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U.S.–China war Relations Good

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China Relations Core - Berkeley 2016
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Relations good – U.S. – China war

U.S.–China war

Relations Good

Relations good – U.S.–China mod***

Misperceptions cause nuclear war between the United States and China – communication and coop solve.

Peter Symonds, 5/30/2016, “THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA”, World Socialist Website, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/05/30/pers-m30.html
An arms race is underway that finds its most acute expression in the arena of nuclear weaponry, delivery systems and associated technologies. Determined to maintain its supremacy in Asia and globally, the US is planning to spend $1 trillion over the next three decades to develop a broader range of sophisticated nuclear weapons and means for delivering them to their targets. The unstated aim of the Pentagon is to secure nuclear primacy—that is, the means for obliterating China’s nuclear arsenal and thus its ability to mount a counter attack. The Chinese response, which is just as reactionary, is to ensure it retains the ability to strike back in a manner that would kill tens of millions in the United States. The reality of these dangers was underscored last week by the release of a report by the US-based Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). It chillingly warned: “Twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, the governments of the United States and the People’s Republic of China are a few poor decisions away from starting a war that could escalate rapidly and end in a nuclear exchange. Mismatched perceptions increase both the possibility of war and the likelihood it will result in the use of nuclear weapons. Miscommunication or misunderstanding could spark a conflict that both governments may find difficult to stop.”

Relations good – U.S. – China war

Relations key to prevent US-China war- resolving distrust solves

Lieberthal and Wang 12
(Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Kenneth Lieberthal is Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and in Global Economy and Development and is Director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Wang Jisi is Director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University March 2012 “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust”, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series Number4, pg 1-3, HY)
The above analysis is both candid and sobering. It does not bode well for the long-term ability of the U.S. and China to maximize cooperation for mutual benefit. Looking to the future, it is possible that growth in strategic distrust cannot be avoided and that the two countries can, at best, strive to develop means to limit the resulting damage to their respective interests. Both sides should prepare to do this if efforts to reduce strategic distrust prove ineffective. But such efforts are vitally necessary. In the context of growing strategic distrust, an accident could trigger a devastating political or military crisis between China and the United States. The “enemy image” about each other could be easily invoked in the populations, as was exemplified in China after the NATO bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the collision between an American spy plane and a Chinese air fighter in 2001. Even more important, strategic distrust can produce, over time, a self-fulfilling prophecy of antagonistic relations that are basically zero sum on both sides, to the severe detriment of all concerned. It is, therefore, worth considering the very difficult issue of how to address strategic distrust with the goal of reducing it over time. During 2012, leaders in China and the United States are rightly concentrating on their domestic priorities. They have good reason to believe that they have so far managed the complicated and sometimes difficult U.S.-China relationship rather successfully. Indeed, the top leaders have met frequently in bilateral and multilateral settings, and have been working through official channels like the Strategic and Economic Dialogue to improve broad mutual understanding and cooperation. This is a presidential election year in the U.S. and a year of leadership transition in China. It is unlikely to be a time for significant new initiatives by either side barring some unanticipated major event that requires fresh efforts. For the longer term, though, both sides need to think in terms of initiatives that can significantly alter the current narratives that enhance strategic distrust. Building strategic trust will be difficult because the sources of distrust are deep, multifaceted, and not well understood by either side. The above narratives seek to make these sources and the related mindsets clearer. We make the following recommendations to illustrate the types of new initiatives that might encourage more constructive thinking about the long-term U.S.-China relationship. To be successful, such initiatives should focus on increasing mutual understanding on key issues and on taking steps that challenge conventional assumptions that are integral to the narratives of strategic distrust on each side. The coauthors recognize that many of the following suggestions will be controversial in either or both countries, and even we do not necessarily agree with each other on the details of each of them. We therefore do not put them forward as a specific action program. Rather, we are providing these ideas in the spirit of illustrating the types of actions in various spheres that may be necessary to move thinking in both countries beyond the narratives of strategic distrust laid out above.