*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention
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- Aid to Egypt Fails: Reforms Must Be Perceived as Internal to Succeed
- Aid Through NGOs Fails: Egypt
- US Won’t Solve Egyptian Corruption
Aid to Egypt FailsEGYPTIANS SKEPTICAL OF U.S. AID Lloyd C. Gardner, History Professor-Rutgers, 2011, The Road to Tahrir Square: Egypt and the United States from the rise of Nasser to the fall of Mubarak, p. 202 So, again, why was there such skepticism about possible American aid? The Gallup Organization’s chief analyst of the poll claimed the reason was simple: Egyptians had long perceived U.S. aid to be the reason why Egypt could not make its own decisions politically and why Egyptian “aspirations on the ground are not reflected in the way the country is governed.” In addition, he said, opinion would significantly improve if the United States would pressure Israel to halt settlement expansion “in the Palestinian territories.” But the main reason was suspicion that American aid only went to perpetuate the conditions of the Mubarak years.
Michele Dunne, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 224 Just as critical as integrating political reform and democratization with other policy goals would be integrating policy engagement with assistance programs. Assistance programs can be effective only as part of a coherent policy strategy including active engagement with the Egyptian government on the structural changes in law and practice that political reform demands. Aid to Egypt Fails: Reforms Must Be Perceived as Internal to SucceedEGYPTIAN PROGRESS ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS WILL FAIL IF MOVES ARE PERCEIVED AS A RESULT OF US EXTERNAL PRESSURE Robert Bowker, Center for Arab & Islamic Studies, Australian National University, 2013, American Democracy Promotion in the Changing Middle East: From Bush to Obama, eds. Akbarzadeh, MacQueen, Piscattori & Saikal, p. 122 Anecdotal evidence also suggests there has been an upsurge in participation by women in municipal elections in Upper Egypt—not without tensions as men reacted to the challenges this presented to male-dominated traditional society – with the assistance of Egyptian NGOs, some enjoying US support. Growing wage-based employment of women in manufacturing and service industries is likely to have a progressive effect, over time, on social attitudes. Together with the emergence of growing numbers of women in senior management and professional roles, mostly in the non-traditional areas of economic activity, and of a younger generation of female role models in civil society and business, continuation of such programs may perhaps, eventually, have some positive impact on the political system as well. But as demonstrated by the fiasco mentioned earlier, which saw moves in 2006 to condition US trade relations with Egypt on improvements in its human rights performance, too close or direct an association between political reform and US assistance in these and other areas is likely to be damaging for both the reformist agenda and US interest.
Patrick Cronin & Tarek Ghani, Director-International Institute for Strategic Studies & Policy Assistant-Center for Global Development, 2007, Security By Other Means: foreign assistance, global poverty, and American leadership, ed. L. Brainard, p. 205 However, democracy assistance faces significant obstacles. The U.S.-Egypt bilateral aid agreement establishes the Egyptian government’s right to veto any U.S.-funded assistance project or nongovernmental organization, which in the past has limited USAID in project selection and implementation. Only in 2003 did Egypt begin to allow ESF funds to be disbursed directly to nongovernmental organizations providing technical assistance and training in support of governance reform rather than requiring these funds to go through the central government.
Daniel Kaufmann, Brookings Institute, 2011, From Aid to Global Development Cooperation, The 2011 Brookings Blum Policy Brief, [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2011/09_global_development/2011_brookings_blum_policy_briefs.pdf#page=30] p. 37 Regime change and the rejection of the old autocratic political order do not automatically guarantee major governance improvements in the near future; hard work and major reforms will be needed, including new constitutions, competitive elections and the like. The fact that the ruling families, which were at the center of the economic capture network, are out of power does not guarantee a transition away from a captured economy. Some of the vestiges of the old cronyism may have more staying power and ability to morph than commonly assumed. Their ability to capture economic rents may not quickly wane, and they tend to engage in capital flight. In addition, new oligarchs and cronies (such as, in the case of Egypt, associates of the military, an institution with vast economic interests) are likely to emerge during the transition. The military itself may turn out to resist abdicating economic and political power, contrasting what experts predicted when the Mubarak regime collapsed. CRONYISM IN EGYPT WILL BE REPLACED WITH MORE OTHER FORMS OF SKEWED POLICYMAKING Daniel Kaufmann, Brookings Institute, 2011, From Aid to Global Development Cooperation, The 2011 Brookings Blum Policy Brief, [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2011/09_global_development/2011_brookings_blum_policy_briefs.pdf#page=30] p. 38 Finally, there is also a more subtle risk of elite capture during the transition—and this refers to the broader elite, namely, the educated middle to upper class, at the expense of the poor. In Egypt, the majority of the population is still poor and not very highly educated or Internet-connected, yet such a silent majority has largely been absent in the transition so far. It is also unclear who will represent their interests. Thus, even with less visible forms of crony capture than in the past, the risk that skewed policymaking will favor the educated elite at the expense of the poor should not be ignored.
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