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Impacts- Econ Good- A2: War- Goldstein
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- Impacts- Econ Good- A2: War- Goldstein
Impacts- Econ Good- A2: War- GoldsteinGoldstein’s argument is logically flawed- explains a nation state level argument in the context of systemic level factors Cashman 2k (Greg, poli-sci @ Salisbury state U, What causes war?: an introduction to theories of international conflict , pg. 68) ET Goldstein’s explanation for the link between K-waves and war is that increasing production produces a great demand for these resources. This competition occurs during a period when production increases have made increased supplies of war material available to the military sector, drastically increasing the probability of war. (This is essentially a lateral pressure argument without the emphasis on population growth.) Since war is a costly endeavor, states prefer to engage in it when the resources are relatively plentiful. War is most likely to occur, then, near the end of the long-wave upswing. Note, however, that Goldstein falls back on nation-state- level argument ( the presence of economic wherewithal) to help explain a theory based on systemic-level factors (K-waves). Goldstein’s theory of upswing causing war is empirically wrong- 4 of the last 10 wars were in a downswing and only 2 were in an upswing Cashman 2k (Greg, poli-sci @ Salisbury state U, What causes war?: an introduction to theories of international conflict , pg. 68) ET What does this have to do with Modelski’s long-cycle theory? Goldstein argues that the hegemonic cycle and economic long-wave cycle, though they are not in phase with each other, operate in conjunction with each other. Thus, hegemonic decline does not by itself lead to war; it is only dangerous when it coincides with an expansionary phase of the economic cycle. Economic expansion by itself is not dangerous either; it must be accompanied by hegemonic stagnation. For example, the economic expansion of the 1960s was not associated with major wars because of the strong hegemonic position of the United States. Goldstein predicts new economic upswings to coincide with the continuation of American hegemonic decline between 2000 and 2030 Jack levy reexamines the issue, matching Goldstein’s data on economic production cycles against the ten general wars of the last 5 centuries. He is interested not in peaks of war severity, but in war initiation. When the production cycle alone is considered (after all, Goldstein’s theory is based on the rise and fall of production, rather than on prices or other variables), Levy discovers a picture at odds with Goldstein’s theory. Four of the ten wars were begun during the middle or end of a production downswing phase, and two occurred at the beginning of an upswing- rather than near the end of the upswing, as Goldstein’s theory suggests. Many of the wars broke out near the transition from downswing to upswing, so that the causalities associated with them belonged in the upswing phase even though the wars might have begun in the downswing- explaining why Goldsttein found an association between K-waves and severity of war, but not between k- waves and war initiation. Impacts- Econ Good- A2: War- GoldsteinGoldstein is wrong- fails to take key authors into account Midlarsky 89 ( Manus, political science @ Rutgers U, Journal of Politics, Vol 51 No. 4, Nov 89, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131568 , pg 1068-9)ET There are heartening and disappointing aspects to both books taken together. On the positive side, the study of systemic, world, or hegemonic wars is now receiving separate and, I might add, highly successful theoretical and empirical treatment. This is indicative of the maturation of a science. Cognate elements of a phenomenon are analyzed separately from the remainder to see how well they cohere in the attempt at explanation. Additionally and importantly, how successful is that explanatory effort? Fortunately, in the case of Goldstein treatment, the answer to both questions is yes. The disappointing aspect emerges in the danger that analysts of systemic wars may become increasingly divorced from those who treat smaller wars. This danger is already foreshadowed in the two books under review here. Neither Modelski, Levy, nor Doran are referenced in James' book. In turn, neither Bueno de Mesquita, Zinnes, nor Wilkenfeld are referred to in Goldstein's volume. The division already is appearing at this time, with unforeseen, but I suspect ultimately deleterious consequences for the field of international conflict research. Goldstein’s statistical methods were flawed- wrong groupings and lack of quantitative methods Rostow 88 (W.W., United States National Security Advisor, Journal of Economic History, vol 48 no. 4, Dec 1988, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2121682 , p.990 ) ET This book is flawed in a number of respects. The review of long-cycle theories and evidence is complicated by the effort to link the character of theories to the political orientation of theorists. The grouping proves rather unsatisfactory, with a good many figures disposed of in a few unpersuasive phrases; and there are some curious anomalies as well. While respecting Goldstein's effort to survey and give shape to the whole long-cycle literature, I can only report that, for this reader, it didn't come off. The flaw in Part Two is much more serious. First, as indicated earlier, the data are not adequate for a test of his long-wave/war hypothesis, with respect to time periods, quality, or variables covered. Second, the statistical methods and results constitute a reduction and absurdum of the present fashion in political science of reliance on formal quantitative methods. Goldstein is wrong- his empirics are based off of nominal rather than real figures- economically incorrect Rostow 88 (W.W., United States National Security Advisor, Journal of Economic History, vol 48 no. 4, Dec 1988, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2121682 , p.990 ) ET To get at the heart of the matter, it is simply not true that there is a systematic relation between the price trends which underlie Goldstein's "base dating scheme" and trends in production. There are good and bad price upswings and downswings. The first price downswing (1815-1848) was marked by a higher rate of growth in the British and world economies than the first upswing (1790-1815), when corrected for cyclical biases in dating. The second price downswing (1873-1896) was a period of deceleration in British production (not real wages) but accelerated growth in a good many other countries. The third price downswing (1920-1933) was, of course, accompanied by deceleration or decline in most parts of the world economy. The results of the upswings are similarly mixed. The clustering of major innovations is also erratic in relation to the "base dating scheme." Goldstein is false- historical summaries incorrect Rostow 88 (W.W., United States National Security Advisor, Journal of Economic History, vol 48 no. 4, Dec 1988, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2121682 , p.990 ) ET Finally Goldstein's historical summaries are inevitably thin, given the long timeperiod covered, his speculations on the past and future as well, and the complexity of the issues he raises. The human race won't get from here to "common security" by incantation, or even the joint exploration of space. The peaceful phasing out of the Cold War; the absorption into the world economy and polity of technologically mature China, India, Brazil, and Mexico, and other upwardly mobile states; the preservation of a viable physical environment in the face of the strains imposed by global industrialization; the patient provision of support for countries not yet in take-off; and the maintenance of strong, vital societies in North America, Western Europe, and Japanworking in partnership-and much more are implied by the decent aspirations evoked by Goldstein at the close. Download 0.75 Mb. Share with your friends:
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