United states military academy learning from Lightning
Institutional Lessons of 1940
Download 174.98 Kb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Technological Lessons of 1940
- VIII: Conclusions
Institutional Lessons of 1940The official doctrine of the U.S. Army already stresses many of the principles used to great success by the Wehrmacht in 1940. Therefore it seems that the gap between the energetic maintenance of the initiative by the German Army in France and the more measured advance by American forces in both operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom has its foundations in the translation of doctrine into practice. If U.S. Army doctrine stresses responsibility and decisive decision making at all levels, the Army must reflect this thinking in its institutions. With these considerations in mind, the following policies are recommended. First, the U.S. Army should explore the feasibility of conducting recruitment on a regional basis. The United States certainly has the breadth of population to make such recruitment methods practicable. Additionally, the variety of regional subcultures present within the U.S. promises some return in terms of increased unit cohesion. While regional recruitment might complicate the basic training process, this drawback should be weighed against the concrete advantages arising out of superior unit cohesion. Second, the U.S. Army should look to enact policies that reduce turnover within its ranks. If regional recruitment is to have a lasting effect, the Army must refrain from shuffling people out of units after a set period of years. Even if recruitment is conducted along the present lines, allowing soldiers to remain with their units for a good portion, if not the entirety of their careers, would serve to increase the overall level of cohesion. Third, the U.S. Army should consider the delegation of authority currently held by central administrative departments to unit (perhaps brigade) commanders. Giving American commanders the ability to determine MOS distribution within their units, as regimental commanders in the Wehrmacht did, would certainly mark a significant expansion in the power of the commander over the lives of the troops entrusted to his care. However, this expansion would also serve to increase the sense of responsibility leaders felt for their men, increase mutual trust, and ultimately result in increased unit cohesion and fighting power. Technological Lessons of 1940Owing to the rapidly advancing state of technology, the lessons of 1940 in this regard are of a general nature. It is important to note that the Wehrmacht of 1940, having built upon the sound doctrinal principles established in the Reichswehr under Von Seeckt, had developed an operational concept and had then acquired the weapons necessary to enact it168. While rearmament along those lines had not been completed in 1940, the effect of using technology to enable doctrine were already evident. The very first Panzer IIIs armed with long barreled 50mm cannon came online during the course of Fall Gelb and the number of Panzer IIIs and IVs was increasing. 169 During the war however, at the whims of an increasingly erratic Hitler, the German arms industry was made to pursue technologically impressive weapons for technology’s sake.170 These programs consumed resources that could have produced the more conventional weapons necessary for fully arming the Wehrmacht.171 While tanks like the King Tiger and aircraft like the Me-262 jet fighter were superior to anything in Allied inventories, their complexity and expense prevented them from being produced in anything like the numbers necessary to defend against the Allies. The lesson to be learned is that technology is properly the servant of doctrine and the principles of warfare. As the U.S Army moves unrelentingly into the digital age, it will be important to resist the temptation to reverse this relationship. Recently cancelled and discontinued programs such as the F-22 fighter and the Future Combat Systems, demonstrate a tendency within the military to pursue high technology solutions to projected threats. While being at the forefront of technology has its advantages technology must not become an end in and of itself. VIII: Conclusions“The great proof of madness is the disproportion of one’s designs to one’s ends” Napoleon Bonaparte172 The German experience during World War II holds many lessons for the close observer. However, it is also quite clearly a tale fraught with caveats. The German Army forged combat units with incredible cohesion, lead by leaders with initiative and imbued with flexible and sensible doctrine that could achieve great feats. As Hitler himself once said, “The German soldier can do anything!” 173 The problem, as the course of World War II would show, was that there was little the German soldier wouldn’t do. The same unit cohesion that would lead Panzergruppe Kleist unflinchingly into the teeth of French fortifications on the Meuse and to victory on the Channel coast would also lead German troops to unquestioningly serve as accomplices to the greatest atrocities in human history. Clearly, the values of the United States are incompatible with an army that has sacrificed its conscience in the name of enhanced capability. Fostering morality in line with cohesion should therefore remain a paramount concern for the nation. In short, the ability to achieve anything must not be translated into a willingness to do anything. More concretely, the fact that Germany ultimately lost the Second World War demands attention. In a war largely decided by the strategic concerns of economic output, population, and resources, Germany operationally won itself to death. In France the German Army displayed a tactical and operational prowess that is rightly admired. The later years of the war would see the German Army smash itself to pieces in a series of operationally brilliant but strategically fruitless battles. This clearly demonstrates the limits of any army, however excellent it may be, to bridge the gap between ambitious strategic aims and limited resources. If the American Army is to truly serve the nation in drawing lessons from the German experience it must heed the words of Cicero who once reminded the Roman Senate, “ Splendid armies afield are of little use without sound council at home. “
Directory: dmi -> siteassets -> sitepages sitepages -> West Point, New York 10996-5000 15 December 2004 Effective 9 March 2005 dmi -> A brief Social History of Game Play dmi -> Who plays, how much, and why? A behavioral player census of a virtual world dmi -> Root motion, function, scale-degree sitepages -> Registering your vehicle in the State of New York… Download 174.98 Kb. Share with your friends:
|
