ingando do so for an average of twelve weeks, and participants live together in close barrack-style
quarters (field notes 2006; Thomson 2011d). There is a significant military presence, with armed
soldiers monitoring the activities of participants. The setting is formal, and information is delivered
lecture-style; there is little “downtime” as participants follow a structured program of “reeducation,”
with a focus on their socioeconomic reintegration into Rwandan society. Ingando are held in all five
provinces, although most individuals receive their reeducation in a locale other than their home
community (World Bank 2002, 17). The version of history taught at the ingando camps is offensive to
many ordinary Rwandans who have participated, notably Hutu who experienced the events of 1959–
62. Ingando camps also teach participants, the majority of whom are ethnic Hutu, that reconciliation
means to remain silent and not question the RPF’s vision of national unity and reconciliation
(Thomson 2011d). As Joseph B., a destitute Hutu who graduated from ingando in 2002, said: “I am a
former Hutu. This means I am a source of shame for this government. They think that only Hutu
killed. Ingando is just a way for them [the government] to make sure we don’t think for ourselves. The
message is that we are not full citizens.”
Ninth, mandatory participation at the now closed gacaca trials (discussed in detail in chapter 6): the
RPF created the gacaca courts in 2001 as a response to the backlog of more than one hundred
thousand genocide suspects and to establish a truthful record of what happened during the genocide as
a means to promote unity and reconciliation among Rwandans. The government portrayed the gacaca
courts as a “traditional” community-based and participatory process that “clear[ed] the backlog of
cases” while “promoting national unity and reconciliation” (interview with Ministry of Justice official
2006). The purpose was to bring together local communities to witness, identify, corroborate, and
prosecute perpetrators. There were almost ten thousand gacaca jurisdictions, meaning one for each
cell and sector. Perpetrators “told their truth,” while survivors were, once the truth had been
established, to forgive. Participation in gacaca was mandatory, and individuals were sometimes fined
and/or imprisoned for failure to participate (MINIJUST 2004, 8). In practice, the gacaca courts
increased the number of accused because of new denunciations, which means that the gacaca process
has increased the prison population, not reduced it as the government envisaged.
Tenth, administrative presence and control at the local level: the RPF tries to control the flow of
information, particularly any dissent from government policy, through a highly devolved
administrative structure that has to be “felt” in a localized and intimate fashion. The lowest unit in the
Rwandan administrative structure, according to the government, is the family, while the highest is the
central government (NURC 2000, 14; 2004, 9). Rwanda is governed by “two layers of government
(central and local) and one of six administrative entities: the Province (Intara), the District (Akarere),
the Sector (Umurenge), the Cell (Akagari) and the Village (Umudugudu)” (MINALOC 2007, 8). The
sixth and lowest level of government (one that is left out of this list) is the nyumbakumi (meaning
“responsible for ten households”). Since 2006 there have been 5 provinces (North, South, East, West,
and Kigali), 30 districts, 416 sectors, and 9,165 cells (see fig. 3 in chapter 1 for a map of the post-2006
administrative boundaries). Most decisions are made at the lower levels of government, with
committee structures at the sector and cell levels in place to oversee the individual and group
activities of all Rwandans. During my reeducation interviews with senior government officials, I
asked how many villages and nyumbakumi there were, but no one was able to answer. A representative
of MINALOC stated prosaically, “There are as many as the population requires to meet the
development needs of their locale” (field notes 2006).
The sector-level office is the most important in terms of both its physical presence and its political
authority as the place where ordinary Rwandans experience “the state” (see fig. 6). Sector-level
officials, the most important of whom is the RPF-appointed executive secretary, are responsible for
ensuring that the national unity and reconciliation, development, and service delivery policies of the
central government are implemented at the local level (Ansoms 2009, 307; Ingelaere 2011, 69).
Sector-level officials take few, if any, decisions on their own. Instead, their primary task is to
implement decisions made in Kigali, making local governance “paralysed and ineffective because it
waits for vital information to make it down the tree-like ‘plumbing’ of the state” (Purdeková 2011,
479). As Ingelaere notes (2011, 69), “there is a clear hierarchy between appointed and elected
postholders, with only those in appointed positions receiving a regular salary from the central/district
administration.”
Figure 6. Rural residents shelter from the rain at their local sector-level office, April 2002. (photo by
anonymous, © 2002)
Figure 7. In 2006 the RPF was the only political party allowed to have office locations in district
capitals across the country. Since then, RPF-satellite parties are able to operate at the sector and cell
levels. This image is of an RPF provincial office building in Butare (now Huye) town, May 2006.
(photo by author)
In the sectors in southern Rwanda where I worked, the relationship between appointed and elected
officials was clear, with each appointed official having the power to make decisions about the national
unity and development of his constituency in line with the national vision. There is little room for
creativity or problem-solving as local leaders are expected to unify and develop those in their
bailiwick quickly and in accordance with their imihigo (performance) contract. Many executive
secretaries receive military training before taking up their appointed posts (field notes 2006,
corroborated by Ingelaere 2011, 75n2). In addition, the majority of appointed local officials I met
were members of the RPF, highlighting the overlap between the apparatus of the state and the political
party. Only RPF members are government administrators throughout the seven layers of the
bureaucracy, and indeed the RPF is the only political party in Rwanda with a defined presence at the
village, cell, and sector levels (field notes 2006, corroborated by Purdeková 2011, 480–82) (see fig. 7).
All of the officials at the cell level that I met also looked to Kigali for their policy instructions. The
unpaid but elected coordinator is responsible for the daily administration of the people in his or her
jurisdiction, working as the head of (also volunteer and unpaid) cell committees. Taken together, the
sector and the cell represent the immediate source of state power at the level of the individual. It is at
these levels that the control and authority of government play out in daily life. Reports on individual
behavior, as well as requests for government assistance, start at the local level. As a member of one
my local research partner organizations said, “There is no one level [of bureaucracy] that is more
important than the other. Each has its purpose and a specific task and that is something Rwandans
know how to respect. But at the lowest levels, it can really feel heavy. If you are having an affair, they
[local administrators] know. If you are drunk or if your house is in disrepair, they know. If you fail to
attend sensitization meetings, they know. If you want to join a cooperative, you must get a signature
from the [cell] coordinator who might ask for the signature of your village coordinator who might also
ask for the signature of your nyumbakumi. So there are a lot of people watching you, checking on your
actions and the people you are with. Without signatures, nothing happens. If you are not a good citizen
who supports national unity and reconciliation, you will rot [at home]” (field notes 2006).
Eleveth, social surveillance: the policy of national unity and reconciliation provides incentives to
local security and administrative personnel to remain vigilant against criminal elements, those who
hold genocidal ideologies, or anyone who fails to promote unity in accordance with the dictates of the
policy. The government provides livestock (cattle, goats, sheep, and rabbits), as well as radios and
refrigerators, to local security forces as incentives to control the population. Local political and
military authorities who fail to control those within their jurisdiction are subject to a variety of
sanctions, including dismissal, imprisonment, and naming and shaming for “poor work ethic,”
“corruption,” “sexual immorality,” or “having HIV/AIDS” (interviews 2006).
Dense networks of spies are known to exist throughout Rwanda (and abroad), and the Department
of Military Intelligence is rumored to pay for valid information (field notes 2006). The low-level
bureaucrats report the activities of individuals in their bailiwick to the immediate superior at the next
level of government, who then decides whether the information warrants transmission to the next level
up, and so on. Ordinary Rwandans all know of state surveillance; most shrug their shoulders,
acknowledging prosaically that “we are monitored to make sure we do what we are told; we did it
before the genocide [under Habyarimana] in the name of national development and now we do it in the
name of national unity and reconciliation” (interviews 2006, corroborated by Verwimp 2003;
Desrosiers and Thomson 2011).
Twelfth, government cooptation of associational life: the RPF maintains tight control of civil
society organizations and other forms of associational life. In 2001 the RPF passed the Law on Non-
Profit Associations, which provided it with the power to control projects, budgets, and the hiring of
new staff; it also required all organizations to obtain a renewable certificate of registration from
MINALOC. The certificate is granted on the basis of the organization’s mission statement and annual
report and must be renewed biannually. The registration process allows government authorities to
monitor the activities of civil society and to control its publications.
In 2001, and again in 2004, LIPRODHOR, one of the few remaining local independent human rights
organizations in Rwanda, was summoned by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission and
MINALOC to respond to allegations that its representatives were acting against national unity and
reconciliation (Amnesty International 2004). Nine LIPRODHOR employees fled into exile, and the
organization was shut down in December 2004 on unsubstantiated charges that the policies and
practices of the organization were “divisionist” and that its representatives were promoting “genocide
ideology” among ordinary Rwandans (Amnesty International 2005). The “new” LIPRODHOR, which
is managed by individuals who are “closely connected with the authorities,” was reopened after an
internal investigation to root out those individuals “having the genocide ideology” (Maina and
Kabilama 2006, 47).
Between July 2004 and January 2005, several domestic human rights NGOs that openly criticized
the RPF and documented human rights abuses by government authorities were closed (field notes
2006). As a result, many civil society organizations practice self-censorship (HRW 2007); at the time
of writing, civil society organizations in Rwanda are not free of government oversight (Gready 2011).
Most such organizations play an important role in filling the social void in the lives of many
Rwandans in the aftermath of the genocide. In particular, women’s organizations work to meet the
basic needs of their members while providing much-needed social support to individuals who lost
their families and social support networks during the genocide (Newbury and Baldwin 2001, 23). As a
result of their social role, the RPF sees women’s organizations “as the real civil society” (interview
with Ministry of Culture official 2006).
Women-focused organizations in civil society have been instrumental in creating legal mechanisms
designed to protect Rwandan women, such as the inheritance law of 1998. Burnet notes that there are
other “unifying issues” for government and women’s organizations to rally around, notably land
tenure and land use, since women “are most vulnerable to losing access to land,” but “women’s NGOs
and MIGEPROF [the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development] have refused to define land as
a women’s issue” given its political “volatility” (Burnet 2008a, 379–80). In addition, the RPF advises
civil society organizations on what development issues they may work on, who is allowed to join, and
how the rules and conditions of participation are set (field notes 2006). Most organizations,
particularly those in Kigali, are dedicated to servicing so-called survivor issues, including
psychosocial trauma counseling, HIV/AIDS support, and the provision of micro-credit. Membership
in civil society organizations is officially open to both Tutsi and Hutu survivors. Many Hutu
“survivors” do marginally benefit from their membership in organizations that support survivors,
although specific privileges such as access to subsidized health care and the waiver of school fees for
children are available only to Tutsi women in their recognized status as “real survivors” (field notes
2006). Tutsi and Hutu women who remarry sometimes lose access to these privileges, not on the basis
of their ethnicity but rather because they have been able to reconstitute their families (field notes
2006).
Conclusion
This chapter analyzed the mechanisms of the policy of national unity and reconciliation to illustrate
the extent to which it structures the daily lives of ordinary Rwandans. Identification of the myriad
practices of power that the RPF uses to promote its policy of national unity and reconciliation
demonstrates the extent of RPF control of the political and social landscape through the policy of
national unity and reconciliation. A focus on the practices of national unity and reconciliation allows
for analysis of the social and political differences that the policy masks. In particular, the chapter
described the structural bedrock of the policy of national unity and reconciliation to illustrate its
myriad forms at all levels of society, notably at the local level, where “the state” is most acutely
experienced. Such an approach is necessary to set the stage for the next two chapters so that we may
understand the everyday acts of resistance of some ordinary Rwandans to the dictates of the policy of
national unity and reconciliation as purposeful responses.
5
Everyday Resistance to National Unity and Reconciliation
J
olie and I used to meet almost every Tuesday afternoon. We would bump into one another at the
kiosk near my residence. She sometimes stopped to buy cooking oil or matches there on her way home
from the market. Sometimes I would walk home with her so we could spend some private time
together, sharing stories about our children in particular and family lineages more broadly. She was
fascinated that someone like me would choose to live in Rwanda, given its “problems” and my
“freedom to live anywhere.” My explanation that I was in Rwanda as a long-term visitor because of
my interest in reconciliation processes in the country was met with some confusion. Jolie was one of
the few Rwandans I met who did not lose any immediate family members during the genocide, and
she often shared stories with me about how her “good luck” translated into social shunning and
economic hardship afterward. Her Tutsi husband joined in the killing in May 1994 as a “way to stay
alive. They thought he was one of them and so he survived. He killed at least three people, but we
never talk about it because we can’t.” She is unable to join any of the associations set up for
“survivors” of the genocide since she does not “qualify as a Hutu woman. I mean they say ‘good luck,’
but they just use that as an excuse to keep me out of their association.”
When I asked whom she meant when she spoke of “they,” Jolie explained:
“They” are Tutsi survivors. We [survivors] are many, but only a few get
benefits. It is hardest for me because some of them know that my husband killed
to stay alive. They seemed to understand just after the genocide, but then the
government brought gacaca and some of them participate fully. What if they
speak against him and I have to raise these kids alone? People like me stay on
the sidelines to avoid too much trouble. My husband once wanted to admit to his
crimes [to the authorities], but I begged him not to. I am a former Hutu married
to a former Tutsi. Am I not a survivor? Did I live through the genocide? Did I
lose relatives? Is my husband half crazed because of what he did? I survived the
events, and even I could say that my husband is lost to me now. He feels a lot of
guilt and shame for his actions [during the genocide]. We have not discussed his
actions since a long time. It is not really possible now. There are too many
people that could denounce him [to the authorities] and make our lives very
hard.
It is much harder to live together with my husband and my neighbors since
the genocide because of what happened. Everyone killing everyone and others
stealing; some just hid. Many died, many killed, many lost their belongings. Just
coping is what I think about most. Really. It is just getting to the next day. What
those survivors who won’t let me join their group fail to understand is that I am
suffering as well. Coping is a task; it takes a lot of my energy. My family has
many needs. I have two other kids [orphans] that live with us now that need
feeding. One has malaria, and I have no money for his medicine. When I give to
that kid, I take away from my own kids. My husband is only of little comfort. He
hardly works at all. He has no ideas of his own since gacaca started. He works
only to avoid contact with other people. He is isolating me as well. What else
can I do but just keep going? My problems are many, and the solutions are few. I
could speak out like some of my foolish [abasazi] neighbors. Instead, I will
continue to try to get support from the survivors association, even though they
say I am not a survivor. What other solution is there? How can you seriously ask
me who “they” are when you know full well the answer? (Interview 2006)
Jolie and I had spent enough time together over the preceding few months for me to know that what
she had just told me was difficult for her to say; I apologized for my insensitivity. I knew quite well
how hard her life was since the genocide. She had shared some of her “inner secrets” with me before
but always reminded me to say nothing to anyone lest “it attract the attention of the authorities.” The
need to avoid the attention of the authorities, particularly appointed local government officials and
members of the local security forces, is an everyday lament for many ordinary Rwandans. Ordinary
Rwandans like Jolie live under close surveillance from the government (as well as each other), as
analyzed in chapter 4. The threat of retaliation is constant and runs the gamut of sanctions—from
losing access to social benefits, to social shunning and outcasting, to imprisonment and, in extreme
cases, disappearance and even death. This chapter examines the everyday acts of resistance of
ordinary Rwandans to the policy of national unity and reconciliation, the precise forms of which
depend on the unique combination of dangers and opportunities that exist in any given situation. By
necessity, Rwandans’ everyday acts of resistance are tactical since government officials and other
agents of the state suppress any perceived challenge to the requirements of the policy, sometimes with
a ferocity that dramatically exceeds the original violation.
About a week after Jolie’s outburst, we found each other at our regular meeting point, the kiosk; she
greeted me warmly and said, “Did you tell anyone about what I told you last time? You know, about
how I would continue to fight to get [membership in] the survivors’ organization?” I reassured her
that I had not uttered a word to anyone about our private conversations. She sparkled with delight as
she pulled a government-issued health card out of her handkerchief, which she kept carefully folded
and tucked underneath the head wrap she usually wore. “Do you see this? Do you know what this is?” I
nodded yes. She continued,
You see what can be done with some persistence? I finally got the signature I
needed from the FARG official, and here is proof that I am now a full member. 1
Even my husband did not believe what I accomplished. But I did. I really did it. I
got some protection from this government for my children. She said “no” many
times before now, but finally, I am a member! This is my first step to getting
more support and to getting it as a survivor. Maybe next they will accept me as
one of them!
Jolie’s experience exemplifies a number of qualities of everyday resistance, which are subtle,
indirect, and nonconfrontational acts that those subject to power enact to show their anger, opposition,
or indignation vis-à-vis what they perceive as unfair or unjust actions against them. Many ordinary
Rwandans understand that the policy of national unity and reconciliation represents wrongs against
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