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- B. New upswing in the K-Wave will make WWIII happen—shift in thinking a new transition
- C. Resource wars
Offensive TurnsWar1NCEconomic growth causes warA. Economic growth makes conflict escalation more likely—Increases resolve of leaders.Boehmer, ‘10 [Charles Boehmer is a Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University, “Economic Growth and Violent International Conflict: 1875-1999,” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10242690903568801#tabModule]JAKE LEE The theory set forth earlier theorizes that economic growth increases perceptions of state strength, increasing the likelihood of violent interstate conflicts. Economic growth appears to increase the resolve of leaders to stand against challenges and the willingness to escalate disputes. A non-random pattern exists where higher rates of GDP growth over multiple years are positively and significantly related to the most severe international conflicts, whereas this is not true for overall conflict initiations. Moreover, growth of mililary expenditures, as a measure of the war chest proposition, does not offer any explanation for violent interstate conflicts. This is not to say lhat growth of military expenditures never has any effect on the occurrence of war, although such a link is not generally true in the aggregate using a large sample of states. In comparison, higher rates of economic growth are significantly related to violent interstate conflicts in the aggregate. States with growing economies are more apt to reciprocate military challenges by other states and become involved in violent interstate conflicts. The results also show that theories from the Crisis-Scarcity perspective lack explanatory power linking GDP growth rates to war at the state level of analysis. This is not to say thai such theories completely lack explanatory power in general, but more particularly that they cannot directly link economic growth rates to state behavior in violent interstate conflicts. In contrast, theories of diversionary conflict may well hold some explanatory power, although not regarding GDP growth in a general test of states from all regions of the world across time. Perhaps diversionary theory better explains state behaviors short of war, where the costs of externalizing domestic tensions do not become too costly, or in relation to the foreign policies of particular countries. In many circumstances, engaging in a war to divert attention away from domestic conditions would seemingly exacerbate domestic crisis conditions unless the chances of victory were practically assured. Nonetheless, this study does show that domestic conflict is associated with interstate conflict. If diversionary conflict theory has any traction as an economic explanation of violent interstate conflicts, it may require the study of other explanatory variables besides overall GDP growth rates, such as unemployment or inflation rales. The contribution of this article has been to examine propositions about economic growth in a global study. Most existing studies on this topic focus on only the United States, samples of countries that are more developed on average (due to data availability in the past), or are based on historical information and not economic GDP data. While I have shown that there is no strong evidence linking military expenditures to violent interstate conflicts at the state level of analysis, much of the remaining Growth-as-Catalyst perspective is grounded in propositions that are not directly germane to questions about state conflict behavior, such as those linking state behavior to long-cycles, or those that remain at the systemic level. What answer remains linking economic growth to war once we eliminate military expenditures as an explanation? Considering that the concept of foreign policy mood is difficult to identify and measure, and that the bulk of the literature relies solely on the American historical experience, I do not rely on that concept. It is still possible that such moods affect some decision-makers. Instead, similar to Blainey, I find that economic growth, when sustained over a stretch of years, has its strongest effect on states once they find themselves in an international crisis. The results of this study suggest that states such as China, which have a higher level of opportunity to become involved in violent interstate conflicts due to their capabilities, geographic location, history of conflict, and so on, should also have a higher willingness to fight after enjoying multiple years of recent economic growth. One does not have to assume that an aggressive China will emerge from growth. If conflicts do present themselves, then China may be more likely to escalate a war given its recent national performance B. New upswing in the K-Wave will make WWIII happen—shift in thinking a new transitionDE GREENE 06 [Kenyon B. De Greene is a professor at the Institute of Safety and Systems Management, University of Southern California, USA. “Toward New Conceptual Models of the Kondratiev Phenomenon” 2006 http://digamo.free.fr/devezas6.pdf] JAKE LEE Instability, for both better and worse, seems immanent in the KCS from the terminal ¶ part of the stage of depression to the middle of the stage of prosperity. Now, as ¶ humankind's impact on Earth penetrates all aspects of Nature, "international stability" ¶ assumes an even more global and ominous meaning. Throughout history, wars have been ¶ fought over land, water, minerals, and so forth. Preventing imminent major wars may be ¶ beyond human capability without radical and revolutionary new thinking. ¶ It seems unlikely that the technologically advanced nations will go to war against one ¶ another in the near future. Patterns leading to such major war must be seen in the absence ¶ 18 K.B. De Greene / Toward New Conceptual Models of the Kondratiev Phenomenonof the clutter or noise caused by continuing guerrilla wars, wars for ethnic liberation, and ¶ the so-called war on terrorism. However, intervention by the technologically advanced ¶ countries in these smaller wars may lead to the passing of some critical threshold and ¶ explosion into World War III. The United States is presently the major intervening nation, ¶ but it seems likely that Russia, China, India, and perhaps Brazil will also play such roles in ¶ the near future as their internal situations improve. All nations must realize that war cannot ¶ be won, only prevented. Note the analogy with virus diseases that can be prevented through ¶ inoculation but not cured. Unfortunately, there are aspects of humanity that suggest that ¶ humanity is not a learning system [3], [39].[40], [41], [42], and we can ask why the United ¶ States insists on pursuing military actions on six continents, actions that accrue to a ¶ worsening of social and environmental conditions and perhaps the foundering of ¶ democracy itself [41, [43]. The U.S. is the world's most powerful country--indeed, the most ¶ powerful in history. She faces no major military threats. Increasing militarization of ¶ American society during the Cold War generated a momentum that should have been ¶ reigned in but was not. Instead, as fits Kondratiev theory, the macropsychological order ¶ parameter of national thought became increasingly conservative, and power-driven, even ¶ fanatical, leaders harnessed the momentum. As Lord Acton's warned: Power corrupts and ¶ absolute power corrupts absolutely. Part of these dynamics of course stems from the ¶ limitations immanent in all bureaucracies. Bureaucrats will not use information that ¶ challenges the way they are used to doing business. Organizations try to solve "known ¶ problems "while ignoring problems they do not understand [44] C. Resource warsTrainer 10 [Ted Trainer is a Conjoint Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales.¶ He has taught and written about sustainability and justice issues for many years.¶ He is also developing Pigface Point, an alternative lifestyle educational site near Sydney, and a website for use by critical global educators, which can be viewed at:¶ http://socialsciences.arts.unsw.edu.au/tsw/ “Global Peace and Conflict” October 10, 2010 https://socialsciences.arts.unsw.edu.au/tsw/PEACE.htm] JAKE LEE Throughout history conflict and war have mostly been caused by the determination to take the resources of others, or to take more than a fair share of the available resources. The armed conflicts in the world today are mostly explicable in these terms. It is not possible to understand the problem of peace and war in the world today if we do not connect it to the taken for granted affluence of rich countries.¶ Our high "living standards" in rich countries would not be possible if we were not getting far more than our fair share of the world's resources. The global economy is massively unjust; it increasingly allocates most of the world's wealth to the rich few. This is not possible without a) the deprivation of the Third World, because most of their resources are flowing to the rich countries, and b) armed conflict, because the situation cannot be maintained without the use of force and violence. If we insist on remaining as affluent as we are we will have to support repressive regimes and remain heavily armed and ready to use force to preserve our access to more than our fair share of the world's wealth. ¶ CONSIDER OUR SITUATION¶ --- Resources are scarce and many are being depleted at a rapid rate.¶ --- Rich countries are heavily and increasingly dependent on imports for their resources and energy. We have only about 15% of the world's population but we get about 80% of resources produced.¶ --- Thus the distribution of world resource use is extremely unjust; a few rich countries are getting most of them, through the normal operation of the global market economy. If the already-rich countries insist on becoming even richer the distributions will become even worse.¶ --- Many of the resources the rich countries consume are taken from poor countries through normal economic processes which seriously deprive the majority of the world's people. For example much of the best Third World land grows crops to export, not to feed hungry local people.¶ --- World population will probably reach 9+ billion somewhere after 2060, so there are likely to be 1.5 times as many people demanding resources as there are now.¶ --- Land available for agriculture might not increase at all, because the rate at which it is being eroded and otherwise lost to production. Water resources, fish and forests are rapidly becoming more scarce. There will be much greater demand for these biological resources in the near future. However the most serious problems are probably going to be set by the peaking of petroleum supply, possibly between 2005 and 2010. (See http://socialwork.arts.unsw.edu.au/tsw/D08ThePetroleumSit.html)¶ --- If all the people the world will probably have by 2060 were to have the per capita resource consumption that people in rich countries average now, demand for resources would be about 8 times as great as it is now.¶ ...and everyone, including even people in the richest countries, is obsessed with increasing living standards, economic output, production and consumption and affluence as fast as possible and without end!¶ The inescapable conclusion:-¶ While all parties remain dedicated to greater and greater affluence regardless of how rich they already are, and there are nowhere near enough resources to enable all to be as affluent as the rich are now, there can be no outcome other than increasing competition and conflict between nations for resources and markets.¶ In other words, global peace is not possible unless there is movement towards a society in which we can all live well on far lower per capita resource use rates than at present. 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