G20 BEST AGENT
Homi Kharas, Brookings Institute Fellow, 2011, From Aid to Global Development Cooperation, The 2011 Brookings Blum Policy Brief, [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2011/09_global_development/2011_brookings_blum_policy_briefs.pdf#page=30] p. 14
The G-20 has the potential to be the “Goldilocks” of international groupings. Some bodies (arguably the UN) are simply too large to make effective decisions in areas where trade-offs are required. Others are too small to drive the global agenda and overcome global collective action problems. The G-8 may have fallen into that category with regard to economic issues. Still others, like the DAC, do not have the political heft to ensure that commitments made in the rush for outcomes at international gatherings are implemented in the sober days of domestic realpolitik that follow.
The G-20 is positioned to do better. As a leaders’ summit of the largest economies in the world, the G-20 certainly has the political will and economic clout to drive the development agenda forward. It has representation of all the economies that matter for the exercise of a full range of global development cooperation policies—aid, trade, investment, financial flows and even migration. Unlike other more representative bodies, the G-20 is sized to be an action-oriented group that can make decisions and implement policies.
EASY FOR G20 TO ACT
Homi Kharas, Brookings Institute Fellow, 2011, From Aid to Global Development Cooperation, The 2011 Brookings Blum Policy Brief, [http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2011/09_global_development/2011_brookings_blum_policy_briefs.pdf#page=30] p. 14
It is now time to turn this promise into reality by showing progress on the global development agenda. The G-20 should take global development seriously because it is a topic of considerable concern to the public in G-20 countries (as shown by various polls) and is also an area where consensus among G-20 members is possible despite the diversity of the group. Unlike financial regulation or the unwinding of global imbalances, taking the global development agenda forward does not require any G-20 member to trade off domestic sovereignty against a global good. This should make it easier for G-20 members to act.
EU CP: EU Democracy Promotion Distinct from US
US FUNDED DEMOCRACY GROUPS PROMOTE A DIFFERENT CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY FROM THE EU
Doyle Stevick, Education Professor-University of South Carolina, 2008, Advancing Democracy Through Education: US influence abroad and domestic practices, eds. E. Stevic & B. Levinson, p. 105-6
The third factor that defies the conception of donor neutrality, after the influence of public funding and donor advocacy, is the way ostensibly neutral organizations reflect broader ideologies. Guntars Catlaks (2006) provides crucial background for understanding how these different political ideologies are reflected in practice. He discusses how the different American and European philosophies are manifested in civic education programs and thereby sheds light into the different goals that each pursued through civil society:
“American model Civics programs favor more individual liberty and responsibility, while European programs emphasize the social network and sense of belonging to various social groups, from family to neighborhood, and from native town to country and nation….In the American Civics model, the focus dominantly centers on Law and Constitution, or more precisely, Fundamental principles of constitutionalism, as a base of democratic politics….The society here is basically the playground of the responsible individual, who knows the Law and is able to interpret it according to the Fundamental principles. The Interpretation of Law (Constitution on highest level) and ability to defend one’s own rights (and interests) accordingly are crucial skills in American civics…This is why court cases analysis, mock trials, and discussions on Constitutional amendments and the issues behind them occupy a very significant place in American Civics courses.
European curriculums endorse Lawfulness but in different ways. The Laws in general are more perceived as given value and sphere of specific knowledge and expertise (tradition of Roman law). On the other hand they are products of Parliament and tools of government, which are constantly changing. They represent the changing task of new policies implemented by changing governments, according the popular vote. In a way, the perception of Laws in the concept of democracy in European Civics is more diverse and complex: traditionally inherited as part of heritage and treated as Medieval architecture, but also flexible and subject to short term social agreements through political processes, rather than surfaces of underlying Constitutional concepts or fundamental principles as in U.S.” (Catlaks, 2006).
In light of these often implicit ideological differences, the mission statement of IFES—an organization with early involvement in Estonia shows its clear American (and non-neutral) aspects: “if democracy is to take root and thrive, a society must possess free and fair elections, an informed, engaged civil society, the rule of law, and ethical public officials who are accountable to the citizens they serve” (IFES, n.d.). While unobjectionable, its emphases upon the rule of law, accountability, and individual ethics are characteristic of American partners. Nowhere in this statement, for example, is there mention of cultural pluralism or minority rights, which are central concerns for European organizations.
*Neo-Liberalism/Cap Kritik*
Links: Democracy Promotion
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION INTRINSICALLY RELATED TO THE PROMOTION OF CAPITALISM
Dionysis Markakis, Center for International and Regional Studies- Georgetown University, 2016, US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: The Pursuit of Hegemony, p. 33
The third formative influence behind the strategy of democracy promotion is free market capitalism. The US’s commitment to the expansion of free market economies is longstanding, and arguably deeper engrained in its foreign policy than the promotion of democracy. There is a significant degree of overlap between the two though, and they should be seen as mutually reinforcing components of the promoted ideology. This is evidenced as early as the administration of Woodrow Wilson, who in his effort to make the world “safe for democracy,” was also seeking to expand American commercial interests. Wilson argued:
“Since trade ignores national boundaries, and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of the nations which are closed against him must be battered down…Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process. Colonies must be obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the world maybe overlooked or left unused.”
Time and again US policy-makers have stressed the belief that liberal democracy and capitalism share an intrinsic relationship. For instance, the National Endowment for Democracy claims that “an open market economy is a prerequisite of a democratic political system” (emphasis added). This reflects the fusion of liberal democratic political values and free market economic principles that comprises America’s ideology.
USAID DEFINES GOOD GOVERNANCE FOR DEMOCRACY IN NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC TERMS
Wil Hout, Associate Professor World Development in the Hague, 2007, The Politics of Aid Selectivity: good governance criteria in World Bank, US and Dutch development assistance, p. 73-4
In the view of US government officials, good governance would not be an exclusive feature of the public sector. USAID explicitly made a connection between the nature of the political system and the functioning of the private sector, and stressed the centrality of the protection of property rights:
“The prospects for development, and for effective development assistance, depend on the quality of governance – the way in which public power is exercised and public resources are managed and expended. Poorly performing states – those mired in poverty and illiteracy for decades – will not achieve sustainable development unless they dramatically improve governance. Only when the rule of law ensures property rights and low transaction costs will domestic capital be invested productively and international capital flow in. But corruption and weak rule of law will persist until voters have the power to remove governments that fail to perform – politically as well as economically.” (US Aid for International Development 2002a: 42).
“Sound economic policies,” which relate, in USAID’s view, to good governance, have to do with the functioning of national markets, as well as with the integration of developing countries in the world economy through trade and investment. Referring to the captions of two figures presented by USAID, “greater freedom means greater integration with global markets: and “market integrators grow faster.”
According to USAID, good governance is instrumental for democracy:
“For democracy to flourish over the long run, competent, transparent, and accountable government institutions are needed. Good governance provides security, operates according to reasonable standards of justice, and provides basic public services. Furthermore, democracy is more likely to be sustainable when it is held accountable by checks on its authority.” (US Agency for International Development 2005:5).
Democracy, apart from being valuable in and of itself, is also seen as central to US national security, as terror networks, which are defined as the “primary” contemporary security threat, tend to flourish in “failed states or weakly governed regions.”
SHOULD REJECT THE WORLD BANK DEFINTION THAT EQUATES GOOD GOVERNANCE WITH NEO-LIBERAL POLICIES
Wil Hout, Associate Professor World Development in the Hague, 2007, The Politics of Aid Selectivity: good governance criteria in World Bank, US and Dutch development assistance, p. 136-7
The issue of the conceptualization of governance is directly connected to the problem of the relation between governance quality and aid effectiveness, which was discussed in the previous section. Aid agencies that have implemented selectivity policies usually also adopted definitions of governance developed by the World Bank. It was argued in Chapter 3 that the understanding of governance issues in World Bank circles has been heavily influenced by neo-liberal precepts of market-oriented reforms. The Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) was and still is dominated by considerations related to economic management and structural policies, while issues of democracy, political participation, the rule of law and human rights are completely absent in this evaluation tool of country performance.
The neo-liberal bias of the CPIA, which is also applied by donors such as the Netherlands, has two important implications. In the first place, the concept of governance that transpires in the CPIA is overly economistic and leads to an overexposure of the implications of “governance” performance on economic effects of aid. There is broad agreement nowadays that development is more than simply growth of GDP per capita and at least should include aspects of health and education (as in the human development understanding of the term), as well as pay attention to the distribution of wealth. More alternative conceptions of development, social participation and self-reliance.
In the second place, the equation of “good governance” with certain types of institutions (in particular, more market- and property-oriented ones) and of “good policies” with orthodox monetary, fiscal, debt and trade policies leads to a bias against institutions and policies that do not conform to the post-Washington Consensus. Heterodox approaches, which are, for instance aimed at the maintenance of general standards of welfare or the self-sufficiency of a country in terms of food or energy production, will easily be cast aside as examples of “bad policy.” Cuba, which occupied the 52nd position in the 2005 Human Development Index, is an example of a country that has achieved good social results with policies that would be considered out of bounds by the World Bank.
Instead of buying in to the governance concepts developed by the World Bank, the development assistance agencies would be well advised to apply a multidimensional definition of governance. Such a definition should comprise the more political dimensions of governance (participation, democracy, human rights) and should avoid equating good with orthodox economic policies. Also, the economistic fallacy of equating development with economic growth should be avoided in order to acknowledge the diversity of objectives of public policy making.
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND NGO FOCUS FOR DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE ENTRENCHES NEO-LIBERALISM
Jens Stilhoff Sorensen, Research Fellow – Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2010, Challenging the Aid Paradigm: Western Currents and Asian Alternatives, ed. J. S. Sorensen, p. 10
The 1990s also meant a new possibility to promote democratization, with the idea that democratization and market liberalization went together. The Bank’s diagnosis for the disappointing results with Structural Adjustment in Africa was that the problem lay not with the policy but with Africa, more precisely with its states and governments. As early as 1989 it launched the idea that the solution in Africa was not just to have less government, but to have better government, or democracy. Since then the notion good governance has become the catchword. In Eastern Europe the concept was transition (from communism). Aid agencies developed separate budgets for democracy assistance and support to civil society. Here, another feature that expanded under neoliberalism was the increasing subcontracting of NGOs as partners in aid policy and their promotion in developing countries as well as in post-communist transition countries. Since the 1990s this form of assistance has been presented and construed as the promotion of civil society, which is considered an essential component of democracy. In many areas, NGOs have become favored partners, filling the space where the state in the aid-receiving society has been regarded as insufficient or undesirable as a partner.
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