Britain was based on a parliamentary supremacy system, but Americans viewed British as untrue to their constitutional guarantees. This feeling informed the revolution, which must be understood as a constitutional revolution.
Once drafted, Madison was profoundly disappointed with the Constitution, for failure to protect human rights, specifically with regards to religion and slavery. He viewed the document as morally bankrupt and felt that it would ultimately destroy America. Additionally was concerned about protecting people against liberty violations from states, which he viewed as a threat.
Post Madison, Americans, especially in the south, begin to accept constitutionalism with slavery. Madison’s pleas are overlooked and forgotten.
Reconstruction Amendments finally allow national power to be used against the states (specifically the 14th Amendment), in an effort to protect individual liberties. This broad view of the amendments did not catch on initially, and was not fully realized until post-WWII, but it was used from the start as a tool to protect irrational racism.
King and the civil rights movement help to fully realize the 14th Amendment as a guarantee of human rights.
Constitutional Interpretation by the Judiciary, and Judicial Review
Marbury v. Madison (US 1803) [Gunther p.3, reading notes 1, class notes 4-7]
Considers the entitlement of Marbury to an appointment, that was not realized with a commission by the subsequent Jefferson administration.
The court finds that Marbury has a right to the commission as a matter of law, there is a remedy at law, but fails to grant mandamus after finding that the dispute was improperly before the Supreme Court on original jurisdiction – denies relief.
Case is important for it creates the concept of judicial review. Marshall denies relief because he thinks that the Judiciary Act of 1789’s grant of original jurisdiction for mandamus is not consistent with Article III of the Constitution, which outlines instances where the Supreme Court is to have original jurisdiction. Thus there is also a strong argument for constitutional supremacy.
McCulloch v. Maryland (US 1819) [book 90, reading 7-8, class 5]
Congress chartered a national bank, with branches in various states. Maryland enacted a tax to be levied against the national bank branch in the state.
Marshall, for the court, finds that the state taxing of the federal bank is unconstitutional, for it hinders the exercise of national power. While states have the power to tax, they cannot exercise it in a way that is in opposition to the federal powers. Here the federal powers are constitutional, not expressly, but on an implied basis, and thus as the means are narrowly tailored to a legitimate goal, judicial deference is in order.
Richards notes that this case stands for the idea that there are some matters which are judicial in nature, and others which are uniquely political. When the latter is the case, judicial deference is proper.
Legislative and Executive exercise of constitutional review is not unheard of. Presidents have used the veto power to reject legislation they view as unconstitutional, Congress has rejected legislation on similar grounds, and prosecutorial discretion and the pardon power have been used to mitigate the effects of law viewed as unconstitutional. [Class 7, book 22-27]
Democratic Objections to Judicial Review [class 7-13]
Argued that the branches of government are coequal, and have no authority to make final constitutional decisions for each other. Rejected Marbury v. Madison, and the concept of judicial review – though rights clearly exist, they only bind the legislature. Branches are only accountable to the people.
Court Skeptic Approach – Thayer
Three stages of Thayer’s perspective:
Judicial review is an inferred power from the constitution
The power of judicial review is limited to judicial contexts – an is only appropriate when necessary to decide a constitutional issue
Court must be deferential in the review. Court should operate by the rule of clear mistake – only finding legislative acts unconstitutional when they are clearly erroneous. Thus, so long as there is any constitutional basis for the law, courts should defer).
Thayer does not view courts as the primary enforcers of human rights, but rather, as a last resort when there is not other means of keeping the constitutional structure intact. Believes strongly in an engaged citizenry that vigilantly defends its rights.
Rights Skeptic Approach – Hand
Two parts to Hand’s perspective, which comes from his work Bill of Rights:
Judicial review of congressional legislation is a usurpation (from history)
Rights do not exist, thus judicial review to validate them is invalid (political theory). Believes that rights are not logical (with respect to utilitarian principles of maximizing benefits for the majority), and are too subjective (which leads the court to becoming a third legislative chamber).
Weschler critiques Hand’s perspective – argues that judicial review is appropriate so long as it approaches it from neutral perspectives of constitutional law. Focuses on Hand’s contention that in practice, it amounts to courts being third legislative chambers – contends that the procedural adherence to neutral principles, in arbitrating actual controversies, mitigates against this finding. Weschler though, would find no neutral principle in Brown, but would in Plessy.
Richards questions Weschler’s formulation, as even neutral principles can give rise to results that devalue human rights – i.e. Nazi Germany, Plessy.
Dworkin engages the skeptical objections to judicial review:
Court Skeptical Challenge – rights exist, but courts do not give us the best reading of what they are.
Right Skeptical Challenge – based on a utilitarian approach, which doesn’t acknowledge the existence of rights. Subsequently, judicial review to enforce rights is illegitimate.
Dworkin argues that you must have a coherent political philosophy in interpreting the Constitution, and on some level rejects both the court and rights skeptic challenges (though the legislative branch can often aid in defining the scope of rights). Argues that constitutional law should be aimed at protecting basic human rights, but should do so from arguments of principle; thus, he supports the concept of judicial review.
Dworkin argues that the measure comes from hard cases. First look to fit, to determine how a decision will fit with existing precedent (in hard cases this won’t end the inquiry, as the precedent is in disarray). Must then look to background rights, which are the constitutional rights that should be protected.
Remaining forms of skepticism
John Hart Ely – argues that judicial review is only appropriate when there are problems in representation, as the products of a fair procedure are unreachable by the courts. Brown and reapportionment are acceptable results, as racial stereotypes given the force of law hurt representation, but Roe v. Wade is not, as women have the right to vote (and are a majority), and fetuses are unrepresented. Proper weight must be given to the interests of all citizens when passing legislation that affects them. Minorities victimized by prejudice in a way that harms representation may give rise to judicial review:
Originalist – argues that cases should be decided as founders would have interpreted – thus opposes judicial intervention to enforce modern views of rights.
Richards critique: Notes that the text does not require it, and it goes against the way in which the founders wrote the text – broad. Better is an approach that respects the text, judicial interpretation, and evolving social contexts and norms. Five key justifications for rejecting originalism:
Presence of indefinite clauses suggest the founders intent to leave them open to interpretation
Must allow for changing circumstances, and not bind future generations to historical denotations
Constitution was enacted and grounded in enduring principles of justice – must acknowledge the abstract intentions of founders.
A broad view is essential for meaningful judicial interpretation
The originalist emphasis on popular sovereignty is dangerous for human and minority rights.
The Role of History in judicial interpretation – Originalism Isn’t Really Followed
Williams v. Florida (1970) as an example of the problematic nature of originalist history.
The case dealt with the constitutionality of a six member jury in Florida for non-capital criminal cases. The court looked to the history of the Sixth Amendment, and ultimately determined that a jury of 12 was not required. How should “jury” be interpreted?
Can look to the text
Can be denotative – i.e. denoting what is being referred to – here clearly the unanimous 12 person jury.
Can be connotative – i.e. conveying that which is logically related to what is referred to – here a body of size enough to do justice in a deliberative fashion.
White, for the court, adopted a connotative meaning of jury, finding that what was meant was a jury of the size enough to be deliberative, and representative of the community.
Harlan’s opinion argues that the originalist understanding (here, a 12 person jury) should not be departed from unless there is a compelling reason.
Lovett v. United States (1946) [class 15, reading 5]
Dealt with the understanding of the meaning of a bill of attainder under Article I sections 9-10. Here congress passed legislation reclassifying pay of federal employees, and a group of individuals were set out on account of their political views. Was it a bill of attainder?
British understanding of bills of attainder were legislative acts, without trial, that declared one guilty of a crime, ordered death, and resulted in corruption of the blood. This would have been the originalist understanding of the meaning.
Black’s opinion for the court was anti-originalist, as it disregarded the British understanding of bills of attainder. Black finds it is akin to a bill of attainder for its legislative punishment that occurs without trial.
Richards notes that it is a legislative punishment for stigmatizing people on account of their political beliefs.
United States v. Brown (1965) [reading 5-6, class 15-16]
Congressional act prohibited Communist party officials from serving as union leaders.
Warren for the court found that it was a bill of attainder.
Home Building and Loan v. Blaisdell (1934) [reading 6, class 16-18]
Considered the constitutionality of a state law, passed in the depression, to delay foreclosure for missed home payments. Originalist understanding of Article I Section 10 would have understood this as an impairment of the obligation of contracts.
CJ Hughes for the court finds that while emergencies do not expand the powers of states, a narrowly tailored exception to contracts when there is a compelling state interest in the public welfare is acceptable, so long as it does not materially affect the terms of the contract.
Sutherland dissent argues that this goes against the originalist understanding of the constitution.
Other Problems with Originalism [reading 6-7]
There are differences between what the framers did and said, thus looking to the political positions they took does not always give the best understanding of what they intended constitutionally.
Changing factual situations depart from what the framers could have predicted and/or understood, thus changing constitutional interpretation is needed.