The majority of supplies will be shipped via Jordan/Kuwait, NOT Turkey
Carter 9, (Chelsea J, Associated Press, 8/31/2009 12:43 PM, U.S. ramps up withdrawal from Iraq, Republished with Permission by: USA Today, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2009-08-30-withdrawal_N.htm) WDK
The military has identified more than 1.5 million pieces of equipment, from tanks to antennas, that need to be shipped out of Iraq, Brown said. Under the plan, much of that equipment would go by ground to Kuwait, 330 miles south of Baghdad, and to Jordan's Aqaba port, more than 500 miles southwest of Baghdad, where it would either be shipped back to the states or sent to troops in Afghanistan, Brown said. Some will likely go through Turkey as well.
-----A2: Terrorism Advantage-----
No Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
No risk of terrorism: nuclear weapons secure
Knops 10 (Raymond, Netherlands representative, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 048 DSCFC 10 E - U.S. NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE: A FUNDAMENTAL NATO DEBATE, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2083)
Recent incidents have also raised questions regarding the safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons installations in Europe and whether the potential for theft, diversion or other loss of control exists. Indeed, a 2008 high level U.S. Air Force panel determined that most sites used for deploying nuclear weapons in Europe did not meet the Department of Defense’s security requirements.(26) The problems cited at the bases included inadequate fencing and security systems, staffing shortages, and inadequately trained security personnel.(27) Despite these reports, NATO believes that “there is no question that nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are safe and secure,” according to Guy Roberts, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Weapons of Mass Destruction Policy and Director for Nuclear Policy. Roberts told Arms Control Today in August 2008 that the above-cited U.S. Air Force report contained no new concerns that NATO was not aware of, and that NATO was implementing “a number of enhancements” in response to its internal oversight procedures.
Nuclear Weapons are secure
Kristensen 05 (Hans, Natural Resources Defense Council, U.S. Nuclear
Weapons in Europe, http://www.nukestrat.com/pubs/EuroBombs.pdf)
Schlesinger’s views were partially influenced, according to one recent account, by the outbreak of war in July 1974 between two nuclear-equipped NATO countries, Turkey and Greece. Schlesinger wanted to know if the U.S. nuclear weapons were secure and asked his director of telecommunications and command and control systems, Thomas C. Reed, if he could talk to the U.S. officers holding the keys to the weapons. Reed reported back that the U.S. custodians were in charge, but at one Air Force base “things got a little dicier.” “The local Army troops outside the fence wanted in. Their Air Force countrymen inside wanted them kept out. The nukes on alert aircraft were hastily returned to bunkers as the opposing commanders parleyed under a white flag. Soon both sides went off to dinner, but through it all we held out breath.” 39 Fears about the physical security of the weapons had been raised during the military coup d’état in Greece in 1967, where “political tension in the vicinity of some of our nuclear storage facilities” had caused concern in Washington. 40 As a result of the Turkish-Greek war, the United States removed its nuclear bombs from Greek and Turkish alert fighterbombers and transferred the nuclear warheads from Greek Nike Hercules missile units (see Figure 9) in the field to storage. Greece saw this as another pro-Turkish move by NATO and responded by withdrawing its forces from NATO’s military command structure. This forced Washington to contemplate whether to remove its nuclear weapons from Greece altogether, but in the end the Ford administration decided against it after the State Department warned that removal would further alienate the Greek government from NATO. 41 U.S. Nothing was said about this nuclear dilemma in the final communiqué from NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) that met in December 1974. The group remarked it had “discussed the recent legislation in the United States calling for an examination of the doctrine for the tactical use of nuclear weapons and of NATO's nuclear posture….” 42 Other than that, the public was kept in the dark. The Turkish and Greek episode and the discoveries at Pacific Command led to immediate improvements in the command and control of the forward-deployed nuclear weapons. A wave of terrorist attacks in Europe at the time added to the concerns. By the end of 1976, all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were equipped with Permission Action Links (PALs). The June 1975 NPG meeting made a vague reference to this by stating that, “actions [were taken] to enhance the security of nuclear weapons stored in NATO Europe.” 43
A2: Terrorism: U.S. Intel fails
U.S. intel is useless to Turks fighting PKK. Turkey can now provide its own intel.
Yuvuz 10 (Ercan, journalist, “U.S intelligence-sharing against terror not ‘real-time’, evidence shows” Today’s Zaman, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-213347-us-intelligence-sharing-against-terror-not-really-real-time-evidence-shows.html) MKB
The real-time intelligence-sharing agreement reached between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and former US President George W. Bush on Nov. 5, 2007, which was supposed to aid the Turkish military in air and land strikes on Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorist camps in northern Iraq have turned out to be neither “real-time” nor “effective.” MHP Adana deputy Kürşat Atılgan, a longtime major general in the Turkish Air Forces, said the real-time nature of the intelligence is overly exaggerated. It is believed that real-time intelligence is provided immediately. This is not how it works. The US does not provide raw footage, it submits filtered images,” Atılgan said. Nearly 260 PKK members have reportedly been killed during air strikes thanks to the US’ real-time intelligence sharing. Political sources said intelligence-sharing, which previously could only be provided with a 24-hour lag, is now being provided in 45 minutes due to negotiations between Turkish authorities and their American counterparts. However, 45 minutes is not enough for the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) to hit moving targets. Because of this, fighter planes and helicopters in Diyarbakır and Batman must stay ready all the time to effectively hit moving targets. Those air forces not on a constant state of high alert need at least an hour to be ready to take off. Even if the location of moving targets is detected, at least two hours are required to be ready -- enough time for terrorists to escape and hide. Atılgan, who served as a pilot in many similar operations in the past, notes that the intelligence provided to Turkey by the US does not allow the military to hit moving targets. “Real-time intelligence is significant. But American intelligence-sharing is not enough. The fact that American intelligence is not enough was revealed in the Aktütün attack in 2008. The biggest problem is that the US does not provide the raw images that its intelligence planes record. The images are transmitted to General Staff headquarters with a 45-minute delay and then transferred to Diyarbakır or Batman to scramble the air force against the terrorists. It takes two or sometimes three-and-a-half hours for the air forces to take off and attack targets. This in turn makes it easier for moving terrorists to escape and hide,” the former pilot said. Turkey has fought the terrorist PKK since it was formed in 1984 with the goal of establishing an autonomous Kurdish state in the eastern and southeastern parts of Turkey. More than 40,000 soldiers and civilians have been killed in the clashes thus far. The PKK has been declared a terrorist organization by the international community, including the US and the EU. The United States has shared intelligence with Turkey since 2007, and former Chief of General Staff retired Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt once praised this intelligence sharing, saying that the intelligence on PKK movements and camps resembled the footage available of the reality TV show “Big Brother.” Büyükanıt’s remarks were met with criticism by all opposition parties, particularly former Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Deniz Baykal. The aptness of this reaction was proved on Oct. 3, 2008, when the Aktütün outpost on the Turkish-Iraq border was attacked by 350 PKK terrorists, leaving 17 soldiers dead. The Taraf daily published shocking evidence on Oct. 13 of that year that security flaws played a large role in the deaths of the 17 soldiers. Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ, surrounded by high-ranking commanders during a press briefing, did not respond to questions raised by Taraf but lashed out at the media for publishing classified information, saying this was “an attack” on the military, on Oct. 28, 2008. He also said the military was taking legal action over the leak of reports on the attack of Oct. 3 on the Aktütün outpost. Although the probe was concluded, its findings have never been publicly announced. Today’s Zaman has learned from political sources that the TSK has organized operations against the terrorists without finding any, raising the eyebrows of Turkish intelligence agencies, too. It was revealed that images provided to Turkey were not live clips; rather, they were provided with a six-hour delay. In fact, a deal reached with the US on real-time intelligence sharing did not initially include providing live intelligence to Turkey. The images were originally submitted to Turkey with a 24-hour delay, which was then reduced to six hours. Turkish intelligence units understood that the intelligence was filtered before it was handed out to Turkish authorities subsequent to the Aktütün attack. To remedy this situation, Turkish officials restarted negotiations with the US to obtain intelligence images more quickly. As a result of closed-door talks, the US has started to provide intelligence with a 45-minute delay. After this change, images showing Turkish fighter planes hitting PKK camps in northern Iraq were unveiled by General Staff. Considering the weaknesses it perceives in intelligence shared by the US, the General Staff started preparations to obtain its own unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). It decided to purchase 10 Heron UAVs from Israel in 2007 but only one or two of them have been delivered to Turkey due to delays and a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Israel. Despite issues with Turkey’s first Israel-made UAVs during trial flights in Batman, the TSK was for the first time able to get its own images of northern Iraq. As a result of this, Turkey detected intelligence weaknesses in the intelligence provided by the US.
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