1. In Asia restraint is more likely than scs conflict—their evidence relies on media narratives of escalation that are sensationalized and artificially inflated

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AT: SCS Advantage

1NC AT: SCS Advantage

1. In Asia restraint is more likely than SCS conflict—their evidence relies on media narratives of escalation that are sensationalized and artificially inflated

Steven Stashwick, 9-25-2015, spent 10 years on active duty as a U.S. naval officer, made several deployments to the Western Pacific, and completed graduate studies in international relations at the University of Chicago. He is a Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy Reserve. The views expressed here are his own. South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and ‘Miscalculation’ Myths, http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/, /Kent Denver-MB

In Asia, there is recent and dramatic precedent for restraint, even after an unambiguously hostile local event, which belies theoretical arguments about the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. When the South Korean warship Cheonan was sunk in 2010, South Korea determined that North Korea was responsible. Far from a mere ‘incident’ of the sort worried over in the South China Sea, this was a belligerent act against South Korea’s armed forces. And yet, there was no miscalculation-fueled conflict spiral, and instead a strategically calibrated response. It remains unknown whether the sinking of the Cheonan was ordered by the North Koreans (they continue to deny any responsibility), the act of a renegade, or, perhaps least plausibly, an accident. What is clear is that despite a sunken ship and 46 sailors killed, the incident did not spiral out of control. This suggests that South Korea’s political calculus did not view militarily punishing North Korea worth the risk of a renewed – and potentially nuclear – war, which is to say that an extraordinary but tactical-level event did not trump strategic preferences. Even so, some take the miscalculation-escalation dynamic so far as to suggest that incidents between fishing vessels and coast guards in the South China Sea might lead to war. In view of the Cold War record and the recent Cheonan example, such propositions are drastically overstated. It is conceivable that a state already resolved to escalate a dispute militarily might view a local maritime incident as a convenient casus belli. But in that emphatically calculated case, no institutional impediments to such incidents would prevent the hostility. On the contrary, the prevalence of coast guards and fishing vessels is actually a sign of restraint. For a front so often considered a “flashpoint,” it is notable how few incidents in the South China Sea are between naval assets. This is not accident or luck, but instead suggests that regional players deliberately use lightly armed coast guard and other para-military “white hull” vessels to enforce their claims. Because these units do not have the ability to escalate force the way warships do, it in fact signals their desire to avoid escalation. And while “gray hull” naval vessels may be just over the horizon providing an implicit threat of force, they can also provide a further constraint on potential incidents; their very presence compels parties to consider how far to escalate without inviting more serious responses. As in the Cold War, parties in the South China Sea have sought diplomatic mitigation of maritime incidents, principally through the perennially-stalled Code of Conduct, the year-old Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), and the bilateral Military Maritime Consultative Agreement between the U.S. and China. But underpinning concerns about miscalculation and escalation, and mitigation efforts like CUES, is the idea that by avoiding incidents the region will avoid war. This belief is dangerous insofar as it conflates the symptoms of the disputes (incidents at sea) with the terms of the dispute itself (maritime rights and sovereignty). Incidents and the activities that precipitate them help establish new and accepted regional norms and “facts on the ground” (bloodlessly, if inelegantly). In that sense, avoiding incidents sets back the de facto resolution of the disputes. Since the balance of these evolving norms and facts on the ground appears to favor China’s efforts (e.g., using its coast guard to eject fishing vessels from disputed waters and island reclamation projects), it is neither surprising that China’s regional rivals propose institutional remedies like CUES and the Code of Conduct, nor that China only agrees to them after negotiating away any legally binding provisions. The record suggests that miscalculation concerns over incidents in the maritime realm are exaggerated and can artificially increase tensions, raise threat perceptions, and justify arms build-ups. Whether an incident is deliberate, or a true organic accident, if it occurs within a dispute context where neither side desires armed conflict, it will not escalate at the strategic level. However, because of the very seriousness of that perceived escalation threat, the miscalculation narrative can also motivate positive diplomatic efforts like INCSEA, DMA, and now CUES (not to overstate their realistic contribution to resolving disputes). Further, for all its conceptual and historical problems, and not least its potential to feed narratives of aggression, another possible advantage of focusing on “miscalculation” in the South China Sea is that it allows countries to maintain ambiguity about the real terms of dispute. Avoiding war is a distinct objective from “solving” disputes; war is a dispute resolution mechanism after all. But if peace is the priority, ambiguity may be preferable if all that clarity reveals is just how intractable those disputes may be. Clarity can rob governments of the flexibility to equivocate to their domestic audiences (and competitors) and force a choice between escalating a conflict and backing down from their claims. Then open conflict might become more realistic. Conversely, if all parties are more or less content to live with ambiguity in the region’s maritime claims, then a somewhat mutually dissatisfying peace prevails, but peace nonetheless. Everyone wants to win, but as long as everyone also wants to avoid losing even more, occasional incidents do not have to fuel strategic tension.

2. Plan fails – China won’t back down because US has zero clout and war is unlikely

Frasure 5/3/16 [William G. Frasure is Professor of Government at Connecticut College. He has worked and lived intermittently in Hanoi since 1997, teaching, lecturing, directing academic exchanges, and occasionally consulting for various Vietnamese government agencies and ministries. “U.S. Credibility in the South China Sea” The Diplomat http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/u-s-credibility-in-the-south-china-sea/ c.shack]

China continues to militarize the South China Sea, with the manifest intention of making its claim of sovereignty thereto impossible to challenge. China has made clear that it does not plan to accept a likely unfavorable decision, forthcoming in a month or so, by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. Moreover, China has so far refused to discuss any sort of multilateral negotiations over the many overlapping, conflicting territorial claims. Nations who contest China’s claims as violations of their own sovereignty are left having to figure out how to confront China’s increasingly threatening military posture in the South China Sea. Must the Philippines, Vietnam, and other contestants either accede to Chinese sovereignty over the Sea or fight to defend their interests? If, indeed, those are the only options, then the choice seems clear. None of the contesting countries can overcome China’s military might, and they must eventually concede the South China Sea to China and hope for the best. Rather steadily, however, Vietnam and the Philippines have moved beyond that simple choice to another option of greater global significance: strengthening military ties with the United States. By drawing closer to the U.S., China’s Southeast Asian adversaries seek to acquire some degree of balance in the region, so as to dissuade China from brazen invocations of military might to enforce its sweeping claims. Which is to say, they hope a more visible, active American military presence will deter China. There is no doubt that the United States has, for the time being, adequate military resources to more than balance anything China can put into the South China Sea. But, as aficionados of the Cold War will recall, a fundamental component of deterrence is credibility. It is one thing to possess assets, it is another to convince an adversary of your willingness to use them, and another still to convince friends of your willingness to use them on their behalf. A further step requires that your friend believes that your adversary is intimidated by your posture. It is this last element that seems to be at play in the South China Sea. The United States seeks to assure the Philippines and Vietnam, perhaps others, that China will be sufficiently intimidated by growing U.S. involvement to move toward more reasonable, more accommodating policies, and accept the need to resolve the conflict through serious multilateral negotiation. There is little to indicate that the approach is working. The steady course of events in the South China Sea – China’s construction of artificial islands, introduction of surface-to-air missiles, landing strips, fighter jets, advanced radar, encouragement of provocative intrusions by fishing fleets and oil rigs – indicates China’s emerging confidence that major gains in the establishment of virtual sovereignty within its nine-dash line can be had by patiently undertaking a series of many very small steps. China flaunts its belief that no such steps will be obstructed or interfered with by the U.S. It is hard to imagine that one more dock or airstrip or even one more SAM battery would elicit a military confrontation by the U.S. Nor is it likely that China will unambiguously attack an American ship or plane, or commit any clear act of war against the U.S. China, then, can just keep on piling sand. A more pertinent issue with respect to credibility, is how the U.S. would react to a military engagement between China and an aggrieved Southeast Asian nation. Under a Mutual Defense Treaty, made sixty-five years ago and ceremonially reaffirmed in 2011, the United States has some responsibility to side with the Philippines in the event of a Chinese attack. The extent of that responsibility, however, is not spelled out beyond acting “to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes” and referring the matter to the U.N Security Council. Moreover, it is not at all clear – indeed, it is doubtful – that the treaty requires the United States to resist Chinese encroachments on contested reefs and shoals. Toward Vietnam, the U.S. has no formal obligations at all. The U.S., in short, has plenty of latitude in deciding how to respond to actual military conflict between China and either or both of its most prominent adversaries in the South China Sea. As China continues to strengthen its military capabilities in the maritime region, it appears increasingly confident that the U.S. will not present any physical obstacle to its ambitions. Chinese media emphasize the theme of supposed U.S. weakness, derisively portraying the recent Russian fly-by of an American guided-missile destroyer in the Baltic Sea, for example, as a humiliation. American activities in the South China Sea have not been conducted so as to support Philippine or Vietnamese territorial claims, but to assert a generalized principle of freedom of the seas. Any action to assert or defend their territorial claims will be left, evidently, to the claimants themselves. Any such action taken by a claimant alone would surely be repulsed by China, easily and quickly. Therefore, no such action is likely to occur without concrete prior assurance of American military support. There is no reason to assume that such assurance would ever be forthcoming. If they are paying attention to domestic politics in the United States, China and the rival South China Sea claimants must be aware of how problematic it would be for an American administration to rouse public support for a military confrontation with China over obscure bits of rock and sand in a corner of the world that, to most Americans, is quite remote. At present, polls showing what Americans are concerned about do not even mention the South China Sea conflict. Occasional polls register only some low-to-mid-range concern about “China,” mostly about trade. Importantly, no effort is being made by the present administration to prepare the public for trouble in the South China Sea, nor is there any indication that any successor to this administration will do so. The Paracels and Spratleys are not even a vague shadow of Quemoy and Matsu in the realm of U.S. presidential politics. The persistent increase in China’s intimidating presence in the South China Sea has the effect, intended or not, of raising doubts about America’s course there. The appearance grows that the U.S. may, for a while, offer encouragement to its allies, actual and would-be, but can do little or nothing to actually prevent China’s military dominance of the maritime region. Such is likely to continue to be the case, especially if China exercises self-discipline and patience, moving small step by small step, refraining from ugly provocations or attempts to humiliate the U.S.

3. No impact to economic decline –new aggregate data proves

Daniel Drezner 14, Professor of IR at Tufts, “The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession”, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

4. No solvency – Using military posturing as a bartering chip has no effect on China relations – armed conflicts won’t happen

Zhenglong 5/5/16 [Wu Zhenglong is a senior research fellow at the China Foundation for International Studies. “Tensions Are Under Control in the South China Sea,”China Focus May 05, 2016 http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/tensions-are-under-control-in-the-south-china-sea/ c.shack]

In the past several months, the U.S. military has visibly ratcheted up its posture in the South China Sea. Last May, a U.S. P-8A Poseidon flew over China’s islands in the South China Sea with a journalist onboard to conduct live reporting. It happened again in July, only this time it was the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Scott Swift, onboard the aircraft and that single reconnaissance mission lasted seven hours. Three months later, guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen came very close to one of China’s Nansha Islands. In December, two U.S. B-52 bombers flew close to China’s Nansha Islands. This was followed by the entry of another guided-missile destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur into waters within 12 nautical miles of China’s Zhongjian Island in the Xisha Islands in January. Last month, the John C. Stennis Strike Group sailed into the so-called disputed waters in the South China Sea. Now the US Defense Secretary Ash Carter confirmed recently that the US and the Philippines had already conducted joint patrols. Clearly, the United States is deliberately showing off its muscle to intimidate China in the South China Sea. The United States claims that it does not take a position on sovereignty disputes regarding those islands in the South China Sea. Its military actions, however, prove otherwise. By using “freedom of navigation” as a pretext, the U.S. has been directly challenging China’s sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea and siding with the Philippines and other claimants against China. It has moved from behind the scenes to center stage and become deeply involved in these disputes. The U.S. knows full well that it is impossible to deter China from defending its rights in the South China Sea. By deploying military assets on top of a series of diplomatic and public opinion campaigns, Washington hopes to pressure China into accepting a settlement of the disputes that suits the U.S. But that is apparently a miscalculated move. These actions go against not only the DOC, a document signed by China and all ASEAN members on the settlement of disputes in the South China Sea, but also the dual-track approach advocated by China. Naturally, these actions have been vehemently criticized by the Chinese government. Apart from backing up the Philippines, the U.S. is also trying to form some kind of a coalition by inviting Japan and other allies or partners outside the region to join its patrols in the South China Sea to double the pressure on China. Before each military action, relevant information would invariably get leaked to the media and widely reported, creating a sense of imminent crisis or threat posed by an increasingly “aggressive” China that wants to “militarize” the South China Sea. In this way, the U.S. gets to keep the situation looking flammable in the South China Sea and to supply ammunition to the “China threat” theory. Despite all the media hype about potential military confrontation and armed conflicts in the region, it is unlikely that they are the intended result of the U.S. military action. While the U.S. would like to hold back China’s development by singling out the maritime disputes in the South China Sea and making it a regional flashpoint, the global dimension and comprehensive nature of China-U.S. relations suggest there is little possibility that the South China Sea issue could dominate the course of the relations. For China and the U.S., the importance of cooperation outweighs competition. The U.S. is playing a dangerous game. Though the aim is to counter China’s growing strength, the U.S. can’t afford to see the hawks take over at home and risk losing control over tensions in the South China Sea. China is an indispensable partner for the U.S. in solving key global and regional issues. Cooperation between China and the U.S. serves the fundamental interests of both countries and the need for peace and development in the wider world. In addition, despite their serious divide on the South China Sea issue, China and the U.S. do share one thing in common. Both advocate a negotiated settlement of the disputes. Moreover, even though frictions do occur from time to time between China and the U.S., there are bilateral mechanisms to prevent those frictions from spinning out of control. For instance, the MOU on Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters the two sides announced in 2014 provides a code of conduct for effective and normal communication between the two navies. Up till now, Chinese and U.S. naval vessels have been able to act in a professional and rules-based manner, which is also critical for avoiding miscalculation and accidents as well as keeping the South China Sea stable. Based on the above analysis, to advance its rebalancing strategy, the U.S. will continue to meddle in the South China Sea issue, using its political, diplomatic, public opinion and even military tools to challenge China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests to build obstacles to China’s development. But it will limit the scale and intensity of such action so as not to upset the cooperation between the two sides on critical issues. It is also hard to imagine that the U.S. would ever take a high risk and pay a heavy price for other countries’ interests. At their latest summit meeting in March, President Xi Jinping and President Barack Obama agreed to manage differences constructively and avoid misunderstanding, miscalculation and escalation of tensions. So long as both sides stick to these common understandings, the situation in the South China Sea will remain stable and the disputes will stay under control and away from conflict or war.

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