The United States federal government should lift bans on space cooperation and offer a bilateral space partnership with the People’s Republic of China
An asymmetrical arms race causes space war
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- Space conflict would become an earth war
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An asymmetrical arms race causes space warDeblois 8, LT. COL for the United States Air Force LT COL BRUCE M. DEBLOIS, Space Sanctuary A Viable National Strategy, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.pdfSPACE “militarization/weaponization” is not an “all-or- nothing” affair. For clarification, one can view military activities in space on a threat continuum (see table 1). As used here, space weaponization refers to anything greater than the cur-rent capability, which is roughly at the moderate threat level.Much of the literature flowing from the Department of Defense (DOD) on space and its role for future military operations makes a fundamental assumption: “Space will be weaponized; we only need to decide if the US will take the lead.”2 One cannot so readily make such an assumption. The immediate military advantages of being the first nation to weaponize space are undeniable 3 but must be weighed against long-term military costs, as well as against broader social, political, and economic costs. The decision to weaponize space does not lie within the military (seeking short- term military advantage in support of national security) but at the higher level of national policy (seeking long-term national security, economic well-being, and world-wide legitimacy of US constitutional values). At that level, many reasons suggest why the weaponization of space may not be the obvious “best” strategy. The purpose of this article is to articulate those reasons. Space- sanctuary advocates will appreciate what follows as a comprehensive summary of their position; likewise, space weaponization advocates will have to ad dress these issues if their belief (that American preemptive weaponization of space best serves this nation) is to remain on firm ground. The following summary of the case against space weaponization proceeds from the historical trend of US nuclear and space policy to consider domestic and international political concerns. It then addresses the space weaponization issue by briefly examining adversarial potential (the threat), tech no logical limitations, financial trade- offs, practical considerations of military strategy, and the emotional appeal of global security and well-being. This article is not meant to be an in-depth study of each facet of the debate; rather, it is a terse summary of the space-sanctuary argument aimed at open ing the debate. Demonstrations of atomic weapons at the close of World War II and the prospect of nu-clear weapons married to emerging ballistic missile technology ushered in a new era of international relations. Threatening to use military force had always been an instrument of diplomacy, but the potential for instantaneous, indefensible, and complete annihilation posed a new rubric in the games nations play. Thus, nuclear deterrence was born. Initial thoughts that such a threat relegated war fare to the shelves of history due to the prospects of massive nuclear retaliation proved naïve—sub sequent lower-order conflict did not force nuclear escalation. Symmetric nuclear capabilities among the pal powers weakened the credibility of their use, while asymmetric responses (guerrilla and terrorist tactics, aligning with nuclear-capable par ties, conflict protraction, etc.) still allowed lesser powers to test the resolve of the principals—particularly over issues of peripheral interest to those nuclear powers. Examples include Vietnam and Afghanistan. Visions of massive space superiority and the touted huge, coercive power advantage they provide will likely prove as bankrupt a notion as that of massive nuclear retaliation. In their logical evolution, both give way to strategies that recognize an international con text of reactive nations.Principal powers will simply not allow a space hegemon to emerge, and lesser powers may concede hegemony but will continue to seek asymmetric counters.The result will be a space strategy that better aligns with what evolved out of the nuclear dilemma: mutual assured destruction (MAD). As a common MAD logic developed across the globe (but primarily between the two players in the game—the United States and Soviet Union), nontraditional foreign-policy traits became apparent. Any move toward developing weapons or practices that increased the viability of the idea that one could “win” a nuclear exchange was perceived as destabilizing. Deterrence in the form of MAD had to overcome the notion of “winning”—one that could come in several forms: 1. A nation could survive nuclear attacks and prevail. Conceding offensive dominance was critical if MAD were to deter nu clear holocaust. One had to avoid an odd array of destabilizing practices and systems, including missile-defense systems and civil-defense programs. 2. A nation could use nuclear weapons on a small scale and prevail in a predominantly conventional conflict. The term theater nuclear weapons was an oxymoron—every nuclear weapon was strategic because it posed the threat of escalation. Limited use of nuclear weapons was destabilizing; hence, one had to avoid any such strategy. Prohibiting the development of the neutron bomb, in spite of the immediate tactical benefits it offered to outnumbered NATO forces in Europe, was a direct result of this logic. 3. A nation could launch a success ful first strike. Stabilizing approaches that reduced the viability of surprise via first strike were pursued. More than its name implies, if MAD were to prohibit a nuclear exchange, it had to be paired either with a reliable early warning capability allowing a reactive nuclear response or with a survivable second-strike capability. The United States pursued both: the former via space- and land- based early warning net works and the latter via submarine-launched ballistic missiles. From this experience, one can draw and apply les sons as the possibility of space weapons emerges. Clearly, these weapons offer the potential for instantaneous and indefensible at-tack. Although the Outer Space Treaty of 1967(outlawing weapons of mass destruction [WMD] in space) prohibits complete annihilation, the threat of annihilation would still exist—it is difficult to distinguish space based WMD from space- based non- WMD. In simple terms, space weaponization could bring a new round of MAD. Although MAD success fully deterred a nuclear ex change over the past 40 years, it was a very costly means of overcoming the lack of trust between super powers. The dissolution of that distrust and the corresponding reduction of nu clear arms lie at the very heart of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START).Comparing the emergence of nuclear-tipped ICBMs with the accession of space weapons does yield some stark differences, however.There is no single threat to focus diplomatic efforts aimed at building trust, and there does seem to be some international support for the idea of coalescing a strategy supporting space sanctuary and deter ring third world space up-starts. Aside from these differences, though,one could assume the existence of proliferated space weapons and proceed with the thought experiment that a space-MAD strategy would emerge among the principal powers. Again, one would have to eliminate the notion of “winning” a space-weapons ex-change, and on at least the first two counts, one could do so: 1. It is logical to concede the offensive dominance of space-based weapons in low- earth orbit (LEO). Any point on earth could have a weapon pointed at it with clear line of sight; the potential of directed- energy weapons takes the notion of instantaneous to the extreme; and defense of every national asset from such an attack would prove next to impossible. 2. The same argument against the logic of “tactical” nuclear weapons would also apply to the “tactical” use of space-based weapons. Once they were used, any conflict could automatically escalate to a higher level. 3. The failing of a space-MAD strategy comes on the third count: early warning or survivable second-strike capability. Should space be weaponized and two space- capable foes emerge, there will be no 30-minute early warning window from which one actor could launch a counter attack prior to the impact of the pre emptive first strike. Furthermore, space basing is equivalent to exposure—no strike capability can be reliably hid den or protected in space in order to al low a surviving, credible second strike. Space- MAD weapons without early warning or reliable survivability logically instigate a first strike. This creates an incredibly unstable situation in which the viability of “winning” a space war exists and is predicated upon striking first (with plausible deniability exacerbating the problem), eliminating the “mutual” from MAD and only assuring the destruction of the less aggressive state. Obviously, this is not a good situation. Putting weapons in space could well be a self-fulfilling prophecy: we put them there be-cause we anticipate we’ll need them, and be-cause they’re there, we’ll be compelled to use them; hence, we needed them. The conclusion, then, of a nuclear weapons–space weapons analogy can only be that while the threats from each type of weapon are similar, the most successful strategy (MAD) for dealing with the former cannot work for the latter. Unlike the strategy for nu-clear weapons, there exists no obvious strategy for employing space weapons that will enhance global stability. If the precedent of evading destabilizing situations is to continue—and that is compatible with a long history of US foreign policy—one ought to avoid space- based weapons. Further, even if one could construct a workable space-MAD strategy, the nuclear-MAD approach teaches that this is an intensely expensive means of dealing with mutual distrust between nations. Space conflict would become an earth warBroder 16 Jonathan Broder writes about defense and foreign policy for Newsweek from Washington. He's been covering national security issues for more than two decades, including 12 years as a writer and senior editor at Congressional Quarterly. Before moving to Washington, Broder spent 20 years as an award-winning foreign correspondent in the Middle East, South Asia, China and East Asia for the Chicago Tribune and the Associated Press. Broder’s writing also has appeared in The New York Times Magazine, The Washington Post and Smithsonian magazine. He's a frequent commentator on foreign affairs for NPR and Al Arabiya TV. 5/4/16 Newsweek Why the Next Pearl Harbor Could Happen in Space http://www.newsweek.com/2016/05/13/china-us-space-wars-455284.html Such scenarios may read like science fiction, but the threat of what military experts call a “space Pearl Harbor”—a sneak attack on U.S. satellites that cripples American forces before a shot has been fired—has Pentagon planners seriously worried. Space is the ultimate high ground for today's warriors, and no military has dominated those strategic heights as successfully as America's. But its constellations of GPS, surveillance and communications satellites are largely undefended, a vulnerability that hasn’t escaped notice in China and Russia. The result: a new three-way space race—the first since the end of the Cold War, and one that now includes the development of weapons to knock out the other side’s space assets. “The U.S., China, Russia are all working on not just using space but also taking it away from the other side,” Singer, a military strategist at the New America Foundation, a Washington, D.C., think tank, tells Newsweek. Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a high-profile visit last month to air force headquarters in Beijing, where he ordered his generals to sharpen the country’s defensive and offensive capabilities in space in preparation for what many Chinese military analysts believe is an inevitable war in space with the U.S. Like the U.S. and Russia, China has sent astronauts into space and landed a spacecraft on the moon, and it is developing its own space station. The Pentagon also notes that Beijing continues to ramp up its military capabilities in space, launching 142 satellites to provide intelligence, navigation, communications and weather forecasting that can “limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by adversaries during times of crisis or conflict.”
This year, the Pentagon will spend $2 billion on measures to counter threats to its national security satellites. That amount is expected to soar as part of the $22 billion set aside to maintain U.S. superiority in space in 2017. Senior U.S. officials explain such large investments reflect the Pentagon’s recognition of a major shift in U.S., Chinese and Russian capabilities. For the first 25 years after the Cold War’s end, they note, America’s conventional forces were unmatched, thanks largely to the advantages their satellites gave them on the battlefield. Making their debut in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, satellites have guided American precision munitions, provided U.S. commanders with worldwide communications and helped American forces navigate the globe ever since. Scenario B – Satellite accidentsIncrease in space debris is inevitable and poses a threat to both US and Chinese satellites, lack of international accountability and transparency risks collision misinterpretation of a declaration of war Billings 15, Lee Billings, 8-10-2015, "War in Space May Be Closer Than Ever," Scientific American, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/war-in-space-may-be-closer-than-ever/ [KKC] For Krepon, the debate over the definitions of space weapons and the saber-rattling between Russia, China and the U.S. is unhelpfully eclipsing the more pressing issue of debris. “Everyone is talking about purposeful, man-made objects dedicated to warfighting in space, and it’s like we are back in the Cold War,” Krepon says. “Meanwhile, there are about 20,000 weapons already up there in the form of debris. They’re not purposeful—they’re unguided. They’re not seeking out enemy satellites. They’re just whizzing around, doing what they do.” The space environment, he says, must be protected as a global common, similar to the Earth’s oceans and atmosphere. Space junk is very easy to make and very hard to clean up, so international efforts should focus on preventing its creation. Beyond the threat of deliberate destruction, the risk of accidental collisions and debris strikes will continue to grow as more nations launch and operate more satellites without rigorous international accountability and oversight. And as the chance of accidents increases, so too does the possibility of their being misinterpreted as deliberate, hostile actions in the high-tension cloak-and-dagger military struggle in space. The amount of space debris continues to grow with China ASAT testing – both debris created and accidental targeting could lead to warZenko 14, Micah Zenko, April 2014, "Dangerous Space Incidents," Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/space/dangerous-space-incidents/p32790 [KKC] A January 2007 direct ascent ASAT test carried out by China against its defunct Fengyun-1C weather satellite instantly increased the amount of space debris in low earth orbit (LEO) by 40 percent. Debris is especially problematic in LEO, where half of the world's 1,100 active satellites operate. Space objects—even flecks of paint—travel as fast as eighteen thousand miles per hour and can cause catastrophic damage to manned and unmanned spacecraft—creating even more debris in the process. The U.S. National Research Council estimates that portions of LEO have reached a "tipping point," with hundreds of thousands of space debris larger than one centimeter stuck in orbit that will collide with other pieces of debris or spacecraft, thus creating exponentially more debris. Significant growth in the quantity or density of space debris could render certain high-demand portions of outer space unnavigable and inutile. Currently, there are no legal or internationally accepted means for removing existing debris. China could also test co-orbital antisatellite systems in which an interceptor spacecraft destroys its target by exploding in close proximity, creating even more debris. For several years, Beijing has conducted a series of close proximity maneuvers with its satellites in LEO; the most recent occurred after a July 20, 2013, launch of three satellites on the same rocket, which have since conducted sudden maneuvers toward other Chinese satellites. Human or operating errors during these maneuvers could inadvertently result in a collision that produces harmful debris. While these maneuvers could eventually be used for civilian purposes, most U.S. officials believe these experiments are primarily intended to demonstrate latent ASAT capabilities. An ASAT test that causes unintended damage to U.S. and ally satellites or an accident in space caused by debris could trigger a major international crisis between the United States and China. The risk is heightened by the fact that both countries have no pre–space-launch notification arrangements, similar to the U.S.-Russia agreement on notifications of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launches. Management of such a crisis could also be hindered by a lack of direct communication between U.S. authorities and the PLA agency that oversees Chinese military As the amount of space debris continues to grow, a collision becomes more likely and will risks miscalculating leading to warByrd 16, Norman Byrd, A writer for Blasting News, 1-26-2016, "Space junk collisions could provoke armed conflict, Russian scientists warn," Blasting News, http://us.blastingnews.com/news/2016/01/space-junk-collisions-could-provoke-armed-conflict-russian-scientists-warn-00754097.html [KKC] The increase in the amount of space junk orbiting the Earth has the potential to not only damage satellites, spacecraft, and devices already in orbit, but could potentially lead to war. A recent study posits that errant space junk colliding with satellites could easily be misconstrued as an attack and cause political friction, even provoke warfare. The Independent reported January 25th that a study conducted by scientists at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow contends that debris orbiting the Earth poses a "special political danger" to operational satellites in that it would be difficult to determine the origin of the damaging impactor. In short, the impacted satellite's controller would not be able to ascertain if the impact had been caused by ordinary space junk or if it had come under attack. To make matters worse, as more space junk accumulates and more of the orbiting pieces collide, the amount of debris in orbit increases, thus increasing the likelihood of collisions with the aforementioned security-sensitive satellites. "The owner of the impacted and destroyed satellite can hardly quickly determine the real cause of the accident," astrophysicist Vitaly Adushkin explained in the study, which was published in Acta Astronautica. He noted that such uncertainty could very well "provoke political or even armed conflict between space-faring nations." To illustrate the potential dangers involved, the expansive ring of space junk has been accumulating since the space race began in the late 1950's. Over decades of test flights, satellite placements (both governmental and private sector), spacecraft launches, and various other space missions by literally dozens of national players, thousands of man-made objects have become part of the debris ring. Given intentional ejections, cast-offs, dead satellites, and inevitable collisions that come with pieces and particles moving at varying speeds in ever-decreasing orbits as Earth's gravity takes it toll, the number of pieces of space junk has soared. The Guardian noted that U. S. and Russian space agencies already monitor some 23,000 pieces of space junk measuring larger than 10 centimeters in diameter. One of those pieces of space junk, dubbed WT1190F or "WTF," had been tracked since 2013 and re-entered Earth's atmosphere in November. But estimates as to the true scope of orbiting fragments push the number into the trillions when considering smaller particles. At present, the fragments pose problems for orbiting satellites and the International Space Station, which celebrated 15 years as a living space habitat in November. A 2015 Russian Space Agency report noted that, in 2014, the station had to take evasive action against potentially harmful wreckage five times. Adushkin's warning follows an incident in 2013 when a Russian satellite was disabled by a piece of space junk created after China, using a missile to test its anti-satellite capabilities, shot down one of its own weather satellites in 2007. That demonstration produced an estimated additional 3,000 pieces of debris. Adushkin's research corroborates a 2011 NASA report that revealed the level of debris circling the Earth had reached a "tipping point," was increasing exponentially, and had become a danger to satellites and the ISS. The astrophysicist further warned that, unless something is done to clean up the ring of space debris, the dangers presented will only get worse due to the "cascade process" of ongoing collisions. space launches. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 109.45 Kb. Share with your friends:
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