*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention
Civil Society Assistance “Anti-Corruption” Goal Undermines Most Effective Civil Society Groups
Download 2.51 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Civil Society Assistance Fails: “Civil Society” Groups Don’t Represent Path to Real Change
Civil Society Assistance “Anti-Corruption” Goal Undermines Most Effective Civil Society GroupsEXTERNAL ASSISTANCE BYPASSES KINSHIP-BASED ASSOCIATIONS WHICH ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE Benoit Challand, Research Fellow-European Institute in Florence, 2009, Palestinian Civil Society: foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, p. 17 One of the problems is that civil society promotion does not really try to penetrate the sector of charitable organizations (and of Islamic ones), either because the latter is resistant to western aid sometimes perceived as a form of intrusion, but also because many of the western discourses on this second Palestine (in short portrayed as the “traditional” Palestine) do not see in it the prerequisite for success of civil society promotion. Why? For the simplistic reason that it is precisely “traditional” or too communal in its way of organizing itself, and therefore not yet ripe for “modern” forms of civil society support (namely institutional capacity building and the like). This goes hand in hand with some of the views held by development actors (touched upon in the following chapter) which apply Eurocentric methods without reflecting on the differences or commonalities that social movements have in the region. Thus, international aid considers that kinship-based associations and “strong ties to family…have often been received as an impediment to democratic forms of participation, and hence democratic development.” But the reality is different and there are no evidences that such communal ties affect civic engagement in a negative manner. Therefore the very exclusion of this second Palestine from western aid, it will be argued, is defeating the purpose of civil society, in its continuing struggle to improve democratic standards of the polity.
Marina Ottaway, Carnegie Endowment, 2008, Beyond the Façade: political reform in the Arab world, eds. M. Ottaway & J. Choucair-Vizoso, p. 4 The concrete steps taken by Arab governments to reform their political systems do not come even remotely close to matching the rhetoric. Many of the signatories of the eloquent declarations issued by “civil society” are not organizations but individuals who work for or with the same government they supposedly want to reform. Intellectuals engaging in the debate over democracy in the press are careful not to cross redlines that would bring down the ire of intolerant regimes upon them. Concrete change, in other words, remains limited at best. Furthermore, it is already clear that the process of change will not be linear. In some countries, particularly in Egypt, reverse trends toward greater authoritarianism are beginning to appear.
Francesco Cavatorta & Vincent Durac, International Relations Lecturers Dublin City University and University College Dublin, 2011, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: the dynamics of activism, p. 25 The third view proposes that civil society in the region has indeed been strengthening over the last decade, with a significant surge in the numbers of organizations being created. This is empirically confirmed in a number of studies on Arab countries. However, contrary to conventional wisdom about the expansion of civil society, this is not necessarily a sign that ruling elites are losing control of their own society. The main claim of those working within the third approach is that many civil society organizations are largely creations of the regime itself, while others are either beholden to the state or fully co-opted. This generates an artificial civil society where, at best, autonomy of action is severely limited and, at worst, it is an instrument for ruling regimes to keep a very close eye on social development and issues in order to better pre-empt opposition. In this context, the concept of civil society entirely loses its normative value.
Francesco Cavatorta & Vincent Durac, International Relations Lecturers Dublin City University and University College Dublin, 2011, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: the dynamics of activism, p. 25-6 Rather than considering liberal civil society as the beacon of enlightenment in the region and, by implication, conceiving of Islamist organizations as the “forces of darkness,” it seeks to explain civil activism through an analysis of the authoritarian constraints in place, which force all civil society organizations to engage in compromise with the authorities, leading the majority of them, therefore, to work within and, indirectly accept, the current system of rule. When it comes to secular and liberal groups, their weakness necessarily leads them to co-operate with the regime in order to obtain some benefits. The absence of significant funding, the limited appeal among the masses, the urban background of their support base and the controversial ideals they subscribe to are all factors that contribute to their marginal role. It follows that if they have a specific issue they want to promote, they need to cooperate with the regime, which can easily lead to their co-optation. The regime will give in on an issue that is marginal for its own survival, but which is important for liberal society and the outcome is to tie liberal civil society to the magnanimity of the ruling regime, to which they become beholden. One result of this is that liberal organizations prefer to accept the “devil they know” rather than taking the chance of seeing Islamists in power. The authoritarian nature of the regime, however, not only structures the way liberal organizations play the game, but has a considerable influence on Islamist groups as well, particularly if they are involved in charitable work. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS NOT MUCH DIFFERENT FROM STATE INSTITUTIONS Mathijs van Leeuwen, Professor Radboud University-Netherlands, 2009, Partners in Peace: discourses and practices of civil-society peacebuilding, p. 185 Many civil initiatives established in or immediately after conflict are tainted by a non-democratic and violent past. In both southern Sudan and Guatemala, local organizations had formed from the vanguard of the resistance movements and maintain their authoritarian or even military style of communicating and organizing. Those organizations continued to be dominated by their first generation leaders, as no efforts had been put into training middle cadres. Moreover, in Guatemala, after years of not being taken seriously politically, it was difficult for civil-society organizations to arrive at reform through other means than militancy. Often, there is much more continuity between civil society and (in)formal structures of governance than assumed by outsiders. In eastern DRC and southern Sudan, for many people with political aspirations, civil society functioned as an alternative to inaccessible government structures. As soon as opportunities arose, civil leaders started participating in state governance structures. Finally, in both southern Sudan and Guatemala, the question was if such organizations were representative and legitimate, as many of them depended for their continuation more on external financial support than on a legitimating constituency. As a result, such civil society initiatives had as little local legitimacy as the authorities of the state, so despised for their undemocratic character. EVEN ISLAMIST CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN MIDEAST COUNTRIES COOPTED Francesco Cavatorta & Vincent Durac, International Relations Lecturers Dublin City University and University College Dublin, 2011, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World: the dynamics of activism, p. 26-7 Contrary to expectations, many Islamist groups operating as service-providers are dependent on the state because they need the regime’s cooperation on a number of issues such as licensing or building permissions. In this respect they privilege efficiency of action over futile confrontations that might hinder their capacity to act and therefore act rationally in order to advance the associations’ concrete goals. This has significant repercussions for the more political organizations of political Islam within civil society because of the organizational linkages that exist between the politicized groups and those delivering social services. The first finding is particularly significant because it points to the fact that Islamist groups share with liberal civil society groups the tendency towards compromise with the regime and co-optation. As rational political actors, they realize that, to obtain some recognition for the work they do and benefits for their members, they have to be flexible and operate within the limits of the constraints that the regime has in place. But this results paradoxically, in the strengthening of the regime through reliance on the same informal and corrupt mechanisms that civil society actors often criticize. In conclusion, it seems that civil activism in the Arab world, while strong and widespread within both the liberal and Islamist sectors of society, is not conducive to democratization because it occurs within the constraints of the authoritarian regime. It follows that the lack of substantive autonomy and independence of the vast majority of civil society organizations does not promote democratization and therefore civil society plays a completely different role in authoritarian systems than it does in established democratic ones.
Amy Hawthorne, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 92-3 Sectors of civil society that could ostensibly be a platform for the development of a prodemocracy movement are not sufficiently autonomous to do so. The webs of control and co-optation are spun in various ways. Labor unions are essentially arms of the state, with their leadership appointed by the government. Professional associations sometimes have more independent leaderships, but their members, like union members, are largely state employees or depend on government goodwill for their economic survival. Chambers of Commerce are dominated by businessmen and businesswomen who similarly rely on close economic and personal ties to government officials for their business success. Many think tanks are not truly independent; they are staffed by private citizens but receive all their funding from the government. More nefariously, security services have infiltrated the prodemocracy sector, creating “nongovernmental” organizations to duplicate the work of and siphon donor funds from genuinely independent groups. Donors have difficulty distinguishing these front organizations from the real thing. More commonly, regimes have neutralized groups whose activities are deemed too sensitive by applying a combination of sticks (the threat of repression) and carrots (funding and political protection). (The region is replete with stories of feisty civil society activists who quiet down after receiving generous government funding, a sinecure, or other perks). ARAB GOVERNMENTS MANIPULATE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 257 Arab governments, furthermore, are learning quickly to play the civil society game. They are setting up their own government-funded and even encouraging, prodemocracy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks to organize domestic and international meetings of intellectuals and to issue statements, thereby helping give a democratic aura to the host government. What is missing, and what governments intend to prevent, are civil society organizations with large memberships. Discussions among individuals are fine, but discussions that involve membership-based organizations become threatening. The much-publicized meeting of civil society activists at the Alexandria Library in Egypt in early 2004 was, by design, a gathering of individuals not of representatives of organizations. RECIPIENT GOVERNMENTS MANIPULATE CIVIL SOCIETY TO APPEAL TO WESTERN DONORS Denise M. Horn, Professor International Studies-Northeastern University, 2010, Women, Civil Society and the Geopolitics of Democratization, p. 13 In the context of transitional states and US and EU foreign policies, however the paradox must not be overlooked. As Kubik notes, political scientists “tend to focus on transparent arrangements and mechanisms of accountability while they tend to neglect the task of identifying and analyzing mechanisms (particularly informal) of emancipation.” Similarly, policy makers tend to underestimate the actual “mechanisms of emancipation” when development democratization strategies. Where policy makers attempt to inculcate democratic values through the creation of civil society—by encouraging the growth of NGOs and other independent associations, for example – they must contend with the counter efforts of governments proclaiming the virtues of democracy while continuing age-old power struggles. As can be seen in cases such as Moldova, political leaders often pay lip service to the necessity of civil society—a “magic word often used to placate U.S. and Western European policy makers—while simultaneously undermining the growth of democratic civil society through legislation and other measures meant to inhibit and intimidate any possible opposition. In this light, we must not consider the rudimentary elements of civil society as sufficient conditions for democratization; we must also question whether these elements actually serve to instill the values and norms US and European policy makers associate with a free, democratic society.
Denise M. Horn, Professor International Studies-Northeastern University, 2010, Women, Civil Society and the Geopolitics of Democratization, p. 17 As gatekeepers, hegemonic states utilize a variety of tactics when looking to reinforce their influence within civil society. These tactics will be based on cultural understandings of power, the position of women within civil society, and the shaping the language of civil society. NGOs may take advantage of the opportunity structures made available to them, and frequently use emerging international norms to force states to change their stances on particular issues, such as human rights. However, the implementation of many NGO projects—particularly small, locally based NGOs—is often dependent upon outside funding. This funding may come from a variety of “gatekeepers,” all of which provide a greater or lesser degree of legitimacy to those NGOs—as well as determining the longevity of their projects.
Directory: assets assets -> Northern territory of australia assets -> Number: caveat in the [Will/Will and Codicil/Estate of] assets -> Invitation for Bid Calact/mbta for Standard Floor and Low Floor Rural Duty Vehicles ifb no. 12-03 November 14, 2012 assets -> 12 Step Retreats For Everyone in Twelve Step Recovery Ratner Fellowship assets -> 12 Step Retreats For Everyone in Twelve Step Recovery Ratner Fellowship assets -> Sigaccess annual Report assets -> Central Government is expected to ask the seventh pay commission to consider merging 50% dearness allowance assets -> List of accessible executive records assets -> Emergency telephone numbers Call toll-free from anywhere in France Download 2.51 Mb. Share with your friends:
|