This is a tough one, as the written history of this great subject is tainted with much 'coloring', so to speak
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Gustavus never attempted a major storm or siege of Danzig, but remained content to try to blockade the great port, which clearly was viable, being he cut its communications from both sides. But he could never completely prevent it being provisioned by the sea, and the city's ability to hold out practically neutralized Gustavus' successes throughout the four year campaign. Due to the impracticability that the city could be reduced to straits, he sought to secure its neutrality. This is where he might have been a little rash and lost patience; he was already eyeing the situation in Germany nad might have been hoping to bring the Polish war to a speedy end, which depended on the submission or neutrality of Danzig. A less hectoring style of diplomacy might have procured Danzig's neutrality. It is indeed mentioned in one of my sources that he reconnoitred the fortress of Wisloujscie (Weichselmunde), and he began recruiting from his newly acquired territories, including the procurement of valuable, indigenous horses. At the battle of Gniew (Mewe), fought in September, 1626, Gustavus and his officers, most notably Heinrich Matthias von Thurn and John Hepburn, won an impressive but not overwhelming victory. The wooded terrain around Gniew was utilized by Gustavus to neutralize any devastating effect the Polish cavalry could usually rely upon, augmented by a flooded field. It was in late September of 1626 when Sigismund III finally arrived upon the theater of operations, now commanding a field army in the vicinity of Grudziadz (Graudenz). After conscriptions were carried out from Grudziadz and Torun (Thorn), his force totalled some 15,400, of which about 9,000 were cavalry (about 4,000 husaria). These written down figures are always, of course, paper-strengths. Torun lies on the Vistula about 30+ miles south of Grudziadz. Sigismund III resolved to blockade Gniew, with the intention of drawing Gustavus further south, away from his base at Tczew and the vicinity around the Danzig perimeter. The Poles had recently retaken the fortress of Orneta (Wormditt), perhaps proving other fortresses Gustavus had easily taken earlier could not serve as a permanent defenses. Thus he had to march out against Sigismund III. Led by Sigismund III and his son Wladyslaw, the Poles advanced towards Malbork; on meeting the Swedes, whom they outnumbered, some skirmishes broke out, and the Poles withdrew south, crossed the Vistula at Nowe (Neuenburg), and began to siege Gniew from the town's south side. Though Sigismund III established himself on high ground to the west. Though a strong position, Gustavus set himself up at no disadvantage: he assembled a picked force of 3,500 men (500 horse), drawn from the vicinity of Tczew (Dirschau). His troop strength for the relief of Gniew numbered 7,661 men, of which nearly 1,274 was cavalry, and with 12-20 guns. He headed for threatened Gniew (Mewe), and to challenge Sigismund III's position, he both disposed his men in wooded terrain along the Vistula and behind an anti-flood embankment, good for reconnoitering. The relief of Gniew was a necessity for carrying out the campaign he intended, so he devised a tactic to effectuate its relief. With some light horse and artillery, the Poles had occupied a position athwart his path. Gustavus resorted to a ruse, making his movements appear as a reconnaisance, and proceeded to withdraw. After this clever disposition apparently deceiving the Poles, he then ordered Thurn and John Hepburn to create another diversion and cut a passage over a strongly fortified hill defended by the Poles, who vastly outnumbered them. Thurn and his cavalry diverted the Poles' attention by demonstrative actions, and held up in some serious skirmishing with the lighter kozacy. The Poles were given the impression the Swedish garrison was going to be drawn from within Gniew, and that the place would fall to them in any event, so they made no immediate advance and charged, but failed in a cavalry charge against Gustavus' carefully prepared infantry positions layed in terrain, which was bogged down, which negated much of the ability to charge forward in order, and his new methods of firepower was first realized - the triple rank Swedish Salvee; though loss of Polish life was apparently minimal, the Swedes were trained to fire more at horses, thus many more were dismounted. In all, three charges of the husaria were thrown back. Perhaps they should have attacked sharply in significant numb bers at certain points, and closely observe the region to ascertain Gustavus' real intentions. If they had, perhaps the campaign for Gustavus might have ended here for good. But that's 20/20 hindsight. Simultaneous with Thurn's diversionary activity, the infantry column commanded by Hepburn, which had started at dusk and unseen by Sigismund III's men, approached the enemy position by working around it and ascending the hill by a narrow and winding path, which was encumbered by difficult terrain. Weighed down with muskets, cartridges, breastplates, helmets, and defense obstacles (I'll explain in a bit), they made their way up through the enemy's outposts unobserved, and reached the summit, where the ground was smooth and level. By tactical surprise, here they fell at once upon the Poles, who were busy arranging their trenches. For a time, Hepburn and his men gained a footing here, utilizing Scweinfedders; but a deadly fire, mostly musketry, opened upon them from all around, compelling them the to fall back from the trenches. And soon found themselves charged upon by armored husaria under Tomas Zamoyski, and would have soon been scattered. Hepburn was compelled to retire, drawing his men off till they reached a rock on the plateau, and here they made their stand, the musketeers occupying the rock, the pikemen forming in a wall around it. Gustavus had provided them with valuable defense items, which were utilized effectively here on this emminenece held by the Poles - a portable Cheval de Frise (French for 'Frisian horses'), and the Scweinfedder (the 'Swedish feather', or 'Swine feather'). The bayonet was not yet in use, and musketeers often adopted defensive weapons to protect themselves from cavalry. This small version of the Cheval de Frise consisted of a portable frame, probably a simple log, with many long iron spikes protruding from it. It was erected more in camp and principally intended to stop cavalry dead in its tracks, but was not a serious obstacle to the passage of mobile infantry. But here Hepburn was using smaller versions. The Scweinfedder was a pointed stake (a half-pike about seven feet long) and musket-rest combination, which had replaced the more cumbersome fork-firing rest. The stake was planted pointing toward the enemy cavalry (the musket rested upon a loop) to act as a defensive obstacle, particularly against shock cavalry. Gustavus' Swedish army used the Scweinfedder in the Polish campaign more so than against their enemies in Germany later probably because the terrain offered better cover against cavalry, and there was less cavalry in Germany than Poland. They quickly placed these obstacles along their front (remember, they were portable), and it aided the pikemen greatly in resisting the desperate charges of the Polish horsemen. Their German allies, armed with muskets, aided immeasurably in the effectuated defensive. Hepburn and his force withstood the Polish army for two days. Soon, however, as I stated, they would certainly be overcome by an amalgam of fire and shock from a preponderance of enemy forces (the time between reloading rendered them extremely vulnerable), so they withdrew, both sides being proportionately scathed very little. Clearly, though screened by field fortifications and good discipline and management, fighting the Polish cavalry was still a tall order. While this desperate action was taking place, and the attention of the Poles entirely occupied on Hepburn, Gustavus himself managed to pass a strong force of men and a store of ammunition into the town from the north side, and then turned to protect Thurn's withdrawal, at which point the husaria could make no headway before Gustavus' triple-lined infantry firepower - the Swedish Salvee; two husaria charges were unsuccessful. Sigismund III, seeing that Gustavus had achieved his purpose of relieving Gniew, retired with the loss of some 500 men. It is quite possible that Sigismund III could have thought Gustavus was in force the entire time, and with his artillery, thus they may have thought he was trying to draw them from their good position. The Swedes did not outright beat the Poles and compel them to flee scatteringly, but the town of Gniew was re-victualed and the garrison substantially strengthened by Gustavus. Moreover, the terrain around Gniew would surely be utilized by Gustavus to neutralize any devastating effect the Polish cavalry could usually rely upon. Nevertheless, it was a superbly handled operation on the part of Gustavus. The Polish historian Jerzy Teodorczyk calls this battle the first defeat of the husaria, but I think it should more appropriately be called the first prevention of a defeat at the hands of the husaria. It will not do to say firepower stopped the husaria; the Swedes were the best drilled musketeers with the lightest wheel-lock muskest available, but the time that a riflemen in a pit was invulnerable against horsemen was more than two centuries away. Gustavus' new system of salvos proved effective, but in large part because he utilized flooded terrain and palisades etc. to nullify the charging Polish horsemen. Though Gustavus would begin to endure some severe harassing from better-led enemy forces, with the terrific Stanislaw Koniecpolski coming onto the scene in November, 1626, the object of his campaign so far a success (albeit he was barely challenged militarily, and he wasn't gaining what he wanted with his prime object, Danzig) - to secure a base of operations encircling Danzig; the Swedes' main holdings were Putzig (modern Puck), Tczew (Dirschau), Gniew (Mewe), Elbing (modern Elblag), Brunsberga (Braunsberg, modern Braniewo), and Pillau (modern Baltiysk). Oxenstierna was placed in overall command in October, as Gustavus returned to Sweden to organize reinforcements. It seems Sigismund III overtured peace, but the ministry and people of Sweden supported Gustavus' refusal to what he deemed were unacceptable conditions, which included the kingship be returned to Sigismund III. At the end of 1626, probably in November, Koniecpolski, who had arrived with great celerity from the east with a little over 6,000 men, began a counter-offensive to reopen the Vistula and relieve the blockade of Danzig. Now, the Swedes would be up against a superb commander, commanding the vaunted husaria. Cavalry action took place around Neuteich (modern Nowy Staw) on January 7-17 of 1627, resulting in Swedish reiters heavily scattering Polish foragers. But Koniecpolski swiflty retook Putzig and captured Gniew by stout diversionary moves, and entrenched his forces. He had quickly captured Putzig in early April, 1627, which reopened Danzig's communications with Germany. But the Swedes' lines to Pillau remained intact. Moreover, the Swedes defeated a Lithuanian force near Koknese (Kokenhausen) in December, 1626, detracting a threat to their position there. On April 13 of 1627, Stanislaw Koniecpolski decisively intercepted a force of about 2,500-4,000 recruited from Germany, marching east from Hammerstein (modern Czarne) through Pomerania for Gustavus, and drove them back to Hammerstein, which he forced two days later into capitulation. Earlier sources state this force numbering 8,000, but this is certainly a magnification. I have recently read it was 4,000, and some say the figure of 2,500 was the total number, others say 2,500 was the casualty figure. Radoslaw Sikora says Koniecpolski's force outnumbered the force coming from Germany by very little, thus, if we sustain Sikora's information, 8,000 is certainly incorrect. Whatever the actual number, few Swedes, if any, took place in the battle, and the captured infantry were incorporated into the Polish army. Much of the surviving cavalry rode back to Germany. As it turned out, the Swedes' plans to strike at Koniecpolski from the other direction was foiled by the flooding of the Vistula. Gustavus returned to Poland, landing at Pilawa (Pillau, modern Baltiysk) on May 8, 1627 with about 7,000 infantry, followed a month later by 1,700 cavalry. When he reached the army entrenched around Tczew (Dirschau), he found his total troop strength in Poland had increased to over 22,000 by heavy recruitment. But they were scattered in garrisons, and Koniecpolski could move freely. Georg Wilhelm, the Elector of Brandenburg, took up arms against Gustavus, but Gustavus made short diplomatic work of the small force of about 2,000 men ('blue coats') near Mohrungen (modern Morag), and enlisted them under his own standard. Wilhelm would henceforth remain neutral. After some cavalry skirmishing in early May of 1627, in which Gustavus was nearly cut down, he approached the defensive works around the Danziger Haupt, a large mound at the west mouths of the Vistula. On the Vistula adjacent from Kiezmark (Kasemark, about eight miles SE of Danzig), Gustavus had his eye on a redoubt, which he sought to secure. In the course of a night attack across the Vistula in flat-bottomed boats, he was shot in the hip on the night of 22-23 of May. He was forced to retire, the action halted, the 'Danziger Head' was reinforced and secured, and he was laid up for a month. Koniecpolski began to concentrate his forces just south of the Swedish positions and Sigismund III threatened Jakob De la Gardie's holds in Livonia. As a result, Gustaf Horn was sent there with men to ready themselves for any contingencies. The Swedish operational goal now was seemingly to buttress the region of the eastern side of the Vistula they held, and to defend their hold on Tczew (Dirschau), about fifteen miles down the Vistula. Danzig now could only be threatened from the east by Gustavus, as Putzig was in Polish hands. Koniecpolski didn't possess enough infantry and artillery to threaten Tczew (Dirschau) itself, so his operational aim was to deny the Swedes access to the eastern routes to Danzig, and lure Gustavus into the open field quick enough to do battle before Swedish artillery could be effected, a situation which would certainly favor his husaria. At the beginning of June, Marcin Kazanowski led a forceful cavalry swoop towards Brunsberga (Braunsberg, modern Braniewo); Gustavus arrived to prevent its capture, but Kazanowski got clear before getting lured out of safety. It was a clever diversion, as Koniecpolski was free to strike at Gniew: within a month, Gustavus had attempted again to capture Kiezmark, and succeeded. Thus, Danzig was deprived of a rich supply region. However, this gain was offset by Koniecpolski's seizure of Gniew (Mewe) on July 5, 1627, and with it a vital crossing-point on the Vistula. Koniecpolski began reconnoitring the Swedish works around Tczew (Dirschau) in early August with about 7,800 men, of which about 4,500 were cavalry; Koniecpolski was facing east. Gustavus' field army for the upcoming battle was slightly over 10,294, of which 4,100 were cavalrymen. He possessed maybe twenty guns at most. A Swedish force for the garrison of Tczew, numbering 1,658 soldiers, crossed the Vistula from the eastern side, and into the stronghold. Knowing that the Polish cavalry was virtually impossible to beat on open ground, the Swedes expanded their bridgehead with a longline of fortifications. The route west of Tczew ran through the defile of the marshy Motlawa river. The Poles moved to block the Swedes from advancing beyond this point, encamping close on the western side of the river. But Gustavus knew that the Poles didn't have enough infantry to storm his fortifications, thus he didn't need to 'breakout', as some critics imply he failed at doing so. But he also was keenly aware that his cavalry was vulnerable if not utilized properly. He had some success against the Poles by using fortifications, artillery, and defiles to prevent the Poles from using their cavalry to its full potential, but he had to be cautious. Koniecpolski was a very experienced soldier and despite his limited resources he had put the Swedes on guard. His army was faster on the march and had shown remarkable ability to outmaneuver the Swedes in the open. The Poles fortified their encampment, so it was going to be a standoff with both armies fortified on the west side of the river, slighlty north of Tczew. Both generals knew that an all-out attack by either side would not be advisable; the answer was to probe and hopefully draw the other side out, or force them to withdraw completely. The Battle of Tczew (Dirschau) was set to be fought, beginning on August 7, 1627. The Poles deployed pickets as Dutch negotiators were in Koniecpolski's camp. These negotiations were not bilateral, as the Dutch were mostly in disfavor of Gustavus' campaigning in Poland because it disturbed their trade with Danzig, and Albrecht von Wallenstein, successfull in Germany at this time, promised Sigismund III assistance. The Poles left themselves a vulnerable spot, a situation any good commander will exploit - to strike at one's Achilles Heel, particularly when the enemy will destroy you with their vaunted weapon if fought under conditions viable for the utilization of that weapon. In this case with the husaria, an open field. Gustavus' concern of the husaria was genuine, and that fear of them understandably influenced his operational strategy. As devastating and impressive the Battle of Kircholm, the Swedish catastrophe in 1605 at the hands of the redoubtable Jan Chodkiewicz, was as a display of the formidability and prowess of the husaria in the open field when drawing out an impetuous opponent (Karl (Charles) IX) came off the higher ground, fooled into believing they were retreating), it induced a false sense of security. When Gustavus invaded in 1621, many fortresses throughout Livonia and Ducal Prussia on the Baltic were not defended adequately. Gustavus took advantage of this situation very smartly, and coupled with his army revisions, he would never again allow, to reiterate, a defeat like Kircholm to afflict his army. Gustavus attacked the Polish picket lines with his skirmishers, and had his attackers retire back to his entrenchments when Koniecpolski counter-attacked in force with much of his cavalry. Gusatvus was attempting to lure them into his infantry positions, conditions under which he could blast them with firepower. But once they chased away his skirmishers, they refused to be lured out, and Koniecpolski refused to be lured in, as Sigismund III had at Gniew the previous year. But Gustavus did attack the husaria here at Tczew - simply not when Koniecpolski wanted, or expected, him to; the remaining six Choragiews withdrew west along the marshy causeway, and Gustavus fell upon them swiftly with his cavalry, catching them off-guard. Here at this point of Battle of Tczew (Dirschau), Gustavus' unit of cavalry under the direct command of Henry Matthias von Thurn attacked six Choragiews (Banners) of Polish cavalrmen, after Koniecpolski left with the bulk of his horsemen when it reached a point Gustavus seemingly wouldn't come out to fight. But the stout Polish counter-attack, which included the arrival and attack of a unit under Marcin Kazanowski, would have most likely beaten them, as Thurn's right wing was seriously threatened. But such a contingency Gustavus was prepared for, as he held a reserve unit under Erik Soop on hand, and came in and, combined with Thurn's stabilizing of his own unit, sent the husaria (and two Choragiew of lighter cavalry) into flight. The husaria were the most formidable heavy cavalry (though 'heavy', they could move darn fast!) of their day, but Gustavus' reformed cavalry was hardly three times worse than the husaria; if the Poles had been outnumbered by such vast odds (three to one), as they claim, they would have been crushed. As it happened, they were thrown back, but not scattered terribly. By whatever they were outnumbered upon Gustavus' surprise salvo, the arrival of Kazanowski closed that gap, and they still were repulsed. A Choragiew numbers about 200 men, but the numbers vary. Thus, I think it is possible 1,800 Swedes defeated 1,200 Poles that first day around Tczew (Dirschau). The Poles' counter-attack would have seemingly handled the first wave, but Gustavus was prepared. Also, I have read from one account that the Poles retreated because all their lances broke. With respect to who wrote that, this is not credible. All their lances (kopias)? Every one of them? If this was true, could they not fight the Swedes with their sabres (szablas)? True, a hussar's kopia was constructed with its center bored out to lighten it, and its length, over 15 ft. (5+ meters), made it pliable to the point it would often break. Moreover, it was considered a dishonor for a hussar to return from combat with an intact kopia. But a broken kopia can still be 10 ft., certainly still useful, and a hussar carried more than one into battle. I realize this is all rationalization, though. Gustavus was merely exercising more patience then they were. Sure he wanted to leave his camp, but, again, not under their expectations or terms. For all he knew (again), they were trying to draw him out, feign a calculated retreat, and attack him in the manner that befell his father 22 years earlier. The Poles claimed six banners were 600 men in this battle. From what I have read, a banner, or Choragiew, contains around 200 horsemen (sometimes 240). This is from Radoslaw Sikora, amid his article on husaria tactics, "...A banner with 200 Hussars attacks a regiment of infantry with 600 men (400 musket and 200 pike)...", This is comes from one Marciej Rymarz's description of the Polish/Lithuanian attack on Swedish-held Warsaw in 1656, "...The Hussars totaled approximately 1,000-1,100 men, in eight banners (six Crown and two Lithuanian), so were quite few in number especially compared to the force that might have been raised in earlier years..." Well, I'm guilty of over-rationalization, as I should consider there was no fixed number for a Choragiew; it seems they could be as low as 60. But we are indeed talking about the 'earlier years', specifically here at Tczew (Dirschau), thus it is more likely the 1,800 horsemen under Henry Matthias von Thurn and Erik Soop faced 1,200 or so husaria (maybe more, with Kazanowski coming onto the scene, if he wasn't counted in the enumerations), who were left behind after Koniecpolski thought they weren't coming out of their camp. Maybe some Choragiews numbered 100 or less at other times, but in this case, 600 husaria against three times their number of Swedish cavalry, now only slightly less formidable per se, would have been crushed at a much quicker level than what happened. Koniecpolski's quickly administered counter-attack indeed would have seemingly overwhelmed Thurn, but Soop was placed to stabilize such a contingency, which he did. This 1.5:1 (or a little less) ratio was enough for Gustavus' reformed cavalry, with supporting musketeers (for the first significant time), to repulse them. They pursued them until the Irish mercenary leader James Butler and his musketeers, well placed, prevented any overwhelming rout of the withdrawing husaria. What a novelty for the Swedes to witness: the husaria withdrawing after a fight with their own horsemen, even if not a scattered and wildly broken retreat. In another clash of horsemen, Herman Wrangel, positioned with conduciveness, held up against the counter-attack by Kazanowski. But this also halted any Swedish futher advance. If not thoroughly beaten back, the fact Kazanowski withdrew and Wrangel did not clearly indicates the Poles conceded. Both sides may have been in the same position when they started, but the first day was a tactical success for the Swedes; it was the Poles who withdrew and returned to their camp, not a mutual scenario. Radoslaw Sikora's implication that because the Poles weren't destroyed means they didn't lose that first day (he thinks the battle was a draw) is not tenable, in my opinion. Why must one destroy the enemy to qualify as a defeat of that enemy? How many victories akin to Cannae and Mohi have occured throughout military history? But perhpas there's a translation problem: Sikora's words have been misconstrued before (click here). With all that opined, though, one thing is certain: the Polish husaria were still too strong for Gustavus on their terms. He could only beat them with a method of supporting firepower for his cavalry, and entrenchments with his infantry, as well as careful maneuvering, including catching them unawares with his cavalry. The claim that Gustavus' reformed cavalry could match the Poles on equal terms is, in my opinion, overall superficial. But his mounted arm was improving by the year, and if the husaria and other enemy horsemen were forced to fight without the benefit of their charges, the cuirassiers under Gustavus proved a tough foe: according to the State Archive of Gdansk (formerly Danzig), the Danziger secretary, one Johann Chemnitz, stated, "...the (hussar) lances were able to do little against the (Swedish) breastplates, whereas so many of them broke that they (the Poles) were encumbered by wood when they needed to come away again..." From this assessment, it seems the hollowed kopia of the husaria was a more effective and efficient killer against less well-armored opponents, such as Turkish and Russian lighter horsemen and infantry; it seems here it was more a psychologically morale-breaking weapon than a multiple-killing or maiming one against armored heavy horsemen opposed to them. But the same can be stated for the advanced Swedish artillery and firepower of the day. it would be substantial if we had more recorded statements like that of the Danziger Secretary. The first day had been a cavalry duel, with some of Gustavus' horsemen supported by musketeer fire, and on the Polish side, James Butler firing on the pursuing Swedes. The Battle of Tczew (Dirschau) commenced on a second day on August 8, and despite the descriptions I have read that the Polish guns were in a better position, and this position well protected, they never did inflict upon the Swedes with any significant battering, and Gustavus' leather guns and other cannons could have probably, with a little time, circumvented any defilades around the Polish camp (assuming the guns would not have high proportional problems of premature igniting, as was often the case). But the Swedes had twelve 24 lb. guns to bombard the Polish camp in addition. But a serious wound to Gustavus occured, in which a bullet hit his shoulder and then lodged into his throat, and another suffered by Johan Baner, who was in command of the important bombardment, precluded a thorough Swedish victory. Following his serious injury, Gustavus placed Herman Wrangel in overall command, and for some reason Wrangel, reputed to have been a more cautious commander than Johan Baner, halted the Swedish attack and ordered the Swedish troops to hold their postions in the Motlawa Valley. Once darkness approached, the Swedish army returned to it's fortifications at Tczew (Dirschau). But why did the attack stop, as victory seemed imminent? It has been theorized that Gustavus believed his wound was mortal; he had been shot in the shoulder with a 14-15 mm ball, which permanently dislodged into his neck, causing pain for the rest of his life. He perhaps didn't want to risk the loss of his army on this day of his death. Download 114.5 Kb. Share with your friends:
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