Eight theories of religion second edition

Durkheim takes great pride in being scientific. Like earlier theorists, he wants to gather data, compare it, classify it, and make generalizations, or laws, to explain it. In a limited way, he also embraces social evolution. He assumes human societies do evolve from the elementary to the complex. And he agrees that the best place to start is with cultures that are simple—with so-called primitive peoples. He does not, of course, like the idea of some broad scheme of human progress. He rejected this view for the most part when he met it in the philosophy of Comte. He also rejects Frazer’s version, which presents the portrait of humanity marching steadily upward through the ages of magic, religion, and science. Against the British anthropologists, he insists that we must not use the comparative method to pick out customs and beliefs casually from around the world and then arrange them, out of their contexts, into some predetermined scheme of historical progress. That will not work. What he says we must do—and here The Elementary Forms serves as a model—is center on a single society, examine it carefully, and attend to details. Only after that close work has been done may theorists begin to make very limited comparisons with other societies, and even then, only if they are societies of the same type. True science, he insists, works slowly—from a few specimens carefully examined, not from many gathered in haste.

In the years after World War I, this important point of Durkheim’s method was taken very much to heart in the field of anthropology, especially in Britain and America. In England, it was promoted especially by the social theorist A. R. Radcliffe-Brown and by the field anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, who wrote on religion and other features of primitive cultures in the South Pacific. This principle of investigating one and only one society in depth before going on to comparisons is now widely approved in social science. It seems to have put an end permanently to the grand ambitions of Tylor, Frazer, and their associates from the older, Victorian era of anthropology.
3. Ritual and Belief

Durkheim also parts from the ways of Tylor and Frazer on the question of the relation between religious ritual and belief. Their “intellectualist” approach holds that beliefs and ideas about the world are the primary elements in the religious life. Religion’s practices—its customs and rituals—are seen as secondary; they follow from the beliefs and depend upon them. On this view, as

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noted, the practice of those primitive peoples who bury servants along with their kings arises out of the prior belief that, in the afterlife, the king’s soul will need the souls of servants to assist him. The belief comes logically before the ritual; the idea can be said to cause the practice. In Durkheim’s thinking, just the opposite view is put forward. For him the rituals of religion have priority; it is they that are always basic and actually create the beliefs that accompany them. If there is anything “eternal” about religion, he says, it is that a society always needs rites—ceremonial activities of renewal and rededication. Through them, people are reminded that the group always matters more than any of its single members. Beliefs, by contrast, are not so eternal. While the social function of religious rituals has always remained constant, the intellectual content of religious beliefs has always been changeable. Beliefs are the “speculative side” of religion. They may serve to separate the Christian from the Jew and the Hindu, but in reality the particular ideas they assert make little difference. Ideas always change from religion to religion and even from age to age in the same religion. But the need for ceremonies always remains; they are the true source of social unity, and in every society they are the real ties that bind. They disclose the true meaning of religion.

The matter of ritual takes us to the heart of Durkheim’s theory: the functional explanation of religion. Durkheim, like Freud, sees himself as presenting not just a different theory but a theory different in kind from those that came before him. In explaining religion, he thinks he can go beneath the surface of things. Tylor and Frazer try to explain religion as it appears; they take more or less at face value the beliefs that religious people hold and then ask how those beliefs explain their lives and deeds. In this intellectualist approach, ideas and beliefs—Durkheim’s speculative side of religion—are the key to explaining other cultures. For the follower of Tylor, a primitive ritual makes sense once we know that the Indian rainmaker believes an imitation of thunder can create a storm and send showers on his fields. The principle of imitative magic may be absurd to us, but not to him; so it explains why he acts as strangely as he does. Like Freud, however, Durkheim wants to ask another question. If we agree that these beliefs are absurd, then why do people hold them? If such ideas are silly superstitions, they nonetheless do not die easily. Why do they survive?

For Durkheim, the answer to this riddle can be found only in one place: not in the content of the beliefs, not in what they claim about gods or the world, but in their function—in what they do, socially, for those who live by them. The true nature of religion is to be found not on its surface but underneath.

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Needless to say, Durkheim’s aggressively social approach presents us with a most original and intriguing theory of religion. Unlike Tylorian animism, it claims to show how the roots of religious behavior run much deeper than the purely intellectual need to understand how the world works. And unlike Freudian personality theory, it appreciates in all its wide scope the powerful shaping influence that social structures exert when people declare some things sacred and others profane. Yet compelling as it appears in these respects, Durkheim’s ambitiously sociological theory displays certain noticeable limitations in others. The very first reviewers of The Elementary Forms were quick to notice some of these difficulties, and more recent critics have not hesitated to multiply the complaints. The criticisms tend to cluster about three main issues: Durkheim’s assumptions about the nature of religion, his Australian evidence, and his “reductionist” conclusions. We take them here in turn.

With Durkheim, as with our other theorists, a great deal depends on what the Greek thinker Archimedes called his pou sto, the place “where I stand” at the start of the argument. Consider in this connection the definition of religion laid out in the opening pages of The Elementary Forms. Religion, we are told, is rooted in the basic distinction all societies make between the sacred and the profane. The main concern of religious rites is with the first, that is, with the sacred, which is to be kept separate from the profane. Further, the sacred is always tied up with the great social events of the clan, while the profane is the realm of private affairs. This root conception serves as the foundation on which the full framework of Durkheim’s imposing theory is then erected.

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If we look at it very closely, however, surely the pivotal role of this definition in the theory creates something of a problem. If, already at the start of the discussion, Durkheim envisions the sacred as the social, is it not quite easy— rather too easy—to reach the conclusion that religion is nothing more than the expression of social needs? The inquiry would seem to begin at the very place where Durkheim wants to finish. The sacred is the social, he writes, and the religious is the sacred; therefore, the religious is the social. To be sure, Durkheim is not the only theorist whose reasoning tends toward a certain circularity; we have seen something of the same in Freud, and others too are inclined to offer definitions that most easily accommodate the theory they hope to defend. But Durkheim’s way of starting the analysis very near the place where it ought to end is, logically, a cause for some concern.

Durkheim contends that the great merit of his study, unlike those of earlier theorists, is his determination to study only one type of culture, the aborigine communities of Australia, and explain religion in that context. He relies on the widely acclaimed ethnographical reports of Spencer and Gillen, along with those of other firsthand observers, and he rests his theory squarely on the evidence they provide. The scientific value of such an approach is clear and undisputed—but so is its potential weakness. Should reason arise to

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question the value of these reports, or Durkheim’s readings of them, what would be left of his theory, linked as closely as it is to this Australian evidence? Significantly, several of the very first critics to comment on The Elementary Forms made this point in forcible terms. One, a sociologist named Gaston Richard, who had earlier worked with Durkheim, carefully examined the Australian reports and showed how, in a number of places, the evidence could be read to prove quite the opposite of what Durkheim concludes. Richard also claimed, rather persuasively, that most of Durkheim’s theory had been assembled before he ever looked at the Australian reports.¹⁹ Other critics now question whether even the Australian reports themselves were completely accurate.²⁰ Perhaps the harshest words on this subject were to come from Arnold van Gennep, the famed Dutch anthropologist of Africa. In a strongly worded review written soon after The Elementary Forms appeared, he wrote, “In ten years the whole of his analysis of the Australian material will be completely rejected.” He then added that it was based on “the most unsound group of ethnographical facts I have ever encountered.”²¹ These words have proven at least partly prophetic. Today, much of the evidence and most of the interpretation of totemism that Durkheim makes a part of his theory have come to be quite widely rejected.²²

Just as psychological functionalism is the cornerstone of Freudian theory, sociological functionalism is the key to Durkheim’s explanatory method. In a certain sense, of course, the value of such an approach seems beyond question. Who can really doubt that, beneath the surface of things, religious beliefs and rituals often accomplish social purposes that believers themselves may be quite unaware of? Who would wish to deny that for devout Catholics, a requiem mass, which on its face is a plea to God to save the souls of the dead from Hell, is, underneath that surface, also a powerful ritual of group solidarity and renewal? Such socially functional readings of religion seem so natural and appropriate that no one is any longer likely to dispute them.

But even if all agree in a general way that religion and society are thus functionally related or even inseparable, we must still ask just how this relationship really works. In discussing this matter, Durkheim almost always claims that society determines, while religion is the thing that is determined. Society controls; religion reflects. In each Australian instance he considers, Durkheim insists that society powerfully shapes religious ritual and belief, while religious beliefs never seem able to do the reverse. In each instance we are reminded that social structure is always the reality, while religion is merely an appearance. It seems at least reasonable to ask why this should have to be

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Despite that difference, Durkheim’s theory, like Freud’s, fits the mold of an aggressively reductionist functionalism; his aim is to “reduce” religion to something other than what it appears to be. Although functionalist explanations have proven their merits through the years, the question of such reductionist versions of functionalism is a different matter—one that leaves present-day theorists sharply divided. Some applaud such approaches, finding in reductionist theories the very model of a strong scientific method.²³ Others find them one-sided and fundamentally misleading.²⁴ In that connection, it should not come as a surprise that most actual religious believers find the reductionist theories of both Freud and Durkheim generally unacceptable. In the eyes of religious faith, these approaches, though they may offer insight into aspects of belief, simply misunderstand what religion at bottom is all about. Even at that, however, the views of Freud and Durkheim are probably less offensive to religious ears than those expressed, well before theirs, in one of the most militant and aggressive of all reductionist theories: that of the German socialist philosopher Karl Marx. His unsparing and combative account of religion is the one we consider next.

1. Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, tr. Joseph Ward Swain (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915), p. 419.

2. Durkheim was, of course, not the only contributor to the “sociological revolution” in modern thinking. On the matter of Durkheim’s influence, see Albert Salomon, “Some Aspects of the Legacy of Durkheim,” in Kurt H. Wolff, ed., Essays on Sociology and Philosophy: Durkheim, et al. with Appraisals of His Life and Thought (New York: Harper Torchbooks, [1960] 1964), pp. 247–66.

3. The authoritative biography of Durkheim is Steven Lukes, Émile Durkheim, His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

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An excellent study of Durkheim’s thought in depth is W. S. F. Pickering, Durkheim’s Sociology of Religion: Themes and Theories (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984).

5. On Durkheim as a political theorist, see Steve Fenton, Durkheim and Modern Sociology (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 81–115.

6. See Ernest Wallwork, Durkheim: Morality and Milieu (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).

7. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 47. On the importance of this distinction, see Nisbet, The Sociology of Émile Durkheim (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 172–76.

8. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 47.

9. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 44.

10. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 168.

11. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 188.

12. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 206; on this crucial linkage between the clan, the totem, and the totem symbol, with each as sacred, see Anthony Giddens, Émile Durkheim (New York: Viking Press, 1978), p. 94.

13. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 209.

14. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, pp. 218–19.

15. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 249.

16. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 347.

17. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 10.

18. Durkheim, Elementary Forms, p. 212.

19. “Dogmatic Atheism in the Sociology of Religion,” in W. S. F. Pickering, ed., Durkheim on Religion, tr. by Jacqueline Redding (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 228–76; first published in Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religieuse (1923).

20. W. E. H. Stanner, “Reflections on Durkheim and aboriginal Religion,” in Pickering, ed., Durkheim on Religion, pp. 277–303.

21. Arnold van Gennep, review of The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, in Pickering, ed., Durkheim on Religion, pp. 205–208; first published in Mercure de France (1913).

22. See in particular Stanner, “Reflections on Durkheim and aboriginal Religion,” and A. A. Goldenweiser, review of The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, both in Pickering, ed., Durkheim on Religion, pp. 277–303, 209–27. Goldenweiser’s article was first published in American Anthropologist (1915).

23. See, for example, the writings of Donald Wiebe, especially “The Failure of Nerve in the Academic Study of Religion,” Studies in Religion 13 (1984): 401–22; also the following works by Robert Segal: “In Defense of Reductionism,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 51 (March 1983): 97–124; Religion and the Social Sciences: Essays on the Confrontation (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989); and Explaining and Interpreting Religion: Essays on the Issue, Toronto Studies in Religion (New York: Peter Lang, 1992).

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24. Daniel L. Pals, “Is Religion a Sui Generis Phenomenon?” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 55, 2 (1987): 260–82.

Allen, N. J., ed. On Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of Religious Life. London: Routledge, 1998. A collection of instructive analytical essays reappraising the background, design, and influence of Durkheim’s landmark study.

Bellah, Robert N., ed. Émile Durkheim: Morality and Society: Selected Writings. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973. An instructive selection of Durkheim’s more important shorter writings, chosen and introduced by a leading American sociologist of religion.

Durkheim, Émile. The Division of Labor in Society. Translated by G. Simpson. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, [1893] 1964.

Durkheim, Émile. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Translated by Joseph Ward Swain. New York: The Macmillan Company, [1912] 1915.

Durkheim, Émile. The Rules of Sociological Method. Translated by S. A. Solovay and J. H. Mueller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, [1895] 1938.

Durkheim, Émile. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. Translated by J. A. Spaulding and G. Simpson. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, [1897] 1951.

Fenton, Steve, ed. Durkheim and Modern Sociology. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Essays by recognized authorities who assess Durkheim’s role and influence in the development of contemporary sociological research.

Giddens, Anthony. Émile Durkheim. New York: Viking Press, 1978. An insightful, brief study by a leading contemporary sociological theorist.

Jones, Robert Alun. Émile Durkheim. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1986. An illuminating short study by a scholar familiar with Robertson Smith, Frazer, and other early interpreters of religion.

Jones, Susan Stedman. Durkheim Reconsidered. Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2001. A reappraisal of Durkheim that seeks to clear away misconceptions and place his career and achievement in the context of French society, politics, and culture of his time.

LaCapra, Dominick. Émile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. A substantial account of the full range of Durkheim’s thought.

Lukes, Steven. Émile Durkheim, His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. The definitive recent examination of Durkheim’s life and thought.

Mestrovic, Stjepan G Émile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988. An assessment of Durkheim’s role in creating the modern field of sociological inquiry.

Nisbet, Robert A. Émile Durkheim: With Selected Essays. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. A critical assessment with illuminating contributions from other authors on Durkheim’s most important books and leading theories.

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Pickering, W. S. F., ed. Durkheim on Religion. Translated by Jacqueline Redding. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975. Presents selections from Durkheim’s original works on religion along with selected reviews by other scholars, including some of the very earliest assessments of The Elementary Forms.

Pickering, W. S. F. Durkheim’s Sociology of Religion: Themes and Theories. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984. An excellent in-depth study of Durkheim on religion.

Wolff, Kurt H., ed. Essays on Sociology and Philosophy: Durkheim, et al., with Appraisals of His Life and Thought. New York: Harper Torchbooks, [1960] 1964. Illuminating essays by different authors on the origin, character, and influence of Durkheim’s thought.

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