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Impacts- Econ Good- A2: War- Goldstein
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- Impacts- Econ Good- A2: War- Goldstein- Wave theory
Impacts- Econ Good- A2: War- GoldsteinGoldstein only shows correlation- no causation claims Midlarsky 89 ( Manus, political science @ Rutgers U, Journal of Politics, Vol 51 No. 4, Nov 89, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131568 , pg 1065-1066)ET The core of Goldstein's analysis is the relationship between elements of the long cycle and what has been called the hegemonic war (more on that usage momentarily). As conceived of by Nikolai Kondratieff in his first 1925 publication, long cycles are waves of economic activity which undergo long upswings and downswings as measured by prices, production, and trade, among other economic indices. His legacy, although not without substantial controversy, has been to bequeath his name to what is now frequently called the Kondratieff wave. More recently, George Modelski suggested theoretical relationships between the Kondratieff wave (or more generally, the long cycle) and world war, and William Thompson, among others, provided empirical support for aspects of this relationship. In this book, data on prices, production, wages, and other important economic indicators are collected over the period 1495-1975. A total of 55 economic time series are used to test a bevy of hypotheses that Goldstein has collected from the long-cycle literature. What is appealing about these hypotheses is that they are frequently paired with their obverse counterparts, also culled from that literature. Thus, the first hypothesis-that "long waves exist"-is paired with its obverse, namely, that "long waves do not exist" (164). Or "war concentrations occur on long wave upswings" is coupled with "war clusters early in the downswing" (168). The economic time series then are used to demonstrate the strong relationship between prices and, in a time-lagged effect, production, with periods of war severity (measured by battle fatalities) occurring on the long-wave upswing. This is the major contribution of Goldstein's study-not only to confirm or disconfirm hypotheses in the long-wave literature using a variety of straightforward as well as highly sophisticated methodologies-but finally to demonstrate a robust relationship between two of the most frequently used economic variables in longwave research, and periods of war severity. These points coincide with wars such as the Thirty Years' War, the Napoleonic Wars, and World War I. The findings are used to construct a theory of long waves with production growth and war severity at its core. Goldstein wrong- based off the wrong hegemon Midlarsky 89 ( Manus, political science @ Rutgers U, Journal of Politics, Vol 51 No. 4, Nov 89, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2131568 , pg 1066)ET These accomplishments notwithstanding, there is a problematic area in the historical treatment of the book. And in fairness to Goldstein, this emerges not so much from his own analysis, as in his acceptance of the term hegemonic war, used by others, to characterize his periods of greatest war severity. The difficulty may be summarized in the question: Who is the hegemon at any given time? It is fairly easy to pinpoint hegemonic powers in the contemporary period, especially if one accepts the primacy of economic production and sea power in that determination. Great Britain during the nineteenth century or the United States during the latter part of the twentieth century easily comes to mind. But what of earlier time periods when the choice of a particular country is unclear and the criteria for selection are fuzzy? These difficulties lead Goldstein to choose Venice as the initial hegemon of the modern period beginning approximately in 1350 and ending in 1648. With a population only slightly in excess of 100,000 in the middle of this period, and a military size to match, it is difficult to conceive of Venice as a hegemonic power. True, in economic terms, and especially trade, she stood out from the remainder but is it sufficient to use only economic criteria and sea power in the Mediterranean, when the other bases of power are so meager? This problem points to the further difficulty of choosing either landbased or sea-based power as the principal basis for selecting the hegemon. Impacts- Econ Good- A2: War- Goldstein- Wave theoryKondratieff wave theory empirically false North 6/27 (Gary, economist and publisher and PhD in history from the University of California, Riverside, The Myth of the Kondratieff Wave, http://www.lewrockwell.com/north/north725.html, 6/27/09, AD: 7/6/09) JC THE K-WAVE These days, the Kondratieff Wave has a spiffy new name: the K-Wave. (I can almost hear it: "Attention: K-Wave shoppers!") The K-Wave is supposedly going to bring a deflationary collapse Real Soon Now. The Western world's debt structure will disappear in a wave of defaults. Kondratieff's 54-year cycle is almost upon us. Again. The last deflationary period ended in 1933. This became clear no later than 1940. World War II orders from Great Britain, funded by American loans and Federal Reserve policy, ended the Great Depression by lowering real wages. In 1942, price and wage controls were imposed by Washington, the FED began pumping out new money, ration stamps replaced the free market, the black market overcame shortages, and the inflationary era began. That was a long time ago. But the K-Wave is heralded as a 50 to 60-year cycle, or even more specifically, a 54-year cycle. That's the entire cycle, trough to trough or peak to peak. The K-Wave supposedly should have bottomed in 1933, risen for 27 years (1960), declined in economic contraction until 1987, and boomed thereafter. The peak should therefore be in 2014. There is a problem here: the cyclical decline from 1960 to 1987. It never materialized. Prices kept rising, escalating with a vengeance after 1968, then slowing somewhat – just in time for the longest stock market boom in American history: 1982–2000. OK, say the K-Wavers: let's extend the cycle to 60 years. Fine. Let's do just that. Boom, 1932–62; bust, 1963–93; boom, 1994–2024. Does this correspond to anything that happened in American economic history since 1932? No. More empirical evi North 6/27 (Gary, economist and publisher and PhD in history from the University of California, Riverside, The Myth of the Kondratieff Wave, http://www.lewrockwell.com/north/north725.html, 6/27/09, AD: 7/6/09) JC You may think that I am devoting way too much space to this. But I want my readers to understand why Kondratieff was wrong in 1925. His popularizers were even more wrong in 1975–85, with their "idealized" chart, and their contemporary heirs' unwillingness to learn from the fact that the downward phase of the cycle is now 44 years late. It should have begun no later than Kennedy's administration: 1932+30=1962. This assumes that the original downward phase was due in 1932. It wasn't. It was due around 1926: 1896+30=1926. It should have lasted until 1956. But 1945–73 was a boom era, with mild recessions and remarkable economic growth per capita. Forget about a K-Wave which is going to produce price deflation. The Federal Reserve System remains in control. Sorry about that. It is creating new money. Long-term price deflation of 5% per annum is not in the cards or the charts – anywhere. I recommend that you not take seriously arguments to the contrary that are based on the latest updated version of the K-Wave. The K-Wave forecasted that secular deflation was just around the corner, repeatedly, ever since 1932. It wasn't. Download 0.75 Mb. Share with your friends:
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