Countering Radiological Terrorism: Consequences of the Radiation Exposure Incident in Goiania (Brazil)
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- Countering Radiological Terrorism: Consequences of the Radiation Exposure Incident in Goiania (Brazil)
- RADIOLOGICAL TERRORIST THREATS
- CONSEQUENCES FOR THE AUTHORITIES IN GOIANIA 2.1 Loss of control
- Regaining control 2.2.1 Triage
- CONSEQUENCES FOR PROFESSIONALS 3.1 Crisis management
- Problems encountered by emergency responders
- Problems encountered by the medical profession
- CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PUBLIC 4.1. Contaminated residents
- 4.2 Uncontaminated residents
- Table 1: Parameters determining the impact of a radiological terror attack on society
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REFERENCE.: F. Steinhäusler, in : Social and Psychological Effects of, Radiological Terrorism, Volume 29 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics, Editors: I. Khripunov, L. Bolshov and D., Nikonov, November 2007, 176 pp., hardcover, ISBN: 978-1-58603-787-1 Countering Radiological Terrorism: Consequences of the Radiation Exposure Incident in Goiania (Brazil) F. STEINHÄUSLER Div. of Physics and Biophysics University of Salzburg, Hellbrunnerstr. 34, A-5020 Salzburg, Austria E-mail: friedrich.steinhaeusler@sbg.ac.at ABSTRACT Radiological terrorism can use several modes of deploying radioactive substances in order to cause deliberate radiation exposure, ranging from the intentional covert exposure of large population groups to a strong gamma radiation source, to combining conventional explosives with a suitable radioisotope leading to the intentional dispersal of radioactive aerosols (dirty bomb). The deployment of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) by terrorists is likely to result in relatively low radiation exposure of the targeted population, in most cases insufficient to cause a severe radiation detriment. Nevertheless, the social and psychological effects can be severe, particularly in an urban area where a large number of persons may either be actually contaminated or perceive to be contaminated. This paper focuses on the extensive experience gained in the aftermath of the radiological accident contaminating the Brazilian city of Goiania in 1987. The incident showed the multiple practical difficulties of the professionals and the authorities caring for the radiation victims, addressing the needs of those suspecting to be contaminated, and the reaction by the uncontaminated residents of Goiania. The results of this analysis are used to recommend practically applicable solutions from Lessons Learned:
There is concern among members of the international intelligence community about a terror attack using radioactive material to cause an uncontrolled exposure to ionizing radiation. Members of the terrorist organization al Qaeda reportedly tried to acquire weapons-usable nuclear material on a number of occasions in the period 1993 to 2001; Chechen separatists have repeatedly threatened to use radioactive material against Russian soldiers and the civilian population. They have pilfered a radioactive waste depository site near Grozny and allegedly intended to use the recovered radiation sources to make powerful bombs. Dozens of radiation sources were found in parts of Grozny during the second military campaign in Chechnya between 2000 and 2002.1 In May 2002, the suspected member of al Qaeda, Jose Padilla, was arrested in Chicago on charges of plotting a terrorist attack using a radiological dispersion device (RDD). The objective of deploying such a weapon is contamination of persons and the environment. This objective can be achieved by either causing the contamination in a controlled manner (e.g., using an aerosol generator or releasing radioactive gas) or less uncontrolled by combining the radioactive material with conventional explosives and detonating them together (Dirty Bomb). It is also possible for terrorists to consider an RDD using spent nuclear fuel as the source of radiation. The high exposure for the terrorist resulting from the handling of such a device makes this kind of attack only feasible for a suicide commando. In either case, the main purpose is to cause mass panic rather than mass destruction, as is the case with the detonation of a nuclear weapon. There are a variety of locations worldwide where thousands of potentially suitable radioactive sources are in use, such as research establishments, medical institutions, industrial facilities, and military sites. Eight radioisotopes have characteristics that raise the sources containing them to the highest security risk level, such as: reactor-produced americium-241, californium-252, cesium-137, cobalt-60, iridium-192, plutonium-238, strontium-90, and radium-226. As a practical example, cesium chloride in a portable container represents an easily dispersible powder, i.e., a high security risk. The activity of such sources ranges from about one Nanobecquerel2 (nBq) in an industrial gauge to about three trillion Becquerel in industrial radiography sources. Depending on the type of source and radioisotope used, the suitability for a radiological terror attack differs significantly.3 Annually, several hundreds of medical and industrial sources are stolen, abandoned, or lost. In the United States alone, more than 200 such incidents are reported on average each year. Major security deficits have been revealed for non-nuclear radioactive material in many countries.4 The radioactive material obtained by terrorists can be hidden in practically any type of containment (e.g., bottle, briefcase, car, van, truck, ship, or aircraft). The volume of the actual radioactive material in a radiation source without the shielding is rather small, typically ranging from only a few cubic millimetres to about a hundred cubic centimetres.5 The subsequent release of the material can be land-, water-, or air-based. The three attack and release scenarios considered most probable are as follows: (1) Radioactive material is dispersed into the environment by using an RDD (e.g., radioactive solution dispersed with an aerosol generator or sprayed by a water truck or crop duster); (2) Radioactive material is combined with conventional explosives (e.g., source blanketed with TNT) and detonated; (3) A fully fuelled plane under the control of a suicide commando, loaded with radioactive material and conventional explosives, is crashed into a civilian target. The target areas at highest risk for such an attack would be areas with high population density in order to cause maximum impact.6 The impact on the target society is largely determined by whether the population is actually aware of the radioactive contamination:
Hitherto, the biggest experience concerning the impact of a large-scale radioactive contamination on society due to a lost control over a radioactive source has been gained from the incident in Goiania, a city in Brazil with approximately one million inhabitants. In September 1987 two thieves removed part of a teletherapy machine from the abandoned clinic Instituto Goiano de Radioterapia for the metal value of the shielding material only. Laws and regulations governing the operation and disposal of radiation sources existed at the time of the incident in Brazil. However, governmental control, compounded by the fact that a large number of governmental organisations, especially in smaller cities, lacked technically qualified personnel to implement legal supervision, was inadequate. This led to the situation that the operators of the clinic moved to another location, leaving the strong radiation source behind in an unattended building.
2.1 Loss of control Unknown to the thieves, the stolen metal container also held a platinum capsule with a Cs-137 source (100 g soluble CsCl2; activity: 50.9 TBq). On September 13, 1987, after several attempts to open the radiation source, using brut force and fire, a scrap yard dealer finally succeeded. This resulted in an uncontrolled release of Cs-137 from the opened capsule, which triggered multiple events, ultimately causing several deaths, hundreds of persons contaminated or suffering from radiation injuries.7 However, the radioactive release was not discovered for sixteen days. It took until September 29, 1987, for the authorities to finally become involved due to unfortunate circumstances, such as:
The last owner, a waste paper dealer, cut the platinum cylinder into altogether seven large and over fifty smaller pieces. He and his family members considered the shiny metal fragments as precious and distributed them among relatives and friends. The Cs-137 powder was referred to as carnival glitter: the daughter of the dealer used some of the powdery substance as body paint and performed in front of invited guests. Subsequently, family members felt sick and sought medical treatment. Initially, they were erroneously diagnosed for dehydration and tropical diseases; in this period five hospitals were contaminated. Only after a protracted period of over two weeks one of the physicians suspected radiation as the true cause and initiated a radiation measurement by a physicist. The physicist confirmed the existence of a high dose rate from the remnants of the stainless steel cylinder brought to the doctor´s office by a family member (dose rate upon contact: >6 Gray/hour)8 and contacted the Atomic Energy Agency of Brazil in Rio de Janeiro on September 28, 1987.
2.2.1 Triage The news about the radioactive contamination of Goiania residents spread quickly across the city and its approximately one million inhabitants. In order to regain control the authorities identified those who were most likely to have been contaminated and directed them to the Olympic Stadium for radiation screening and triage. By February 1988, the total number of persons measured exceeded 125,000. Subsequently, the authorities had to provide three different facilities for the 260 persons suspected or confirmed as being contaminated:
Of this cohort, 70 percent had skin contamination and 30 percent had only slightly contaminated clothes or shoes. Of this latter group (183 cases), about 32 percent (59 cases) had minor external contamination only and were released after decontamination. The remaining 68 percent (124 cases) were decontaminated externally. After a medical examination, external radiation monitoring and laboratory analysis of these persons, the most serious 14 cases were transferred to the Marcilio Dias Naval Hospital in Rio de Janeiro, the centre for radiation accident casualties. This transfer of victims to Rio de Janeiro resembled a war-type operation, because each individual represented a source of radiation, potentially contaminating anyone in close proximity. Four of these persons died in October 1987, their whole body dose ranging from 4.5 to 6 Gy. 2.2.2 Surveys In order to establish the extent of the contamination of the city and its surrounding areas, search teams were equipped with different types of radiation detectors. They investigated the whole city, including the identification of contaminated cars passing by on the highway. The operators and their detectors had to withstand the high humidity and hot conditions (temperatures above 30°C). In addition, aerial surveys were carried out over 67 km². This revealed that in Goiania city seven main areas were contaminated with dose rate values up to 2 Sievert/hour measured at 1 m distance, necessitating two areas to be evacuated. Due to the extended period before the incident was discovered the radioactive contamination spread to multiple sectors of society:
2.2.3 Public services Authorities reacted actively and passively to regain control over the situation in a variety of ways, ranging from setting up physical barriers at the borders of the State of Goias to hinder cars from leaving the state, to providing 8000 residents with an official certification that they were not contaminated. In order to improve communication with the public the authorities established a Telephone Hotline, where initially almost 2,000/day calls were received. Print- and electronic media were used to provide additional information for the public. Nevertheless, members of the public complained about significant deficiencies in the information policy and unduly complicated organisational decisions. Altogether, it took the authorities six months to decontaminate Goiania and its environs.
3.1 Crisis management It required altogether three days after the discovery of the incident for the professionals of the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) to address the most urgent radiation contamination, public health and medical needs. Subsequently, the attention of the expert community from CNEN and several other organisations focused on monitoring the population, clean up operations, and long term consequences resulting from the incident. Initially, there was a high level of panic among the residents: a few days after the official disclosure of the Telephone Hotline at least five percent of the public presented symptoms of contamination. Therefore, it was necessary to establish reliable methods which allowed the identification of radiation victims. For this purpose the radiometric investigations were supplemented by cytogenetic dosimetry on persons without any radiation syndromes but who had become potential victims. Unfortunately, this procedure is comparatively slow, i.e., a chromosome aberration assay requires in excess of three days. Added complications arose from intense fear of residents, who lived in the area of the accident, showing symptoms, which resembled acute radiation syndrome, but were actually caused by chronic stress. Local radiation injury due to the deposition of radionuclides on skin and mucosa or direct contact with the radiation source was an additional clinical problem. In order to reconstruct the radiation exposure, several dosimetric methods was combined:
The most difficult challenges resulted from (a) the development of a superinfection due to an immune deficiency; (b) combining adequate decontamination and wound management. It is important to note that of the four fatal casualties, three were the results of significant deficiencies in medical management and prophylactic measures, such as: poor aseptic environment; multiple evacuation of patients; inadequate antibacterial therapy; lack of experience of the medical staff.
CNEN staff had extensive theoretical knowledge, but no practical experience with real radiation victims. This expressed itself in frequently observed first shock upon encountering radiation dermatitis. Generally, radiation protection experts were strongly affected by the radiation induced injuries, afraid that patients would die. Excessive stress was experienced by overworked experts, having to deal with the organization of services, procedures, coordination and the division of tasks, whilst wearing protective clothing and masks for extended periods. In particular the monitoring of autopsies was found to be unbearable. Due to the lack of regular trained hospital personnel the radiation protection experts also had to assume the role of nurses and guards, e.g., having to cope with patients screaming and – in despair – wanting to escape from the ward by throwing themselves out of the window. This lead to psycho-somatic disturbances among staff, such as: insomnia, gastric problems, weeping freely away from patients and co-workers. After two weeks the radiation protection team was completely exhausted owing to excess work and emotional stress, with the first group suffering most because of inadequate knowledge of what had happened.
Medical care for radiation victims met several obstacles. The Hospital personnel lacked preparation for treating radiation injuries and showed fear, with some of them leaving the victims unattended and going on strike instead. Also, the lack of response from the Goianian medical community is to be noted, despite of the appeals made by physicians. Generally, there was a noticeable lack of medical staff, nurses, paramedical workers, and cleaning personnel in the hospital services. Furthermore, the significant deficiency of laboratory support to perform clinical analyses, the inadequate laundry, and the unsuitable system of collecting hospital- and decontamination waste added to the difficulties. Post-mortem procedures of the four bodies of diseased patients also represented a challenge. The contaminated bodies were placed in double plastic bags, specially designed for the transport of corpses, in order to avoid contaminating the morgue. Dry autopsy was selected to minimize the generation of liquid waste and the spread of contamination by splashing. A control area was set up, where every person, object and material leaving the control area was monitored. Individual dosimetry was conducted for each person involved. All surfaces in the autopsy room were covered by plastic sheets. Body fluids were absorbed with foam. Instruments in contact with tissues, organs and fluids underwent a decontamination procedure. At the end of the autopsy the radioactive corpses were packed, covered with a lead sheet, and placed in coffins for their transport to the funeral in Goiania.10
4.1. Contaminated residents Victims of the incident suffered from the rigid radiation protection rules and the daily painful medical procedures. The first deaths, together with the observation of bodily deterioration and the occurrence of opportunistic infections, caused severe psychological effects among victims, such as depression and even suicidal wishes. After the discharge from the hospital they often faced discrimination and had difficulties in finding jobs as a result of stigmatization. 4.2 Uncontaminated residents Also uncontaminated citizens of Goiania experienced a significant impact on their lives due to the radiological incident:
Some residents living near the contaminated areas displayed severe distrust in the authorities and the official assessment of the situation. Therefore, they resorted to offering water, juice, coffee and fruits to the technicians of the Brazilian CNEN in an attempt to identify rejections which would indicate possible contamination.
A radiological terror attack scenario can be preplanned, table-top and field exercises conducted, but real-life intervention is likely to differ because of the large number of variables characterising the geographical location, climatic conditions at the time of the attack, contamination vectors, and the social classes involved - all of which determining the resulting impact on man and the environment (Table 1). Table 1: Parameters determining the impact of a radiological terror attack on society
Initial response phase: During the initial phase after such a radiological attack decision makers are likely to have only access to insufficient information. Whilst on the basis of radiation protection principles it would be possible to introduce intervention levels, social and psychological factors are likely to impede severely on such an approach relying heavily on a risk-cost-benefit analysis. Lack of knowledge of the size of the area affected by the attack, the actual number of victims, and the type of contaminating radioactive material make it impossible for a single institution to possess all the means necessary for a far-reaching intervention at this stage. Therefore, a unified command (federal, state, city) is needed from the onset. This unified command should stay in the area for the complete intervention process. Within the unified command it is essential that a lead agency is designated in order to: (a) prioritize lifesaving actions and actions to secure the area over radiological/dosimetric considerations; (b) initiate immediately the classification of victims, sites and rescue teams; (c) prioritize decontamination tasks, specifying which techniques to be applied in which situation; (d) designate an official messenger to communicate with the affected population, taking into account trustworthiness and media preference as perceived by members of the public.11 Professional public affairs advice should be taken in developing means and details of how to convey appropriate messages and information to the public on decommissioning. An RDD attack in a densely populated urban area will involve large groups of people without the necessary knowledge to handle the situation. This will result in a significant disproportion between the number of people involved in the incident (typically several thousands), the number exposed to doses above the threshold for early radiation effects (typically tens), and early lethal injuries (single number, if any). Since the provisional readiness of medical facilities and the level of qualification of medical staff determine the fate of the victims, the relatively small number of people having received a significant dose must be quickly sorted out so that they can receive medical and prophylactic attention. Intermediate response phase: Countermeasures have beneficial effect on psychological and social health of many people because they are interpreted as being cared for. However, the community under attack is likely having to implement exceptional procedures, which go beyond its routine operations and procedures, such as: acquisition of and import of materials/equipment needed for treatment of victims, survey and search operations; hiring of expert services unavailable in the area; disposal of contaminated materials; customs barriers to be waived; legislative power granted to isolate contaminated areas; enforce evacuation rules; retrieve contaminated goods; demolish buildings; select areas to store waste temporarily; set up and coordinate relief for the victims. A contentious issue with members of the public will be the management of the waste during clean-up operations, since this more a public perception problem than an engineering challenge. As soon as decontamination starts, it produces a large amount of waste to be removed immediately. Therefore the choice of a nearby site for temporary storage and to become permanent storage eventually is important in order to avoid moving the waste several times. Radioactive waste volume reduction is essential, i.e. mixing of clean and contaminated waste streams should be avoided; for example, the Goianian incident, caused by 100 g CsCl2, resulted in over 5,000 m³ of waste. A particularly difficult task is the management of hazardous material, which may also be radioactive (e.g., asbestos, PCB) because of public fear and the associated NIMBY syndrome.12 It is important at this stage to develop an information strategy for the public, which communicates a scientifically sound basis for all future actions to be taken in managing the radiological aftermath of the terror attack in a non-scientific language understood by the public. Such a basis could be the procedures developed by the international radiation protection community for situations in which the source of exposure or the pathways leading to the doses in individuals can be controlled.13 The approach emphasizes common sense in combination with a cost-benefit analysis or multi-attribute analysis and rests on three basic components of protection: (1) radiation exposure follows a linear no-threshold dose response, i.e., no dose is low enough to be regarded as completely safe, but it may be small enough that all concerned agree to disregard it from a practical point of view; (2) dose limits cannot delineate dangerous from safe but they are efficient tools to limit radiation risks; (3) the actual application of dose limits is subject to an optimization process, requiring that the individual dose and the number of exposed individuals should be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account. Long-term phase: A major decision-making process concerns the establishment of socially acceptable and practically applicable clearance levels for the large amounts of material resulting from the clean-up operations with low levels of residual radioactivity:14
In practice this means that individual-related dose limits for members of the public must not exceed an effective individual dose of 1mSv per year. 6. LESSONS LEARNED The Goiania incident, which happened without any criminal intent of dispersing radioactive material, surprised the local and federal authorities of Brazil, as well as the international nuclear community: neither the magnitude of the radioactive contamination, nor the impact on health and the environment were foreseen. In case of a terror attack with the objective of causing the maximum possible detrimental impact on the targeted society it is safe to assume that the consequences will be at least as severe. Despite several shortcomings in managing the aftermath of the Goiania incident, it can be used for some practically applicable Lessons Learned:
Some of these issues warrant further study. Therefore, it is proposed to consider the creation of an international “Centre of Excellence” under the auspices of NATO, where short- and long-term effects on society can be subject of a coordinated R&D effort. Topics to be addressed range from effects of radiological terrorism on business, real estate and agriculture, to behaviour of the public (e.g., refusal to return to decontaminated areas, radiation phobia). Such a centre cold also develop models and algorithms, for example, cost models for clean-up operations (procurement of general equipment and material, dismantling of contaminated sites, waste treatment and disposal, security, surveillance and maintenance, site clean-up and landscaping, project management, engineering and site support, fuel, other costs). The ultimate goal should be the provision of science-based advice on the best allocation of limited resources in order to enable the targeted population to return to a level of normalcy at the shortest possible time. 1 Lyudmila Zaitseva and Kevin Hand, Nuclear Smuggling Chains, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 46 no. 6, February 2003, 822-844, Sage Publications. 2 Becquerel (Bq) is the SI-unit for the activity of radioactive material; 1 Bq = 1/s. 1 Nanobecquerel (NBq) = 1xE09 Bq = 1,000 million Bq; 1 Terabecquerel (TBq) = 1,000 Nanobecquerel. 3 Friedrich Steinhausler, What it Takes to Become a Nuclear Terrorist, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 46 no. 6, February 2003 782-795, 2003 Sage Publications. 4 Steinhäusler, F., Bremer-Maerli, M. and Zaitseva, L.: Assessment of the threat from diverted radioactive material and „orphan sources“ – an international comparison. Proc. IAEA Int. Conf. on “Security of Material, Measures to Prevent, Intercept and Respond to Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources”, Stockholm, May 7-11, 2001.5 Radiation shielding material is usually lead and can add up from a few kilogram to several hundred kilogram, depending on the source strength. In case of a suicide terror attack, the need for shielding may be of secondary importance. 6 Radiation monitors are not routinely installed in shopping malls, train stations, sport arenas, medical centres, or at security check points in harbours or civil aviation airports, i.e., the probability of detecting a hidden radiation source is low. 7 Proceedings International Conference Goiania – 10 Years Later (Ed.: International Atomic Energy Agency, Department of Nuclear Safety, Doc. No. IAEA-GOCP, A-1400 Vienna, Austria (1998). 8 Gray (Gy) is the SI-unit for the radiation dose equivalent; 1 Gy = 100 rad. 9 1 Milligray (mGy) = 1/1000 Gy. 10 Maximum gamma exposure rate was measured in the liver (7,800 Nanocoulomb/kg.h); maximum beta exposure rate was determined in the Fallopian tubes (990 Microgray/h). 11 Typically trustworthiness: HIGH - national food control agencies, radiation protection authorities; LOW - food industry, politicians, journalists. Typical media preference: HIGH - TV, labels on food packaging; LOW – magazines, community meetings. 12 NIMBY = not in my backyard, i.e. people acknowledging the need for hazardous waste deposit site but refusing such a site in their community. 13 International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP), Recommendation no. 60. 14 Clearance of buildings for any purpose (reuse or demolition), clearance for demolition only, and clearance for building rubble Directory: ~wilson ~wilson -> Gaza Statement to the World: From Rectors of 128 Universities in Turkey 17 ~wilson -> Curriculum vitae robert sydney wilson personal ~wilson -> Second appellate district division five ~wilson -> In the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit luis sancho Download 62.14 Kb. Share with your friends:
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