*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention
US Only Engages in Democracy Promotion When it Supports US Interests
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- US HAS DECIDED IT’S INTERESTS ARE BETTER SERVED WITHOUT PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN KUWAIT
- CLINTON AND BUSH ENGAGED IN MIDEAST “DEMOCRACY PROMOTION” LIMITED TO THAT WHICH WOULD SERVE US INTERESTS
US Only Engages in Democracy Promotion When it Supports US InterestsUS IDEOLOGICAL BIAS IN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION CONTRIBUTED TO THE FAILURE OF THE ARAB SPRING Dionysis Markakis, Center for International and Regional Studies- Georgetown University, 2016, US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: The Pursuit of Hegemony, p. 177 Finally, the case studies evidence the inherently partisan focus of the strategy of democracy promotion, with civil society elements conforming to the ideology promoted by the US, supported against alternatives. This was reflected in the US Embassy in Kuwait’s leaked “Democracy Promotion Strategy”, which repeatedly stressed the need to support “liberal” and “moderate” actors, against those that were “Islamist” or “tribally-based”. In Egypt, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asserted explicitly that “we have not engaged the Muslim Brotherhood and we don’t – we won’t.” This ideological bias was the primary reason for the G.W. Bush administration’s diminishing emphasis on democracy promotion in the Middle East after 2005. Joshua Muravchik argues: “What sapped the vitality of the Arab Spring was the triumph of Islamists—the Muslim Brotherhood’s strong showing in Egypt’s 2005 parliamentary election, Hamas’s victory in Gaza, and Hezbollah’s ascendance in Lebanon. In response to the these election results, the G.W. Bush administration muffled its advocacy of democracy in the Middle East. Some democrats in the region even took a go-slow stance. To put it bluntly, these outcomes renewed questions about whether the Arabs were ready for democracy.” US HAS DECIDED IT’S INTERESTS ARE BETTER SERVED WITHOUT PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN KUWAIT Dionysis Markakis, Center for International and Regional Studies- Georgetown University, 2016, US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: The Pursuit of Hegemony, p. 160-1 Despite Kuwait’s seemingly fertile ground for democratization, with a relatively consensual system of governance and popular demands for reform already present, the US did not seek to encourage expedited reforms. A number of factors explain the restrained American stance towards democracy promotion in Kuwait. First, stability has remained the paramount US interest in Kuwait since the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Under Clinton, the containment of Iraq and Iran was the main emphasis of US policy in the Middle East. Under G.W. Bush the occupation of Iraq, and to a lesser extent the isolation of Iran, predominated. Kuwait was of relevance in both cases, primarily because of its geographical proximity, and the consequent need to ensure its ongoing stability. This in turn meant the continuity of the existing political system. Second, Kuwait serves as an illustration of the American position that authoritarian rule may well be preferable to democratic governance in certain cases. This was reflected in the US Ambassador to Kuwait, Deborah Jones’ assertion that US interests could theoretically be better served by a more “efficient, directive” government in Kuwait, akin to that of Saudi Arabia. A third factor is that the US will only support reform when viable candidates, amenable to its interests, are present. The relative strength of Islamists in opposition politics in Kuwait clearly negated this. Alan Misenheimer, the Deputy Chief of Mission in Kuwait, argued: “In the near term the legalization of parties would be likely to disproportionately benefit Islamists, who are the best organized of Kuwait’s political groups. Legalizing parties is a necessity for Kuwait in the long term, but in the short term it is preferable to allow non-Islamist groups time to gain the requisite political organizational skills.” The consensus was that in the short-term, political reform in Kuwait would likely produce candidates opposed to US interests, as was already the case in the National Assembly, where conservative and Islamist parliamentarians had opposed many of the reforms supported by the US. Brown claims that “as the parliament seemed to become a place where Islamists of various stripes operated freely, it was viewed as a less friendly institution in official American eyes.” This reflects the partisan focus of the strategy of democracy promotion, with liberal civil society actors supported against alternatives, in this case Islamist, elements. CLINTON AND BUSH ENGAGED IN MIDEAST “DEMOCRACY PROMOTION” LIMITED TO THAT WHICH WOULD SERVE US INTERESTS Dionysis Markakis, Center for International and Regional Studies- Georgetown University, 2016, US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: The Pursuit of Hegemony, p. 173-4 The promotion of democracy in the Middle East represents an important, albeit circumspect, strategy of contemporary US foreign policy. Like other great powers before it, the US has sought to propagate its political system and ideology, comprised in this case of liberal democratic political values and free market economic principles, far beyond its borders. In the Middle East, though, democracy promotion emerged to the force of American policy later than in other parts of the world. Since the US assumed primacy in the region in the mid-twentieth century, its interests have been ensured predominantly through authoritarian proxies. While this was also true of US policy elsewhere, for example Latin America, it remained the standard of engagement far longer in the Middle East. This began to change in main under the Clinton administration, which sought to encourage incremental economic and civil society reforms in the region, in the belief that these would serve as a prelude for political reform and a new era of regional stability. Under the G. W. Bush administration, in the aftermath of 11 September 20001, the promotion of democracy emerged as an exigent aim of US policy in the Middle East, this primarily because of the perception of the region’s “democratic deficit” as the underlying cause of the attacks. Therefore, in contrast to popular belief, the strategy of democracy promotion was not introduced in the Middle East by the G.W. Bush administration. Despite its more explicit rhetorical stance, it rather built on and augmented existing initiatives established by Clinton. Both administrations were continuing in an established tradition of US foreign policy, which has aspired to export a synthesis of democracy and capitalism as the necessary ingredients for the “good life” in each and every country. This has been evidenced across the world, from the Philippines to Panama to Poland. Where G.W. Bush, and to a lesser extent Clinton, did diverge from previous administrations, was in their application of the strategy of democracy promotion to the Middle East. 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