This research paper has been commissioned by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, but reflects the views of the author and should not be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the Commission
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- Direct control of launch
- Indirect Control of Launch
- Acquiring a Nuke
- Building a Nuke
- 4. Conclusion
3. Paths of Destruction Having explored how cyber terrorists can operate and the how the nuclear command and control systems are organised, how might a cyber terrorist penetrate these systems? Four main pathways exist for cyber terrorist to detonate a nuclear weapon: direct control of a launch, provoking a nuclear state to launch a nuclear strike on its own, obtaining a nuclear weapon from a nuclear state, or acquiring the means to build a nuclear or dirty bomb themselves. Direct control of launch The US uses the two-man rule to achieve a higher level of security in nuclear affairs. Under this rule two authorized personnel must be present and in agreement during critical stages of nuclear command and control. The President must jointly issue a launch order with the Secretary of Defense; Minuteman missile operators must agree that the launch order is valid; and on a submarine, both the commanding officer and executive officer must agree that the order to launch is valid. In the US, in order to execute a nuclear launch, an Emergency Action Message (EAM) is needed. This is a preformatted message that directs nuclear forces to execute a specific attack. The contents of an EAM change daily and consist of a complex code read by a human voice. Regular monitoring by shortwave listeners and videos posted to YouTube provide insight into how these work. These are issued from the NMCC, or in the event of destruction, from the designated hierarchy of command and control centres. Once a command centre has confirmed the EAM, using the two-man rule, the Permissive Action Link (PAL) codes are entered to arm the weapons and the message is sent out. These messages are sent in digital format via the secure Automatic Digital Network and then relayed to aircraft via single-sideband radio transmitters of the High Frequency Global Communications System, and, at least in the past, sent to nuclear capable submarines via Very Low Frequency (Greenemeier 2008, Hardisty 1985). The technical details of VLF submarine communication methods can be found online, including PC-based VLF reception. Some reports have noted a Pentagon review, which showed a potential “electronic back door into the US Navy’s system for broadcasting nuclear launch orders to Trident submarines” (Peterson 2004). The investigation showed that cyber terrorists could potentially infiltrate this network and insert false orders for launch. The investigation led to “elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders” (Blair 2003). Adding further to the concern of cyber terrorists seizing control over submarine launched nuclear missiles; The Royal Navy announced in 2008 that it would be installing a Microsoft Windows operating system on its nuclear submarines (Page 2008). The choice of operating system, apparently based on Windows XP, is not as alarming as the advertising of such a system is. This may attract hackers and narrow the necessary reconnaissance to learning its details and potential exploits. It is unlikely that the operating system would play a direct role in the signal to launch, although this is far from certain. Knowledge of the operating system may lead to the insertion of malicious code, which could be used to gain accelerating privileges, tracking, valuable information, and deception that could subsequently be used to initiate a launch. Remember from Chapter 2 that the UK’s nuclear submarines have the authority to launch if they believe the central command has been destroyed. Attempts by cyber terrorists to create the illusion of a decapitating strike could also be used to engage fail-deadly systems. Open source knowledge is scarce as to whether Russia continues to operate such a system. However evidence suggests that they have in the past. Perimetr, also known as Dead Hand, was an automated system set to launch a mass scale nuclear attack in the event of a decapitation strike against Soviet leadership and military. In a crisis, military officials would send a coded message to the bunkers, switching on the dead hand. If nearby ground-level sensors detected a nuclear attack on Moscow, and if a break was detected in communications links with top military commanders, the system would send low-frequency signals over underground antennas to special rockets. Flying high over missile fields and other military sites, these rockets in turn would broadcast attack orders to missiles, bombers and, via radio relays, submarines at sea. Contrary to some Western beliefs, Dr. Blair says, many of Russia's nuclear-armed missiles in underground silos and on mobile launchers can be fired automatically. (Broad 1993) Assuming such a system is still active, cyber terrorists would need to create a crisis situation in order to activate Perimetr, and then fool it into believing a decapitating strike had taken place. While this is not an easy task, the information age makes it easier. Cyber reconnaissance could help locate the machine and learn its inner workings. This could be done by targeting the computers high of level official’s—anyone who has reportedly worked on such a project, or individuals involved in military operations at underground facilities, such as those reported to be located at Yamantau and Kosvinksy mountains in the central southern Urals (Rosenbaum 2007, Blair 2008) Indirect Control of Launch Cyber terrorists could cause incorrect information to be transmitted, received, or displayed at nuclear command and control centres, or shut down these centres’ computer networks completely. In 1995, a Norwegian scientific sounding rocket was mistaken by Russian early warning systems as a nuclear missile launched from a US submarine. A radar operator used Krokus to notify a general on duty who decided to alert the highest levels. Kavkaz was implemented, all three chegets activated, and the countdown for a nuclear decision began. It took eight minutes before the missile was properly identified—a considerable amount of time considering the speed with which a nuclear response must be decided upon (Aftergood 2000). Creating a false signal in these early warning systems would be relatively easy using computer network operations. The real difficulty would be gaining access to these systems as they are most likely on a closed network. However, if they are transmitting wirelessly, that may provide an entry point, and information gained through the internet may reveal the details, such as passwords and software, for gaining entrance to the closed network. If access was obtained, a false alarm could be followed by something like a DDoS attack, so the operators believe an attack may be imminent, yet they can no longer verify it. This could add pressure to the decision making process, and if coordinated precisely, could appear as a first round EMP burst. Terrorist groups could also attempt to launch a non-nuclear missile, such as the one used by Norway, in an attempt to fool the system. The number of states who possess such technology is far greater than the number of states who possess nuclear weapons. Obtaining them would be considerably easier, especially when enhancing operations through computer network operations. Combining traditional terrorist methods with cyber techniques opens opportunities neither could accomplish on their own. For example, radar stations might be more vulnerable to a computer attack, while satellites are more vulnerable to jamming from a laser beam, thus together they deny dual phenomenology. Mapping communications networks through cyber reconnaissance may expose weaknesses, and automated scanning devices created by more experienced hackers can be readily found on the internet. Intercepting or spoofing communications is a highly complex science. These systems are designed to protect against the world’s most powerful and well funded militaries. Yet, there are recurring gaffes, and the very nature of asymmetric warfare is to bypass complexities by finding simple loopholes. For example, commercially available software for voice-morphing could be used to capture voice commands within the command and control structure, cut these sound bytes into phonemes, and splice it back together in order to issue false voice commands (Andersen 2001, Chapter 16). Spoofing could also be used to escalate a volatile situation in the hopes of starting a nuclear war. “In June 1998, a group of international hackers calling themselves Milw0rm hacked the web site of India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC) and put up a spoofed web page showing a mushroom cloud and the text “If a nuclear war does start, you will be the first to scream” (Denning 1999). Hacker web-page defacements like these are often derided by critics of cyber terrorism as simply being a nuisance which causes no significant harm. However, web-page defacements are becoming more common, and they point towards alarming possibilities in subversion. During the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia, a counterfeit letter of apology from Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was planted on his political party website (Grant 2007). This took place amid the confusion of mass DDoS attacks, real world protests, and accusations between governments. The 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai illustrate several points. First, terrorists are using computer technology to enhance their capabilities. To navigate to Mumbai by sea and to aid in reconnaissance of targets, they used the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite system and Google Earth (Bedi 2008, Kahn and Worth 2008). They also used mobile phone SIM cards, purchased in foreign countries, VoIP phone calls, and online money transfers (Part of 26/11 plot hatched on our soil, admits Pakistan 2009). Falsified identification and stolen credit cards may have also been aided by online capabilities. Second, a false claim of responsibility was issued through an e-mail to media outlets. Initial tracking of the IP address showed the e-mail to have been sent from a computer in Russia. It was later revealed that the e-mail was sent from Pakistan and routed through Russia (Shashthi 2008). Voice-recognition software was used to allow “dictated text to be typed in the Devnagari font” (Swami 2008). Lastly, the Mumbai attacks showed an increasing reliance on information technology by the intended victims of terrorism. This included Twitter messages, Flickr photos, a map of attack locations on Google Maps, and live text and video coverage of the attacks (Beaumont 2008). Terrorists could insert disinformation into these systems in order to enhance destruction, evade capture, or increase hostility between groups. Terrorist could even clandestinely enlist the aid of their enemy to enhance destruction. For example, at the height of a terror attack they could claim to have exclusive video footage of the attack, which requires a codec to be downloaded in order to be viewed. This codec could contain a Trojan which uses the now infected computer to silently launch DDoS attacks against their desired targets, such as communications networks. Building an infidel botnet prior to an attack could take on a wide range of symbolism, from a pdf file about anti-terrorism to an unreleased Hollywood film. Acquiring a Nuke The previous chapters of this paper have already illustrated concerns over terrorists directly acquiring a nuclear weapon. These concerns include a possible lack of security measures at nuclear facilities in Russia and Pakistan. All of the nuclear armed states have placed an importance on mobility in order to survive a first strike, which raises the concern of increased opportunity for capture or misplacement of these weapons. Dummy warheads, such as those used by India, could further enhance this risk, by providing a cover for the transport of real nuclear weapons. Computer network reconnaissance could gather information on transport schedules. In 2007, the US Air Force mistakenly transported six nuclear missiles on a B-52 bomber from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana. The nuclear warheads in the missiles were supposed to have been removed before taking the missiles from their storage bunker. These warheads were not reported missing and remained mounted to the aircraft without special guard for 36 hours. Ironically, an investigation concluded the reason for the error was that the current electronic scheduling system was substituted by an outdated paper schedule system which contained incorrect information. But upgrading these systems to electronic means will open the possibility of tampering by remote computer exploitation (Liolios 2008, Baker 2007). If terrorists did acquire a nuclear weapon, there is no guarantee they could detonate it. The majority of nuclear states, including the US and Russia, utilize Permissive Action Link (PAL) safety devices. A nuclear weapon utilizing a PAL cannot be armed unless a code is correctly entered. Anti-tamper systems can cause the weapon to self-destruct without explosion. These mechanisms vary between weapon types, but can include “gas bottles to deform the pit and hydride the plutonium in it; shaped charges to destroy components, such as neutron generators and the tritium boost; and asymmetric detonation that results in plutonium dispersal rather than yield ... other mechanisms used to prevent accidental detonation include the deliberate weakening of critical parts of the detonator system, so that they will fail if exposed to certain abnormal environments” (Andersen 2001). Tactical nuclear weapons whose nature precludes the use of PALs may be stored in similar tamper-sensing containers called Prescribed Action Protective Systems (PAPS). It is unclear how pervasive the use of PAPS and similar devices is among nuclear states, with multiple reports suggesting that many are protected by nothing more than simple padlocks (Peterson 2004). Information on PAL codes would be a high value target for cyber terrorists. Building a Nuke Acquiring the material for building a nuclear bomb or dirty bomb is another option for cyber terrorists. There are more than 50 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian use alone (Glaser and Von Hippel 2006). Civilian infrastructure is significantly less guarded than military installations and is more prone to computer network operations. They may not operate on closed networks or have the funding to implement cyber defences and training. Difficulties in nuclear forensics may make it difficult for a nuclear explosion to be traced back to a HEU source, thereby reducing a sense of responsibility for keeping sources secure (Allison 2009). If terrorists acquired HEU they would still need to build a gun-type detonating device. Open source information in the information age provides many clues as to how to build such a device. However it remains far from simple. Numerous states, with resources well beyond that of terrorists, have tried and failed to develop nuclear weapons. One alternative for terrorists would be to acquire a dirty bomb. Dirty bombs combine radioactive material with a conventional explosive. The radioactive material required for these type bombs are much more accessible. There are millions of sources worldwide for medical purposes and academic research. Dirty bombs are designed to disperse radioactive material over a large area. However the death toll caused by this would be minimal. The explosive device itself may cause more death than that caused by subsequent radiation exposure. The resulting financial loss from decontamination, lost business and tourism, and lost confidence and public fear caused by such a device, are what make them an attractive option for terrorists. As of May 2009, no dirty bomb has ever been used, although a few have been found. In 1995, a group of Chechen separatists buried a caesium-137 source wrapped in explosives at the Izmaylovsky Park in Moscow. A Chechen rebel leader alerted the media, and the bomb was never activated. In 1998, a second attempt was announced by the Chechen Security Service, who discovered a container filled with radioactive materials attached to an explosive mine near a railway line. The unsecure nature of radioactive contaminants can be seen in a number of incidents. From the ease in which they can be obtained, demonstrated by two metal scavengers in Brazil who broke into a radiotherapy clinic, accidentally contaminating 249 people, to the undetected transport of polonium-210 used to kill Alexander Litvinenko (Krock and Deusser 2003). 4. Conclusion This research has shown that nuclear command and control structures are vulnerable to cyber terrorism. Cyber terrorism provides the asymmetric benefits of low cost, high speed, anonymity, and the removal of geographic distance. Inherent flaws in current nuclear postures provide increasing opportunities for computer exploitation. Despite claims that nuclear launch orders can only come from the highest authorities, numerous examples point towards an ability to sidestep the chain of command and insert orders at lower levels. Cyber terrorists could also provoke a nuclear launch by spoofing early warning and identification systems or by degrading communication networks. These systems are placed at a higher degree of exploitation due to the need for rapid decisions under high pressure with limited intelligence. The desire of nuclear states to have multiple launch platforms, mobility, and redundancy, open the opportunity for misplaced or misdirected warheads. Lastly, if a nuclear device were detonated, its destructive powern can now be magnified by computer network operations, such as misinformation or shutting down key infrastructure. References Aftergood, Steven. (2000). Strategic Command And Control. 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