West coast debate



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Private CP




1NC Private CP Shell

Text: The United States Federal Government should fully deregulate and privatize ______ [Insert whatever area of transportation infrastructure the affirmative invests in. Example: Interstate highways, ports, railroads]

The counterplan is net beneficial – it solves the case and avoids the spending disadvantage


Clifford Winston, Senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution, 9/14/2010, Last Exit: Privatization and Deregulation of the U.S. Transportation System,

http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/lastexit



Government intervened in a developing urban and intercity transportation system that faced different problems than it does today. Regardless of the justification for that intervention, most policymakers, transportation providers, and users have increasingly concluded that the performance of the current system is generally unsatisfactory and that government’s traditional solution (reinforced by classic political pressure from interest groups) of spending our way out of the problems is not a viable option because the federal government and most state governments are facing severe fiscal pressures for the foreseeable future. Privatization and deregulation may appear to be an extreme approach, especially given past problems with private provision of certain transportation services and infrastructure and current doubts about whether markets can be trusted to deliver essential services. At the same time, government failure in transportation has solidified inefficient practices that must be purged and has slowed technological advance that must be accelerated. Private firms may accomplish those goals if they are not constrained by the kinds of regulatory interventions that undermined their initial efforts to develop the system.

The counterplan avoids the Politics disadvantage


Clifford Winston, Senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution, 9/14/2010, Last Exit: Privatization and Deregulation of the U.S. Transportation System,

http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/lastexit

The deep recession that began in late 2007 has significantly reduced the public’s and policymakers’ confidence in markets and undoubtedly made it more difficult politically to privatize and deregulate the transportation sys- tem. Of course, the U.S. economy will eventually grow again for a sustained period, and memories of the recession’s effects will start to fade. In addition several factors suggest it is important to look beyond the current political climate. First, as noted, the problems associated with the transportation system are primarily attributable to government failure, not market failure, and the public has become frustrated with the government’s inability to improve the system. Second, the nation has been searching for the optimal mix of public and private participation in transportation for three centuries, and it is not going to accept the status quo as a long-run equilibrium. Third, political winds shift very quickly, as indicated by the public’s growing concern that the Obama administration’s intervention in the economy may be excessive. Fourth, budgetary pressures have made public officials more receptive to private sector participation in transportation, while the long-term effects of the recession have intensified officials’ interest in private sector innovations in transportation and other areas of the economy that could spur the nation’s growth.

1NC Private CP Shell

The counterplan solves better – privatization and deregulation ensure higher quality transportation infrastructure by utilizing market forces to spur innovation


Clifford Winston, Senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution, 9/14/2010, Last Exit: Privatization and Deregulation of the U.S. Transportation System,

http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/lastexit



The essential goal of privatization and deregulation of the U.S. transportation system is to develop market-based institutions that are stimulated by competition to respond to customers’ preferences, expand choices, minimize costs, and introduce innovative services and technologies. Privately owned enterprises selling services directly to the public are dependent on customer goodwill and in contrast to public sector providers less likely to have their operations shaped by special interests that substantially raise the cost of transportation to the general public. The evidence I synthesize in subsequent chapters indicates that the annual efficiency costs associated with public ownership and (mis)management of the system clearly exceed $100 billion, not including the costs of impediments to innovation and slow technological advance. Theoretical and limited empirical arguments suggest that privatization and deregulation could significantly eliminate current inefficiencies and spur innovations that are difficult to envision in the current environment, but the case would be much more persuasive if it were accompanied by evidence obtained from privatization experiments in the United States.


AT: Permutation – Do Both

Any government involvement taints the whole operation – public/private partnerships ensure failure


Walter Block, Professor Economics at Loyola University New Orleans, 2009, “The Privatization of Roads and Highways,” pg. 390

Here, Poole advocates Public-Private Partnerships in order to address traffic problems in Wisconsin. Again, the details of this specific case do not concern us. What does is that so-called Public-Private Partnerships are anathema to the free-enterprise system, and this analyst swallows them whole, without question. Let us thrust ourselves into the scenario depicted above: state-run restaurants. Now, the “libertarian” commentator urges a PPP for this industry. This means, if it means anything at all, that private enterprise combines with government in some sort of unholy alliance, and becomes a creature combining the characteristics of both. But that can only be a first approximation, since the two are necessarily incompatible. For government rests on coercion, and the market is the quintessentially voluntary institution. So, what trait must this mischievous combination of the two take on? Clearly those of the former. If an organization is in part based on coercive levies, and part on voluntary contributions, then, as a whole, it takes on that of the former. This is because if a group is coercive part of the time, then it is a coercive group.


Government funding crowds out the private sector


Abigail Payne, Professor of Economics at McMaster University, July 2009, “Does Government Funding Change Behavior? An Empirical Analysis of Crowd‐Out,” www.nber.org/chapters/c10574.pdf

When governments introduce programs or funding for initiatives that are partially provided by lower levels of governments or in the private or third sectors, should the government be concerned about whether its efforts are crowded out by changes in behavior by individuals and institutions participating in the pro-ision of this good or service? The bulk of the theoretical literature suggests that crowdout is an issue. The (historic) bulk of the empirical literature, however, has failed to find a measurable crowd‐out effect. With better data and more sophisticated empirical techniques, there is a burgeoning literature that shows that crowdout exists. The purpose of this paper is to examine the recent literature that studies the issue of crowd‐out across a variety of venues to under- stand better the empirical estimation issues as well as the institutional details that can lead to a better understanding of the effects of government programs on individuals and organizations.

Public and private action cannot be successfully combined


Walter Block, Professor Economics at Loyola University New Orleans, 2009, “The Privatization of Roads and Highways,” pg. 391

But more. An unholy alliance of public and private tends to obliterate the crucial line between them. As there is no more important distinction in all of political economy than that which divides coercion and non-coercion, such combinations tend to blur this crucial difference. To see such perversions advocated by a self-claimed libertarian organization is surely problematic.





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