***Blocks*** CPs
Full privatization is too risky. The U.S. needs to play a role in exploration. AT privatization cp
New York Times 04- WARREN E. LEARY and JOHN SCHWARTZ staff writers, June 14 “NASA Is Urged To Widen Role For Businesses” Section A; Column 5; National Desk; Pg. 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/15/us/nasa-is-urged-to-widen-role-for-businesses.html
But Professor McCurdy and other outside experts warned of taking privatization too far. Donald Lamb, an astrophysicist at the University of Chicago and chairman of a committee on space science sponsored by the Association of American Universities, said he was encouraged by the committee's charge that the exploration mission be ''discovery driven.'' But the outsourcing recommendation seems unrealistic, he said. ''Space exploration,'' he added, ''particularly manned space exploration, is just too expensive and risky to attract private enterprise, especially venture capitalists.'' In another recommendation, the commission said NASA should reorganize its 10 field centers, which specialize in different types of space technology and missions, like engines or aircraft design, and which often build spacecraft and other equipment. NASA should consider converting most of these centers to research and development institutions run by universities or private concerns, much like the Energy Department's national laboratories, it said. Under this plan, which the panel said would encourage innovation and more work with industry, most NASA centers would operate more like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which specializes in interplanetary missions and has for decades been managed by Caltech.
AT Privitization Full privatization is too risky. The U.S. needs to play a role in exploration.
New York Times 04- WARREN E. LEARY and JOHN SCHWARTZ staff writers, June 14 “NASA Is Urged To Widen Role For Businesses” Section A; Column 5; National Desk; Pg. 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/15/us/nasa-is-urged-to-widen-role-for-businesses.html
But Professor McCurdy and other outside experts warned of taking privatization too far. Donald Lamb, an astrophysicist at the University of Chicago and chairman of a committee on space science sponsored by the Association of American Universities, said he was encouraged by the committee's charge that the exploration mission be ''discovery driven.'' But the outsourcing recommendation seems unrealistic, he said. ''Space exploration,'' he added, ''particularly manned space exploration, is just too expensive and risky to attract private enterprise, especially venture capitalists.'' In another recommendation, the commission said NASA should reorganize its 10 field centers, which specialize in different types of space technology and missions, like engines or aircraft design, and which often build spacecraft and other equipment. NASA should consider converting most of these centers to research and development institutions run by universities or private concerns, much like the Energy Department's national laboratories, it said. Under this plan, which the panel said would encourage innovation and more work with industry, most NASA centers would operate more like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which specializes in interplanetary missions and has for decades been managed by Caltech.
A2: Commercialization CP- can’t defend the nation
Frederick 9 – Lt Col Lorinda A. Frederick, USAF, BA, Michigan State University; MBA, Regis University; Master of Military Operational Art and Science, Air Command and Staff College; Master of Airpower Art and Science, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 9/1/09, “Deterrence and Space-Based Missile Defense,” Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2009
The DOD cannot expect developments in commercial industry to be available for national security purposes. Competitive pressures force industry to fund near-term R&D programs and choose near-term survival over long-term possibilities.54 Applied research into SBMD technologies would allow the United States to gain more knowledge about boost-phase defenses. America will get as much R&D in SBMD technologies as it is willing to fund.
Unilateral pursuit by the USFG critical to SMD
Frederick 9 – Lt Col Lorinda A. Frederick, USAF, BA, Michigan State University; MBA, Regis University; Master of Military Operational Art and Science, Air Command and Staff College; Master of Airpower Art and Science, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 9/1/09, “Deterrence and Space-Based Missile Defense,” Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2009
Unilateral pursuit of SBMD strengthens United States’ ability to protect itself without international constraints on how the US projects power and maintains freedom of action. The ability to project power lets sovereign nations defend their interests without relying on other states. SBMD could enable a global on-call missile defense capability and a timely response to rapidly evolving threats.5
The United States has the freedom to launch SBMD assets into orbits favorable for deterring or responding to threats from hostile states. After unilaterally deploying such capabilities, the United States would be free to launch its space-based interceptors when it felt the need to project power. Land- based defenses located on foreign soil, by contrast, might have to request permission from the host nation before launching their interceptors. SBMD could therefore enhance both power projection and freedom of action.
SBMD can also help the United States reduce its dependence on other states further. Augmenting the current BMD architecture with SBMD could let the nation re- deploy land, sea, and air assets and reduce its dependency on overseas bases. Foreign public opinion may not support other forms of missile defense technology on their sovereign territory.6
Political ties between the United States and other countries may be strained if there is public controversy over proposals to field land-based missile defense. Foreign populations who view interdependence as a potential vulnerability may find it unsettling to depend on the United States for their defense. SBMD could insulate the United States from the oscillating currents of foreign public opinion.
Full privatization is too risky. The U.S. needs to play a role in exploration. AT privatization cp
New York Times 04- WARREN E. LEARY and JOHN SCHWARTZ staff writers, June 14 “NASA Is Urged To Widen Role For Businesses” Section A; Column 5; National Desk; Pg. 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/15/us/nasa-is-urged-to-widen-role-for-businesses.html
But Professor McCurdy and other outside experts warned of taking privatization too far. Donald Lamb, an astrophysicist at the University of Chicago and chairman of a committee on space science sponsored by the Association of American Universities, said he was encouraged by the committee's charge that the exploration mission be ''discovery driven.'' But the outsourcing recommendation seems unrealistic, he said. ''Space exploration,'' he added, ''particularly manned space exploration, is just too expensive and risky to attract private enterprise, especially venture capitalists.'' In another recommendation, the commission said NASA should reorganize its 10 field centers, which specialize in different types of space technology and missions, like engines or aircraft design, and which often build spacecraft and other equipment. NASA should consider converting most of these centers to research and development institutions run by universities or private concerns, much like the Energy Department's national laboratories, it said. Under this plan, which the panel said would encourage innovation and more work with industry, most NASA centers would operate more like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which specializes in interplanetary missions and has for decades been managed by Caltech.
Logistics
Uncertainty in launch sites
Airbased defenses also fail
Politics prevent ideal placing for interceptors
Air based systems have to comply with international borders
Kleinberg 11- Howard Kleinberg is a member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington. The author has a Master of Arts in the Security Studies Program from Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. and a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering from the University of Toronto, Canada. He also has 25 years of experience in the U.S. Defense Sector, the Space Industry, and software engineering, March 1, 2011, “A global missile defense 'network': terrestrial High-Energy lasers and Aerospace mirrors part 1 of 2.” Fires , http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-251954702.html
There are other complications involved in planning and positioning terrestrial-based BP interceptor missiles. First, in the case of landmobile ballistic missiles, there is considerable uncertainty as to the location of their launch sites, which greatly complicates basing calculations for both land and sea-based missile defenses. Even airbased missile defenses might be out of position when the missile is launched; and once the missile is aloft, any aircraft is effectively 'standing still' by comparison. Then there Is the problem of geography, wherein borders and coastlines, and politics, may prevent terrestrial BP missile-defense systems from being placed in locations from which they can provide effective defenses. Even air-based defenses must obey international borders, or risk triggering a war. Further, the basing problem is multiplied for boost-phase defenses against submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which could virtually be fired from any of the Earth's oceans. Evidence of this contention, taken from a Washington Times article, "Obama's Gutless Missile Defense Policy," by Michael Turner, lies in the 2009 cancellation of the Kinetic Energy Interceptor Program.
Current Radar Sucks
Radar cant discern missiles from wires
Huge mass of decoys could be created
Not enough tracking range
Easy to implement counter-measures against Aegis and GMD systems
Lewis and Postol 10- George N. Lewis has a Ph.D. in experimental physics and is associate director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University. Theodore A. Postol is professor of science, technology, and national security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations, May 2010, “A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan”, Arms Control Today, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-358-2011-S1_SWP/Syllabus/EReadings/10.2/10.2.LewisPostol2010A-Flawed.pdf
The forward-based X-band radars will have only a modest ability to discern differences in the radar signals from different objects deployed by ballistic missiles at the end of their powered flight. For that reason, these radars will not be able to guarantee that warheads will be confidently distinguished from pieces of debris or decoys. The radars will be able to observe at a range of thousands of kilometers the bodies of rockets that launch warheads, but the radars will have little or no capacity to track warheads deployed by these rockets at these ranges, as the shape and geometry of such warheads make them inherently stealthy relative to the missile bodies.
If ballistic missile trajectories rise above the curved earth into the line of sight of any low-frequency, lowresolution giant U.S. early-warning radar, all of their components, including the warheads, can be tracked. Unlike the much higher-frequency, higher-resolution, shorter-range X-band radars, however, the earlywarning radars have no ability whatsoever to discern differences in the radar reflections from distant objects. In fact, the ability of the low-frequency early-warning radars to tell one object from another is so poor that they could not distinguish warheads from two-foot-long wires. Tens to hundreds of thousands of such wires can be used to create a massively confusing clutter of decoys and would weigh no more than a pound.
The necessarily small size of the radar antennas on Aegis-equipped ships and the low power of these radars typically result in detection and tracking ranges against warheads and missiles that are too short to allow adequate time for SM-3 interceptors to reach their targets. The new defense architecture attempts to address this problem by assuming that ships will launch their interceptors before their Aegis radars actually observe attacking targets. In many actual engagements, ships would likely never see the inherently stealthy warhead targets with their radars. However, if the external tracking radars have provided the ships with sufficiently precise tracking information, such “blind launches” could be used to guide interceptors to the minuscule volumes of space, roughly 10 kilometers on a side, where interceptors might then be able to use their infrared sensors to find and home in on target warheads.
If an adversary deployed thousands of wires on slightly different trajectories along with warheads, the earlywarning radars would not be able to determine which radar signal was from a warhead and which was from a wire. The Aegis ships then would not have the precise tracking information they would need to make a blind launch. This same strategy could also be implemented, with minor adjustments, against the much higher-resolution but inherently shorter-range X-band radars that are also supposed to provide precise tracking data as part of the new architecture and against any airborne infrared sensors carried by UAVs that might, by chance, be in a position to observe the complex of objects launched by missiles.
Thus, any of the many simple countermeasures that disrupt the ability to provide precision tracking data to the Aegis ships could make it impossible for the ships to execute a blind launch. The same kind of basic engagement problems also apply to the GMD system.
ABL not reliable as boost-phase interceptor
Logistical and operational problems
Vulnerable to enemy attacks
Pfaltzgraff 9- Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. is Shelby Cullom Davis Professor of International Security Studies The Fletcher School, Tufts University President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, April 3, 2009, “Boost Phase Missile Defense: Present Challenges, Future Prospects”, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/Pfaltzgraff_Boost-Phase.Missile.Defense_Capitol.Hill-Marshall.Inst_3.April.09.pdf
Finally, the United States has been developing the airborne laser, to be deployed on board a Boeing 747. The ABL could detect, track, and intercept an attacking missile within its range while still in boost phase. Nevertheless, there are logistical and operational problems and enemy counter measures that diminish the utility of the ABL. Operations during a crisis or war would depend on the ability to provide relative safety to the aircraft via protective escort aircraft. The ABL would be vulnerable because an enemy would probably take action to prevent its missiles from becoming vulnerable to boost-phase intercept.
Countries have developed countermeasures that make GMD ineffective
Iran and nook demonstrate cutting stages which confused GMD
Little time to analyze complexes of multiple targets
Both SM-3 and GMD
Most tests have failed
Current systems cant identify warheads
Lewis and Postol 10- George N. Lewis has a Ph.D. in experimental physics and is associate director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University. Theodore A. Postol is professor of science, technology, and national security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations, May 2010, “A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan”, Arms Control Today, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-358-2011-S1_SWP/Syllabus/EReadings/10.2/10.2.LewisPostol2010A-Flawed.pdf
By using simple explosive techniques to cut the one-stage rocket-target into multiple pieces, a potential adversary could substantially further increase the chances that an SM-3 or GMD interceptor would miss the warhead. Iran and North Korea successfully demonstrated this cutting technique when they separated the stages in the multistage rockets they have already flown.[8] The same could be done to the upper stage of a multistage rocket to counter the homing of the GMD kill vehicle, creating the same confusion of objects to conceal the true location of the warhead from the GMD system.
The scenario illustrated in Figure 2 understates the complexity of the scene that would have to be analyzed by the homing kill vehicle, as the images were generated by assuming that the fragments only tumble in the plane perpendicular to the line of sight of the approaching interceptor. It also does not assume that additional false targets have been created by balloons or unfolded objects that might be deployed as part of this countermeasure.
In the case of the GMD system, which is designed to be able to hit ICBM warheads, the problem is essentially the same. Because the sensor must work at long range, there is little time during the homing process to analyze complexes of multiple targets that could be intentionally and easily created by adversaries. In these situations, the closing speeds will be much higher than those encountered in SM-3 tests, about 12 to 15 kilometers per second compared to four to five kilometers per second. The higher speed requires that the kill vehicle see its targets at much longer range, 450 to 600 kilometers. In order to provide adequate time to maneuver to hit the target, the kill vehicle must have a much larger optical aperture to collect signals from the more distant targets and a much narrower field of view (about 1 degree instead of the roughly 3.5 degrees used in the SM-3 kill vehicle) to be able to get comparably accurate spatial information. In other words, the vulnerabilities of the SM-3 and GMD kill vehicles to countermeasure technologies that have already been demonstrated by Iran and North Korea are the same.
The same fundamental system vulnerability that led to the failure to hit warheads in the SM-3 tests also led to the failure of the X-band radar in the January 31, 2010, GMD missile defense flight test, the FTG-06. The source of this fundamental system vulnerability is the inability of ground-based long-range radars and interceptor-based infrared homing sensors to provide the kind of accurate and detailed images that make it possible to identify the warheads unambigously. Without such true and unambiguous image data, it is fundamentally not possible to recognize the warhead when it is attached to or surrounded by unexpected objects that also individually appear to be different from what was expected.
AT- Tests prove current BMD is effective
In tests, there aren’t multiple opjects
Target missiles are side on to interceptor
Exact geometry of missile is known
They still failed the tests according to DOD
Tests show adversaries how to attack
DOD assessment is flawed and wrong
Lewis and Postol 10- George N. Lewis has a Ph.D. in experimental physics and is associate director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University. Theodore A. Postol is professor of science, technology, and national security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations, May 2010, “A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan”, Arms Control Today, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-358-2011-S1_SWP/Syllabus/EReadings/10.2/10.2.LewisPostol2010A-Flawed.pdf
The flight-test data from the 2002-2009 tests show many striking artificialities that would not be present in actual combat conditions. There are not multiple objects in the threat volume, there are large fins on the back end of the target missiles, the target missiles are always side-on to the interceptor, and the exact geometry of the target missile is known. All these factors considerably simplify the interceptors’ job. Yet, in spite of these artificial advantages built into the tests, the Defense Department’s own data show that the interceptors almost always failed to achieve necessary hits on the warheads.
These test data show potential adversaries such as Iran and North Korea exactly how to defeat the SM-3 and GMD interceptors with technologies they already have flight-tested. The information also shows that the Defense Department’s own technical oversight and assessment of the missile defense program, as described by the missile defense report, is deeply flawed and unreliable. It is yet another example of why measures need to be taken to provide a truly independent source for the White House and Congress to confirm the veracity of claims being made by the MDA and others in the Defense Department about missile defense performance.
SBI’s can replace ground based weapons
Sweep the globe
All surface systems have to deal with gravity and atmosphere
Continuous coverage of any region
Multiple opportunities at all stages of flight
Kleinberg 11- Howard Kleinberg is a member of the graduate faculty of the Department of Public & International Affairs at University of North Carolina Wilmington. The author has a Master of Arts in the Security Studies Program from Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. and a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering from the University of Toronto, Canada. He also has 25 years of experience in the U.S. Defense Sector, the Space Industry, and software engineering, March 1, 2011, “A global missile defense 'network': terrestrial High-Energy lasers and Aerospace mirrors part 1 of 2.” Fires , http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-251954702.html
Fourth, and arguably the greatest single advantage of SB-BMD weapons, is their inherent force-multiplier effect. As Gregory Canavan observed in his article, "Estimates of Cost and Performance for Boost-Phase Intercept," any single space-based weapon can replace hundreds or even thousands of ground-based weapons to cover the same territory. This is because an object in space will sweep over the entire globe, covering a swath of ground, and air, for thousands miles on either side of its flight-path. This same effect holds true for space-based weapons when compared sea-based forces, though the latter's greater mobility and of movement reduces the advantages somewhat. However, like land-based counterparts, sea-based weapons must also climb out the earth's gravity -well and atmosphere, with zero initial and altitude, the same constrictions that apply to all surface-launched systems.
Finally, SB-BMD weapons would be placed in orbiting 'bands' of interceptors in approximately the same orbits, providing both continuous coverage of target regions, and affording multiple opportunities to intercept any given ballistic missile throughout its flight, although this depends upon the interceptor’s boost capabilities. Further interception opportunities are available in the missile's midcourse and even terminal phases as much as the boost-phase, according to Pfaltzgraff's and Van Cleave's 2009 report, "Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the Twenty -First Century."
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