An Bord Pleanála



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Third party submissions

At a special request the inspector gave priority to observers St. Margaret’s Concerned Residents. (exhibit 17/04/07)


Sheila Morris secretary of the group stated that they were a small community, brought it to the Board’s attention that they had missed the deadline for making an appeal because they were at the time attending the ‘runway’ oral hearing, and did not have the time/resources to make an appeal for one hearing and attend oral hearing for the runway at the same time.
In addition the information they were provided with was in disk form requiring high power computers, which the residents did not have access to, and as a result it was nearly impossible to download information which contained large amounts of maps.
The three main areas of concern were noise, roads and consultations.
The EIS for both the runway and the T2 stated that there would be no additional noise as a result of the proposed development. They strongly disagreed with this.
She drew attention to three maps (figures 6.1.V3) contained in the EIS showing road connections form Cherryhound roundabout into the western section of the airport , going through the heart of St. Margarets village. There was no planning permission for this and should not have been included as given. These roads were indicative and had yet to be decided upon by Fingal County Council, in consultation with the residents. No consultation had taken place between DAA , FCC and the Concerned residents groups. The so called special policy area was a fabrication by FCC to manipulate the situation. A meeting had taken place on 22nd March between ARUP, FCC1 but it was no consultation.
While the community groups were a part of DASF (Dublin Airport stakeholders Forum), they did not have a voice having their concerns addressed and taken seriously. It was just a cosmetic exercise.
The increase in aircraft would generate additional fumes and noise and would therefore be a health hazard. The proposed T2, the runway and the roads would have significant adverse impact on their community. Separation of these constituted project splitting.
She also stated that this application in the absence of a decision on the runway was premature.
Mr. Lumley inquired if ARUP was acting for Fingal County Council and asked if this would not constitute a conflict of interest as ARUP were also acting on behalf of DAA.
Mr. Flanagan (FCC ) stated that there was no conflict of interest and ARUP together with Atkins consultants were looking at the roads layout for FCC as part of the LAP proposals for infrastructure.
Mr. Hayden disagreed and stated that this issue would also be raised also during traffic module, and it was clear that ARUP were in both camps. He just wanted to flag it for the time being.
Mr. Mc Grath for FCC stated that there was considerable amount of development being planned in south Fingal area (population of 40-50 000) and considerable amount of infrastructure needed to be planned to serve such population, including connection between Baldoyle and Blanchardstown. Consultants were retained for standard work such as road design, route selection and constraint mapping. ARUP were the consultants for Baldoyle to Stockhole lane running parallel to the southern runway. Atkins were working on Stockhole lane to Malahide Road.
Mr. Sweetman stated that there was no question of whether there was a conflict of interest. This was conflict of interest.
Mr. Lumley stated that he has been making representations to An Board Pleánala on many occasions and this was the first time he had come across such a primae fascia and irreconcilible conflict of interest. The panning authority in carrying out their functions as an independent authority were employing a firm of consultants as lead consultants for road proposals which were required to serve the proposed development, who were also the consultants for the applicant for the proposed development. In his view ARUP’s role as a consultant for the planning authority and also for the DAA constituted an irreconcilible conflict of interest as to impune on the integrity of the EIS.
Mr. O’Donnell (DAA) categorically refuted that there was such a conflict of interest but would deal with the matter during traffic module. Mr. Flanagan (FCC) agreed.
Sheila Morris confirmed that a meeting had taken place in November attendee by four representatives from ARUP and two from FCC in which they were shown a constraints map. They had asked their community to be retained intact and not to go ahead with road proposals going through their village. They got an e-mail from FCC stating that the meeting was a conversation. They had no voice. If the roads went ahead there would be nothing left of the community. Some had already been CPO’ed in the 70s. the planning authority was not being upfront.
Mr. Sweetman stated that the local authority should be the guardian of the people, not the developer. He stated that in this case the conflict of interest was so severe, the hearing needed to be abandoned. Inspector stated that the matter would be brought to the attention of the Board, but the hearing would continue.

Next Speaker Brian Bryne (for Bridget Byrne) was a resident of Portmarnock for over 40 years and had worked at the airport for 30 years. He was objecting to the proposed development on grounds of project splitting, and promotion of unsustainable development.


An Board Pleánala had two significant development applications before it. The runway an the T2. during the runway hearing they were prevented from entering a dialogue regarding traffic generation on grounds that only the terminal would generate additional traffic. They were passed from one to the other to prevent full scrutiny of the whole project. They had just been told there would be subsequent application for a car park. All these separate applications either pointed out to in competency or a deliberate attempt to mislead people.
There was a well known airport development concept: “never build a runway without knowing where the next one is going to go”. He asked what the long term development of the airport was and was it planned as part of the national infrastructure and not as a commercial benefit to DAA which was a private company and no longer a semi state body.
FCC was in acqiuesence with the DAA. They represented only 1/3 of the planning authorities in the region and did not subject the proposed development under independent scrutiny it deserved under national interest.
There was no national aviation policy.
It was no longer the case where what is good for Aer Lingus it is good for the country, as it was now a private company. Similarly DAA was becoming one and did not have the national interest but rather commercial interest.
The consultants were recruited and employed by the DAA (preparing the EIS). They would have come up with different conclusions had they been employed by a third party.
He had living in Portmarnock concerns regarding health, noise, road congestion. All these were brushed over in a haste. The FCC saw themselves as facilitating the DAA, they also had responsibility to him and to the residents.
They were quoting selectively from the NSS to make the development look acceptable. This was grossly misleading. His understanding was that the eastern sea board was overpopulated and the NSS sought to redress the balance by encouraging development in other areas.
If one looked at the routes where the airlines were flying from Dublin Airport they were all to cities with two airports, but there was only one airport for Dublin. Ms. Coveny’s arguments were commercial, and using Ryanair to support her argument was not appropriate. The same logic would lead to a single airliner.
FCC had rushed through the application in haste perhaps to get the rates. An Board Pleánala had to take the national interest into account as the fundamental issue of planning was not commercial. An Board Pleánala need to take a strategic view and require a rigorous assessment of the aviation infrastructure, not based on commercial interests of DAA.


Mathew Harley speaking on behalf of Portmarnock residents community association (UPROAR) was also representing some of the other third parties in relation to economic issues was an engineer and economist, and had worked as a policy analyst in various government departments and OECD. His paper was entitled ‘The proposed expansion is bad for Portmarnock and bad for Ireland’ (exhibit E-17/04/07)
Noting that the module was concentrating on policy issues, he stated that so far one policy that was missing was ‘value for money’. This was an overriding government policy and would apply to all projects. Under the Critical infrastructure Act the Board would also need to take ‘costs’ into account.
While the policies outlined in the NSS and referred to by the first party and the planning authority were aspirational, concentrating on generality and totalogy the overriding policy value for money cut through all these. While it was true that Dublin was good for the economy, this did not follow that any development in Dublin was good for the economy.
They would also argue that the second runway, the terminal, piers, car parking were all part of the Dublin Airport expansion programme, and should not be separately considered. This constituted project splitting.
Through a long and very detailed submission lasting two hours, Mr. Harley presented that the DAA was planning an expansion for 60mppa over the next two decades (by 2030) at the expense of tax payer and the local communities. This was not in the national interest. He referred to the supreme court decision that if the state invades the rights of individual citizens it could only do so in the interest of common good, and this must not be disproportionate. (Aug 2000, regarding Planning and Development Bill, 1999).
He referred to the sustainability test by the Taoiseach to ensure wider economic and social environment is taken into account before projects go ahead at all and examining sustainability principles concluded that a development would be sustainable only if a balance is achieved between the three dimensions (social, economic and environmental) and the balance must be tested by an economic analysis that objectively assesses the trade off between conflicting impacts taking time dimension into account. This would need to be done for alternative proposals.
They claimed that the DAA expansion plan failed the test of sustainability twice.
He referred to CBA (cost benefit analysis) used by CAR (Commission for Aviation), as well as DoF guidelines (applying to projects over 10 million since 1994), and CAR conclusion that no CBA has been prepared for the major increase in airport capacity through T2 and R2 projects.
In their view no real alternatives were considered. Only ‘do- nothing’. Improvement of runway 29/11 was not considered, social costs were not included, land costs were not included, climate change costs were not included, time lost due to congestion was not included, cost of developing airport box (roads) were not included, cost of Metro was not included. He stated that DAA was requiring CAR to abandon CBA because the expansion of Dublin Airport was government policy. If Government policy was final there was need for Planning and Development Acts, An Board Pleánala, DoF guidelines for appraisal of public expenditure, NDP requirements for appraisal of its components. We could have a gold plated T2 regardless of costs.
DAA’s economic case was job creation, but there would be no additional job. Indeed the 30% claim was retracted by the consultants. Overheating labour market was un economic. UK guidelines now stated that building airports in areas of no unemployment must be taken as negative.
Using CBA they were claiming that the Dublin Airport expansion would cost 4.5 billion of public and private assets, while a second airport in t GDA would bring a 7.4% return on investment at similar passenger charge as Dublin Airport (unsubsidised). In their analysis they had included land costs, rezoning of lands, and opportunity costs as used in other jurisdictions such as Australia, New Zealand, and recommended in UK Green Book. They calculated that the cost of Dublin Airport expansion would be 3.4billion with additional 2.3billion in additional costs (roads, loss of property values etc). Cost to climate was not included. This would turn a national asset into a liability.
Dublin Airport lands were assigned only 20 million (total lands) in the CAR calculations. This was not acceptable as the land was owned by the public. The reason no body was building a second airport was because of this subsidy on land cost. The argument that there was no blank space in Ireland to build a second airport was not correct, one had to look at a satellite image of Ireland with large tracks of bogland. New infrastructure was not just needed for a second airport. It was also needed in this case (airport box, metro).
Duplication of services argument was flawed. It created competition. Dunnes stores, Tesco all provided competition through duplication of services. What was being created was a monopoly. The argument that two Belfast airports competed to their mutual detriment was flawed. Competition was not detrimental to the consumer. It was required for the benefit of consumer. All the arguments put forward by DAA was anti-competitive, without clear analysis.
He referred to the argument by the first party that CBA is not a planning issue, and that the DAA’s application precedes the 2005 Guidelines. DAA’s methodologies included approaches outlined in DoF Guidelines. They were in place since 1994. These guidelines were Government guidelines and planners needed to have regard to them.
The consequences of the subsidy meant Dublin Airport dictated national aviation policy. It meant driving an unsustainable growth to 60mppa, while there was no chance for regional airports or private airports to compete. He provided some figures for land charges, and compared London City airport with Dublin. Dublin Airport was being subsidised by the tax payer at a cost of 400 million per annum. That’s why second airport elsewhere was not an alternative. Nobody could compete with tht kind of subsidy.
There was need for examination of alternatives with full costs, and CBA including subsidies arising from land costs. He asked the appeal be upheld.

The first speaker on behalf of Ryanair was Jim Callaghan head of legal and regulatory affairs. He would provide the context for Ryanair opposition to proposed terminal. (exhibits F,G, O-17/04/07)


He was with Ryanair for 7 years. Ryanair had grown from 5mppa (neck and neck with Aer Lingus) to 53mppa, from 10 aircraft to 20 aircraft based in Dublin (130 based in Europe). 75% of all the traffic in Dublin was short haul (point-to-point).
Dr. Coveney’s presentation earlier had put her finger on the issue, ‘a complete monopoly’. Most European cities had either a low cost second airport or a second low cost terminal. Ryanair had offered to build a second low cost terminal, but the Government had decided to support a monopoly.
Initially they had supported a proposed second terminal of 50,000m2, at a cost of 170 million. But within a year the building had grown from 50,000m2 to 92,000m2, and the cost had increased from 170 million to 800 million, quadrupling the costs of the previous year, and including the destruction of the existing Pier C. They would not have been here if the original plans remained.
The plans for T2 violated the FCC policies as expressed in LAP. Over 20mppa passengers going through T2 would create chaos on the surrounding roads and the M50. The LAP had capped the development at the eastern campus to 30mppa. The proposed T2 would bring this to 40mppa and violate it. The two terminals together would reach to 46 million.
The splitting of applications was to mask the cumulative impacts. The issues of project splitting, cumulative impacts and destruction of Pier C had to be addressed.
There was a serious conflict of interest arising from ARUP acting as consultants for Fingal County Council and as consultants to the DAA.
The proposed timing of the proposed development was arbitrary and there was no drop dead urgency to build by 2009. It was based on a Government statement. DAA’s own traffic forecast and reports by CAR indicated that there was no immediate need for a second terminal given the recent developments of pier D and check-in area 14 in the basement of T1, and 2012 was a more realistic date.
The increase in size seems to be based on peak morning demand which did not exist anywhere in the universe. The basis for these were not disclosed. As a result the passenger charges could increase from €6 /passenger to €11/ passenger. This would constitute 25% of cost of a ticket for Ryanair passenger.
Major airports including Schiphol were developing low cost terminals. Though the 75% of the traffic was low-cost, point-to-point, the DAA was spending a lot of money to provide a high cost terminal. One needed to question why. The end goal seemed to be spend as much as possible.
Mr. Moran had stated that no changes had occurred since the completion of their report in 2003. In fact a lot had changed. Ryanair traffic had doubled while Aer Lingus stagnated. The traffic dynamic had changed. It was very difficult to see the impetus for this proposal. Spending 800 million instead of 200 million as originally agreed was because DAA was compensated on the basis of all assets. Why build to achieve a return of 1.5mil while you can get 6 million? CAR gave guaranteed rate of return on CAPEX. The driving force behind the sudden and unexplained reason was maximising the profits by increasing the size. Deep queuing was no longer necessary.
He looked at the history of developments by DAA /Aer Rianta, which he described as ‘bad’, including Cork airport catering for only 3mppa but at a cost of 180 million, ten times the cost of airports by other European cities.
Referring to the current design he said why build two buildings instead of one? If the design had to be changed why not go back to the basics and check the requirements? The design of the building was not ideal. It put the building into a cul-de-sac. It scrapped pier C built seven years ago at a cost of 150 million. Another 400 million would be spent putting T1 back to 15 million capacity.
Already 325 million was spent getting T1 to 21 million capacity. He quoted ‘ the addition of T1 extension will increase terminal capacity to 4800 per hour’ (DAA general manager, 2007). This would equate to 26mppa.
He asked whose growth this was to cater for.
Ryanair had an alternative option using northern apron as a box at the end of pier D. It eliminated long walks to pier D. It would necessitate removal of only one hangar (as opposed to Corballis House and destruction of pier C). It was in the right location, relieved traffic congestion, had right design, and was at right cost. It had no impact on OCTB. It had better access to both runways.
The proposed T2 was the latest in line of grossly inefficient and costly developments that had lead to the current inefficiency and congestion at three main Irish airports. It was based on increasing costs and charges. DAA was incentivised under regulatory system to maximise capital expenditure in order to inflate passenger charges. The DAA had failed to establish a ‘need’ for the facility proposed.
The 50,000m2 increase in the size of the facility breached FCC LAP and would contribute to unacceptable congestion. It was quite clear that DAA intended to breach the 30mppa cap on the eastern campus. This would be unauthorised development by stealth. There were numerous planning applications relating to the airport capacity, for which there was no EIS to show cumulative impact. It was quite clear that the EIS treated T2 in isolation.
The proposed building was designed to increase cost and passenger charges. Alternative buildings have not been properly considered.
He concluded the Board must now overturn the decision of Fingal County Council.

The next speaker for Ryanair was Tony Manahan Planning consultant with extensive experience in local authorities and in private sector. (exhibits H, I, J, K, L-17/04/07)


In relation to policy issues subject of this module he would not talk about the big picture as outlined in the NDP and RPG, but concentrate on the policies at micro level namely LAP and CDP.
The CDP recognised the importance of Dublin Airport to the county, the region and the State and had a policy to facilitate expansion of Dublin Airport in an orderly fashion. To decide how it should happen it required preparation of an LAP, which was adopted in June 2006.
He described the zoning provisions of the LAP, and noted that the LAP had made a strategic decision that the development would take place in Eastern/Western campus. The LAP stated that the Eastern campus should cater for a maximum capacity of 30mppand thereafter the development should take place in the western campus. The reasons for this were preservation of the capacity of M50 and M1, allowance for other development such north fringe, Ballymun, and allow ease of access to the airport.
Based on 2005 Pascall and Watson study, the LAP proposed that the most effective way to provide capacity for short term was to provide a second terminal and piers in the eastern campus.
Referring to paragraph 4.2 of the LAP, (location to the south east of T1 and incorporating Pier C) he noted the LAP made no reference to the size of the terminal.
With the help of slides he examined the space between Pier C, and Corballis House (logical as it was presently used as a surface car park), and submitted that there was adequate space to build a second terminal in this space without demolition of Corballis House or jumping over the road.
The LAP was quite clear regarding of protection of Corballis House a Protected Structure, and any proposal for its demolition clearly contravened this policy of the LAP and thus the CDP.
Their thesis was that the proposed terminal building was overly large, and seems to have been driven by the forecasting (to be discussed in the next paper), rather than development plan policies or availability of the space.
The capacity figures provided by the DAA indicated that the numbers using the airport in 2006 were 20mppa, and with completion of Area 14 and extension for 7400m2 extension would be in the region of 23mppa in 2007. This would be catered for in T1. While T2 was stated to cater for 15mppa they would show that it was well capable of processing 20mppa. As such the total capacity of the two terminals would be 46-52mppa in the eastern campus. This would clearly be in contravention of the LAP as it would exceed the strategic figure of 30mppa set by the LAP. He questioned how would this comply with 30mppa requirement.
The paragraph 4.2 stated that central to the design of T2 was provision of passenger links to short term car parking and Ground Transportation Centre. The proposed development did not include short term car parking, and did not comply with the objective. Nor did it comply with the objective for provision of convenient access between terminals.
He examined the kerb side facilities proposed and concluded that the proposed development did not comply with the objective for improvement of kerbside facilities for T1.
Summarising all the requirements and proposals he concluded that it was clear the proposed development did not comply with the requirements of the LAP and was in contravention of the same, particularly in terms of demolition of Corballis House.
He then examined the planning authority report on the application of some 34 pages, and stated that the report came to an abrupt end without analysis of pros and cons of the proposed development.
There was space for a smaller building in the area indicated and Ryanair would not have objected to such a building. The proposed building had large retail space which forced the passengers to go walk distances longer than necessary.
There were 28 separate applications in 3 years and 9 in the last six months for various developments. He provided a list. Such an approach amounted to project splitting. Some were made immediately after decision on another one, though one depended on the other. These were very confusing to others. In this case the Board was being asked to consider T2 without the MSCP.
In response to questions by Mr. Hayden, he stated that the DAA did not show exceptional circumstances, there was adequate space for a building of smaller size at the location indicated in the LAP, which would comply with the requirements of the LAP, there was an insular approach to developments (28 applications in three years) which did not examine the cumulative impacts of the total development and that there was no reasoned argument in the planning authority report to indicate why the decision was made.

The next speaker for Ryanair was Louise Congdon managing partner of York Aviation, and a specialist in airport planning and development, forecasting, economic impact analysis and airport business planning. (exhibits M and N-17/04/07)


While she would refer to policies set out in the LAP she would mainly concentrate on capacity, design parameters, achievement of a balanced development of the airport campus, and economic justification and cost effectiveness of the proposed T2. Her key conclusions from detailed examination was that T2 was to big, would result in unbalanced development of capacity at Dublin Airport, was at wrong location and that it did not represent an economically efficient development.
The LAP had set out a clear cap on development of the eastern campus of the airport at 30mppa. The plan relied on the Pascal &Watson capacity enhancement report of 2005 for the DAA (only recently made available).
The proposed development based on this plan was in fact for a development on the eastern campus capable of handling 41mppa. This raised significant issues as well as potential environmental concerns.
All of the options in the Terminal and Piers Capacity study provided at Dublin Airport to be a total of 30mppa, (western only, east/west, east/ north, eastern only ).
The CIP consultation for airlines gave a total capacity of 30mppa on the eastern campus whether located north or the south of T1. The required size was 47000m2 at a cost of 170million and this proposal was supported by Ryanair.
The CIP also included proposals for Pier D and Area 14 to improve service and provide additional capacity in T1 to accommodate 22mppa. The P&W study which have started from the premise to cap development at T1 at 15mppa, was inconsistent with this.
Good utilisation of existing infrastructure and assets was one of he objectives of 2005 P&W study, but the proposed development would result in loss of pier C both during and after construction.
By 2006 the scale of the T2 proposal increased to 75000m2, capable of accommodating 11.4mppa in the first phase. Second phase would bring it to 15mppa.
The CIP had also referred to further extension of T1 to give hourly capacity of 4800 departing passengers. This would translate to 26mppa.
Therefore T1 and T2 together would provide a capacity of 41mppa, significantly in excess of the 30mppa cap of the LAP.
The principle of excess capacity was confirmed in the EIS which referred to 35mppa.
Referring to the EIS that Aer Lingus would be the anchor tenants and that a number of American airlines would also be accommodated, she produced a graph stated to indicate passenger demand by the said airlines for a typical summer Friday.
The EIS stated that the design hour for T2 was based on proportion of Aer Lingus fleet which departed on busy morning hour increasing from 65%to 80%, and this (bunching) in her calculation would bring the numbers from 2310 to 2860 passengers. This bunching would mean a growth of 46% for Aer Lingus passengers while the growth in overall passengers using Dublin Airport would be 32%. There was no explanation why demand in T2 would grow substantially faster. This would require at least 9 additional based short haul aircraft by Aer Lingus or city jet by 2013. No such fleet were ordered by Aer Lingus, which was planning at least one base located outside Ireland, while city jet were planning growth in London.
She provided a number of graphs showing various airlines and airports in UK and Australia, to indicate design capacity of T2 was excessive and would lead to inefficient use of capacity.
The ‘busy hour’ ratio which seem to be used to convert it to annual throughput would leave T1 to 1100 passengers in the busy hour (though T1 would have a capacity of 4800pph). Based on current ratio of busy hour departure demand she calculated the ratio as 0.000184.
Using a number of BAA airports terminals as benchmarking, she indicated on a graph that the while Dublin airport currently fell in a place similar to those unconstraint airports (such as Stanstead and not constrained ones as Heathrow) the proposed T2 would bring it at levels to high way beyond any expectation. Taking into consideration of loss of efficiency in the region of 15-20% for each additional terminal, she repeated the graph concluding that by any means the proposed ration of busy hour to annual passengers proposed at T2 was grossly inefficient.
Assuming no further spreading of the peak, the annual capacity of the T2 would be 22.8mppa for phase 1 and 29.9mppa for phase 2. Together with the expanded capacity of T1 at 26.1mppa, would bring the total capacity to between 46 and 52mppa. This would clearly breach the LAP policies and give rise to wider implications including surface access.
Leaving only 1100 passengers in T1 during busy hour would result in gross inefficient utilisation of existing and recently refurbished and extended infrastructure wit a capacity of 2800pph.
The LOS (level of service) for T2 was designed for full service airlines, while the majority of traffic using Dublin Airport was short haul, no frills traffic. This gave rise to excessive floor area increasing the cost compounding those caused by excessive design hour.
Demand for Dublin Airport could be handled within an expanded T1 until 2011 which would give time to develop appropriately sized and configured new terminal capacity included in the northern section relocating one hangar.
In any event the runway capacity would be insufficient. The available capacity at peak period (at 31 movements ph) was limited to enable the terminal capacity to be used. T2 would use 28 movements ph.
T2 would not result in net gain of apron capacity taking into account of loss of pier C, there will be a net gain of 10 stands. Additional capacity would be in remote stands not improving passenger service.
The proposed development would result in an inefficient layout of the airport, resulting in extended walking distances particularly to pier D, for majority of the passengers (except those using pier E)
T2 was too big relative to rational use of facilities at Dublin Airport as it was sized to handle an excessive busy hour volume of passengers and was capable of handling far more passengers per annum that stated by DAA. It provided capacity which could not be utilised in the short term due to stand and runway constraints, and it was designed to an inappropriately high LOS, and duplication of services such as US pre-clearance which already exists in T1
T2 was not only too big, but was also too expensive. Analysis by CAR had calculated T2 at 4,418 /m2, this was very high particularly for low cost carriers.

Recently developed terminals at Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Frankfurt Hahn, and Marseilles, were in the region of €4-8 /mppa while in the case of T2 the cost was €60 per mppa


A smaller terminal could be located at the southern end of Pier C retaining 4-5 stands and providing additional 15 stands (also retaining Corballis House)

Increased size equated increased cost and increased profit


In conclusion, the proposed development did not meet the objectives set out for the development as it did not provide additional capacity until the runway was built. It did not provide additional stands, did not represent good utilisation of additional capacity and resulted in unbalanced development of the eastern campus, resulted in significant loss of operational integrity through loss of Pier C and associated stand capacity, did not meet the user needs and resulted in excess capacity.
It was clearly in breach of LAP, too big relative to rational airport design parameters, would in combination with T1 bring the capacity to 46-52mppa, could not be effectively used until the second runway is completed, would lead to lengthy walking distances, and poor customer service, and was costly and economically inefficient.

Mr. Sweetman speaking on behalf of Teresa Kavanagh said he agreed with a number of arguments put forward by Ryanair, and would not repeat them instead he would concentrate on other issues.
The planning permission granted by FCC was invalid because it did not comply with the consolidated EIA Directives. Referring to Yvonne Scannell’s book Environmental and Land Use Law (s 5.12), he stated that the Directive had direct effect.
He stated that despite limited interpretation by Irish Law, the European Court have indicated that the entirety of the Directive must be taken as law. Reading from various sections of the EIA Directive he questioned if the planning authority had taken anything into consideration.
Going through a number of conditions imposed by the planning authority he stated that the conditions particularly in relation to roads, water, sewer, construction compound requiring surveys to be carried out, details to be provided, proposals to be revised, mitigation and monitoring measures be provided all indicated that the EIS was inadequate as these matters should have been addressed in the EIS.
The EIS was inadequate in addressing alternatives, interrelationships, or cumulative impacts. There was no impact assessment of the MSCP shown on the model. Cumulative impact of all the development within blue line must be assessed.
The Article 10 (a) of the Directive 2003 /335 required public access to a review procedure carried out by an independent authority. The planning authority decision was so lacking in assessment of the EIS this oral hearing could not possibly be a review of the planning authority’s decision. The Board had to look at the proposal as if it had been made to it in the first instance.
The Board could not possibly grant permission, because the information required under the Directive was not provided. The conditions imposed by the planning authority supported this argument. He examined conditions requiring road junctions, road realignments, road works and stated that none of these were in the EIS, nor were they within the blue line (lands in the ownership of the applicant).
He referred to the conditions requiring short term (1750 spaces) and long term car parks, which were not part of the proposed development and not included in the EIS. Redesign of the project to include a large car parking as a condition, without an EIS and cumulative impact assessment was not acceptable.
The condition in relation to MMP required surveys to be carried out. That should have been carried out before submission of application, and included in the EIS. Traffic management plan for construction traffic must be submitted with the application to enable third parties to examine the effects. Agreement with planning authority only prevented public participation in the process.
Water was a specific item under the EIA Directive. The planning authority had imposed a number of conditions requiring works o be carried out outside the blue line, discharges into water courses, details of dewatering and attenuation to be provided later. This was clearly in breach of the Directive.
The conditions in relation to foul sewer requiring revision of design details clearly showed the information was wrong, and in contravention of the LAP and County Development Plan.
The conditions requiring details of ground water investigation, or measures in relation to contaminated soils were not acceptable. Mitigation measures had to be in the EIS.
The EIS did not comply even with the minimalist implementation of the EIA Directive by Ireland.
The condition requiring application for a remote compound for activity which had direct effect was clearly project splitting.
The planner’s report had referred to further information but there was none.
This application was reliant on the parallel runway. It was conceded that the runway application was invalid. Therefore there was no need for this application.
Condition number 30 did not comply with the European Court judgement 183-05. trees were required to be felled during the hibernation of bats.
He referred to the submission by Eastern Fisheries Board. Discharges into Sluice River were being proposed without any reference to the otters whatsoever.
The Board had no option but to refuse the proposed development.


Mr. Ian Lumley speaking for An Taisce stated that being down in the order of speakers meant a number of issues he was going to raise were already raised by other appellants. Ryanair had already made an overriding request under Irish Law.
He would therefore concentrate on the issues arising from validity of the application and compliance with European Law.
The issue of validity of the public notice had also come up in the other part of the project (runway). The planning authority had already identified major difficulties in relation to infrastructure. Conditions imposed by the planning authority already indicated that there were many elements such roads, water and sewer provisions (some of which required land-take and effecting third party rights) which were not identified in the public notice. Instead of requiring an appropriate public notice to be submitted together with an appropriate EIS, the planning authority had simply chose to use conditions to address the problems. They were simply not entitled to do so as these nullified the third party right (residents or businesses).They needed ask further information and revised public notice with revised EIS, or simply declare the application invalid.
The Board had no entitlement to validate an application retrospectively. He invited the inspector to adjourn the hearing which was costly and time consuming to the third parties. The Board could ask for Council’s opinion on the matter which could nullify the process. The board also had powers to go directly to the High Court though they had not exercised that right up to now.
The inspector would bring the matter to the attention of the Board, but would proceed with the hearing. Mr. Lumley continues with other points noting this was without prejudice to the argument that the Board could not retrospectively validate an invalid application which denied the third party rights and which did not comply with the requirements of the EIA Directive.
There was no specific Irish legislation to implement the Council Directive 2000/ . Therefore it had direct effect. EPA had produced a SEA methodology. Both the DAA and FCC had referred to a number of policy statements contained in documents at national, regional, local levels (NDP, NSS, RPG, LAP etc). Only two of these really mattered, NDP and LAP. The first was an overriding Government policy (and included funding). There was no SEA of the NDP. NDP was an over riding plan with specific policies for roads, aviation, etc, including funding. It had to be subject of an SEA. Article 3 of the Directive and 11 sectors linked the SEA to the other directives such as EIA and Habitats Directives.
NDP was in breach of the Directive. He noted that this was brought to the notice of European Commission who was investigating the matter. An Board Pleánala would need to be aware that Ireland was facing breach of Directives more than any other European country.
While it was possible to assess the impacts of all aspects of the development at the airport through a single, integrated EIS for all, this was not done so. This amounted to project splitting. Interrelationship between various factors were not examined. SEA directive similar to the EIA directive required provision of an environmental report, public consultation in the process, assessment of trans-boundary effects (climatic impacts). The proposed development was nullified by the failure to subject NDP to SEA.
He was pleased to see that the format of this hearing would include relevant European Directives (as specified under item 3).
An Taisce was a prescribed body for consultation in the preparation of a County Development Plan and individual projects, but it was not included in the new SEA regulations as such for LAP. They were simply not aware that a LAP was being prepared. They only became aware of its existence after the planning application for the runway at which time they discovered a serious deficiency in the SEA of the LAP. It did not include one of the headings to be covered under the SEA Directive, namely Climate. In the case of the airport there would be land based transport generated emissions as well as air based emissions. This rendered the LAP null an void under the SEA Directive.
He noted the earlier question by the inspector regarding statue of limitations for challenge of the SEA for the LAP. There was no time limit if the case was Primae fascia, as in this case, omission of one of the headings. The An Board Pleánala could not deal with the case until the Council admit the deficiency and subject the LAP to proper SEA. Ireland had the fastest growth in aviation and land based emissions at 160%, significantly higher than allowed under Kyoto (30%).
The split assessment of the project on a piece meal basis was in breach of the Art 5 and 4 of the EIA Directive. The description of t development did not include development outside the site though these were clearly considered necessary by the planning authority through conditions.
There was no discussion of alternatives to obviate the proposed development. Suggestion by Andrew Moran (2.1) to dig a tunnel to a remote part of Wales was not the case. Institute of Engineers of Ireland had drawn preliminary proposals for a tunnel at Tuscar Rock, to connect to a high speed rail network which would then lead to Europe through channel tunnel.
As stated by Mr. Harley there was no adequate cost /benefit analysis. As stated in the Stern report the long term impact of climate change on the GDP was simply ignored.
In terms of alternative sites within the airport they found the Ryanair argument that a northern location would remove the necessity for demolition of Corballis House to be persuasive.
There was significant information deficiency regarding impact of road proposals in the surrounding community especially St. Margaret’s, regarding soil contamination (no trial hole investigation regarding pockets of hydro carbon collection under the tarmac). Water and foul sewer disposal issues were unresolved, all raising serious questions regarding credibility of the EIS. He reserved the right to comment further during specific modules.


Rebuttal by Regine Weston



Ms. Weston for DAA wanted to respond to capacity issues raised by Ms. Congdon for Ryanair. The paper discussed these under the headings of ‘busy hour’ demand and capacity, annual passengers, airline market share, terminal size and level of service.

(exhibits A, B, C, D 18/04/07)


Ms.Congdon was working from correct numbers, and the issues had arisen from use of the numbers. Dublin Airport was operating at a level of constraint agreed by the DAA and the airlines as per Dublin Airport Capacity Declaration, 2007, at 4050, though the demand from the airlines was 5838. This was because arising from the terminal capacity constraint, airlines were moved away from the hour they wanted to fly. In other words the 60 minute limit of 4050 artificially reduced the demand to fit inside the terminal capacity, though the demand was 5838. The purple section of the graph showed these.
Using the 5% growth projection to 2013 would bring this number to 7900 at peak hour. Using numbers quoted by Ms. Congdon, the busy hour capacities in 2013, would be 4800 for T1 and 4200 for T2 bringing a total of 9000. The inefficiency of 15-20% used by Ms. Congdon would bring total busy hour capacity to 7200-7650. using the same numbers the demand would be 7900 bringing the inefficiency down to 12%. The primary reason for inefficiency arose from differing profiles of airline traffic using different terminals. The second graph also showed the combined peak to be over 4050 showing 11% inefficiency.
Peak hour and annual demand were not tied as closely as submitted by MS. Congdon. The relationship between these was unique to each airport and changed overtime. While it would be worth noting that the selection of airports in Ms. Congdon’s graph represented a number of terminals in Heathrow and Gatwick which were capacity constrained, rather than airports comparable to Dublin, other airports added to the graph such as Oslo, Athens, Lisbon and Manchester would be located at much higher levels than the line shown on the graph. These were capital city airports.
A better way of calculating annual passenger volumes would be to consider total airport forecast passenger demand and the market share of airlines likely to be assigned to each terminal. The assumption was that 45% of scheduled traffic would use T2 and remaining 55% would use T1. The forecasts by Ms Coveney (DAA) had shown an airport wide projection of 27.7mppa for 2013. This would mean 15.3mppa for T1 and 12.4mppa for T2. The total figure for 2018 was 32.2mppa.
The figures of 28-32mppa were the correct figures and not the 46-52 as argued by the appellant. When these figures used in the graph, location of Dublin Airport fell to its correct position well below the level of other capital city airports including Manchester but would provide a level of service at acceptable level.
Dublin was unique as airline market share was dominated by two airlines (Ryanair 40%, Aer Lingus 37%, leaving only 23% for all the others). Manchester on the other hand had a number of airlines where the two biggest had market shares of 14% and 12%.
In Dublin it was not viable to design a terminal for 8-10mppa. Based on the current share of the market each terminal had to provide for at least 37% of the total traffic (Aer Lingus)
The sizing of the terminal was based on future planning day of airlines, and six potential peak hours. For example Aer Lingus had announced a 50% increase in aircraft numbers, taking the fleet to 42 with 34 narrow bodied aircraft. At 80% this would yield a peak hour demand of 4155, which was completely consistent with planning day figure of 4200.
The level of service (LOS), was IATA determined. There were 48 scheduled airlines using Dublin Airport majority of which were members of IATA, and endorsed the LOS ‘C’. Also CAR supported service level of C.
A lower LOS did not necessarily mean less space was required as suggested. Smaller space meant longer waiting times and increased depth to accommodate longer queues. Thus check-in at level D service would require a 10% increase over LOS ‘C’.




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