*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention
Impact: Military Intervention/Interstate Violence
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Impact: Military Intervention/Interstate Violence“DEMOCRACY PROMOTION” USED AS A COVER FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION Shahra Akbarzadeh & Benjamin MacQueen, Center for Islamic Studies, University of Melbourne & Sr. Lecturer in Political Inquiry-Monash University, 2013, American Democracy Promotion in the Changing Middle East: From Bush to Obama, eds. Akbarzadeh, MacQueen, Piscattori & Saikal, p. 2 The military response to September 11 against the Taliban/al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was swift and crushing. The same model was followed against Saddam Hussein after years of sanctions and diplomatic pressure. However, in both cases, despite quick and precise military operations, Washington needed a rationale to justify its continued presence once the old regime had been removed. Democracy promotion justified in terms of this neo-conservative vision provided the political cover for the lengthy and costly US presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. References to the importance of democracy promotion became the dominant theme, especially in relation to Iraq, as the United States failed to find thee feared weapons of mass destruction. Democracy was presented as the panache to the political and strategic malaise that affected the Middle East, most urgently the rise of violent Islamism. In a 2004 speech to the US Army War College in Pennsylvania, President George W. Bush made the following comments: “Helping construct a stable democracy after decades of dictatorship is a massive undertaking. Yet we have a great advantage. Whenever people are given a choice in the matter, they prefer lives of freedom to lives of fear…The terrorists’ only influence is violence, and their only agenda is death. Our agenda, in contrast, is freedom and independence, security, and prosperity…” As such, democracy promotion became an integral part of the ‘War on Terror’, providing the logic for activity outside the immediate security operations. The transition to democracy was presented as the antidote to the festering political alienation in authoritarian states, which provided an easy recruitment pool of violent groups like al-Qaeda. This linkage grew in popularity among US policy-makers, with Condoleezza Rice’s widely cited Cairo speech in 2005 was an articulation of its widespread appeal.
Leanne Piggott, Director Business Programs-University of Sydney Business School, 2013, American Democracy Promotion in the Changing Middle East: From Bush to Obama, eds. Akbarzadeh, MacQueen, Piscattori & Saikal, p. 94 However, the “Catch-22” for authoritarian regimes, and the US in its pursuit of regional stability, is that such policies breed disaffection in the wider population and the more a regime exercises its coercive power in an attempt to protect its rule, the more its institutional weakness and lack of popular legitimacy is reinforced. This is turn promotes instability, provoking the threat of violent resistance, and in some cases, violent action. The more violent the dissent, the more brutal is the state’s response. The more brutal the state’s response, the more violent is the dissent. For US policy-makers engaged in counter-terrorism, Islamist opposition groups that promote extremism and violence are a case in point. As Hafez argues in his book, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World, there is a strong correlation between political and institutional exclusion, on the one hand, and reactive and indiscriminate repression on the other. Islamist rebellions, he explains are “often defensive reactions to overly repressive regimes that misapply their repression in ways that radicalize, rather than deter, movement activists and supporters. *EU CP*Perm Answers: Acting Alone BestDISTINCT U.S. /EU POLICIES MORE EFFECTIVE THAN JOINT ACTION Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 263-4 In the Middle East, particularly at present, the roles of the United States and European countries are not as interchangeable. As noted earlier, the United States and Europe relate to the countries of the Middle East in different ways and are seen by them in a different light. The United States is distrusted, hated, but also seen as the country that holds the key to a solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. European countries are seen as more sympathetic to the Arab view of the Palestinian issue, more willing to engage over the long run, but also as less influential. The United States is inclined to resounding rhetoric, fond of splashy initiatives, but also quick to change course. European countries are more willing to engage over the long run and to toil quietly out of the limelight, but also timid when it comes to pushing Arab governments to reform. These differences, and the Arabs’ contrasting perceptions of the United States and European countries, could turn into an asset if Western democracy promoters accept the idea of allowing the two sides to play to their own strengths. First, however, both sides would need to admit that the differences are real, that they are deep rooted and not just the result of a temporary spat over the war in Iraq, and that they do affect what different countries can and cannot do in terms of democracy promotion. Joint U.S.-EU initiatives in the Middle East do not play to strength of either side but are based on a least-common-denominator approach that, in view of the differences, tends to be feeble. The example of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative launched by the G-8 in June 2004 at the insistence of the Bush administration is a good example of such a flawed approach. Reluctantly accepted by European countries after the United States agreed to dilute the initial concept, it is an unfunded initiative that will likely end up dong little to strengthen the separate efforts of the various formal partners to the agreement. US AND EU SHOULD ACT DISTINCTLY FOR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE – GOOD COP/BAD COP LEVEL COOPERATION NOT NECESSARY TO BENEFIT FROM DISTINCT ACTIONS Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment, 2005, Unchartered Journey: promoting democracy in the middle east, eds. T. Carothers & M. Ottaway, p. 265-6 We are not proposing here that Europe should play good cop to the American bad cop in a carefully orchestrated game where both cooperate to achieve the same results. Europe and the United States do not need to agree on what they ultimately want in the region in order to play to their own strengths but also to take advantage of what the other side does. Europe and the United States are unlikely to truly agree on may crucial issues concerning the Middle East, from the solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to the kind of regimes they would like to see emerge in the Arab world – democratic, to be sure, but what else? Yet the policies Europe and the United States pursue, even if pursued somewhat independently of each other, can have a complementary effect if each side plays to its strengths and recognizes the value of the other doing so. Directory: assets assets -> Northern territory of australia assets -> Number: caveat in the [Will/Will and Codicil/Estate of] assets -> Invitation for Bid Calact/mbta for Standard Floor and Low Floor Rural Duty Vehicles ifb no. 12-03 November 14, 2012 assets -> 12 Step Retreats For Everyone in Twelve Step Recovery Ratner Fellowship assets -> 12 Step Retreats For Everyone in Twelve Step Recovery Ratner Fellowship assets -> Sigaccess annual Report assets -> Central Government is expected to ask the seventh pay commission to consider merging 50% dearness allowance assets -> List of accessible executive records assets -> Emergency telephone numbers Call toll-free from anywhere in France Download 2.51 Mb. Share with your friends:
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