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AQAP Scenario1NCDrone are spurring AQAP – continuation creates a terror safe havenBoyle, 13 Michael Boyle, Associate Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia and a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare,” 2013, Wiley // IS Just as in Pakistan, the result of a drone-first policy in Yemen has been to increase the ranks of the government’s enemies. Drone strikes against AQAP have fostered anti-American sentiment in the tribal regions of the country and encouraged friends and family of civilians killed to join AQAP or other militant networks. The drone strikes have bred ‘psychological acceptance’ of AQAP among Yemenis, in part because they appear to confirm its narrative of a bloodthirsty US dropping bombs from afar with no concern for who is killed.107 A prominent Yemeni youth activist, Ibrahim Mothana, has argued that ‘drone strikes are causing more and more Yemenis to hate America and join radical militants; they are not driven by ideology but rather by a sense of revenge and despair’.108 As Zenko has reported, AQAP has increased its membership from a few hundred in 2010 to a ‘few thousand’ today.109 It is impossible to know how many of these recruits have come to AQAP as a result of the drone strikes or because of other factors, but this trend raises the worrying possibility that AQAP may gain several recruits for every leader killed in a drone strike.110 As one local human rights leader put it, ‘the drones are killing al Qaeda leaders, but they are also turning them into heroes’.111 Another beneficiary of drone strikes in Yemen has been Ansar al-Sharia, a Yemeni group affiliated with AQAP which has waged an increasingly vicious insurgency against the government since the beginning of the Arab Spring.112 As the Yemeni government has relied more on American drones to patrol its ungoverned spaces, Ansar al-Sharia has stepped into the vacuum and begun to provide social services in its place. The danger, as former CIA official Robert Grenier put it, is that the increasing reliance on signature drone strikes may create a ‘larger terrorist safe haven’ in Yemen.113
AQAP strikes are driving both Yemeni and broader Middle East instabilityCorombos, 15 Greg Corombos, news director for Radio America, citing retired US Navy Capt. Chuck Nash, “MILITARY ANALYST: OBAMA PLAYING 'DANGEROUS GAME',” 1/31/15, WND, http://mobile.wnd.com/2015/01/military-analyst-obama-playing-dangerous-game/ // IS Chaos in Yemen is leading to even greater Middle East instability, shines the spotlight of failure on a nation President Obama hailed as a foreign policy success just four months ago and forces an even tougher negotiating position with the Iranians, according to retired U.S. Navy Capt. Chuck Nash. As he laid out his approach to confronting the Islamic State, or ISIS, in September, Obama cited numerous operations targeting terrorists in Yemen as a major success of his effort to take the fight to the terrorists. “We took out Osama bin Laden and much of al-Qaida’s leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Obama said. “We’ve targeted al-Qaida’s affiliate in Yemen, and recently eliminated the top commander of its affiliate in Somalia.”
Yemen has a complicated history in the fight against radical Islamic terrorism. Even before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, al-Qaida attacked the USS Cole as it refueled in Yemen, killing 17 Navy personnel. Since 9/11, the Yemeni government sporadically assisted in the fight against al-Qaida even as the terror group’s Yemeni chapter, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, grew in size and effectiveness. The U.S. has conducted numerous drone strikes in Yemen, including the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, the American citizen who inspired the Fort Hood massacre and the attempted Christmas Day underwear bombing of an international flight. Even years after his death, AQAP credits al-Awlaki with planning the deadly Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris earlier this month. Ali Abdullah Saleh was effectively forced from power during the Arab Spring after losing support from the U.S. and other Western nations. His vice president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, was forced to resign last week as Iranian-backed Houthi rebels stormed much of the capital and forced most of the government to step down. Nash said while the Houthis are kindred spirits with the Iranians, they are their own group with their own ambitions. 2NC – Internal LinkDrone strikes are fueling AQAP – the solution is departureJarrell, 14 Matthew Jarrell, International Relations concentrator and Associate World Section Manager of the Brown Political Review, “Yemen: The Importance of Success in a Failed State,” 10/30/14, Brown Political Review, http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/10/yemen-the-importance-of-success-in-a-failed-state/ // IS Second, in regards to US interference, it is insufficient to focus on “foreign missteps in Yemen” in terms of the American administration’s support of Saleh. Counterterrorism, in the form of a covert drone war, is a key issue. For this reason, you cannot state that “Yemenis should form a common front against AQAP,” when in fact the US’ escalation of the drone war plays a role in fueling both support and sympathy for AQAP—this is especially true in rural areas, where illiteracy, poverty, and drone strikes prevail. For example, the most recent attack on the airport in Sana’a was in response to a US drone strike. By continuing to ramp up airstrikes on AQAP, the US is putting civilians in danger. With every drone strike that kills an innocent Yemeni, AQAP takes advantage of the situation by using Yemen’s tribal-based society to gain support and “legitimacy” in the area. In short, the US counterterrorism model in Yemen, which Obama ironically dubs a “success,” is beyond counterproductive. If anything, the first step to a more stable society in Yemen not only includes the removal of “destructive foreign interests” but also includes efforts to de-Saleh the Yemeni government, which still includes many loyalists to Saleh—leading to various internal power struggles. Further, the recent appointment of new ministers is a good step; however, the sanctions against Saleh that were announced in November 2014 are too little too late. Overall it’s too simplistic for the author to suggest dialogue and the removal of foreign interests as a solution. AT: Drones SolveTheir evidence is inherently flawed – they don’t assume the long-termBoyle, 13 Michael Boyle, Associate Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia and a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare,” 2013, Wiley // IS As this discussion illustrates, each of the most common claims for the effectiveness of drones is based on shaky empirical evidence, questionable assumptions and logical fallacies. Several of them conflate arguments about efficiency—that is, the relative ratio of inputs (measured in dollars or risk to US personnel) to outputs (measured in killed terrorists) with arguments about effectiveness. Drones are only ‘effective’ if they contribute to achieving US strategic goals in a region, a fact which is often lost in analyses that point only to body counts as a measure of their worthiness. More generally, arguments in favour of drones tend to present only one side of the ledger, measuring the losses for groups like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban without considering how many new recruits they gain as a result of the escalation of drone strikes. They ignore the fact that drones have replaced Guantá- namo Bay as the number one recruiting tool for Al-Qaeda today.72 The gruesome mathematics of assessing drone strikes, especially when measured only in the dead bodies of those associated with terrorist movements, ignores the impact that drones are having on how the US is perceived among the populations of these states. Drone warfare may be considered ‘effective’ only if one operates with an attenuated notion of effectiveness that focuses on short-term tactical successes— that is, dead terrorists who might some day have posed a threat to the United States—while ignoring or underplaying long-term strategic costs. 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