A2: SECURITY RHETORIC (Impact ans.)

A2: SECURITY RHETORIC (Impact ans.)

Even if we securitize, it doesn’t lead to violence because it isn’t offensive securitization

(Evan, Research Fellow at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “Breaking out of the Security Dilema: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty,” International Security, 31(2), AD: 7-11-9) BL

Defensive realists also rely on two particular variables—the offense-defense balance and offense-defense differentiation—to explain when states can and will reveal their motives.10 Specifically, when defense is distinguishable from and more effective than offense, benign states can adopt military postures that provide for their security without threatening others. Combining both variables yields six ideal-type conditions, yet only one—offense-defense differentiation and a neutral offense-defense balance—clearly allows security seekers to communicate their motives without increasing their vulnerability. Offense-defense differentiation is a necessary condition for reassurance without vulnerability, as benign and greedy states will each be able to choose military postures that visibly reflect their preferences.

Security discourse isn’t inherently bad—presenting it in debate solves the impact

(Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, 47(4), AD: 7-10-9) BL

I have argued thus far that recognizing the roots of securitization theory within the legacy of a Schmittian-influenced view of politics explains a number of its key and most controversial features. Charges of an ethically and practically irresponsible form of objectivism in relation to either the act of securitization or the concept of societal security are largely misplaced. Locating the speech-act within a broader commitment to processes of discursive legitimation and practical ethics of dialogue allows the most radical and disturbing elements of securitization theory emerging from its Schmittian legacy to be offset. Seen in this light, the Copenhagen School is insulated from many of the most common criticisms leveled against it.

A2: SECURITY RHETORIC (Impact Turns)

SECURITY RHETORIC FOSTERS THE ELIMINATION OF PERMANENT WAR

I will argue that the symmetrical externality of the United States and terrorism to the world order lies at the foundation of the rhetoric of security by which the U.S. government justifies its hegemonic actions and policies. This rhetoric depicts a world in which helpless, vulnerable citizens can achieve agency only through the U.S. government, while terrorist individuals and organizations command magnitudes of destructive power previously held only by states. The moral-psychological discourse of agency and fear, freedom and enslavement invoked by this rhetoric is rooted in both classical liberalism and postwar U.S. foreign policy. The war of "freedom" against "fear" is a psychic struggle with no specific military enemies or objectives. It arises from the portrayal of the United States as an autarkic, ideally impermeable collective agent that reshapes the external world in its own image. The war of freedom against fear thereby justifies measures said to increase the defenses and internal security of the United States as well as measures said to spread freedom and democracy over the world. Now that the destructive capacity of warlike individuals can threaten the world order, the power of the United States must be deployed in equal measure to neutralize this threat throughout the world. The world as a whole now comes within the purview of U.S. disciplinary action. Any manifestation of the state of war, terrorist activity, anywhere in the world, is now a threat to the existence of the United States and to world peace. There is no "clash of civilizations," but the Middle East, as the current site of the state of war, is the primary danger to the world and must be contained, controlled, and reshaped. The symmetrical externality of the United States and terrorism to the world order, then, allows its rhetoric to envision a historic opportunity for mankind—the final elimination of the state of war from human existence, and fear from the political psyche. This will be achieved, however, only by incorporating the world order into the United States for the foreseeable future.

SECURITY DISCOURSE FOR DEMOCRACY IS KEY TO PREVENT TERRORISM AND FOSTER WORLD PEACE

Yaseen Noorani, ‘5, Asst. Prof. of Near East Studies at the University of Arizona, Tuscon, “The Rhetoric of Security,” The New Centennial Review, 5.1, pp.13-14, JT

The Bush administration perpetually affirms that the war against terrorism declared in response to the attacks of September 2001 is "different from any other war in our history" and will continue "for the foreseeable future." This affirmation, and indeed the very declaration of such a war, belongs to a rhetoric of security that predates the Bush administration and which this administration has intensified but not fundamentally altered. Rhetorically speaking, terrorism is the ideal enemy of the United States, more so than any alien civilization and perhaps even more so than the tyrannies of communism and fascism, terrorism's defeated sisters. This is because terrorism is depicted in U.S. rhetoric not as an immoral tactic employed in political struggle, but as an immoral condition that extinguishes the possibility of peaceful political deliberation. This condition is the state of war, in absolute moral opposition to the peaceful condition of civil society. As a state of war, terrorism portends the dissolution of the civil relations obtaining within and among nations, particularly liberal nations, and thus portends the dissolution of civilization itself. Terrorism is therefore outside the world order, in the sense that it cannot be managed within this order since it is the very absence of civil order. For there to be a world order at all, terrorism must be eradicated. In prosecuting a world war against the state of war, the United States puts itself outside the world order as well. The Bush administration affirms, like the Clinton administration before it, that because the identity of the United States lies in the values that engender peace (freedom and democracy), the national interests of the United States always coincide with the interests of the world order. The United States is the animus of the world order and the power that sustains it. For this reason, any threat to the existence of the United States is a threat to world peace itself, and anything that the United States does to secure its existence is justified as necessary for the preservation of world peace. In this way, the existence of the United States stands at the center of world peace and liberal values, yet remains outside the purview of these values, since when under threat it is subject only to the extra-moral necessity of self-preservation.

A2: SECURITY RHETORIC (policy paralysis)

DENYING SECURITY PREDICTIONS CREATES A FLOOD OF UNCERTAINTY AND POLICY PARALYSIS

Michael Fitzsimmons, Winter 2006-‘+, defence analyst in Washington DC., “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning,”Survival, Vol 48, no 4, pp. 136-37

Admittedly, the role played by strategic uncertainty in the decision-making processes at the highest levels in this case is speculative. And, to be fair, neither of the two previous QDRs was notable for codification of difficult choices either. There are considerable inertial political forces, both inside and outside the Pentagon, that slow efforts to implement major programmatic change. Nevertheless, the gap between the QDR’s aspiration and its achievement in terms of driving transformational change raises the questions: might different choices have been made if advocates for change could have mustered stronger arguments about the potential bases for making controversial trade-offs? And on what grounds might advocates of paring back procurement of expensive weapon systems have justified their views, if not the diminishing likelihood of conventional conflict with peer or near-peer military competitors? But, if claims about differential likelihoods of various types of major military contingencies are drowned out by the noise of uncertainty, then the intellectual grounds for debating strategic choice become quite slippery. In the process, strategic choice becomes more susceptible than it would otherwise be to the dynamics of bureaucratic political power.

A2: SECURITY RHETORIC (universalism bad)

REPRESENTATIONS OF THREATS DEMAND ATTENTION TO PARTICULAR CONTEXTS

Matt McDonald, University of Warwick, UK, ‘8, “Securitization and the Construction of Security, “European Journal of International Relations, vol. 14, pp.563-586

Representations of threat — pivotal to Schmittian security politics — can of course be viewed as constitutive of security and identity. As Simon Dalby has argued, the designation of that from which we need to be protected is crucial in telling us ‘who we are, what we value and what we are prepared to countenance to protect our self-preferred identities’ (Dalby, 2002: xxx). But is this the only way in which security is constructed, and what do we miss through focusing only on the designation of threat? I suggest here that while central, a focus on the designation of threat alone risks missing much about the construction of security, especially through privileging the ‘content’ of security over its meaning in particular contexts.

USING SPEECH ACTS AS A UNIVERSAL FRAMEWORK DOWNPLAYS CONTEXT

Matt McDonald, University of Warwick, UK, ‘8, “Securitization and the Construction of Security, “European Journal of International Relations, vol. 14, pp.563-586, JT

Related to the above focus on the role of linguistic practices, it is also possible to argue that the securitization framework is problematically narrow in its focus on the speech act relative to the social and political context in which the act itself occurs. Indeed, this is a problem acknowledged (but not fundamentally redressed) in Buzan et al. (1998). Put simply, in developing a universal framework for the designation or construction of threat through speech acts the Copenhagen School ultimately downplays the importance of contextual factors — such as dominant narratives of identity — that condition both patterns of securitization and the broader construction of security. This is particularly curious given that Wæver has explored these contexts in detail elsewhere, linking security perspectives and actions to narratives of history and identity in European contexts (Wæver, 1996; Hansen and Wæver, 2001).

A2: SECURITY RHETORIC (rejection bad)

JUST REJECTING SECURITY POLITICS REPRODUCES SOVEREIGNTY AND EXPLOITATION. ONLY POLITICAL ACTION CAN END GLOBAL OPPRESSION

Agathangelou & Ling ’97 Anna M. Agathangelou, Dir. Global Change Inst. And Women’s Studies Prof at Oberlin, and L.H.M. Ling, Institute For Social Studies at The Hague, Fall 1997, “Postcolonial Dissidence within Dissident IR: Transforming Master Narratives of Sovereignty in Greco-Turkish Cyprus,” Studies in Political Economy, v. 54, pp. 7-8

Yet, ironically if not tragically, dissident IR also paralyzes itself into non-action. While it challenges the status quo, dissident IR fails to transform it. Indeed, dissident IR claims that a “coherent” paradigm or research program — even an alternative one — reproduces the stifling parochialism and hidden powermongering of sovereign scholarship. “Any agenda of global politics informed by critical social theory perspectives,” writes Jim George “must forgo the simple, albeit self-gratifying, options inherent in readymade alternative Realisms and confront the dangers, closures, paradoxes, and complicities associated with them. Even references to a “real world, dissidents argue, repudiate the very meaning of dissidence given their sovereign presumption of a universalizable, testable Reality. What dissident scholarship opts for, instead, is a sense of disciplinary crisis that “resonates with the effects of marginal and dissident movements in all sorts of other localities.” Despite its emancipatory intentions, this approach effectively leaves the prevailing prison of sovereignty intact. It doubly incarcerates when dissident IR highlights the layers of power that oppress without offering a heuristic, not to mention a program, for emancipatory action. Merely politicizing the supposedly non-political neither guides emancipatory action nor guards it against demagoguery. At best, dissident IR sanctions a detached criticality rooted (ironically) in Western modernity. Michael Shapiro, for instance, advises the dissident theorist to take “a critical distance” or “position offshore’ from which to “see the possibility of change.” But what becomes of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like while the esoteric dissident observes “critically” from offshore? What hope do they have of overthrowing these shackles of sovereignty? In not answering these questions, dissident IR ends up reproducing despite avowals to the contrary, the sovereign outcome of discourse divorced from practice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving.

A2: SECURITY RHETORIC (rejection bad)

REJECTING SECURITY DISCOURSE ROBS MARGINALIZED GROUPS OF AGENCY AND MAKES US PASSIVE RECIPIENTS OF ELITES

Matt McDonald, University of Warwick, UK, ‘8, “Securitization and the Construction of Security, “European Journal of International Relations, vol. 14, pp.563-586

The question of which actors’ representations are viewed as significant within this framework, however, entails important normative commitments and has important normative implications. Put simply, the securitization framework focuses on articulations capable of leading to change in practice, with the default position being a focus on the ‘securitizations’ of political leaders who are able to achieve a wide audience in their statements and interventions, and who are able to marshal the resources of the state to respond to the existential threat. As Wæver (1995: 57) argues, ‘security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites’. Such a focus serves to marginalize the experiences and articulations of the powerless in global politics, presenting them at best as part of an audience that can collectively consent to or contest securitizing moves, and at worst as passive recipients of elite discourses.

DETAILS ARE KEY. WE CANNOT JUST DISMISS ALL SECURITY CONCERNS

Maurizio Lazzarato, March 15, ‘8, Prof. at the Univ.of Paris, sociologist and social theorist and a member of the editorial group of the journal Multitudes, “Biopolitics/Bioeconomics: a politics of multiplicity,”

Translated by Arianna Bove and Erik Empson, http://www.generation-online.org/p/fplazzarato2.htm

Security intervenes in possible events rather than facts. It therefore refers to what is aleatory, temporal and in course of development. Finally, security, unlike discipline, is a science of details. To adapt a citation from “Security, territory and population”, we could say that the things that concern security are those of each instant, whilst what concern the law are definitive and permanent things. Security is concerned with small things, whilst the law deals with the important issues. Security is always concerned with the details.

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