The South China Sea Is the Future of Conflict

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Jul 10, 2014

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Jun 5, 2014

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Video: Recent Trends in the South China Sea and U.S. Policy: Day 2, Panel 1

Jul 14, 2014
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Bali Accord on South China Sea is Overrated

by Bonnie S. Glaser • August 29, 2011 • 7 Comments

Control over maritime territory is at the center of the ASEAN-China dispute.

Agreement between China and ASEAN on a set of guidelines to implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) is a welcome development, but it is doubtful that this heralds a change in Beijing’s approach to handling the territorial disputes with its neighbors, as claimed by Yang Fang. The eight guidelines have taken nine years to negotiate due to a dispute between China and ASEAN over the inclusion of language permitting the ten member states of ASEAN to confer among themselves before talking to Beijing.  ASEAN dropped this demand, paving the way for the signing of the Bali agreement.

The impetus came from a shared desire to set a positive tone and atmosphere at the ASEAN Regional Forum last month.  The result was a set of vague statements that fall far short of the needed binding code of conduct that will prevent the reoccurrence of recent incidents such as the severing of cables of a PetroVietnam survey ship, the construction activities on Amy Douglas Bank and other acts of intimidation by China.  The document does nothing to identify behaviors that are unacceptable nor does it include consequences for violations.  It does not even contain progress toward implementing the basic confidence-building measures that were outlined in the DOC, including holding dialogues among defense officials; notifying other parties of planned military exercises, and exchanging information.

Until these steps are taken, there is little reason to be optimistic that joint development of oil and gas will take place.  In the meantime, China continues to insist that territorial disputes be discussed bilaterally, which enables Beijing to bring pressure to bear on its smaller, weaker neighbors.  Moreover, the Chinese persist in their stance that the US has no direct interests in the South China Sea, despite Secretary Clinton’s claims to the contrary.  And Beijing shows no readiness to clarify the nature of its territorial claims in the South China Sea or provide a justification for its claims on the basis of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

China’s decision to agree to the guiding principles is nothing more than a tactical step aimed at assuaging regional worries about China’s aggressive behavior and constraining Washington’s ability to intervene.  It does not signal a strategic shift in Beijing’s handling of maritime territorial disputes.  Some reports even suggest that China’s position is already hardening.  Barry Wain writes that China has notified ASEAN that it wants to delete it’s one minor concession—ASEAN’s intention to consult—from the summary record of their agreement.  It is too early to join hands and sign Kumbaya.  The Bali agreement will only be judged a success if it paves the way for a binding accord that sets out rules of the road at sea that can both prevent conflict and promote shared economic prosperity in the region.

NYT

A View From the Sea, as China Flexes Muscle

Photo

Fishermen in Da Nang. On a two-day trip from that port, a Vietnamese vessel encountered some 70 Chinese ships. Credit Gilles Sabrie for The New York Times

ABOARD CSB-8003, in the South China Sea — As the large white Chinese ship closed in, the smaller Vietnamese Coast Guard vessel could only veer off, black exhaust billowing from its stack. The Vietnamese vessel had advanced to within 13 miles of the Chinese offshore oil rig, and the Chinese decided it could come no closer.

With the rig barely visible on the horizon but the Chinese ship looming close behind, the Vietnamese patrol boat, CSB-8003, blasted a two-minute recorded message in Chinese, from loudspeakers on the back of the boat. These waters belong to Vietnam, the message said, and China’s placement of the rig had “hurt the feelings of the Vietnamese people.”

About six hours after the encounter on July 15, one of the last in a two-and-a-half-month standoff over the rig known as HD 981, China began moving the rig north toward the Chinese island of Hainan and out of waters Vietnam considers its exclusive economic zone. Three weeks later, analysts are still debating whether China, facing international pressure, blinked in its standoff with Vietnam — or whether this was just a tactical retreat before a more aggressive campaign.

Vietnamese and Chinese vessels near a Chinese oil rig. Credit Gilles Sabrie for The New York Times

While Vietnam claimed success in forcing the departure of HD 981, China National Petroleum Corporation, which managed the project, said the rig had completed its exploration work and was moving as planned.

The relocation of the rig just ahead of the approach of a typhoon in the area also prompted speculation that the storm may have forced its early departure. But the $1 billion rig, which is owned by the state-run China National Offshore Oil Corporation, was moved to a spot about 60 miles southeast of Hainan Island that is also exposed to typhoons.

While the Vietnamese Coast Guard celebrated the departure of the Chinese rig, some officers said they were worried that the episode represented a more aggressive attitude by China.

“From the moment that they installed the rig near the islands, the Chinese began more and more and more attacks, in words and in actions,” said Lt. Col. Tran Van Tho of the Vietnam Coast Guard as he stood smoking a cigarette on the deck of CSB-8003. “Why? It is a part of a Chinese strategy to control the sea. This is a first step to try to make a new base to expand farther south. This not only threatens Vietnam, but the Philippines and other countries. This has been organized systematically, as part of a strategy. It is not random.”

Lyle J. Goldstein, an associate professor at the United States Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, said that China has long taken an assertive stance toward its claims in the South China Sea, but was now much more able to uphold them.

“If anything is changing it is that China has capabilities to enforce and explore more carefully and it has money to field the cutters — that to me is what is driving the situation,” he said.

Vietnam invited groups of foreign reporters to embed with its Coast Guard vessels in an effort to focus international attention on the standoff over the rig. On the water with CSB-8003, the superior numbers of the Chinese vessels were clear.

On its two-day trip from Da Nang in central Vietnam, CSB-8003 encountered some 70 Chinese vessels, including fishing boats, Coast Guard cutters, patrol ships from other Chinese maritime organizations and two vessels that the Vietnamese Coast Guard identified as Chinese Navy missile corvettes.

Vietnam says there were about four to six Chinese military vessels among the more than 100 Chinese ships that patrolled around the rig, along with the Chinese Coast Guard, other maritime agencies and dozens of fishing boats.

As recently as two years ago, many observers said China’s policy in the South China Sea was dominated by an array of poorly coordinated agencies.

Some encounters showed organizational ability, as when Chinese ships harassed the Impeccable, a United States Navy surveillance ship, in the South China Sea in 2009. But many analysts argued that the Chinese Navy, China Marine Surveillance, the Bureau of Fisheries Administration, local governments and state-owned energy companies operated with high levels of autonomy and fueled regional tensions as they sought to increase their own influence and opportunities.