At about 0940 on 31 January 2013, a Queensland Rail passenger train (T842) failed to stop at the Cleveland station platform and collided with the end-of-line buffer stop, the platform and the station building at a speed of about 31 km/h. There were 19 people on board the train (including the driver and a guard); three people were on the platform and five were in the station building. A number of people were treated for minor injuries and transported to hospital for further examination.
The ATSB’s investigation found that local environmental conditions had resulted in the formation of a contaminant substance on the rail running surface. This caused poor adhesion at the contact point between the train’s wheels and the rail head. The braking effectiveness of train T842 was reduced as a result of reduced adhesion and the train was unable to stop before hitting the end-of-line buffer stop.
The ATSB concluded that Queensland Rail’s risk management processes prior to the accident had not adequately assessed, recorded, managed and communicated the risks associated with operating trains on their network under low adhesion conditions.
Queensland Rail initiated a risk mitigation strategy in response to the collision of train T842 at Cleveland station on 31 January 2013. The strategy included the formation of a Wheel Rail Interface Working Group that identified the wheel/rail interface risks, particularly for Queensland Rail’s fleet of IMU160/SMU260 class trains being operated under certain conditions.
Queensland Rail have also implemented a series of risk controls including identifying localised black spot locations and applying vegetation control measures, treating rail-head contaminants, reviewing and updating driver training with enhanced train handling advice about wheel slide and the trialling of sanding equipment on IMU160/SMU260 class trains. Queensland Rail have now undertaken emergency exercises to test the effectiveness of their emergency response arrangements and are implementing new communication protocols for emergency incident response.
Safety message
Rail operators should recognise that train braking performance may be significantly impaired when local environmental conditions result in contaminated rail running surfaces and reduced wheel/rail adhesion. Rail operators should put appropriate measures in place to assess and mitigate the risk to the safe operation of trains under these conditions.
The occurrence 4
Events prior to collision 4
Service T842 4
The collision 5
Post collision 8
Emergency response coordination 8
Vehicle recovery 9
Infrastructure repairs 10
Context 11
Location 11
Organisation 11
Infrastructure 11
Track 11
Overhead traction system 12
Buffer stop 12
Slippery track conditions 13
Track adhesion and friction 14
Rail head and train wheel contaminants 14
Rail head and train wheel profiles 17
Train driver 19
Driver’s actions 19
Train information 19
Braking system 20
Brake inspection and tests 22
Pre-service brake conformance testing (IMU160 class) 24
Brake software changes 25
Test train SMU292 25
Wheel tread dressing 26
Train crashworthiness 27
Station overruns 31
Frequency by train class 31
Locations where trains have higher incidence of overrun 32
Previous Queensland Rail train wheel slide occurrences 37
Beerwah 9 January 2009 37
Beerwah 9 March 2009 40
Narangba and Morayfield 28 January 2013 41
Caboolture - test train 41
Train testing and data irregularities 42
BCU 42
VCU 43
Brake test methodology 43
Investigations of slide occurrences by other organisations 44
Siemens Nexas train overruns - Melbourne 44
Derailment of CityRail train 312A - Thirroul, NSW 11 September 2006 45
Rail slide occurrences - United Kingdom 46
Reference documents for the management of wheel slide 46
Train driver training 47
Training and qualifications 47
Emergency response management 48
Documented emergency management procedures 49
Emergency management training of involved Queensland Rail staff 49
Exercising emergency management procedures 50
Roles and responsibilities of train control personnel 50
Procedures for the assurance of Overhead Line Equipment (OHLE) safety 51
Actions of Queensland Rail staff at the emergency site 52
Communications between network control and Cleveland station 53
Train operations internal emergency debrief 53
Management of safety risks 54
Regulatory oversight of Queensland Rail 55
Confidential reporting system 58
Safety analysis 59
Organisational risk management 59
Beerwah 60
Other occurrences 61
Buffer stop collision risk 61
Regulatory oversight 62
Beerwah 63
Investigation report reviews 64
DTMR spot and compliance safety audits 64
National Rail Safety Regulator (NRSR) 65
Driver training for braking under conditions of low adhesion 65
Effectiveness of emergency management response 67
Design and accessibility of the Emergency Management Specification: 67
Preparedness and role of customer service staff in emergency response 68
Exercising simulated emergencies 69
Actions and interactions of train control personnel 69
Managing and communicating OHLE status 70
Criticality of efficient and standard communication protocols 71
Opportunities for organisational learning about emergency management 72
Findings 73
Contributing factors 73
Other factors that increased risk 73
Other findings 74
Safety issues and actions 75
Management of risk associated with poor adhesion 75
Safety issue description: 75
Current status of the safety issue: 76
Assessment and recording of rail safety risks 76
Safety issue description: 76
Cross divisional recognition of rail safety risks 77
Safety issue description: 77
Current status of the safety issue: 77
Application of safety actions from internal investigations 78
Safety issue description: 78
Awareness of rail safety occurrences in other jurisdictions affecting rail fleet type 79
Safety issue description: 79
Current status of the safety issue: 79
Buffer stop design criterion 79
Safety issue description: 80
Driver’s manual explanation of effects and control of low adhesion 80
Safety issue description: 80
Effective coordination of emergency communications 82
Safety issue description: 82
Emergency management exercises 82
Safety issue description: 82
Post emergency debrief and findings 83
Safety issue description: 83
Occurrence notification standard and guideline 84
Safety issue description: 84
General details 85
Occurrence details 85
Train: T842 85
Sources and submissions 86
Sources of information 86
References 86
Submissions 87
Appendices 88
Appendix A - Safety issues update 88
Queensland Rail’s response to the ATSB’s preliminary report published on 13 March 2013 88
Appendix B – Other investigations 90
RAIB - Esher, United Kingdom 90
RAIB - Lewes, United Kingdom 90
RAIB - Review of adhesion-related incidents during autumn 2005 91
Australian Transport Safety Bureau 93
Purpose of safety investigations 93
Developing safety action 93
Glossary 94