Civil Society Assistance Fails: Organizations Compete with Each other for Funding

Civil Society Assistance Fails: Organizations Compete with Each other for Funding

Benoit Challand, Research Fellow-European Institute in Florence, 2009, Palestinian Civil Society: foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, p. 125

But Bourdieu’s notion of “champ” (or field) is of interest here to give more grounding to the reasons why PASSIA and BISAN might have actually hosted and promoted such limited (managerial) views on civil society. Bourdieu’s emphasis on the variety of capitals (economic, cultural, social, and symbolic) whose accumulation individuals compete for in a given field, provides interesting motivations to analyze the position of the two NGOs. Not only does writing a report or organizing a series of seminars on civil society provide a non-negligible economic capital, but it also enhances social and symbolic capital of the involved actors; socially, these NGOs are meant to play a leading role towards their sister organizations and fellow country (wo)men through courses and lectures given to other NGOs. In other words, such writing or courses giving includes a strong element of networking with dozens of institutions. Symbolically as well, this enhances their social position since it gives them the chance to appear through podium discussions, lectures and conferences on the issues that matter to them.

But by competing in a rather exclusive manner within the field of international donors, some local NGOs tend to forget about their domestic role and anchorage: gradually, apposition enhanced thanks to international “trophies” might become a double-edged sword when claiming to fight more on the domestic field. This will be further discussed and circumstantiated in the last chapters.
COMPETITION AMONG NGOs FOR FUNDS LIMITS THEIR EFFECTIVENESS

Dirk-Jan Koch, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, Aid from International NGOs: blind spots on the aid allocation map, p. 1

Doyle Stevick, Education Professor-University of South Carolina, 2008, Advancing Democracy Through Education: US influence abroad and domestic practices, eds. E. Stevic & B. Levinson, p. 119-20

“Individuals in postcolonial societies still tend to privilege those social relations determined exclusively through personal connections…These frameworks of social relations usually escape Westerners’ sensibilities, unless they are project workers with extensive knowledge of local cultures.” (as cited in Wedel, 2001, pp. 113-14).

Indeed foreign experts in civic education often gave their partners complete freedom to select participants of their choice, and this practice was one of the greatest obstacles to broad dissemination of donors’ materials and ideas. Foreign donors and experts who are aware of this problem could structure aid so that opportunities and resources are more likely to be distributed on the basis of need or merit, rather than through social networks and patronage. As Chris Hann explains,

“Those who succeed in establishing good relations with a western organization maneuver to retain the tremendous advantage this gives them …[in these hierarchies] where everything depends on patronage and personal connections.” (as cited in Wedel, 2001, p. 114)

These practices both served to avoid competition and to exclude rivals. Wedel (2001) observed that, “The promise of Western money and access often inspired secrecy, suspicion and competition among groups” (p. 93). Bruno further observed that, “It can be counterproductive to bring together previously unacquainted recipients…other recipients are seen as undesirable competition and the dominant attitude is one of suspicion” (as cited in Wedel, 2001, p.. 113-114). In addition, “Central and Eastern European groups often were unwilling to share information or otherwise cooperate with anyone who had not reached the status of personal friend” (Wedel, 2001, p. 113). In Estonia, one of the country’s leading figures indicated that s/he had never been invite to the sessions sponsored by another organization. A review of training documents revealed just one such invitation, dating from 1996. When I explained these dynamics to an American partner who had encountered him/her at conferences, he exclaimed “So that’s why [that person] avoids me at conferences!” (personal communication, July 2003). Without an awareness of these dynamics, foreign partners cannot address this typical problem: “In the absence of sophisticated, well-conceived incentives on the part of donors to help build bridges among groups, funding frequently inspired competition among groups, rather than cooperation” (Wedel, 201, p. 114).
NEED TO ATTRACT FUNDING PREVENTS NGOs FROM FOCUSING ON THE POOR AND TAKING RISKS

Dirk-Jan Koch, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, Aid from International NGOs: blind spots on the aid allocation map, p. 19

However, the view that NGOs have a clear focus on the poor has also been challenged. Research has shown that the claims of reaching the poorest of the poor have been exaggerated. Many case studies have shown that even if NGO interventions reach the poor, they usually do not reach the poorest of the poor (Steering Group 2002). For example, Sharma and Zeller show that NGOs services in Bangladesh “are located more in poor pockets of relatively well-developed areas than in remoter, less-developed regions” (Sharma and Zeller 1999, p. 1).

NGOs may however be reluctant to work in the poorest countries as they have to secure financial survival. According to the principal-agent model of Fruttero and Gauri (2004), the dependence of NGOs (the agents) on external funding (from official back donors as principals) tends to drive a wedge between organizational imperatives related to future funding and charitable objectives when making geographic choices. Principals have incomplete information on NGO projects, while future funding of agents depends on perceived success or failure of current projects. To demonstrate success, NGOs are as a consequence inclined to minimize risk, which weakens their incentive to operate in the poorest environments where failure may jeopardize future funding.
NGO COMPETITION FOR FUNDS CAUSES THEM TO FOCUS ON THE EASY CASES TO SHOW RESULTS

Dirk-Jan Koch, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009, Aid from International NGOs: blind spots on the aid allocation map, p. 20

In a similar vein, the so-called marketization of aid is supposed to have unfavorable side-effects which bias the allocation of NGO aid towards recipient countries offering “easier” environment (Cooley and Ron 2002; Fowler 2000; Lewis and Wallace 2000). The notion of marketization includes that NGOs increasingly have to compete for government and private funding. With the renewal of funding becoming less secure, however, NGOs may turn more risk averse and allocate aid strategically, by targeting recipients where success is easier to achieve. The poverty orientation of NGO aid may thus be undermined by increasing pressure from co-financing governments to demonstrate project-related poverty impacts. This may appear counter-intuitive at first sight, but there is casual evidence to this effect. According to Bebbington (2004), increased intervention of the Dutch government into co-financed NGO projects in the Andes raised concerns with the NGOs that they might lose funding unless being able to demonstrate immediate project-related poverty impacts. Visible results are easier to achieve when projects address transitory forms of poverty, which may induce NGOs to shift attention away from the neediest recipients.