Egmont papers

n°19: Nigeria: Is the end of Mafia politics in sight?, Jérome Spinoza and Olivier Vallée, March 2008.

résumé: “A poli-thug state” – Nigeria as described by Nigerian writer and Nobel

Laureate Wole Soyinka1

In spite of improvements to the electoral law, the last general elections in

Nigeria, Africa’s demographic giant, turned out to be a masquerade even worse

than those of 2003. They allowed Olegusun Obasanjo, unable himself to seek a

third mandate, to retain his grip on the client-based state system indirectly,

thanks to the victory of Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, a regional political leader close

to the northern military aristocracy in the Presidential election, and that of the

People’s Democratic Party in most of the State elections;

Confronted by the duplicity of a political class wedded to the preservation of its

rents, especially from gas and oil, the vote only increased popular frustration

and the desire of ordinary people to free themselves from the system which has

them in its grip. It added to the already considerable list of social and ethnic

problems which already afflict a country made up of regions such as the Niger

Delta, the Muslim North, the Middle Belt and the Ibo region, each with its own

mixture of internal and external problems.

In the longer term, there must be real doubts about Nigeria’s ability to outgrow

a system of regulation by political and organised crime elites, based on earning

rent from oil, and in the near future mining as well. In essence, the system is

intended to prevent the consolidation of countervailing powers, yet it also

restricts the freedom of action of the only social and economic forces capable of

limiting the fallout from the decline of petrol production in and after 2020.

Given the significance of Nigeria for the continent as a whole, this outcome is

not one that Europeans can contemplate with equanimity.

Jérome SPINOZA and Olivier VALLÉE2

1. Wole Soyinka, The Open Sore of a Continent, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996.

2. Jérome Spinoza is a specialist in African peace and security issues, and was a member of the

European Union Election Monitoring Mission in April 2007. Olivier Vallée is an independent consultant

and the author of many works on African political and economic issues, including Politique

et pouvoir en Afrique (1999) and Les gemmocraties, économie politique du diamant africain

(1997). The authors wish to thank David Chuter for his contribution to this paper and its translation

into English.

n°18: The Kyoto Policy of Belgium, Karel Van Hecke and Tania Zgajewski, Feb. 2008.

résumé: Since the start of negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, the Belgian authorities

have always taken a favourable position towards an ambitious climate change

regime, both at international and European level. This is obviously linked to the

perception of a series of threats in Belgium.1 However, the Belgian position also

results from the clear awareness that a global threat calls for a global solution.

In the context of the Kyoto Protocol, the Belgian authorities have assumed

ambitious commitments within the European Union. The start of the first commitment

period (2008-2012) of the Protocol offers an excellent moment to evaluate

the results so far. In this perspective, the present note recalls Belgium’s

reduction commitment (§ 1) and describes the institutional structures put in

place (§ 2), the general policies and measures taken at the federal and regional

levels2 (§ 3) and finally the results obtained (§ 4).

Karel VAN HECKE & Tania ZGAJEWSKI3

1. To get a overview of these threats, see the 2004 report entitled Impact of climate change in Belgium

by the Université Catholique de Louvain. This report analyses the potential impact of climate

change in Belgium. Although the report finds that the initial impact of global warming would be

relatively limited in Belgium, the identified possible consequences are worrying. Belgium would be

confronted with an increased risk of flooding, a heavily affected coastal area, less biodiversity and

considerable health risks. The summary in English is available from http://www.astr.ucl.ac.be/users/

marbaix/impacts/docs/GP-rep04-Sum_2-EN.pdf.

2. One must emphasize that it is impossible to mention all initiatives taken at all levels. For example,

as CO2 is the main source of difficulty in Belgium, some initiatives regarding other GHG gases

than CO2 are sometimes not mentioned in this paper.

3. Karel VAN HECKE is Research Fellow at EGMONT – The Royal Institute for International Relations

and Tania ZGAJEWSKI is Director of HERA and Senior researcher at the University of Liège.

This comment does not in any way represent a position of the institutions to which they belong.

The authors thank Professor Franklin DEHOUSSE for his observations.

n°17: The Coming Energy Crash and its Impact on the European Union, Franklin Dehousse, Feb. 2008.

résumé: The energy markets have undergone fundamental changes during the last years:

the rise of oil and gas prices, the progressive liberalization in many western

countries, various forms of re-nationalization in some producing countries, the

implementation of greenhouse gas reduction programmes, the multiplication of

geopolitical worries. This new context obviously requires a new approach.

At the beginning of 2007, the Commission proposed a new strategy, which was

broadly approved a little bit later by the European Council1. To make a proper

evaluation of this strategy, it is necessary to analyze first the constraints of this

new context. This is the objective of the present paper. It will thus deal, most

simply, with the evolution of energy demand (§ 1), of energy offer (§ 2), and of

the constraints linked to climate warming (§ 3). After a quick perusal of the

possibility of a crash (§ 4), it will then examine the adequacy of the new European

strategy (§ 5). In synthesis, the conclusion is that the strategy is quite valid,

but the means of implementation remain obscure in some aspects.

n°16: The ABC of European Union Strategy: Ambition, Benchmark, Culture, Sven Biscop, Oct. 2007.

résumé: 1 Europe does not threaten anyone, Europe is geared to stability; Europe

has no enemies nor does it have territorial aspirations. It could be a

heavy-weight force, but Europe as a whole is still reluctant to accept its

role as a global player.

Egon Bahr2

The adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) by the December 2003

European Council was a landmark event for the European Union (EU) as an

international actor. Of course, the ESS was not handed down in the shape of

stone tablets. It is not because something is written in the ESS that it necessarily

will be so, nor is everything written in the ESS. But the simple fact that it is

omnipresent – in EU discourse, in statements by European as well as other policy-

makers, in the debate in think tanks and academia – proves that its importance

should not be underestimated either. It is after all the first ever strategic

document covering the whole of EU foreign policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy

and the military. As such it is first of all a statement of the EU’s ambition

as an international actor, and has therefore become the reference framework

guiding the EU’s performance as well as the benchmark to judge it. Through its

performance the EU at the same time is developing a strategic culture of its own,

the maturation of which is helped forward by the ESS. Ultimately however, what

really counts, and what determines the consolidation of the EU’s strategic culture,

is whether the EU, through its policies and actions, is able to achieve results

and realize its ambitions.

1. Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop is a senior research fellow at Egmont – The Royal Institute for International

Relations in Brussels and visiting professor at the College of Europe in Bruges. This paper

was commissioned by the T.M.C. Asser Institute in The Hague. The final version will be included

in the edited volume resulting from the 37th Asser Colloquium on European Law, ‘The European

Union and International Crisis Management: Legal and Policy Aspects’ (The Hague, 11-12 October

2007). The author offers warm thanks to Dr. Christoph O. Meyer (King’s College, London)

and Alexander Mattelaer (Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel) for their helpful

comments on the first draft of the text.

2. Egon Bahr, Europe’s Strategic Interests – The Role of German Foreign and Security Policy en

Route to European Self-Determination and Global Responsibility. Brussels, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

– EU Office, April 2007.

n°15: Belgium and Counterterrorism Policy in the Jihadi Era (1986-2007), Rik Coolsaet and Tanguy Struye de Swielande, Sept. 2007.

résumé: Belgium is not a significant safe haven for terrorist groups, according to the

2006 edition of the Country Reports on Terrorism, released by the U.S. State

Department in April 2007. Belgium is only a piece in a global puzzle of terrorism,

including its jihadi variant that gained worldwide prominence with the 9/11

attacks.

In the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, Belgium bore its share of the burden

of terrorism, as did some of its neighbours. The Cellules Communistes

Combattantes were the Belgian branch of a Europe-wide movement of anticapitalist

terrorism that caused widespread anxiety in public opinion. In the

mid-1980s, much earlier than most of its neighbours (with the exception of

France) Belgium then encountered a new variety of terrorists, religiously

inspired groups, linked with the Shia regime in Teheran. Subsequently in the

mid-1990s Belgian authorities discovered support cells of the Algerian radical

Islamist movement GIA on its soil. These were the beginnings of Belgium’s

encounter with jihadi terrorism.

Jihadi terrorism went through different mutations. It started as an ‘Islamonationalist’

movement in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. It then

acquired a global character, with al-Qaeda as the vanguard organisation of

international jihadi terrorism. As a result of international and national efforts

the organisation started to atomize and gave way to a decentralized, largely

home-grown patchwork of jihadi groups, linked by ideology and opportunistic

links.

form of terrorism from its early signs in the 1980s until today. Next, it analyses

the measures taken by the Belgian law enforcement apparatus since 9/11.

Finally, it assesses Belgian specificities in combating jihadi terrorism.

Rik Coolsaet & Tanguy Struye de Swielande2

1. This Egmont Paper is simultaneously published in: Fernando Reinares, ¿Estamos más Seguros?

Democracias Occidentales y Terrorismo Global (Are we Safer? Western Democracies and Global

Terrorism). Madrid, RIE/Ariel, 2007.

2. Rik Coolsaet is Chair of the Department of Political Science at Ghent University (Belgium) and

Director of the Security & Global Governance Programme at Egmont-Royal Institute for International

Relations (Brussels). Tanguy Struye de Swielande has been a research fellow at the Egmont

Institute.

n°14: La contribution militaire belge à la Politique Européenne de Sécurité et de Défense (Fr) - De militaire bijdrage van België aan het Europees veiligheids- en defensiebeleid (Nl), June 2007.

résumé: La Belgique n’a pas (plus) de politique de défense. Souvent entendue, cette affirmation

interpelle, car la politique de défense fait partie intégrante de la stratégie

internationale d’un pays. À cet égard, la Belgique a pourtant pris une option

claire. Depuis 1991 et la fin de la Guerre du Golfe, notre pays inscrit prioritairement

ses positions internationales dans une perspective européenne et dans le

respect du cadre des Nations unies. Cette double priorité institutionnelle est

complétée par la volonté affichée de voir s’établir un pilier européen au sein de

l’OTAN.

La Belgique estime que l’Europe doit pouvoir tenir pleinement sa place dans un

encore en matière de politique étrangère et de sécurité. En Belgique, il existe un

fort consensus sur la nécessité d’un multilatéralisme effectif et institutionnalisé,

afin de garantir la paix et la sécurité internationale par une approche globale de

la sécurité collective. Tout comme le précédent secrétaire général de l’ONU,

Koffi Annan, la Belgique estime que des règles préétablies, valant pour tous,

faibles ou puissants, et des institutions crédibles et fortes, constituent la

meilleure garantie pour un monde stable et juste. Dans cette perspective,

l’Europe constitue sans aucun doute notre levier le plus important.

La Défense tient une place essentielle dans le cadre de cette stratégie. Contrairement

à ce que d’aucuns espéraient à la fin de la guerre froide, la défense demeure

une composante incontournable d’une stratégie internationale crédible. Par

manque de capacités militaires et d’organes adaptés de décision, l’Europe et la

communauté internationale n’ont pas été capables d’intervenir à temps et de

manière efficace dans une série de situations dramatiques à l’origine de souffrances

humaines à grande échelle. Ces épisodes douloureux nous rappellent que, si

nous voulons voir se réaliser un jour l’ambition d’une Europe pouvant jouer un

rôle mondial, les moyens militaires sont indispensables.

D’un autre côté, nous pouvons constater chaque jour à quel point l’usage de la

seule puissance militaire peut se révéler inopérant, voire contreproductif. Pour

essentiels qu’ils soient pour rétablir l’ordre et la sécurité, les moyens militaires

se révèlent insuffisants pour rendre la stabilité durable et légitime, et donc pour

réduire la souffrance humaine. La sécurité au 21ème siècle est par conséquent

multidimensionnelle. Les moyens militaires en forment un des piliers, à côté des

piliers politique, diplomatique, économique et de coopération au développement.

Si l’un des piliers échoue, toute la construction vacille.

L’appareil militaire n’a de sens qu’au service d’une politique de défense, laquelle,

à son tour, doit s’inscrire dans la politique de sécurité d’un pays. Ces quinze

dernières années, partout dans le monde, les appareils de défense ont connu une

transformation continue pour s’adapter aux changements importants du contexte

international. Les appareils de défense ne se transforment cependant pas

aisément. En effet, étant donné la longue durée des programmes militaires,

l’horizon stratégique d’une politique de défense se situe généralement entre dix

et quinze ans.

Cet horizon place tous les Européens devant un choix clair. Soit nous continuons

la pratique actuelle qui voit chacun des vingt-sept membres de l’UE établir sa

politique de défense sur une base strictement nationale, repoussant à une étape

ultérieure la question d’éventuelles coopérations internationales. Cette façon de

procéder met en avant la souveraineté nationale en matière de défense et conçoit

la coopération internationale comme une pratique limitée basée sur le volontariat.

Si cette approche présente quelques mérites, la pratique nous enseigne

qu’elle ne permet de remédier ni aux multiples duplications de moyens ni aux

lacunes capacitaires identifiées de longue date.

Soit nous nous décidons à établir d’emblée les plans nationaux à partir d’une

perspective européenne. Plusieurs pays, se sont déjà exprimés – et la Belgique de

manière explicite – pour cette seconde option. Malheureusement, nous devons

constater que la politique suivie dans la pratique se réduit souvent à la première

option. Une partie de l’explication se situe sans aucun doute dans le fait que, sur

le plan politique, il apparaît souvent plus aisé de prendre des décisions unilatérales

à court terme que de s’engager dans des coopérations multilatérales dans

la longue durée.

À un moment où des questions fondamentales se posent sur l’avenir de l’Union

européenne, cet Egmont Paper s’attache donc principalement à un plaidoyer

pro-européen en matière de défense. La recherche de la paix et de la sécurité

n’était-elle pas au coeur du projet d’intégration européenne? Pour leur part, les

auteurs sont convaincus que le développement subséquent d’une politique de

sécurité européenne peut contribuer à une relance du projet européen tant il est

vrai que l’opinion publique belge et européenne est globalement acquise à l’idée

d’un rôle plus ambitieux pour l’Europe dans les affaires internationales.

La présente publication a pour ambition de contribuer à initier un débat informé

sur les moyens militaires dont un pays comme la Belgique peut et doit pouvoir

disposer pour étayer ses ambitions internationales. Comme de précédentes

publications d’Egmont – Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, ce document

résulte du travail d’un groupe informel constitué de personnalités issues

des mondes diplomatique, militaire et académique. Ont participé à la rédaction

du texte: Sven Biscop (Egmont), Jo Coelmont (Représentant permanent militaire

de la Belgique près du Comité Militaire de UE), Rik Coolsaet (Egmont &

Université de Gand), Michel Liégeois (Université Catholique de Louvain-la-

Neuve), Jacques Rosiers (Département Stratégie à l’État-major de Défense) et

Dirk Wouters (Représentant permanent de la Belgique au Comité politique et de

Sécurité). D’autres contributeurs ont préféré garder l’anonymat. Chaque membre

du groupe de travail a participé à titre personnel1.

Ce travail comprend trois parties. La première précise le rôle de l’armée dans

une Europe où la menace militaire directe a disparu. La seconde partie propose

une analyse «forces/faiblesses» de l’armée belge. Sur cette base, la troisième partie

formule onze recommandations, afin de renforcer les points forts et remédier

aux points faibles.

n°13: For a ‘More Active’ EU in the Middle East. Transatlantic Relations and the Strategic Implications of Europe’s Engagement with Iran, Lebanon and Israel-Palestine, Sven Biscop, March 2007.

résumé: 1. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), calls for the EU to be ‘more active’

in pursuing its strategic objectives. The two probably most salient examples of

a ‘more active’ EU are to be found in the Middle East.2 The ‘EU3’ (France,

Germany and the UK) are leading nuclear negotiations with Iran. The EU has

taken the lead in reinforcing the UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon, UNIFIL,

as authorized by UNSC Resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006. Over 70% of

the enlarged force or 7,600 troops out of 10,800 are provided by the EU27. This

engagement clearly fits in with the EU’s interests as defined in the ESS, notably

the need ‘to promote a ring of well governed countries […] on the borders of the

Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’, and

to avoid ‘a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East’.

The cases of Iran and Lebanon can be seen as positive examples of an EU that

is more united and hence ‘more active’. Yet, they also provoke fundamental

strategic questions on the ambitions and potential of EU policy towards the

region, and of the EU as a global strategic actor. These are questions which the

EU inevitably will be confronted with if it continues its ‘more active’ role in the

Middle East.

1. Prof. Dr Sven Biscop is a senior research fellow at Egmont – the Royal Institute for International

Relations in Brussels and professor of European security at Ghent University. This paper was commissioned

by the Israeli-European Policy Network (IEPN), an initiative of the Friedrich Ebert

Foundation. The author thanks all colleagues who participated in the IEPN meetings where the

first draft of this paper was presented, as well as Prof. Dr. Rik Coolsaet, Prof. Dr. Michael Brenner

and Dr. Sharon Pardo, who kindly reviewed the paper before publication, for their vital comments

and suggestions. A number of quotes in the paper refer to interventions by officials at various seminars

held under the Chatham House Rule which the author attended, hence their source cannot be

revealed.

2. Including Iran obviously stretches the traditional definition of the Middle East, although I will

argue that developments on Iran and, for that matter, Afghanistan, are inextricably linked to Lebanon,

Israel-Palestine and Iraq. As the ‘greater’, ‘broader’ and ‘wider’ Middle East have all gained

some connotation or other, I will opt for ‘the Middle East broadly defined’.

n°12: Toward a More Independent Europe, Michael Brenner, March 2007.

résumé: ?

n°11: NATO, ESDP and the RIGA Summit: no transformation without re-equilibration, Sven Biscop, 24 May 2006.

résumé: If NATO at the time of the 2002 Prague Summit assertively shook off the limitations

imposed by the ‘out-of-area debate’ and looked forward to an ambitious

worldwide role, the Alliance in 2006 seems to have lost confidence. The nervousness

concerning the lack of a civilian crisis management dimension, especially

evident when compared with the civilian dimension of ESDP, the compulsion

to enhance its profile by participating in ever new types of missions in ever

new parts of the world, and the permanently strained relationship with the EU

appear to be symptoms of an existential unease and a loss of direction. Even the

most avid Atlanticists – or they in particular – have noticed. Consider the introduction

to a high-profile report by a Spanish think tank presided by former

Prime Minister José María Aznar:

What really endangers the cohesion of the Alliance and provides the key

to whether the organization really has a future is the loss of the organization’s

raison d’être, the lack of a mission that can be shared by all of

NATO’s members (FAES 2005, p. 11).

Under the heading of ‘NATO transformation’ two Summits of Heads of State

and Government, one in Riga on 28-29 November 2006 and one in 2008, are

to provide a remedy. A ‘global partnership’ embracing democratic States from

all over the world, common funding of operations and capabilities, and a role

in civilian crisis management and peacebuilding are all on the agenda. Yet the

question is whether these Summits can give a renewed sense of direction and

confidence to the Alliance without addressing the real cause of the loss of a

common purpose. That root cause is a new structural factor in transatlantic

relations and the world order: the emergence of the EU as a strategic actor in its