The Speech (Beginning date: 15 October 1927) The general situation

Preparatory work for the congress at Sivas

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Preparatory work for the congress at Sivas
Meanwhile everything was being done in Amasya to hasten the election of delegates to the congress we were trying to assemble at Sivas, and to ensure that the delegates arrived safely. All the military commanders and a great number of patriots showed extraordinary enthusiasm. But at the same time we were hampered by the propaganda put out by our enemies, and chiefly by the obstructions put in our way by the Istanbul Government. Some districts not only declined to elect delegates but replied to our request in terms which had a damaging effect on the morale of the people. While we were struggling to overcome the apathetic. attitude prevalent in these districts, unrest began to show itself in Sivas itself. The Vali of Sivas, Resit Pasha, said in a telegram that he had been visited by some French officers, one of whom, a Major Brunot, had threatened that Sivas would be occupied within five or ten days if I attempted to hold a congress there. The telegram added:
I implore y our Excellency to give up the idea of holding this second congress. Ifyou cannot abandon the idea, I beg youfor your country.s sake to hold it at Erzurum, .for that is a place that is not likely to be occupied, or, at Erzincan. In any case, , ifyou prefer I urge you to give up the idea of Sivas, which is exposed on all sides.
In my reply I expressed the opinion that this threat to occupy Sivas was a bluff:
The occupation of Sivas by the French within five or ten days is not quite such an easy thing as Major Brunot seems to imagine.
Major Brunot must be well aware that if the French were to decide to occupy Sivas, they would have to face a new and very expensive war.
I also requested the Vali to take great care that these threats did not become known, as if they did it would excite the people.
The road to Sivas
We left Erzurum on 29th August 1919. You will remember the Ali Galip incident on the way from Amasya to Erzurum. Strangely enough, a similar incident occurred on the way from Erzurum to Sivas.
On the morning of our departure westwards from Erzincan, we had reached the Pass of Erzincan when our cars were stopped by some gendarmes and officers, who were in a state of great excitement."The Kurds of Dersim have occupied the pass. It is very dangerous for you to go on," they told us, One of the officers offered to send a message to the chief town in the district asking for reinforcements to be sent to attack the brigands, drive them back and clear the road. Very good, but how strong were these brigands? Before these questions could be answered, I would have had to go back to Erzincan and waste who knows how many days!
But we were in a great hurry. If I failed to arrive in Sivas on the appointed day, and if it were rumoured in Sivas and elsewhere that I had changed my mind and for: some reason was coming by a different route, there would surely have been panic among the people and this would have wrecked all our plans.
What was I to do in this emergency? Go on and take the risk? Yes, that was the only thing that could be done. Even so, we took the precaution of sending ahead of us a car equipped with some light machine guns.
From the very beginning I had thought that this was all part of a plan to delay us. So we went on and crossed the pass, arriving in Sivas on 2nd September 1919. Long before we had reached the town, the inhabitants came out to meet us and greeted us with great enthusiasm.
Selahattin Bey, who commanded the 3rd Army Corps, was in Sivas. He and the Vali extended the greatest hospitality to us in arranging accommodation for the delegates who were coming to the congress. They also prepared the school building in which the Representative Committee was to meet, as well as the assembly hall for the congress itself.
The inauguration of the Sivas Congress
The Sivas Congress was opened on Thursday 4th September 1919 at two o'clock in the afternoon. After some discussion, I proposed that the chairman be elected by secret ballot. This resulted in my being elected almost unanimously, with only three votes against.
It was agreed that the Sivas Congress shou1d deal with the resolutions and the manifesto approved by the Erzurum Congress, as well as a motion drawn up by the members who had arrived in Sivas before us.
The first three days were taken up with discussions about the oath we were to take, about the wording of a message to the. Sultan, and replies to telegrams that had come when the congress was opened. One important question was whether or not the congress should concern itself with politics! Is that not amazing? What else was all this petty squabbling but politics?
Finally, on the fourth day, we reached the principal subject of our meeting and began to discuss the resolutions which had been passed by the Erzurum Congress. No time was lost in assentihg to these. The reason for this was that we had already prepared amendments to the main resolutions, the most important of which were these:

1. The title 'Union for the Defence of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia' was changed to 'Union for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia'.

2. The words "The Representative Committee is the representative of the whole of Eastern Anatolia" were changed to read: "The Representative Committee is the representative of the whole country. "

3. The clause " In view ofthefact that we shall regard any incursion of our national territory or any interference in our affairs as an attempt to set up Creek or Armenian organizations, we are resolved to adopt the principle of united defence and resistance" was amended to " w e are resolved to act in a united manner to halt any incursion of our territory or any interference in our affairs, and in particular to bring to an end any activity designed to set up Creek or Armenian organizations."

These two clauses differ from one another in one very important respect: namely that in the first, no hostile attitude and no resistance with regard to the Entente Powers is referred to, whereas these are clearly implied in the second.

The proposal for an American mandate
At our sitting of 8th September we discussed a motion relating. principally to the question of an American mandate. Severa1 individua1s, including Halide Edip, had wrItten to me expressing the view that the acceptance of an American mandate over our country was the least undesirable of the possibi1ities open to us. After much debate this idea was rejected. Article 7 of the Manifesto issued by the Erzurum Congress says only that "scientific, industrial and economic aid from any state would be warm1y welcomed by us, provided that it respected our independence, our territoria1 integrity and our frontiers, and exhibited no imperia1istic intentions towards us."
We always have been and a1ways will be pleased to accept such aid as is extended to us on these terms. W e have accepted with pleasure the help of Belgian and Swedish groups in the construction of roads and railways. We will also accept the aid of foreign capitalists who may wish to help in the development of Ankara and the other towns in Anatolia or in the construction of our roads, railways and harbours. It will be sufficient for us if those who invest their capital in our country have no ulterior intention to compromise our independence or our territorial integrity.
The Ali Galip affair
The congress came to an end on 11th September. On the 12th, a public meeting took place in which the inhabitants of Sivas took part.
Now, with your permission, I shall say something about the Ali Galip affair, which was a very important incident in our national struggle.
At the beginning of July, while we were still at Erzurum, we had received information that two individuals had been supplied with considerable sums of money by foreigners in Istanbul and were to be sent to Kurdistan to agitate and intrigue against us there. Their names were Celadet and Kamuran Ali.
After I had found out about this, I wrote to the officer commanding the 13th Army Corps at Diyarbakir to the effect that these men were. to be watched and arrested on their arrival.
On 6th September, shortly after the beginning of the Sivas Congress, I announced that according to information received from the 13th Army Corps, Celadet and Kamuran Ali had arrived in Malatya and had been received by Haul Bey, the Mutasarrif. They were accompanied by a certain Ekrem Bey and an English Major, and escorted by armed Kurds. This English officer had previously been spreading propaganda against us in the district of Diyarbakir, and now stated that he had been authorized by the government in Istanbul to study on the spot the proportion of Turks, Kurds and Armenians living in those districts.
I had been informed that the cavalry regiment at Malatya was unable to arrest these individuals, but had applied to Istanbul for their arrest. My informant said he had asked the Vali of Harput for information on the subject.
Now, it so happened that the Vali of Harput was Ali Galip Bey, so my suspicions were aroused. Surely a cavalry regiment should have been able to deal with these people? I ordered a certain Ilyas Bey, commanding a regiment stationed at Elazig, to set out for Malatya on 9th September with sixty men and arrest the Vali (Ali Galip), the Mutasarrif of Malatya (Halil Bey), CeladetBey, Kamuran Bey, Ekrem Bey and the English Major, and escort them to Sivas.
We heard later that Ali Galip had been kept informed of all that was going on. This had caused him to spend the whole night in the Government building in Malatya without any sleep. On 10th September, Ali Galip and his friends had met in the Government building, accompanied by some gendarmes and armed Kurds, broken into the cashier's office, opened the safe, counted out 6,000 lira and left a receipt saying: "In accordance with orders received, we have removed 6,000 lira to cover expenses incurred in the suppression of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his collaborators. 10th September 1919. (Signed) Halil Rahmi, Ali Galip."
When news was received that the troops commanded by Ilyas Bey were approaching, the commander of the cavalry regiment in Malatya at last decided to act. He pointed out the Mutasarrif's house to his officers, surrounded it and, after cutting the telephone wires, entered it. Halil Bey's family sent a warning to the Vali's office. As soon as the Vali, the Mutasarrif and their companions, who were busy taking money from the government safe, heard the news, they were seized with terror and fled. Leaving the money and the receipt behind them, they mounted their waiting horses and without losing a moment they were off with their escort.
It is useless to pretend that the officers commanding the cavalry and artillery were not aware that the Vali had spent the night in the Vali's office. They knew it was more important to capture the Vali than the Mutasarrif. It is evident that they decided to frighten these people, then permit them to escape.
We had to take into account the fact that the fugitives would certainly succeed in raising a certain number of Kurds belonging to the neighbouring tribes and might even find support from the foreign troops stationed at Maras, so we sent reinforcements into the area.
Let me read you the orders that were sent to Ali Ga1ip on 3rd September 1919 by Adil Bey, Minister of the Interior, and Süleyman Sefik Pasha, Minister of War. They will throw light on what was going on, as well as on the activities of Ali Galip and the perfidiousness of the government.
As you are already aware, some persons assembled at Erzurum, calling their meeting a 'congress', and passed certain resolutions there. These persons are of no more importance than ,their resolutions. However, this so-called 'congress' has caused to be spread abroad in the country certain rumours which are echoed in an exaggerated form in Europe. It is evident that certain of these persons intend to hold another 'congress' at Sivas. The Government is well aware that nothing of importance can result from such a meeting consisting of five or ten people, but it is impossible to make Europe understand this. For this reason, it is necessary to prevent such a meeting.
The first thing to do is 10 appoint a Vali at Sivas who enjoys the full confidence of the Government and who can be relied upon to obey to the letter, for the , all orders sent to him. We have sake of his country appointed you to this post. We are confident that you will have no difficulty in preventing a mere handful of men from holding a congress at Sivas. But we have been informed that some officers of all ranks and some enlisted men share the views of these people and will do all they can to prevent the Government from rendering them ineffective, so we think it would be well if you were escorted by 100 to 200 trustworthy men. Consequently , if you were to arrive in Sivas unexpectedly with 100 to 150 mounted men recruited from the Kurds in your area, and if you took over the dual functions of vali and Commandant, you would be able firmly to establish your authority. This would be comparatively easy, as you would not have to anticipate any resistance. You would then be able to stop this meeting from taking place, arrest those present and send them under escort to Istanbul.
Thus, eventually, Ali Galip's activities came to an end, thanks to the prompt and decisive steps we took to counter them. The tribes A1i Ga1ip and Halil Bey tried to raise in rebellion against us dispersed and Ali Galip fled in despair, first to Urfa and then to Aleppo.
Breaking off communications with the government
Ali Galip's enterprise had clearly been organized with the consent of the Sultan, Ferit Pasha's Cabinet and the foreigners. However, in our counter movement we chose, rather than attack openly all those responsible, to concentrate on a single target. W e therefore chose Ferit Pasha's Cabinet as our target and pretended that we knew nothing about the comp1icity of the Sultan. Our publicly expressed opinion was that the sovereign had been deceived by the Cabinet and was in total ignorance of what was really going on.We wanted to give the impression that we believed he would punish those who had deceived him as soon as he was made clearly aware of the facts.
In a telegram signed "The General Assembly of the Congress" we informed Ferit Pasha, the Grand Vizier, that the nation had lost confidence in his Cabinet and that it retained confidence in the Sultan alone, and we accused him of trying to erect a wall between the.nation and its Sultan. The following day, 12th September 1919, all communications with the Istanbul Government were broken off.
Ferit Pasha's government, although it had given formal orders for the holding of parliamentary elections, had not up to this point taken steps to ensure that these orders were carried out. It therefore seemed dangerous to leave the country without guidance for an indefinite time. So, without taking any notice of the objections that were raised, I circu1ated the following order:
1. The official business of the state will continue to be carried out according to the existing laws. The lives, property, honour and rights of all citizens will be protected without distinction as to race or creed.

2. State officials will continue to exercise their duties in accordance with the legitimate wishes of the people.

Those who are not willing to do so will be considered to have resigned, and will be replaced temporarily by other qualified persons.

3. Those officials who actively work against the aims of the nation and the national movement, will he severely punished for the sake of the security of the people and their religion.

4. Anyone who acts contrary to the resolutions of the nation or who spreads confusion among the people will likewise be severely dealt with.

5. The welfare and happiness of the country and people can only be secured by justice, .respect for rights and the maintenance of order throughout the country.

6. Until we have succeeded in laying the demands of the people before His Highness the Sultan, and until the setting up of a legitimate government which possesses the confidence of the people, the Representative Committee of the General Congress at Sivas will conduct the affairs of the nation.

7. These resolutions are to be communicated to the headquarters of all national organizations and are to be proclaimed to the public.
Mustafa Kemal
I will not disguise the fact that this declaration gave rise to a great deal of criticism.
The Sultan's proclamation
Between 12th September, the date on which we suspended communications with the government in Istanbul, and the fall of Ferit Pasha's government three weeks 1ater, we repeatedly sent messages to the Su1tan. On 20th September, the Su1tan issued this proclamation:
1 . As a result of the policies followed by the Government, the tragic events in Izmir have attracted the sympathetic attention of the civilized nations of Europe.

2. A special commission has begun to conduct an impartial enquiry on the spot. Our rights are beginning to be recognized by the civilized world.

3. No decision or proposal which threatens our national unity has been made.

4. There is talk by some people of a supposed divergence between the people and the Government.

5. This state of affairs can only lead to the postponement both of the elections, which we desire to be held as soon as possible in accordance with the regulations laid down by law, and of the meeting of the Chamber 'of Deputies, the existence of which is particularly necessary in view of the fact that peace negotiations are shortly to take place.

6. At the present time, that which I expect of my people is complete obedience to the orders of the Government.

7. The spirit of fair play shown by the Great Powers, and the sense of justice exhibited by public opinion in Europe and A merica, strengthen us in our hopes of achieving, within a short time, a peace settlement which will safeguard our position and our honour
At the same time as we had broken off official relations with the government, we had also taken steps to ensure that all telegraphic and postal communication between Istanbul and the mainland of Anatolia was 'Cut off. If our instructions had been carried out properly, this proclamation wou1d never have been brought before the eyes of the public in Anatolia. However, it was in fact circulated in several 1oca1ities. In order to counteract the undesirable effect it would be certain to have, we drew up a rep1y to the Sultan, rejecting his assertions, and published and circulated this so that everyone in the country should have the chance to read it.
The national forces in Western Anatolia.
The congress had appointed Ali Fuat Pasha to the rank of Commander of the National Forces in Western Anatolia. As you probably know, at that time there were British troops in Eskisehir. Ali Fuat Pasha himself, with all the national troops he could muster, had gone to Cem~it, a place near Eskisehir, and had surrounded the town. General Sally-Clade, in command of the Allied troops at Eskisehir, sent a deputation to Ali Fuat Pasha. They assured him that the British had no intention of interfering in any way in our internal affairs or our national movement.
At the same time, the British asked us whether it would be agreeable to us if they withdrew their troops from Merzifon. We promptly told them that we would be very pleased indeed if they did so. They actually proceeded to withdraw from Merzifon with all their baggage and munitions, marching to Samsun and embarking for Istanbu1.
A conversation with General Harboard
As you will remember, at this time the American Government had sent a commission, led by General Harboard, to study our country and the Caucasus. This commission came to Sivas, where I had a long conversation with Genera1 Harboard on the aims of the natIonal movement.

The General asked me some unexpected questions, such as: "What will you do if, even after every conceivable effort and sacrifice have been made by the nation, it should all end ill fai1ure?" If my memory does not deceive me, I replied to the effect that a nation which exerts every imaginable effort and makes every possible sacrifice to secure its freedom and independence cannot help but be successfu1. However, if we fail, we will have to admit that our nation is dead.Therefore, the possibility of failure is unthinkable.

I did not trouble to find out the Genera1's motive for asking me this question. However he seemed pleased with my reply.
Ferit Pasha's resignation
On 2nd October, an unsigned telegram arrived. It ran:
Your Excellency, we have just heard from some close friends that Ferit Pasha is reported to have resigned for reasons of health. They say the story is in all the evening papers. Tevfik Pasha is supposed to have been asked to form a new government. Rumours about this were circulating this morning, but now it has been officially colifirmed.

I enquired who was sending the telegram, but the message continued:

We, the telegraph operators of Ankara, send our respects to His Excellency the Pasha. We congratulate him on his success in bringing down the government. Please communicate this to him.
Then the line went dead.
It was true that Ferit Pasha's government had fallen, but it was A1i Riza Pasha, not Tevfik Pasha, who was to form the new one.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank all our te1egraphists publicly for their services to our national movement.
Gentlemen, I told the entire nation in a circular letter that Ferit Pasha's government had fallen and that Ali Riza Pasha had been asked to form a new government. On the same day, we tried to get in touch with the new head of the Cabinet. He promised to speak to the Representative Committee when the Cabinet met the following day. The main points of my circular letter were:
1. If the new Cabinet will recognize the organization set up at the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses and the national aims, the national forces will support it.

2. The new Cabinet shall not undertake anything of a binding nature regarding the fate of the nation until the National Assembly has met and definitely established its authority.

3. The delegates who are to be sent to the Peace Conference shall be selected from those who- are fully aware of the wishes of the nation and who enjoy its confidence.
However, we soon came to the conclusion that a considerable amount of uncertainty reigned in Ali Riza Pasha's Cabinet. We decided not to resume official correspondence with the government "until agreement on views and demands has been reached between the government and the people". By the fifth day of the Ali RIZa Pasha Cabinet we had still not reached agreement with them; it was evident that none of the members of the Cabinet had any intention of coming to terms with us.
You will remember that the British had withdrawn from Merzifon and Samsun. To ce1ebrate this event, which coincided with the fall of Ferit Pasha's government, the people of Sivas had organized a torch light procession. Speeches were made, and during the festivities some shouts of "Down with the occupation!" were heard. A local newspaper reported this.
In a communication to the Vilayet of Sivas, the new Minister of the Interior observed that the appearance of such articles in the Press was not in accord with government policy .
What did this mean? Were the government pursuing a po1icy which did not regard the occupation as a bad thing? Or did they believe that to protest against it might lead the enemy to extend the occupation still further? Did the government believe that it was reasonab1e and politically correct that the people should remain passive and docile in the face of this occupation and should not express their dissatisfaction?

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