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US action in the South China Sea hurts relations- distrust spills over
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US action in the South China Sea hurts relations- distrust spills overMingjiang and Kemburi 15 (Li, Associate Prof at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Kalyan, Associate Research Fellow at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2015, “New Dynamics in US-China Relations: Contending for the Asia Pacific,” Routledge, New York, NY, p. 4) NV Second, sources of instability and conflict in US-China relations are many and profound. The most dangerous source of conflict in their bilateral relations has been identified as maritime security in East Asia. Territorial disputes over various islands and other land features in the East and South China Seas, maritime zone demarcations and maritime resources could easily sour US-China relations and could even lead to open conflicts between the two countries. It is also pointed out in this volume that the deterioration of strategic trust between Washington and Beijing has generated significant negative impact on bilateral relations in some of the less sensitive areas, such as regional economic integration, energy, and various non-traditional security issues. Contending for influence and the shaping of the regional strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific is likely to continue to be a major element in US-China relations. Empirics prove—US policy clarification in the SCS leads to increased tensionsFravel 14 (M. Taylor Fravel, Associate Prof of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 2014, “Policy Report: U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea Since 1995,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Pg. 4, http://taylorfravel.com/documents/research/fravel.2014.RSIS.us.policy.scs.pdf) NV In 2010, the United States decided to expand and clarify its policy towards the South China Sea in response to the escalation of tensions among the claimants after 2007. During this period from 2007 to mid-2010, all claimants, especially China, more actively asserted their claims and, at times, took actions to uphold or defend those claims that only further increased tensions. Such actions included China’s threats to foreign oil companies investing in Vietnamese offshore exploration blocks (including several American companies) between 2006 and 2008, the 2009 submission of claims and counter-claims for extended continental shelf rights to a UN body, China’s detention of hundreds of Vietnamese fishermen operating in the waters near the Paracel Islands in 2008 and 2009, China’s efforts to obstruct the operations of the USNS Impeccable roughly 75 nautical miles from Hainan Island in March 2009, China’s inclusion of a map with the “nine-dashed line” in a note verbale to the UN in May 2009, China’s imposition of seasonal fishing bans in the northern portion of the South China Sea, an increase in the number of patrols by Chinese maritime law enforcement agencies in contested waters, an increase in the frequency and scope Chinese naval exercises in the South China Sea, symbolic visits by Malaysian and Vietnamese leaders to the Spratly Islands in 2009 and 2010, the passage in the Philippines of an archipelagic baseline law with claims to many of the Spratlys in February 2009, and a stand-off between Vietnamese and Chinese law enforcement vessels in April 2010.8 Download 357.18 Kb. Share with your friends:
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