Vojenské rozhledy 1/2000, Czech Military Review [vr no 1/2000] English Annotation The Alliance Dimension of Conceptual Frame of Security And Defence Policy of the Czech Republic
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- Risk Management in Military Buildings, but …
- Operational Levels of Command -- Yes, or No
- Professionalisation of Artillery Occupational Skills
OPINIONS, CONTROVERSYAbout our Future Army, or What to Do with Operational Levels of Command? by Col. GSO Milan Kubeša, CSc. The author in his essay reacts to the article by gen. (ret.) Ing. Karel Pezl in Military Review No 3/2001 that induced in him a lot of questions. In spite of the fact that Col. Kubeša agrees with many of his ideas, there are some that are open to discussion. Firstly it is again a problem of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. Col. Kubeša thinks that both institutions ought to be separated and independent. The General Staff is the Highest Command Authority in time of war, Ministry of Defence is more civilian, and its main task is conceptual. Secondly Col. Kubeša recommends abolishing Military Financial Offices, because they are said they make the financial problems more complicated. He would like also to return the Military Police Corps under the General Staff (from its present subordination under the Ministry of Defence). He opposes to absolute abolishing operational levels of command and control. He argues that the General Staff should not have sections that are useless in war. Operational commands should be reasonably reduced, but not completely abolished. The author proposes the following commands: Ground Forces Command, Air Force Command, and Support Forces Command that are necessary even in peace. Our operational plans ought to be set up soberly and realistically. We should not follow and solve individual defence, without friends, but only and always in co-operation and in the frame of NATO alliance. Supposing we were to fight alone, then our membership in the Alliance should be useless. Our defence is of alliance character. The structure of the Army must arise from the tasks the Army was ordered to fulfil and not vice versa. And finally we should stop differentiating between the Territorial Defence Forces and the Ground Forces. Those are only some problems ahead of us. Officials who are in charge of military reform will not have an easy task. Risk Management in Military Buildings, but … by Capt. Ing. Pavel Růžička. It is a response to the article ”Risk Management in Military Facilities” in the Military Revue No 2/2001. This article deals with various variants of risk management after latest changes in rules and directions tied with risk management, taking into account methods used in NATO countries. The author of this polemical article thinks that some of the statements are either wrong of misleading. Firstly it is a question of precise definition. What does ”relevant accident” mean? The word ”relevant” is in our documents precisely explained. Nobody could use it too freely. Even though the definition used in the controversial article in MR No/2001 is to a certain measure precise, the authors (whose names Capt. Růžička doesn’t mention) forget to emphasise that the word ”relevant” is used only when designated limitations, given by the law, are overstepped. Car parks, maintenance depots, propellant or lubricant deposits are certainly combustible materials and therefore there is always a danger of fire. The question is whether such fire is ”relevant” accident (as all three authors claimed), or it is only ”regular” or ”ordinary” accident as the author of this polemic thinks. Law No 239/2000 regulates life emergency system and disposing routines. They all are part of the so-called ”Integrated Emergency System”. The armed forces belong to the section labelled ”Other Items” with precise defined missions, tasks, and assignments. Capt. Růžička is not sure whether he understands correctly sentences and certain statements introduced by the authors. Which ”important” role belongs in this connection to the ACR? The departure time of squad units has been prolonged for the first emergency team by 30 minutes, for detached emergency unit by 180 minutes, and for the whole base by 24 hours. Such time data are for the Integrated Rescue System uninteresting. His statements are also supported by released statistics of the intervention of armed forces. Such actions are minimal. And therefore the authors were mistaken in this issue. [VR No 4/2001] Operational Levels of Command -- Yes, or No? by Col. GSO Ing. Jiří Halaška. This author also reacts to the article by gen. (ret.) Ing. Karel Pezl in the Military Review No 3/2001. He agrees with numbers of his ideas, but not with abolishing operational levels of command and their transfer on the General Staff of the Army of the Czech Republic. He points to the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) that during their last great reorganisation took out army corps from peace system of command, removed all supporting units, but they were left as authorities for commanding operations in large scope of deployment. Territorial defence covers not only combat tasks, but also supporting, rescue, humanitarian and other operations, which of course demands high degree of co-ordination. Mechanised brigade receives one or two tactical tasks (e. g. redispositions, attack), but the Command of Territorial Defence may receive from ten to fifteen tasks, depending on actual situation. If the General Staff took over the tasks of the Territorial Command, then it would be completely overloaded with activities that are not necessarily related to strategical objectives. It will arrange contacts with civilian institutions, to serve as a supporting organisation, it will be in daily contacts with Allied liaisons at an operational level. The most serious argument for preserving operational levels of command is the vulnerability of defence system with only one key centre. Operational levels of command are in fact a sort of alternative command posts. In peace they may serve as a practical means of training officers who will move up from a tactical level towards the strategical level or for the work in NATO operational structures abroad. Nevertheless, the author agrees with gen. Pezl that we have too wide system of operational commands. He proposes to split the ACR into two parts: mobile components (able of deployment in the frame of NATO or the EU) and stationary components, tied with the very territory in which they are deployed. Then to create two operational commands, the first for NATO and the second for the EU. [VR No 4/2001] Professionalisation of Artillery Occupational Skills by Lt.Col. Ing. Luděk Krzystek. The world is undergoing permanent changes in political layout. Diplomatically solutions are not always possible and therefore armies can’t be abolished. Their missions and structures are changing, so are the tasks in the Artillery of the ACR. The main tasks of the artillery is to neutralise or destroy enemy’s forces, in the depth of first line enemy’s battalions, which could be seen from observation posts at advanced boarders of combat configuration of the mechanised brigade. On the grounds of assigned scientific task, the Artillery Section of the Military Academy in Brno began to solve the problem of a command post of the close artillery support regiment, with the stress put on the activities of the centre of fire control. The command post of the commander of artillery regiment is a place from which the commander directs all subordinate commanders and units during preparation for the fight and in the fight. The Artillery Section of the Military Academy in Brno tried to draw up a working model of the command post of close artillery support and verify methods of planning, organisation and control of warfare activities of an artillery regiment. The results reached are interesting. In the future, we shall not use old and obsolete methods of computing target data, but all our artillery will adopt Alliance systems. We also introduce the military decision-making process, according to NATO standards. Those NATO systems are very sophisticated. Firstly we use them only in the rapid deployment forces and the forces of immediate response, but later they will be introduced into all artillery regiments. It is difficult to master them. Many items of commander’s decision-making process must be practised, all the time. The Military Academy in Brno built in its campus an artillery lab that is possible to use for training mentioned artillery occupational skills. It offers it to all who are interested in, Czech students or students from abroad. It is its contribution to Alliance co-operations. [VR No 4/2001] Directory: images images -> Pelan pentaksiran kursus images -> Military callsign list as of dec 2010 images -> For Date: 02/01/2013 Friday Call Number Time Call Reason Action 13-768 0008 motor vehicle stop warning Issued images -> New embedded S images -> Creating Buy-In – Building Relationships images -> Deadline: Saturday, March 12th, 2016 images -> News items from Raising Our Voices images -> Last year four of the best Afrikaans Christian singers joined forces to tour Down Under with the production ‘Manne wat Glo’ images -> World-renowned vocal ensemble sweet honey in the rock images -> Peoples Voice Café History Download 1.5 Mb. Share with your friends:
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