic 2005). Other countries, however, were more concerned with commercial interests or maintaining dominant relations with former colonies (ibid.). Therefore, publications on the role and motivations for aid during this period can help to highlight continuities and discontinuities in trends leading up to the present day. This bibliography contains a number of publications written during, or concerning, the Cold War period, their findings should provide a deeper understanding of the relative importance of geo-strategic and ideological considerations for different donors in their formulation of foreign aid policies.

During the Cold War McKinlay (1978) and McKinlay and Little (1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1979) conducted research into British, French, German, and US aid relationships with the Third World. A comparative analysis of the findings of the separate studies is presented in McKinlay (1979). McKinlay relates their findings on the nature of aid relationships to the concept of imperialism in which any nation maintains direct or indirect political or economic control or dominance over another (ibid.). He attributes this to the structure of the international system, rather than domestic structures, in which there are high levels of competition due to a lack of a basic normative order and collective goal formulation and actions in the international system (ibid.). McKinlay argues that this differs from the domestic orders in which there are extensive formal and informal regulatory frameworks, which in turn create a basic normative order (ibid.). He argues that the asymmetries within the relatively unregulated international environment encourage dominant nations to promote their own interests and maintain dominance through the use of control strategies (ibid.). Formal and informal rules do exist, however, McKinlay argues, these are far from extensive, and sanctions to reinforce these are weak (ibid.). The author states that although the most highly developed systems of rules, sanctions and collective goals are institutionalized within Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), these only have limited resources and implementable sanctions (ibid.). The resources IGOs have, McKinlay observes, are dependent on contributions from donor countries, and their aid provision patterns reflect, and reinforce, the international hierarchy and prevalent cleavages and tensions (ibid.). The author identifies two forms of imperialism active within this essentially unmoderated international framework in which asymmetries encourage dominant actors to promote their own national interests and maintain dominance through the use of control strategies such as foreign aid (ibid.). The first form, McKinlay argues, is political imperialism which is driven by concern for national security, therefore control strategies are employed to enhance national security (ibid.). The second form identified by McKinlay is economic imperialism which is driven by trade and investment concerns, where control strategies are employed in order to enhance the actor’s material well-being (ibid.). The author concludes by emphasizing that there are, however, important differences among donors on which interests are promoted and how systematically and comprehensively developed the foreign policy of their aid relationship is (McKinlay 1979: 450).

With the increasing importance of intergovernmental organizations, an increasingly influential global civil society, and collective goal formulations in the forms of, for example, the Millennium Development Goals, it would seem that a number of the aspects of the structure of the international system that facilitated the imperial aid relationships, have progressed into more just forms. However, the asymmetrical relationships between donors and recipients remain, and still remain a concern for those in or sympathetic to Third World countries.

Meerink et al (1998) analyze the explanatory models of researchers concerning the US foreign policy behavior during and immediately after the Cold War. They suggest that it was still too early to clearly identify the altered importance of the determinants of foreign aid such as ideological motivations, as the new international distributions of power and levels of systemic threat had not become settled yet (ibid.). However, the authors provide precursory evidence indicating that strategic considerations are declining while ideological goals are becoming more prominent, though they state that this evidence is not yet conclusive (ibid.). Meerink et al argue that as the US has not been an active participant in an international environment where there was not an all-consuming threat, therefore it lacks experience in formulating foreign policy and foreign aid policy in the new international system (ibid.). These current authors believe that the recent Global War on Terror might be seen as the all-consuming threat in response to which the US is experienced in drawing up its foreign policy strategies.

An earlier study by Griffin (1991) attributes the proliferation of foreign aid programs to the domestic political support for aid during the Cold War. He too identifies motives other than ideological ones, such as commercial and humanitarian interests, during this period (ibid.). However, he states that these motives played a greater role in sustaining aid programs than in initiating them, which he attributes to ideological motives prevalent at the time (ibid.). He concludes by questioning the future of foreign aid post-Cold War, wondering if the loss of ideological motives and the reduction of the national security threat will mean a reduction in foreign aid, thus hindering development in the Third World (ibid.).

Rather than giving space to more humanitarian considerations in development assistance allocation motivations in the period immediately after the Cold War, the publications mentioned above describe a reduction in aid expenditures and a preoccupation with domestic political concerns. The world’s poorest were neglected (Hook 1996) as strategic concerns and colonial relations continued to motivate aid. Furthermore, aid flows were directed away from the poor nations of little strategic importance, towards former Soviet bloc transition states, likely also due to strategic and security concerns (ibid.). Additionally, the increased aid flows to heavily indebted middle-income countries could be seen as a means of safeguarding economic and financial investments (ibid.). Lancaster (2007a) finds that during this period of reduced aid budgets, domestic constituencies for development aid began to campaign for the increase in aid levels and a greater focus on development. During this period too, an increasing number of governments desired to align their aid-giving policies with the development aid standards set by the OECD (ibid.). Lancaster argues that these efforts increased in the wake of the 9/11 and other terrorist attacks in Europe (ibid.). Nevertheless it was the debate on whether or not these poor states, and fragile or failing states, have provided safe havens for terrorism that has to a large extent motivated highly increased aid allocations in the Global War on Terror, as is evidenced by the policy statements of the Australian, Danish and US governments.⁷

China’s foreign aid motivations likewise moved away from the Cold War ideological and political motivations in the post-Cold War period (Chaponnière 2009; Cheng & Shi 2009; Li 2007). An analysis of other emerging donors might show similar trends indicating a more global shift in foreign aid allocation motivations. Noting the changes in foreign aid levels and priorities of the US and other Western industrialized states in the global war on terror, an investigation into the effects of the war or terror on the foreign aid policies of China and different emerging donors might likewise indicate global or simply regional trends.

Aid Allocations and Political Coalitions in the UN

A number of researchers have been concerned with the relationship between aid allocations and political coalitions in the UN. Alpert and Bernstein (1974), Rai (1972, 1980) and Wittkopf (1973) conducted their analyses of this relationship at the height of the Cold War. Although Rai’s first study concluded that more evidence was needed in the discussion of the causal relationship of foreign policy and particular voting behavior, his findings did suggest that certain aspects of US and Soviet foreign policy were closely related to voting in the General Assembly (Rai 1972). His later study observed a difference between the American and Soviet uses of aid in relation to voting in the General Assembly (Rai 1980). He finds that American aid was effectively used as an inducement for voting behavior, even though this also varied in different time periods within the study period (1967-76), whereas evidence on Soviet aid highlights its use as a reward or punishment rather than inducement (ibid.). However, Rai urges caution by arguing that causality cannot be concluded from correlations. Wittkopf (1973), who analyzed the US, the Soviet Union and 12 members of the UN also serving on the OECD-DAC, similarly refrains from concluding that there is a causal relationship between aid allocations and voting behavior in the UN, however, he does find associations between the two for many donors. He states that while these associations were weaker and differed in intensity for different donors in different periods under study, the associations between aid allocations and UN voting behavior remained consistently strong for the US (ibid.).

A post-Cold War study of the relationship between aid allocation and UN voting behavior conducted by Wang (1999) found more conclusive evidence of a causal relationship with regard to US aid allocation and recipient voting behavior. The author focuses the study on UN voting behavior on issues considered important to the US (ibid.). He states that the US government has made great efforts, especially since the linkage policy of Reagan administration, to send the signal to recipient nations that US aid allocation levels are used as reward or punishment for voting behavior in the UN on issues deemed important to the US (ibid.). Wang argues that evidence from his study suggests that the US has been successful in these efforts to induce voter compliance on issues important to the US (ibid.). He further argues that with the end of the Cold War, the US is still unable to use its military might to force political compliance, and thus continues to rely on the “economic statecraft” to induce political compliance (ibid.). Furthermore, Wang indicates that as aid budgets have been reduced in recent years, the marginal utility of each dollar received by recipients has increased, thus the ability of aid to induce voter compliance has also increased (ibid.).

The findings in the study conducted by Dreher et al (2008), using panel data for 143 countries from 1973-2002, also reveal the importance attached to pursuing voter compliance in UN General Assembly through US bilateral aid allocations. When disaggregating the effectiveness of various forms of foreign aid in promoting voter compliance they indicate that general budget support, grants and untied aid are the most effective forms (ibid.). Other forms of aid, they continue, are generally preferred for other objectives (ibid.). They argue that project aid and concessional loans may be preferred forms to encourage the productive use of aid in recipient countries, especially in countries where local governance is not strong (ibid.). Dreher et al add that tied aid might be favored in cases where the commercial interests of the donor are more prominent than commercial interests (ibid.). The authors conclude that there is strong evidence to suggest that US aid allocations have bought voter compliance (ibid.).

Kuziemko and Werker (2006) further analyze US aid allocations to nonpermanent members of the UN Security Council. They find that developing countries serving on the UN Security Council receive, on average, an additional $16 million in aid, while in important time periods this figure can rise to as much as $45 million (ibid.). The authors state that rotating members of the Security Council receive at least 59 percent more US aid when they serve on the Council, having reached a 170 percent increase during important voting periods (ibid.).

In their analysis of post-Cold War voting patterns in the UN General Assembly, Kim and Russett (1996) observe that voting alignment is no longer along the East-West split current in the bipolar international order of the Cold War, rather, they assert, it is now characterized by a North-South split. The authors argue that voting alignments are likely to be influenced by varying notions of self-determination and economic development, reflecting differences between rich and poor countries (ibid.). They argue that although the importance of North-South issues is not new, these issues were subordinated to East-West concerns during the Cold War (ibid.) Kim and Russett (1996) also note that due to the composition of the Security Council permanent membership, namely the dominance of Western industrialized powers, and their voting patterns and alignments, members of the Security Council have been able to hold it to a different course than the General Assembly.

In a similar study of Cold War and post-Cold War voting patterns in the UN General Assembly, Voeten (2000) rejects the structuralist hypothesis of Kim and Russett (1996) who posited that a North-South voting alignment has superseded the Cold War East-West alignment. He argues that much of the East-West alignment of the Cold War has been carried over in the post-Cold War period. Voeten presents a ‘Stability Hypothesis’ in which voting alignment is motivated by security concerns as each state is seen as a potential threat (ibid.). He maintains that besides the fact that a number of former Soviet bloc countries now align their security concerns with the West and a number of major European countries have shifted their alignment slightly away from the US in order to balance US power, voting behavior in the UN General Assembly is still very similar to that of the Cold War period (ibid.). Voeten, however, does observe the emergence of a counter hegemonic voting bloc consisting of China, India and some other countries (such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea) challenging the hegemony of the US and its Western allies (ibid.). Furthermore, he finds that more democratic countries tend to vote more in line with the “West” on issues concerning political and economic liberalism, though he adds that evidence of the influence of regime type on general voting behavior is inconclusive (ibid.). Finally, though he rejects the hypothesis that the post-Cold War global conflict is characterized by a “clash of civilizations”, Voeten does find some evidence of divisions between Western and non-Western countries’ voting behavior, and also between non-Western, Asian, African and Muslim countries (ibid.).

Given the above findings on the correlation between foreign aid allocations and UN voting behavior, India’s aspirations for permanent membership on the UN Security Council,⁸ and the fact that China’s UN Security Council membership can be attributed, at least in part, to its foreign aid efforts in the 1950s and 1960s (Li 2007), investigation in into the correlations between foreign aid allocations of China and other emerging donors and UN (both Security Council and General Assembly) voting behavior in vital in order to highlight foreign policy strategies with regard to pursuit of UN voting objectives. This is even more pertinent given the observations of Kim and Russett (1996) on the North-South alignment, and the South-South cooperation of emerging donors strengthening these trends, as well as Voeten’s (2000) finding indicating the emergence of a counter hegemonic bloc, composed of China, India and a number of other states, to challenge the hegemony of the US and its Western allies.

Donor Influence on International Financial Institutions

Another important aspect of foreign aid policy is the influence a number of donor countries exert on the International Financial Institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and regional development banks. As these institutions play an increasingly important role in aid policies and financial disbursements, a number of governments have attempted to exert pressure on them in order to pursue their own national foreign policy strategies.

Investigating IMF conditionality agreements, Kang (2007) observes that conditions attached to loans varied both qualitatively and quantitatively, this is despite the IMF’s official economic rules meant to determine conditionality. Kang notes that the five biggest contributors to the IMF (namely the US, the UK, Japan, Germany and France) all exert influence upon the IMF in order to determine IMF conditionality that is not in accordance with official IMF economic rules, in order to promote their own strategic agendas in developing countries (ibid.). He argues that this influence allows countries with national characteristics that are considered important to the five biggest contributors to enjoy easier borrowing conditionality than those that do not have such national characteristics (ibid.). Kang concludes that the failure of IMF loan conditionality to address the economic problems of certain recipients can be attributed, at least in part, to the political economic processes within IMF which have led to conditionalities not appropriate to the situation (ibid.).

Taking a political-economy analysis approach to study IMF lending practices Barro and Lee (2005) identify a number of variables that explained the probability of IMF loan approval, the size of IMF loans and the frequency of participation in IMF lending programs. The authors find probability and size of IMF loans to be larger if a country has a higher level of political and economic proximity to the US and other major Western European countries, if it has a bigger quota, and if it has more nationals working on the IMF staff (ibid.). Although this finding does not show an active effort on the part of the US and other major Western European countries to influence IMF lending practices, their influence is implied through the positive correlations between probability and size of IMF loans and the political and economic proximity to the US and other major Western European countries. Barro and Lee proceed to analyze the effects of this political economy of recipient selection, suggesting that, in general, participation in IMF loan programs is bad for economic growth (ibid.).

Analyzing US influence over the World Bank in the period 1986 to 2002, Fleck and Kilby (2006b) find that US influence over the World Bank is characterized by evolving rather than stable relationships, due to the changing interests and policies of different presidential administrations and varying economic and political situations. They indentify two US interests that have a significant connection to World Bank lending allocations when the period under study (1968-2202) is considered as a whole, namely trade and geopolitical interests (Fleck & Kilby 2006b). Concerning trade Fleck and Kilby find that, all else being equal, the greater a country’s share of US exports, the higher the levels of World Bank funds that country receives (ibid.). With regard to geopolitical considerations, the authors find that countries favored in US bilateral aid allocations were also allocated higher levels of World Bank funds (ibid.). However, the authors emphasize exact relations varied with different presidential administrations.

In an investigation into the conditionality of World Bank loan disbursements, Kilby (2009) finds that these are variably enforced. His findings reflect those of Vreeland (2004) regarding IMF conditionality and US influence. As was the case with IMF conditionality, Kilby (2009) finds that for countries friendly with the US, conditionality is not generally enforced. Whereas countries which are not seen as friendly with the US (based on whether or not they make concessions on important UN votes) conditionality is significantly enforced (ibid.). He notes that these correlations remain evident through different periods of time and across different geographic regions using a number of different estimation methods (ibid.).

Wade (2002) provides an in-depth analysis of the political workings of the World Bank, and the influence exerted on it by the US government in part through the US Treasury. Wade does this through the analysis of two cases where the US exerted pressure to influence the statements made by incumbents in important ideas-controlling positions in the World Bank. Namely statements by the chief economist Josephy Stiglitz, who was fired, and director of the World Development Report 2000 Ravi Kanbur, who resigned. Wade demonstrates that the US is able to exert its influence through the administrative machinations of the Bank in order achieve its objectives (i.e. to have Stiglitz fired, and the WDR rebalanced) while appearing to act with procedural appropriateness (Wade 2002). However, he does identify a certain degree of autonomy for the Bank and limits to the US’s influence upon the organization (ibid.).

A similar investigation into the influence of donors on IFIs was conducted by Kilby (2006) which focused on the regional Asian Development Bank. He concludes that there is significant donor influence on the Asian Development Bank, most notably by the US and Japan. Kilby argues that even when the cases of China and India are excluded, donor trade interests and geopolitical interests have a greater influence than humanitarian interests (ibid.). He notes that selection and allocation of ADB funds discriminates against China and India (ibid). Kilby argues that China was discriminated against for Cold War US political reasons, where as India was discriminated against on the basis of Japanese concerns (ibid.). Through comparison with his earlier study, and a number of other studies, Kilby comes to the conclusion that donor interests exert even more influence in the ADB than they do in the World Bank (ibid.).

Given the above findings on donor influence of International Financial Institutions and the fact that China is also a contributor to the World Bank International Development Association⁹ and the IMF,¹⁰ in addition to being a member of the Asian Development bank, similar investigations regarding the influence of China and emerging donors on the IFIs are needed. Results of such studies should highlight similarities and differences in the motivations and means of such influence concerning traditional and emerging donors, identifying areas where mechanisms to mitigate such influence are required.

Human Rights, Corruption & the Environment

A more recent development in foreign aid allocation policy, since the end of the Cold War, is its use (at least in government rhetoric) to promote respect for human rights, reduce corruption, and, more recently, to assist in matters relating to the environment. Not only is the priority of human rights in foreign aid allocation part of the rhetoric of many donors, such as the US, in some nations, like the aforementioned, it is legally required that human rights are given priority over economic and military interests (Apodaca & Stohl 1999). However, US legislation allows for special circumstances in which there can be some deviation from this law (ibid.). Apodaca and Stohl (1999), therefore, studied the relative importance of human rights in US foreign aid allocations. Their findings suggest that human rights concern considerations do play an important role in whether or not a country receives US foreign aid and in determining the levels of aid allocated, with poor human rights performers receiving less US bilateral economic aid than nations with better human rights records (ibid.). Nevertheless, the authors observed that national security considerations trumped human rights considerations in countries perceived to be vital to US national security, these received aid regardless of human rights performance (ibid.).

An earlier study focusing on the relation of human rights practices and US foreign aid allocation to Latin American in fiscal year 1982 by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) aimed to identify whether or not there had been any progress towards human rights considerations in light of earlier studies which found that human rights violators tended to be rewarded while human rights champions were punished. Their findings suggest that there had been progress with regard to human rights considerations in US foreign aid allocation (ibid.). In the two stage process of aid allocation decisions the authors find that human rights considerations did not play a role in whether or not a country received economic assistance, however, recipients with better human rights performances did receive higher levels of economic assistance (ibid.). Cingranelli and Pasquarello find that human rights considerations did have a significant influence on whether or not a country received military aid, as countries with poor human rights records were not allocated military aid, however, levels of military aid were not determined by human rights performances (ibid.).

The effects of UNCHR condemnation on aid flows to a country are analyzed by Lebovic and Voeten (2009). Their findings show that bilateral aid flows are only mildly affected by UNHCR condemnations, while multilateral aid flows, including flows from international organizations are strongly affected (ibid.). The authors observe that poor human rights performances result in large reductions in World Bank and multilateral aid commitments (ibid.). On a similar topic Alesina and Weder (2002) investigated whether or not less corrupt governments received more foreign aid. They found no evidence of negative impact of corruption on foreign aid in their broad country analysis (ibid.). However, their findings do suggest differences among donors with Scandinavian donors rewarding less corrupt recipients while the US is more concerned with form of governance (democracy) than with quality of governance (ibid.).¹¹

A more recent form of aid provision is environmental aid. Figaj (2010) investigates the determinants of environmental aid allocation. Her conclusions, though not complete, indicate that 1) poverty and environmental variables are determinants of whether a country received environmental aid or not, 2) aid levels are determined by economic and environmental issues (ibid.). Figaj finds no evident differences between bilateral and multilateral environmental aid (ibid.). She also finds no evidence that political variables play a role in environmental aid allocation considerations, however, economic considerations do indicate a concern for financial viability (ibid.). She attributes this to the fact most environmental aid is in the form of loans which need to be paid back by recipients (ibid.).

Discussions concerning the relations between foreign aid allocations and human rights are particularly pertinent in the case of China and other emerging donors who are often accused of ignoring human rights performances in their foreign aid allocation considerations (see for example AFRODAD 2008; Asche & Schüller 2008; Cornellisen & Taylor 2000; Dahle Huse & Muyakwa 2008; Konings 2007). As is evident from the findings presented above, the human rights concerns of traditional donors also leave a lot to be desired and are also highly variable. A more in depth investigation into the relationship between foreign aid allocation and human rights considerations by China and other emerging donors is necessary in order to provide an adequate comparison with traditional donors.

The Moral Dimension of Foreign Aid

A number of publications deal with the humanitarian motivation for foreign aid provision (not to be confused with humanitarian aid or disaster relief), or the motivation foreign aid provision which is based on a perceived moral obligation for richer countries to assist poorer ones. Stokke (1989) and Lancaster (2007a), for example, attribute this to certain nations’ particular values, norms and traditions. Moreover, humanitarian and moral rhetoric can be employed to justify foreign aid to the general public, although, in some instances it might be provided with less altruistic motivations.¹² In Loescher and Nichols (1989) a number of authors investigate the relationship between humanitarianism and US foreign policy. Their analysis addresses the issue of morality and politics while also presenting legislative and legal aspects of humanitarian assistance in US foreign policy. The authors do this with regard to US foreign assistance to Central America and the Horn of Africa. Loescher and Nichols argue that humanitarianism is one of the core principles of America’s dominant political ideologies and traditional morals (ibid.). They illustrate some of the difficulties of reconciling these principles with politics in the US humanitarian policy, focusing on humanitarian relief provided in the wake of both natural and political disasters. One of their contributors, Smith (1989), proposes that certain moral principles are not just intimately related to US national interests, but rather are at the core of these interests. These principles, he argues, are not universal. For example, initially, the respect for human liberties was a domestically promoted principle, however, it is now a moral good that the US has chosen to respect and advance throughout the world (ibid.).

An earlier study on the relation between aid and ideology was conducted by Imbeau (1988). The author develops a conceptualization of international aid-giving behavior based on the notion of a bounded rationality that involves the interaction between objective and subjective factors (Imbeau 1988: 3). From this he deduces four hypotheses to explain different levels of aid expenditures: instrumental, humanitarian, ideological and incremental (ibid.). He analyzes these hypotheses across 17 OECD donors in the years 1966, 1971, 1976 and 1981 using a regression model (ibid.). Imbeau concludes that the best predictors of aid as a percentage of GNP, during the periods of study, are the instrumental and ideological hypotheses, the former with a lagged value dependent variable and the latter without (ibid.). He finds that the humanitarian hypothesis’ explanatory value is insignificant (ibid.). Imbeau defines ideology as “an organized set of values and goals about the development of a society” (Imbeau 1988: 24). These values and goals, he argues, influence policy, and due to their ingrained nature in a polity, they are more or less constant when considered within 20 year periods (ibid.). The author argues that it has been shown that in order to gain a reliable picture of foreign policy decision making, it is necessary to simultaneously assess the relationship between objective and subjective factors (such attitudes and values), and foreign policy behavior (ibid.).

Conclusion

As has become apparent from this brief introduction on a few of the aspects of the roles of foreign aid in politics, foreign aid is a complex issue. Foreign aid is used to serve a multitude of purposes and any given donor’s foreign aid policy composition changes periodically. Policies are formulated in consideration of domestic determinants – such as socio-economic climate, dominant norms and values, constituent pressures, government strategy – in view of the international context (e.g. national security concerns, geo-political positioning). This bibliography makes certain recurring and emerging trends apparent, for example, the increased use of aid for commercial reasons in times of economic downturns to promote domestic economic development, and the trend towards more altruistic motivations in times where there are fewer economic and political concerns.

The variable nature of aid should also put into perspective any investigation into the nature of the relations of China and other emerging donors with less developed countries, begging the question whether these relations are so different to those of Western industrialized nations with their less developed counterparts, both past and present (Bräutigam 2009). It is important at this juncture to repeat that China is not a new donor. Due to the changing domestic and political contexts following the end of the Cold War, the economic reforms since 1978, the opening up to foreign investment during the 1990s, and the more recent “outward bound” policies which promote the foreign investment by Chinese companies, its foreign policy and foreign aid strategies and composition has changed (Chaponnière 2009; Cheng & Shi 2009; Li 2007). It no longer pursues the geo-strategic foreign aid policies intended to spread Communism (ibid.). A comparative analysis of Chinese, Japanese, French, US, and Nordic foreign aid policies would likely reveal that Chinese foreign aid policies hold a lot in common with the foreign aid policies all of these traditional donors. There are elements of the commercial interests found in Japanese aid (e.g. Bräutigam 2009; Broadman 2007; Chaponnière 2009; IOSCPRC 2005; MoFAPRC 2006). There are elements of building regional influence, like that found in French and Japanese foreign aid policies, although the terminology used by the Chinese government is that of building friendships, partnerships and trust (IOSCPRC 2005; Li 2007; MoFAPRC 2006).¹³ There are, moreover, similarities with the US national security concerns (IOSCPRC 2005).¹⁴ And finally, there are also aspects of the humane internationalism of Nordic countries, such as the policy of nonintervention (MoFAPRC 2006), though it is not clear whether or not the Chinese government believes it is morally responsible for assisting in the development of less developed countries. Publics in both Japan and France have had little influence of their governments’ foreign aid policy formulation (Lancaster 2007a), as is clearly the case in China too.

A greater understanding of the domestic political forces shaping Chinese foreign policy and foreign aid policy is needed to understand its foreign relations and foreign policy strategies. Lancaster (2007a) provides a useful framework for analysis through the categorization of these domestic political forces into: ideas, interests, political institutions and the organization of aid. Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993) analytic framework concerning the role of ideas in shaping policy could provide a useful underpinning to such an analysis. Assumptions are easily made based on notions of Communism, planned and controlled economies and authoritarian regimes, however, there are other elements of the domestic political forces in China, such as worldviews, traditions, morals, principled and causal beliefs, which need to be investigated and taken into consideration. The effects of Asian values and Confucianism on foreign relations and foreign policy strategy would need to be studied, as well the extent to which foreign policy and foreign aid policy are guided by Marxist/Socialist/Maoist/Communist ideologies and the reformist concepts of Deng Xiaoping. Given the importance of Guanxi (relationships) in Chinese society, and the fact that an overwhelming proportion of senior government officials have relatives in senior business positions,¹⁵ the extent to which these relationships, as one of the domestic political forces, drives or guides foreign policy formulation needs to be investigated and understood. Additionally, analyses such as that conducted by Imbeau (1988) concerning the relationship between objective and subjective political factors and foreign policy behavior will likely produce a better understanding of China’s foreign policy decision making.

Additionally, the effect of Thérien and Noël’s (2000) findings that parties who remain in power for extended periods of time have been able to make their own concepts of social justice central to national political debates, thus shaping foreign aid policies and priorities, needs to be investigated with regard to China.

It might also be fruitful take the lens of humane internationalism, as Stokke (1989) and Pratt (1989) did, and consider to what extent Chinese relations with the less developed countries fits within the different forms of this broad ideology, as socialist ideological elements play a large part in humane internationalism and Communism. Rather than being a humane internationalist or an international realist could China be a humane international realist or a liberal internationalist? Furthermore, is China more sensitive to recipient needs than traditional donors? If so, to what extent can this sensitivity be explained by Pratt’s (1989) theory as to why certain countries are more sensitive to recipient needs than others? It is clear that part of China’s sensitivity could be attributed to the pursuit of favorable consideration by recipients concerning other international political issues (Li 2007), and due to the fact that China itself is still a developing country (IOSCPRC 2005; MoFAPRC 2006).

Additionally, using Holsti’s typology as Hook (1996) did what role would China play? Would it play the role of the “regional-subsytem collaborator” which does not want to play a global role, but, instead wants to build wide cooperative communities? It is obvious that through China’s global reach and increasingly intense economic and political activities, it has already outgrown this role. Further, China’s aid provision and association with voting behavior in the UN could be investigated, especially given the fact that China’s membership can be attributed to the result of their aid efforts in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s (Li 2007).

It is clear that a lot is known about the history and politics of foreign aid provided by Western industrialized nations. Although there is a growing literature on China’s foreign aid policies, these need to be put into the perspective provided by the aid practices, both past and present, of Western industrialized nations, as well as the context of China’s own domestic political forces.