TIED NATURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ASSISTANCE CRITICAL TO ITS POLITICAL SUPPORT IN CONGRESS
Benoit Challand, Research Fellow-European Institute in Florence, 2009, Palestinian Civil Society: foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, p. 105
The first case is that of USAID funding, which involves giving large amounts of aid to NGOs. For example the Tamkeen project (Empowerment of Civil Society) was originally endowed with $33 million for a five-year period. However, only half ($16 million) will be given directly in the form of grants to NGOs; another $8 million is earmarked for “capacity building” and “institutional strengthening.” The final $9 million will go to the “machinery,” as this was described by USAID Civil Society Director, namely administrative costs for Chemonics International (based in Washington) and for Tamkeen’s own administrative costs (25 staff). Though the head of USAID Civil Society excuses the large amount of money remaining in U.S. hands, she is keen to stress that most of the Tamkeen staff are Palestinians. However, she omits to say that most of the computers, vehicles and furniture paid for by the grants must be of American origin. At the end of the day, probably much more than $9 million will remain in the USA. This technique is probably a way to ensure that the American legislator votes in favor of such massive USAID credits to “foreign aid.”
Humanitarian Assistance Popular
PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TRANSLATES INTO CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT
Lael Brainard, Brookings Institute-International Economics, 2007, Security By Other Means: foreign assistance, global poverty, and American leadership, ed. L. Brainard, p. 20-1
Strong public support translates into strong congressional support and substantial budget allocations. As a result this is one area of foreign assistance where the U.S. truly shines, bumping up against its spending ceiling in donations to most U.N. humanitarian aid categories. The United States is by far the biggest single humanitarian donor in the world and among the most effective and technically well-equipped. While development assistance has declined in real terms over the past two decades, humanitarian assistance has grown strongly. Steven Hansch estimates that humanitarian assistance could represent half of the total foreign assistance in ten years if current trends continue. A key challenge for the powerful advocacy groups, rock stars, public figures, and faith-based groups is to help extend the visceral emotional connection that many Americans feel with foreigners afflicted by humanitarian disasters to other types of giving, particularly longer-term development aid.
Aid Policy Reforms Require Political Capital
REFORMING U.S. AID POLICY REQUIRES SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CAPITAL
Lael Brainard, Brookings Institute-International Economics, 2007, Security By Other Means: foreign assistance, global poverty, and American leadership, ed. L. Brainard, p. 59
A significant reform of the current sprawl of foreign assistance activities to achieve greater coherence and efficiency would require significant political capital, fundamental organizational overhaul, and probably new legislation. Based on the analysis of previous U.S. reforms and the recent U.K. reform, a major overhaul of U.S. foreign assistance would likely require at least one and possibly most of the following five conditions:
--a crisis,
--an emerging political consensus that foreign assistance reform is central to advancing vital national interests in the face of new international challenges,
--personal commitment on the part of the president,
--congressional championship, or
--a concerted, sustained, and well-organized advocacy campaign spanning the political spectrum and uniting the disparate interests of coalition members around a clear and compelling goal.
*Hegemony Bad DA* Link: Civil Society Assistance
US USES CIVIL SOCIETY ASSISTANCE AS A WAY TO EXTEND HEGEMONIC CONTROL
Dionysis Markakis, Center for International and Regional Studies- Georgetown University, 2016, US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: The Pursuit of Hegemony, p. 22
It is further demonstrated by the G.W. Bush Administration’s emphasis on funding civil society programs in the region, which followed a template established by Clinton. The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) of 2002 and the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative of 2004 are two examples. These initiatives were devised with the intention of cultivating civil society in the region, in the express belief that “reform in the GME [Greater Middle East] must be driven internally.” The perception of the integral role of civil society owes much to the experiences of the Eastern European states during the Soviet era. There, civil society organizations, most notably the Solidarity trade union movement in Poland, assumed a central role in overthrowing Soviet proxy governments with covert US assistance. This eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology.
CLINTON’S EMPHASIS ON STRENGHTENING CIVIL SOCIETY AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN THE MID EAST IS PART OF A REGIONAL HEGEMONY STRATEGY
Dionysis Markakis, Center for International and Regional Studies- Georgetown University, 2016, US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: The Pursuit of Hegemony, p. 64
Ultimately the Clinton Administration was seeking to facilitate the conditions for a gradual, eventual transition to democracy in the Middle East, through an emphasis on economic reforms and strengthening civil society, as preconditions of political reform. Clearly this varied from country to country, and while this was true of the administration’s policy in Egypt for example, it was not the case in Saudi Arabia. Clinton’s approach in the Middle East can be compared with earlier US policies in Latin America, which in many ways have served as the template for the contemporary strategy of democracy promotion, and where the advocacy of free market reforms either preceded or coincided with US efforts to facilitate political reform. In Chile, for example, neoliberal reforms were introduced under the authoritarian Pinochet government with direct American assistance during the 1970s. Yet with Pinochet facing intensifying popular opposition in the 1980s, the US supported a transition to elite-based democracy. The Clinton administration’s championing of economic reform in the Middle East, a precursor to the Bush administration’s more direct emphasis on political reform, can therefore be seen as contributing to the strategy of democracy promotion and the pursuit of hegemony.
AID TO CIVIL SOCIETY DESIGNED TO EXTEND U.S. GEOPOLITICAL CONTROL
Denise M. Horn, Professor International Studies-Northeastern University, 2010, Women, Civil Society and the Geopolitics of Democratization, p. 20
Given the discussions in Chapter 1, it should be clear that the model I outline in this chapter is based upon the following assumptions: US and Western European foreign policy is a transmitter of values and culture, and as such, their democratization policies will seek to inculcate these values in others. Second, the role of gender in the development of civil society will also be tied to US or Western European expectations regarding the role of the individual within civil society, whether or not this may hold true in every case. Finally, hegemonic policies regarding civil society are based on these liberal ideals while also advocating for neo-liberal economic structures that privilege free market reforms and privatization of social services while limiting the possibilities for different forms of citizenship and participation, particularly for women. All three will have important effects on the attitudes and values reflected by civil society, because they will shape the way NGOs behave within civil society. Civil society will look, act, and behave in ways that reflect hegemonic influence, thereby increasing opportunities for geopolitical control.
CIVIL SOCIETY ASSISTANCE IS A WAY TO EXTEND HEGEMONIC CONTROL INTO DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIES
Denise M. Horn, Professor International Studies-Northeastern University, 2010, Women, Civil Society and the Geopolitics of Democratization, p. 25-6
Ironically, in those states with high political affinity to hegemonic powers and a high degree of receptivity to the growth of the NGO sector and civil society, the impact of a gentle invasion strategy is reflected in the tapering effects of such policies. Once local NGOs become sophisticated enough to survive and succeed on their own and civil society is capable of supporting them, foreign funders become less influential. Thus, the gentle invasion strategy should show to be quite effective in the early stages of democratic transition, but these effects will diminish as transitional states, their citizens, and local NGOs become more accustomed to democratic institutions. As civil society matures and NGOs seek wider funding both domestically and internationally, this strategy becomes less effective for the hegemon, while also becoming less costly. At this point, however, political affinity between the donor state and local NGOs should have increased, and the lessons learned by NGOs will have created a system of NGOs that closely resemble that of the hegemon. In this way, civil society will behave very much like that of the hegemon, while also sharing many values of the hegemon—a gentle invasion, then, is at once a utilitarian strategy and a normative process. Thus, this tapering effect is a marker of success, not an indication of the failure of these policies. These effects can be seen most clearly in successfully transitioned states, such as Poland or Estonia, which have been “graduated” from US assistance.
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