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§3.3.2, p. 18, footnote 3 describes the probability equivalent method to elicit U
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| §3.3.2, p. 18, footnote 3 describes the probability equivalent method to elicit U.
§3.3.2: mutual exclusiveness of events to avoid complementarity is emphasized (see also p. 628). P. 19 seems to write: [i]t is conceivable—and may even in a way be more realistic—to allow for cases where the individual is neither able to state which of two alternatives he prefers nor that they are equally desirable” P. 32: Here is a text of vNM (already in the 44 version) that captures some of Nash’s equilibrium. It still is different because it does not consider individual deviations but, apparently, also joint deviations by subgroups, which makes the concept less interesting: “Second, and this is even more fundamental, the rules of rational behavior must provide definitely for the possibility of irrational conduct on the part of others. In other words: Imagine that we have discovered a set of rules for all participants to be termed as "optimal" or "rational" each of which is indeed optimal provided that the other participants conform. Then the question remains as to what will happen if some of the participants do not conform. If that should turn out to be advantageous for them and, quite particularly, disadvantageous to the conformists then the above "solution" would seem very questionable. We are in no position to give a positive discussion of these things as yet but we want to make it clear that under such conditions the "solution," or at least its motivation, must be considered as imperfect and incomplete. In whatever way we formulate the guiding principles and the objective justification of "rational behavior," provisos will have to be made for every possible conduct of "the others." Only in this way can a satisfactory and exhaustive theory be developed. But if the superiority of "rational behavior" over any other kind is to be established, then its description must include rules of conduct for all conceivable situations including those where "the others" behaved irrationally, in the sense of the standards which the theory will set for them. [underlining added].” P. 66-84: description of decision trees game theory can/cannot be seen as decision under uncertainty: p. 99 seems to write: “from the point of view of player I who chooses a variable … the other variable can certainly not be considered as a chance event. The other variable … is dependent upon the will of the other player, which must be regarded in the same light of “rationality” as his own.” P. 604 seems to write: “We have ... assumed that [utility] is numerical ... substitutable and unrestrictedly transferable between the various players.” P. 628: “since the two are in no case conceived as taking place together, they can never complement each other.” biseparable utility: for their EU %} von Neumann, John & Oskar Morgenstern (1944, 1947, 1953) “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.” Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. {% %} von Nitzsch, Rüdiger (1996) “Entscheidungslehre - Der Weg zur Besseren Entscheidung; 3rd edn.” Verlag der Augustinus-Buchhandlung, Aachen. {% %} von Nitzsch, Rüdiger (1998) “Prospect Theory und Käuferverhalten,” Die Betriebswirtschaft 5, 622–634. {% %} von Nitzsch, Rüdiger & Christian Friedrich (1999) “Entscheidungen in Finanzmärkten, Psychologische Grundlagen.” Mainz Verlag, Aachen. {% %} von Nitzsch, Rüdiger & Martin Weber (1988) “Utility Function Assessment on a Micro-Computer: A Reliable, Interactive Procedure,” Annals of Operations Research 16, 149–160. {% %} von Nitzsch, Rüdiger & Martin Weber (1993) “The Effect of Attribute Ranges on Weights in Multiattribute Utility Measurements,” Management Science 39, 937–943. {% Treats human mistakes in Bayes formula (Bayes’ formula intuitively) and many other funny problems. %} von Randow, Gero (1990/2?) “Das Ziegenproblem.” Rowohlt (pocket-book). {% %} von Stengel, Bernhard (1993) “Closure Properties of Independence Concepts for Continuous Utilities,” Mathematics of Operations Research 18, 346–389. {% Shows existence of policy optimal w.r.t. overtaking policy in a certain context. %} von Weizsäcker, Carl C. (1965) “Existence of Optimal Programs of Accumulation for an Infinite Time Horizon,” Review of Economic Studies 32, 85–104. {% P. 501: Dutch book as if money pump, used only for violations of transitivity/dominanc in lotteries with one nonzero outcome %} von Winterfeldt, Detlof (1989) “A Re-Examination of the Normative- Descriptive Distinction in Decision Analysis,” Annals of Operations Research 19, 499–502. {% Decision analysis, presented in plenary lecture in SPUDM end of 1990s. On p. 537 the author states that at some stage it seemed that the author had only been hired to support a decision already taken, and that the author considered resigning for this reason. He also states, frankly, at the end that, although the final decision was consistent with the decision analysis, it was not clear if the decision analysis had been an input for it. %} von Winterfeldt, Detlof (2007) “Choosing a Tritium Supply for Nuclear Weapons: A Decision Analysis Caught in Controversy.” In Ward Edwards, Ralph F. Miles, & Detlof von Winterfeldt (eds.) “Advances in Decision Analysis: From Foundations to Applications,” 514–538, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. {% %} von Winterfeldt, Detlof, Ngar-Kok Chung, R. Duncan Luce, & Younghee Cho (1997) “Tests of Consequence Monotonicity in Decision Making under Uncertainty,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 23, 406–426. {% Call attention to the flat maxima phenomenon, that near the optimum in a decision task deviations do not cost much. %} von Winterfeldt, Detlof & Ward Edwards (1982) “Costs and Payoffs in Perceptual Research,” Psychological Bulletin 91, 609–622. {% The text is often verbose and not much structured, and not very formal/accurate. It is often not clear if a model is static or dynamic. The nice and special thing of this book is the many practical asides based on experiences of primarily von Winterfeldt. To get a sense of decision analysis in practice, this book is very good. To get a sense of concepts and models, less so. P. xiii 3rd para: the authors do not seem to understand reference dependence. Maybe they automatically take outcomes as changes w.r.t. the reference point, in which case to get total wealth one has to add this "outcome" to the reference point of course. But then the dependence is very particular and not general, and their opening sentence distinguishing from total wealth is not right. Best I can think of is that they are confused. The elaborated discussion on pp. 373 ff. does not help, although bounded rationality plays some role. . Pp. 3-4: DUU as if the universal model of all life. simple decision analysis cases using EU: pp. 8-15: nice practical example of decision making. Ch. 12 (p. 448 ff.) gives 11 applications of decision analysis, not very simple. §3.6 (p. 86 ff.) has an example on a law suite. utility elicitation Ch. 2 is on structuring in general, with Ch. 3 focusing on decision trees. Second sentence of §2.1: in the experience of most decision analysts, structuring problems and identifying options and objectives are the most difficult parts of most problems. Ch. 4 is on measurement of uncertainty. Ch. 5: Bayesian statistics. P. 65/66: that money is a complex outcome. P. 82: value of information P. 112: probability elicitation; UAI p. 122, calibration (see Yates) questionnaire versus choice utility: p. 216 ff. P. 133 (in context of probability measurement): use interaction with client and exploit inconsistencies. P. 144 is on the likelihood principle, on which Edwards has written more. Ch. 6 is on general inference when not statistical and, as the authors say, is “frustrating” (p. 163) with little of general conclusions. They draw upon work in the legal literature, using scenarios. Ch. 7: value and utility measurement. Pp. 312-313 give a useful summary of doing MAUT with recommendations such as having no more than 10 attributes per level. P. 313 point 6 discusses how to handle and benefit from inconsistencies. risky utility u = strength of preference v (or other riskless cardinal utility, often called value): §7.1, p. 215: “The conclusion of our four assertions is that for theoretical, psychological, and practical reasons the distinctions between utility and value are spurious.” Pp. 222/223: suggests use of psychophysical scales in utility assessment P. 236: “However, in general three carefully assessed points of the value function should provide sufficient information to smooth a value curve.” P. 238 (in context of direct rating): “Different techniques almost inevitably produce different responses. Rather than finding such differences distressing, we consider them useful for gaining insights into the nature of the value scale and the reasons for technique, stimulus, and response mode effects. Such discrepancies should be carefully examined and resolved through direct interrogation of the respondent or decision maker.” P. 254: “If a natural scale exists, three or five points between the corner points are usually sufficient for smoothing a utility function.” Ch. 8 MAUT. P. 256/257: “We speculate that formally justified utility elicitation methods deviate at least as much from one another as the utility methods do from the value scaling methods.” P. 267 uses the term dual standard sequence for the MAUT version of the standard sequences that Wakker & Deneffe (1996) use in their Tradeoff method. P. 296 illustrates method for eliciting standard sequences, à la Tradeoff method of Wakker & Deneffe (1996) for MAUT Ch. 9 does theory on utility measurement. Ch. 10: biases. conservation of influence: p. 545 refers to Piaget’s work on conservation laws of quantity, length, number, and so on, how it is recognized by children at certain ages. Use the, nice, term “joint independence” for separability. Ch. 11, on sensitivity analysis: Glenn Harrison (2007, personal communication) pointed out to me that they (§11.4 and 11.5) preceded his influential 1989-paper on the flat optimal payoff problem. Ch. 12 many applications. Ch. 13 cognitive illusions. Ch. 14 history. %} von Winterfeldt, Detlof & Ward Edwards (1986) “Decision Analysis and Behavioral Research.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. {% Practical lessons regarding the structuring of a decision problem learned from an application 10 years ago. Paper is short and accessible and, hence, especially suited for students. %} von Winterfeldt, Detlof & Barbara Fasolo (2009) “Structuring Decision Problems: A Case Study and Reflections for Practitioners,” European Journal of Operational Research 199, 857–866. {% utility elicitation %} von Winterfeldt, Detlof & Gregory W. Fischer (1975) “Multiattribute Utility Theory: Models and Assessment Procedures.” In Dirk Wendt & Charles A.J. Vlek (eds.) Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making, 47–66, Reidel, Dordrecht. {% %} von Wright, Georg Henrik (1963) “The Logic of Preference: An Essay.” Edinburgh. {% P. 52 of this book cites a variation of the serenity prayer by Reinhold Niebuhr, being framed on the office of a man called Billy Pilgrim, a doctor, without source given. There the prayer goes like this: God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, courage to change the things I can, and wisdom always to tell the difference. %} Vonnegut, Kurt (Jr.) (1969) “Slaughterhouse-five, or the Children’s Crusade: A Duty-Dance with Death.” Delacorte Press, New York. (Apparently 3rd edn.) {% losses from prior endowment mechanism Use matching probabilities for Ellsberg urns. Ambiguity seeking is more frequent among inconsistent decision makers, ambiguity neutrality among consistent ones, and ambiguity aversion is the same. ambiguity seeking for losses: not found. There is more ambiguity seeking for losses than for gains (ad = 0.12 in the aggregate for gains and 0.10 for losses) but the difference is not significant, and aversion is stronger than seeking for losses. %} Voorhoeve, Alex, Ken Binmore, Arnaldur Stefansson, & Lisa Stewart (2016) “Ambiguity Attitudes, Framing, and Consistency,” Theory and Decision 81, 313–337. {% Nice illustration of use of Choquet integral in physics. %} Vourdas, Apostolos (2016) “Comonotonicity and Choquet Itegrals of Hermitian Operators and Their Applications,” Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical 49, 145002 (36pp) {% foundations of probability, foundations of statistics; looks a bit like von Mises work. J.V. Howard on p. 343 updates von Mises mistakes and later solutions. %} Vovk, Vladimir G. (1993) “A Logic of Probability, with Application to the Foundations of Statistics” with discussion, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 55, 317–351. {% Bayes’ formula intuitively %} Vranas, Peter B.M. (2004) “Hempel’s Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55, 545–560. {% %} Vriens, Marco & Arne Maas (1990) “Conjoint Analysis of Trade-Off Preference Matrices: Some Possible Extensions.” In Stephen E.G. Lea, Paul Webley, & Brian M. Young (eds.) “Applied Economic Psychology in the 1990’s,” 1075–1081, Springer, Berlin. {% Elsevier is a weekly magazine with 100,000 subscriptions. %} Vrieselaar, Nic, Ralph Koijen, & Peter P. Wakker (2014) “Sparen voor de Dood,” Elsevier 70 (47) p. 73. Link to paper
Vrijdags, Armélie (2013) “Min- and Max-Induced Rankings: an Experimental Study,” Theory and Decision 64/65, 76–86. {% Models of total absence of information, with acts specified only by set of consequences, à la Barberà, Bossert, Pattanaik, Jaffray. Tests average utility model. Finds that averaging axiom (A and B disjoint then A B is between them in preference, which, identifying sets with uniform lotteries, amounts to betweenness) is violated and that a considerable minority of subjects rather prefer what the authors call diversification, but what can also be taken as subjects considering sums rather than averages of utility. The paper also tests restricted independence (adding a disjoint set does not affect preference if the original sets have the same nr. of elements), but only comonotonic versions of it, and finds violations. The paper then proposes a variation of RDU where for each n an n-dimensional weight vector is assigned. These weights can but need not be derived from an RDU functional (contrary to what is suggested on p. 83 2nd and 3rd para; there Yager’s model in fact is a special case of RDU that does not comprise the nonRDU versions of the authors’ model with linear utility). It is RDU if and only if, taking n-sets as uniform lotteries, stochastic dominance holds, as can be seen. It implies also that the first m elements of an n-tuple have the same weight as the first 2m elements from a 2n tuple. The dominance condition that the authors characterize in Proposition 1 is weaker than this stochastic dominance. %} Vrijdags, Armélie & Thierry Marchant (2015) “From Uniform Expected Utility to Uniform Rank-Dependent Utility: An Experimental Study,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 64-65, 76–86. {% %} Vulkan, Nir (2000) “An Economist’s Perspective on Probability Matching,” Journal of Economic Surveys 14, 101–118. {% anonymity protection %} Waal, Ton (A.) G. de, & Leon C.R.J. Willenborg (1996) “A View on Statistical Disclosure Control for Microdata,” Survey Methodology 22, 95–103. {% anonymity protection; SDC means: Statistical Disclosue Control %} Waal, Ton (A.) .G. de, & Leon C.R.J. Willenborg (1996) “SDC Measures and Information Loss for Microdata Sets,” CBS. {% producing random numbers %} Wagenaar, Willem A. (1972) “Generation of Random Sequences by Human Subjects: A Critical Survey of Literature,” Psychological Bulletin 77, 65–72. {% %} Wagenaar, Willem A. & Patrick T.W. Hudson (1990) “Cognitive Failures and Accidents,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 4, 273–294. {% %} Wagenaar, Willem A. & Gideon B. Keren (1986) “Does the Expert Know? The Reliability of Predictions and Confidence Ratings of Experts.” In Erik Hollnagel, Giuseppe Mancini & David D. Woods (eds.) Intelligent Decision Support in Process Environments 87–107, Springer, Berlin. {% foundations of statistics %} Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan & Peter Grünwald (2006) “A Bayesian Perspective on Hypothesis Testing: A Comment on Killeen (2005)” Psychological Science 17, 641–642. {% foundations of statistics: criticize a Bem (2011) paper in the same journal that claimed evidence for psi (that people can predict the future a little bit) and that gave statistically significant evidence. This paper criticizes the Bem paper, using Bayesian views (I sympathize with the latter): Problem 1: Bem did exploratory (data mining; getting hypothesis from data and then testing using that same data), and not confirmatory (specifying statistical test before getting data). Problem 2: it has the problem of all classical statistics, of dealing with probabilities over data given hypothesis, whereas one wants that reversed. The authors consider Bayesian updating with some extremely small prior probabilities for psi, in which case the posterior remains small. Problem 3: p-values overstate for big samples. They put forward the Bayesian argument that one better consider Bayes factors, and I could not agree more. But difficult question for Bayesian factors is which H1 to take. The authors take one called default that I do not understand (they cite papers I do not know) in which case the data more support H0 (no psi) than H1 (a specific degtee of psi, or a more subtle variation of this H1). It is the known phenomenon of statistical significance but not economic significance (or a variation of this phenomenon for noneconomists). Then the authors argue for more rigid statistics in psychology that more often should be confirmatory. In the last para the authors write that Bem played by the implicit rules of statistics in psychology and that they, therefore, aim to criticize those implicit tules rather than Bem. The paper is too strict in imposing requirements on the Bem study that virtually no psychology study can satisfy. Note here that psychology, unlike medicine for instance, by nature is mostly exploratory. It may be refreshing that authors are more explicit in criticizing others than is common in our overly diplomatic and nonexplicit field, but this paper goes too far. Many sentences add nothing to the content but only aim to ridiculize Bem, contrary to what the last para of the paper writes. Probably because many traditional researchers will like hostility towards psi anyhow, the authors could get away with it. Examples: p. 427 1st column 1st para (“anecdotal,” also kown as “worth no more than a bare mention”) P. 428 2nd column end of 1st para “a psychic’s night out at the casino”, p. 429 1st column 1st para (“infinite wealth”). %} Wagenmakers, Eric–Jan, Ruud Wetzels, Denny Borsboom, & Han L.J. van der Maas (2011) “Why Psychologists Must Change the Way They Analyze Their Data: The Case of Psi: Comment on Bem (2011)” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 100, 426–432. {% %} Wagner, Harvey M. (1975) “Principles of Operations Research; 2nd edn.” Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. {% measure of similarity %} Wagner, John & Robert Elliott (1999) “The Simplified Personal Questionnaire.” Toledo: University of Toledo. Unpublished manuscript. {% %} Wagstaff, Adam & Anthony J. Culyer (2012) “Four Decades of Health Economics through a Bibliometric Lens,” Journal of Health Economics 31, 406–439. {% Dutch book %} Waidacher, Christoph (1997) “Hidden Assumptions in the Dutch Book Argument,” Theory and Decision 43, 293–312. {% The paper points out an omission in the proof of Epstein & Schneider (2003) and corrects it. %} Wakai, Katsutoshi (2007) “A Note on Recursive Multiple-Priors,” Journal of Economic Theory 135, 567–571. {% In Eq. 2, used binary rank-dependent utility for intertemporal aggregation function, referring to multiple priors for it. For intertemporal choice this aggregation function leads to a preference for spreading good and bad outcomes. Very nice! I regret somewhat that the author uses the Anscombe-Aumann model to characterize his form. %} Wakai, Katsutoshi (2008) “A Model of Utility Smoothing,” Econometrica 76, 137–153. {% dominance violation by pref. for increasing income: generalizes his 2008 Econometrica model by allowing for violations of monotonicity, but only if due to loss aversion relative to habit up to that point, which may be so strong that one likes to give up present consumption just so as to avoid future loss aversion. Thus the set of discount factors (like set of priors) may contain s exceeding 1. The paper gives an axiomatization using, as in 2008, the Anscombe-Aumann model. %} Wakai, Katsutoshi (2011) “Modeling Nonmonotonic Preferences: The Case of Utility Smoothing,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, 213–226. {% Considers a recursive expected utility that combines both ambiguity aversion as in the smooth model and intertemporal attitudes as Kreps & Porteus (1978), showing how to separate them, considering both conditionings on time and on states of nature. %} Wakai, Katsutoshi (2013) “Intertemporal Utility Smoothing under Uncertainty,” Theory and Decision 74, 285–310. {% ordering of subsets %} Wakker, Peter P. (1981) “Agreeing Probability Measures for Comparative Probability Structures,” Annals of Statistics 9, 658–662. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1984) “Cardinal Coordinate Independence for Expected Utility,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 28, 110–117. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1985) “Continuous Expected Utility for Arbitrary State Spaces,” Methods of Operations Research 50, 113–129. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1985) “Extending Monotone and Non-Expansive Mappings by Optimization,” Cahiers du C.E.R.O. 27, 141–149. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1986) “Representations of Choice Situations.” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Brabant, Department of Economics, Tilburg, the Netherlands. {% %} Wakker, Peter P. (1986) “The Repetitions Approach to Characterize Cardinal Utility,” Theory and Decision 20, 33–40. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1986) “Concave Additively Decomposable Representing Functions and Risk Aversion.” In Luciano Daboni, Aldo Montesano, & Marji Lines (eds.) Recent Developments in the Foundations of Utility and Risk Theory, 249–262, Reidel, Dordrecht. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1986) Book Review of: Dennis V. Lindley (1985) “Making Decisions,” Wiley, New York; Kwantitatieve Methoden 20, 144–145. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1987) “Subjective Probabilities for State-Dependent Continuous Utility,” Mathematical Social Sciences 14, 289–298. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1987) “From Decision Making under Uncertainty to Game Theory.” In Hans J.M. Peters & Koos J. Vrieze (eds.) Surveys of Game Theory and Related Topics, 163–180, CWI Tract 39, Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science, Amsterdam. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1987) “Nonadditive Probabilities and Derived Strengths of Preferences,” Internal report 87 MA 03, Nijmegen University, Department of Mathematical Psychology, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1988) “Nonexpected Utility as Aversion of Information,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 1, 169–175. (Discussion in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 2, 1989, 197–202.) Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1988) “Continuity of Preference Relations for Separable Topologies,” International Economic Review 29, 105–110. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1988) “The Algebraic versus the Topological Approach to Additive Representations,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 32, 421–435. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1988) “Derived Strength of Preference Relations on Coordinates,” Economics Letters 28, 301–306. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1988) “Characterizations of Quasilinear Representing Functions, and Specified Forms of These.” In Wolfgang Eichhorn (ed.) Measurement in Economics (Theory and Applications of Economic Indices), 311–326, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1989) “Continuous Subjective Expected Utility with Nonadditive Probabilities,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 18, 1–27. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1989) “A Graph-Theoretic Approach to Revealed Preference,” Methodology and Science 22, 53–66. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1989) “Subjective Expected Utility with Non-Increasing Risk Aversion,” Annals of Operations Research 19, 219–228. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1989) “Transforming Probabilities without Violating Stochastic Dominance.” In Edward E.Ch.I. Roskam (ed.) Mathematical Psychology in Progress, 29–47, Springer, Berlin. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1989) “Additive Representations of Preferences, A New Foundation of Decision Analysis.” Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. Link to comments & corrections (Link does not work for some computers. Then can: go to Papers and comments; go to paper 89.5 there; see comments there.) Reviews:
French, Simon (1990) British Journal of Mathematical & Statistical Psychology 43, 335–336. & Fishburn, Peter C: (1991) “Subjective Expected Utility with a Topological Twist,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 35, 403–409. {% %} Wakker, Peter P. (1990) “A Behavioral Foundation for Fuzzy Measures,” Fuzzy Sets and Systems 37, 327–350. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1990) “Characterizing Optimism and Pessimism Directly through Comonotonicity,” Journal of Economic Theory 52, 453–463. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1990) “Under Stochastic Dominance Choquet-Expected Utility and Anticipated Utility are Identical,” Theory and Decision 29, 119–132. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1991) “Additive Representation for Equally Spaced Structures,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 35, 260–266. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1991) “Continuity of Transformations,” Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 162, 1–6. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1991) “Additive Representations on Rank-Ordered Sets. I. The Algebraic Approach,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 35, 501–531. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1991) “Additive Representations of Preferences, A New Foundation of Decision Analysis; The Algebraic Approach.” In Jean-Paul Doignon & Jean-Claude Falmagne (eds.) Mathematical Psychology: Current Developments, 71–87, Springer, Berlin. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1992) “Characterizing Stochastically Monotone Functions by Multi-Attribute Utility Theory,” Economic Theory 2, 565–566. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1993) “Additive Representations on Rank-Ordered Sets II. The Topological Approach,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 22, 1–26. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1993) “Counterexamples to Segal’s Measure Representation Theorem,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 6, 91–98. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1993) “Clarification of some Mathematical Misunderstandings about Savage’s Foundations of Statistics, 1954,” Mathematical Social Sciences 25, 199–202. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1993) “Unbounded Utility for Savage’s “Foundations of Statistics,” and other Models,” Mathematics of Operations Research 18, 446–485. Link to paper Figure 2 in the journal is not clear if copied. Here is the pdf-file of this: Figure 2 {% finite additivity %} Wakker, Peter P. (1993) “Savage’s Axioms Usually Imply Violation of Strict Stochastic Dominance,” Review of Economic Studies 60, 487–493. Link to paper Link to comments (Link does not work for some computers. Then can:
Wakker, Peter P. (1994) “Separating Marginal Utility and Probabilistic Risk Aversion,” Theory and Decision 36, 1–44. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1994) “Expected versus Nonexpected Utility: The State of the Art,” Book Review of: Ward Edwards (ed., 1992) “Utility measurements and Applications,” Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht; Journal of Mathematical Psychology 38, 521–524. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1994) “Quiggin’s Rank-Dependent Model,” Book Review of: John Quiggin (1993) “Generalized Expected Utility Theory: The Rank-Dependent Model,” Kluwer Academic Publishers; Journal of Mathematical Psychology 38, 525–526. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1995) “Keuze-theorie: Die Verdraaide Preferenties!” (in Dutch), Economisch Statistische Berichten 80/4000, 231. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1995) “Are Counterfactual Decisions Relevant for Dynamically Consistent updating under Nonexpected Utility,” Medical Decision Making Unit, Leiden University, the Netherlands. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1996) “A Criticism of Healthy-Years Equivalents,” Medical Decision Making 16, 207–214. Link to paper Rejoinder {% %} Wakker, Peter P. (1996) “The Sure-Thing Principle and the Comonotonic Sure-Thing Principle: An Axiomatic Analysis,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 25, 213–227. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1996) “Time Preference,” Book Review of: George F. Loewenstein & John Elster (1992) “Choice over Time,” Russell Sage Foundation, New York; Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 9, 297–303. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1996) Book Review of: Patrick Rivett (1994) “The Craft of Decision Modelling,” Wiley, New York; Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 9, 150–151. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1998) “Non-EU and Insurance,” Book Review of: Christian Gollier & Mark J. Machina (1995, eds.) “Non-Expected Utility and Risk Management,” Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht; Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 11, 151–160. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (1999) “Justifying Bayesianism by Dynamic Decision Principles,” Medical Decision Making Unit, Leiden University Medical Center, the Netherlands. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (2000) “Dempster Belief Functions Are Based on the Principle of Complete Ignorance,” International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems 8, 271–284. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (2000) “Uncertainty Aversion: A Discussion of Critical Issues in Health Economics,” Health Economics 9, 261–263. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (2000) “Luce’s Paradigm for Decision under Uncertainty,” Book Review of: R. Duncan Luce (2000) “Utility of Gains and Losses: Measurement-Theoretical and Experimental Approaches,” Lawrence Erlbaum Publishers, London; Journal of Mathematical Psychology 44, 488–493. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (2000) Book Review of: Barberà, Salvador, Peter J. Hammond, & Christian Seidl (1998, eds.) “Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 1, Principles,” Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht; Journal of Economic Literature 38, 638–639. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (2001) “Testing and Characterizing Properties of Nonadditive Measures through Violations of the Sure-Thing Principle,” Econometrica 69, 1039–1059. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (2002) “Decision-Principles to Justify Carnap’s Updating Method and to Suggest Corrections of Probability Judgments.” In Adnam Darwiche & Nir Friedman (eds.) Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Proceedings of the Eighteenth Conference, 544–551, Morgan Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (2003) “The Data of Levy and Levy (2002) “Prospect Theory: Much Ado about Nothing?” Actually Support Prospect Theory,” Management Science 49, 979–981. link to paper Link to comments (Link does not work for some computers. Then can:
Reply by Levy & Levy {% inverse-S; cognitive ability related to likelihood insensitivity (= inverse-S) %} Wakker, Peter P. (2004) “On the Composition of Risk Preference and Belief,” Psychological Review 111, 236–241. Link to paper Link to comment on role of Amos Tversky (Link does not work for some computers. Then can:
Wakker, Peter P. (2004) “Preference Axiomatizations for Decision under Uncertainty.” In Itzhak Gilboa (ed.) Uncertainty in Economic Theory: Essays in Honor of David Schmeidler’s 65th Birthday, 20–35, Routledge, London. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (2005) “Decision-Foundations for Properties of Nonadditive Measures for General State Spaces or for General Outcome Spaces,” Games and Economic Behavior 50, 107–125. Link to paper Link to comments (Link does not work for some computers. Then can:
Wakker, Peter P. (2008) “Lessons Learned by (from?) an Economists Working in Medical Decision Making,” Medical Decision Making 28, 690–698. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (2008) “Explaining the Characteristics of the Power (CRRA) Utility Family,” Health Economics 17, 1329–1344. Link to paper
Wakker, Peter P. (2008) “Uncertainty.” In Lawrence Blume & Steven N. Durlauf (eds.) The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 8, 428–439, The MacMillan Press, London. Link to paper
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