Atsb transport Safety Report



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ATSB Transport Safety Report

Rail Occurrence Investigation

RO-2013-005

Final – 20 December 2013


australian transport safety bureau

Collision of passenger train T842 with station platform

Cleveland, Queensland, 31 January 2013






Front cover: Photo supplied by Queensland Police Service.


Released in accordance with section 25 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003


Publishing information
Published by: Australian Transport Safety Bureau

Postal address: PO Box 967, Civic Square ACT 2608

Office: 62 Northbourne Avenue Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 2601

Telephone: 1800 020 616, from overseas +61 2 6257 4150 (24 hours)

Accident and incident notification: 1800 011 034 (24 hours)



Facsimile: 02 6247 3117, from overseas +61 2 6247 3117

Email: atsbinfo@atsb.gov.au

Internet: www.atsb.gov.au

© Commonwealth of Australia 2013


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Unless otherwise noted, copyright (and any other intellectual property rights, if any) in this publication is owned by the Commonwealth of Australia.
Creative Commons licence
With the exception of the Coat of Arms, ATSB logo, and photos and graphics in which a third party holds copyright, this publication is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Australia licence.
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Australia Licence is a standard form license agreement that allows you to copy, distribute, transmit and adapt this publication provided that you attribute the work.
The ATSB’s preference is that you attribute this publication (and any material sourced from it) using the following wording: Source: Australian Transport Safety Bureau
Copyright in material obtained from other agencies, private individuals or organisations, belongs to those agencies, individuals or organisations. Where you want to use their material you will need to contact them directly.
Addendum

Page

Change

Date

54

Figure 24: Row 5 - Track section location amended

7 Jan 2014

76

Buffer stop design criterion – QR response 255 t

5 March 2014






Safety summary


Train T842 at Cleveland station

train t842 at cleveland station

Source: Dept of Transport and Main Roads, Queensland
What happened

At about 0940 on 31 January 2013, a Queensland Rail passenger train (T842) failed to stop at the Cleveland station platform and collided with the end-of-line buffer stop, the platform and the station building at a speed of about 31 km/h. There were 19 people on board the train (including the driver and a guard); three people were on the platform and five were in the station building. A number of people were treated for minor injuries and transported to hospital for further examination.

At the request of the Queensland Government, the ATSB initiated an investigation into the accident.

What the ATSB found

The ATSB’s investigation found that local environmental conditions had resulted in the formation of a contaminant substance on the rail running surface. This caused poor adhesion at the contact point between the train’s wheels and the rail head. The braking effectiveness of train T842 was reduced as a result of reduced adhesion and the train was unable to stop before hitting the end-of-line buffer stop.

The ATSB concluded that Queensland Rail’s risk management processes prior to the accident had not adequately assessed, recorded, managed and communicated the risks associated with operating trains on their network under low adhesion conditions.

In addition, Queensland Rail had not undertaken exercises to test the preparedness and effectiveness of their emergency management system. Shortfalls were identified in the response to the accident with respect to internal communications within train control and between staff at Cleveland station which resulted in incomplete information being provided to key personnel.



What's been done as a result

Queensland Rail initiated a risk mitigation strategy in response to the collision of train T842 at Cleveland station on 31 January 2013. The strategy included the formation of a Wheel Rail Interface Working Group that identified the wheel/rail interface risks, particularly for Queensland Rail’s fleet of IMU160/SMU260 class trains being operated under certain conditions.

Queensland Rail have also implemented a series of risk controls including identifying localised black spot locations and applying vegetation control measures, treating rail-head contaminants, reviewing and updating driver training with enhanced train handling advice about wheel slide and the trialling of sanding equipment on IMU160/SMU260 class trains. Queensland Rail have now undertaken emergency exercises to test the effectiveness of their emergency response arrangements and are implementing new communication protocols for emergency incident response.

Safety message

Rail operators should recognise that train braking performance may be significantly impaired when local environmental conditions result in contaminated rail running surfaces and reduced wheel/rail adhesion. Rail operators should put appropriate measures in place to assess and mitigate the risk to the safe operation of trains under these conditions.



Contents

The occurrence 4

Events prior to collision 4

Service T842 4

The collision 5

Post collision 8

Emergency response coordination 8

Vehicle recovery 9

Infrastructure repairs 10



Context 11

Location 11

Organisation 11

Infrastructure 11

Track 11

Overhead traction system 12

Buffer stop 12

Slippery track conditions 13

Track adhesion and friction 14

Rail head and train wheel contaminants 14

Rail head and train wheel profiles 17

Train driver 19

Driver’s actions 19

Train information 19

Braking system 20

Brake inspection and tests 22

Pre-service brake conformance testing (IMU160 class) 24

Brake software changes 25

Test train SMU292 25

Wheel tread dressing 26

Train crashworthiness 27

Station overruns 31

Frequency by train class 31

Locations where trains have higher incidence of overrun 32

Previous Queensland Rail train wheel slide occurrences 37

Beerwah 9 January 2009 37

Beerwah 9 March 2009 40

Narangba and Morayfield 28 January 2013 41

Caboolture - test train 41

Train testing and data irregularities 42

BCU 42

VCU 43


Brake test methodology 43

Investigations of slide occurrences by other organisations 44

Siemens Nexas train overruns - Melbourne 44

Derailment of CityRail train 312A - Thirroul, NSW 11 September 2006 45

Rail slide occurrences - United Kingdom 46

Reference documents for the management of wheel slide 46

Train driver training 47

Training and qualifications 47

Emergency response management 48

Documented emergency management procedures 49

Emergency management training of involved Queensland Rail staff 49

Exercising emergency management procedures 50

Roles and responsibilities of train control personnel 50

Procedures for the assurance of Overhead Line Equipment (OHLE) safety 51

Actions of Queensland Rail staff at the emergency site 52

Communications between network control and Cleveland station 53

Train operations internal emergency debrief 53

Management of safety risks 54

Regulatory oversight of Queensland Rail 55

Confidential reporting system 58



Safety analysis 59

Organisational risk management 59

Beerwah 60

Other occurrences 61

Buffer stop collision risk 61

Regulatory oversight 62

Beerwah 63

Investigation report reviews 64

DTMR spot and compliance safety audits 64

National Rail Safety Regulator (NRSR) 65

Driver training for braking under conditions of low adhesion 65

Effectiveness of emergency management response 67

Design and accessibility of the Emergency Management Specification: 67

Preparedness and role of customer service staff in emergency response 68

Exercising simulated emergencies 69

Actions and interactions of train control personnel 69

Managing and communicating OHLE status 70

Criticality of efficient and standard communication protocols 71

Opportunities for organisational learning about emergency management 72

Findings 73

Contributing factors 73

Other factors that increased risk 73

Other findings 74



Safety issues and actions 75

Management of risk associated with poor adhesion 75

Safety issue description: 75

Current status of the safety issue: 76

Assessment and recording of rail safety risks 76

Safety issue description: 76

Cross divisional recognition of rail safety risks 77

Safety issue description: 77

Current status of the safety issue: 77

Application of safety actions from internal investigations 78

Safety issue description: 78

Awareness of rail safety occurrences in other jurisdictions affecting rail fleet type 79

Safety issue description: 79

Current status of the safety issue: 79

Buffer stop design criterion 79

Safety issue description: 80

Driver’s manual explanation of effects and control of low adhesion 80

Safety issue description: 80

Effective coordination of emergency communications 82

Safety issue description: 82

Emergency management exercises 82

Safety issue description: 82

Post emergency debrief and findings 83

Safety issue description: 83

Occurrence notification standard and guideline 84

Safety issue description: 84



General details 85

Occurrence details 85

Train: T842 85

Sources and submissions 86

Sources of information 86

References 86

Submissions 87



Appendices 88

Appendix A - Safety issues update 88

Queensland Rail’s response to the ATSB’s preliminary report published on 13 March 2013 88

Appendix B – Other investigations 90

RAIB - Esher, United Kingdom 90

RAIB - Lewes, United Kingdom 90

RAIB - Review of adhesion-related incidents during autumn 2005 91

Australian Transport Safety Bureau 93

Purpose of safety investigations 93

Developing safety action 93

Glossary 94






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