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Defense !—F-35—Allied Cred
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- Defense !—F-35—NATO
Defense !—F-35—Allied CredF-35’s key to allied coop Tirpak 9 (John A, Exec Editor @ Airforce Magazine, july, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/July%202009/0709Fighter.aspx) Gates, in his budget announcement, praised the F-35 as emblematic of his vision for new weapons, saying that it would be adaptable to a wide variety of missions, producible in large numbers at “sustainable cost,” and not too specialized. In contrast, Gates lashed out at programs he scornfully referred to as “exquisite.” By this, he evidently meant systems tailored to meet specific military requirements, lacking direct value in today’s irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, or costing more (in his view) than they are worth. He promised to field the F-35 as quickly as possible, accelerating the program by adding some aircraft to the operational test fleet. However, he didn’t change the overall target number. That would remain at 2,443 aircraft across all the services, reached in 2035. If Gates’ plan proves out, the F-35 will be produced in numbers exceeding 100 per year for US requirements, and top 200 a year when foreign sales are included. This production pace exceeds that posted by any fighter program since the late 1980s. F-35s will equip not only the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, but also the air arms of at least eight US allies who are partnered on the program’s development, and many others that will simply buy the fighter. Allied cooperation is critical to military readiness Office of Technology Assessment 1 (Congress, http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1991/9106/9106.PDF) The size and capability required of U.S. forces is related to their autonomy. The U.S. forces stationed in Germany or South Korea would have no hope of defending those countries alone and were never intended to. Clearly, if allies are fighting alongside, the requirement for U.S. forces is reduced. The logistical burden on U.S. forces is also reduced by host-nation support and the existence of secure lines of resupply. Required readiness levels are also affected by the degree to which the United States is willing to depend on allies to defend common interests. A rational division of responsibilities could leave quick response to those allies nearer the threat, while the United States maintains its huge reserve potential. The composition of U.S. forces will depend on the degree of allied cooperation. In many cases, efficiency calls for specialization. NATO is an example of how individual nations in a group have-to a limited extent-divided up military responsibilities so that each can become more expert at their tasks or geographic areas. For example, Denmark has special responsibilities to maintain control of its straits, which are important to all of NATO; the United States has a disproportionate responsibility in air power because it can be reinforced across the Atlantic quickly; and Belgium and the Netherlands have special logistical responsibilities in their harbors. The division of these tasks maybe obvious and straightforward, but no nation’s forces could do its job smoothly without the other nations’ doing theirs. The disadvantage of such a division of labor is that without the cooperation of the other members of the alliance, any single member may become vulnerable. As a simple illustration, if one navy were good at protection against submarines and the other at protection against missiles, then the two may be able to work together but each would face major problems working alone.
The Libyan operation would have been entirely different if the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) had been available. With its stealthy characteristics, advanced AESA radar, unique sensors and modern avionics, the fifth-generation F-35 would have allowed the coalition to establish a no-fly zone without having first to entirely suppress Libyan air defenses. In addition, the F-35 could have conducted combat air patrols with a reduced need for supporting aircraft. This would lower both the cost and risks associated with the air operation. For example, the U.S. Navy could have imposed a no-fly zone with a single aircraft carrier; today, with fourth-generation aircraft, such an operation would require as many as three carriers. F-35Bs would have replaced Harriers in supporting the MV-22 Osprey when it rescued the downed U.S. pilot. As a consequence of the reduced need for unique air assets that only the U.S. deploys, NATO allies operating their own fleets of F-35s could have implemented the no-fly zone by themselves. Against modern air defenses, the F-35 could make the difference between success and failure in future air operations. The F-35 would not only conduct both combat air patrols and ground strikes but electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air defenses and ISR. The ability of the F-35 to share data will also lead to entirely new combat tactics. In combination with the F-22, the F-35 promises to revolutionize air warfare. U.S. allies and F-35 partner countries recognize that the F-35 is their only chance to retain a capability for modern air operations. F-35 is key to NATO Brady 10 (General, Roger, USAFA, http://www.afa.org/events/AWS/2009/post_Orlando/scripts/2009_aws_panel_EAO.pdf) Six of nine F-35 partners are in Europe. Most importantly, I think, we are in Afghanistan, as you know, with 41 countries. Of the 40 partners that we have in Afghanistan, 34 of them are from Europe. I think it’s instructive. Mr. Biden at the Munich Conference just recently said, “Americans and Europeans still look to one another before they look to anyone else.” So our European partnership is extraordinarily important to us when we try to defend the ideas of freedom around the world. We always find partners in Europe. Continues… F-35 is critical to maintaining leadership in NATO and Europe. We’re programmed to have it. And we’re in the process of trying to pull that arrival to the left. Directory: 2011 2011 -> Enterprise Network Management iPost: Implementing Continuous Risk Monitoring at the Department of State 2011 -> Voices of the Old Sea Norman Lewis 2011 -> Malevil Robert Merle 2011 -> The Elephant Keeper’s Children Peter Hoeg 2011 -> January 1: Ecstasy zZz January 2: King of Anything Sara Bareillis 2011 -> Tracks, Mixes, Masters, and More!: Analyzing Preservation Priorities for Multitrack Recordings 2011 -> Department of Electrical Engineering 2011 Annual Report 2011 -> Jv packet •Mars Colonization Affirmative •Mars Colonization Negative 2011 -> Asian Pacific Mathematical Olympiad(apmo) 2011 -> Registration Form (Rev. 8-86) omb no. 1024-0018 Download 0.9 Mb. Share with your friends:
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