Benhorin 10 (Yitzhak, journalist, “U.S.: Sanctions having an effect” YNET, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3909180,00.html) MKB
WASHINGTON – First signs of success: The latest sanctions against Iran have been slammed for not being firm enough, yet US officials are saying that the punitive steps are already having an effect.
The latest round of UN sanctions prompted several private sector companies to cut their ties with the Ayatollah regime, US Undersecretary of Treasury Stuart Levey said Tuesday "The impact of these actions on Iran has been significant and is deepening as a result of Iran's own conduct," he said. Levey, who is the architect of the financial boycott against Iran in the Treasury, told Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee that private sector companies are joining banks in ending their ties with Iran. Virtually all major financial institutions have either completely cut off or dramatically reduced their ties with Iran," he said. "We are now starting to see companies across a range of sectors, including insurance, consulting, energy, and manufacturing make similar decisions," Levey said, adding that ties with Iran are increasingly feared because of the "reputational risk" inherent in such contacts.
A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve
Sanctions cut off Iran’s ability to get the bomb for many years.
Lopez 10 (George, chair at Kroc institute for international peace studies, “On the Issues: Iran Sanctions” United States Institute for Peace, http://www.usip.org/resources/the-issues-iran-sanctions) MKB
The new U.N. resolution captures the important policy subtlety that sanctions must pressure for compliance, not punish for capitulation. It provides an effective balance between a sanctions bite that hurts and a style of imposition that rejects isolating Iran. Instead, these targeted sanctions rightly aim to refocus Tehran on internationally accepted standards of atomic energy development and use.
The resolution’s first strength is that it undermines real assets and capabilities that Iran might use for weapons production. The document astutely mixes compulsory and voluntary measures targeted at the diverse economic sectors that bolster Iranian uranium enrichment and missile development. These measures will complicate further progress in both areas, and may extend significantly the time that Iran would need to develop an actual weapon. This resolution also underscores why and how sanctions constitute the cornerstone, rather than the entire edifice, of a nuclear rollback policy. The past successful cases of Ukraine, South Africa and Libya illustrate that an astute application of narrowly targeted sanctions are the critical first step of a larger policy process, the second element of which is engaged negotiation between imposers of sanctions and their targets. Rather unique in this week’s sanctions resolution is a section providing six full paragraphs expressly dealing with engagement. The resolution also includes as an annex the 2008 incentives package crafted primarily by the EU3 (France, Britain and Germany), which lays out a workable path for Iran to develop peaceful nuclear energy. The resolution’s conventional arms embargo may be the most extensive imposed on a nation not embroiled in civil war. The measures prohibit Iranian purchases of missiles, naval ships, tanks, artillery and armored vehicles, as well as an array of aircraft, most notably attack helicopters. In addition, the draft resolution puts real teeth into the missile system restrictions that first appeared in earlier U.N. resolutions, while also prohibiting other states from supplying training, spare parts or other assistance for any of these arms.
A2: US/Turkey Relations—SQ Sanctions Solve
Sanctions are highly effective.
Cole 10 (Rocky, University of Georgia- International Affairs, “The case for sanctions against Iran” Roosevelt Institute, http://www.rooseveltcampusnetwork.org/blog/case-sanctions-against-iran-some-simple-analytics) MKB
The research, inspired by President Obama's recent attempts to secure international support for tougher sanctions laws against Iran, seeks to determine if economic sanctions can stop states from acquiring nuclear weapons. After an exhaustive study that included both rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis of all instances of sanctions used for nonproliferation purposes, we reached the following conclusions. Security concerns within a target state--meaning a state that is the target of the sanctions--do not affect sanction outcomes. Since nuclear weapons often play an important role in state security, this is an incredible finding for nonproliferation purposes. Essentially, it means that arguments positing sanctions as ineffective because states are more concerned about deterring conventional or nuclear military threats than their economic health are simply not true. The total cost of the economic sanctions to the target is by far the most important variable in determining sanction outcomes. In all our models, this variable consistently remained statistically significant and important. Episodes of sanction busting--third-party states taking advantage of sanctions by increasing trade volume with a sanctioned state--negatively affect sanction outcomes. This is an important finding, as it means that international cooperation is indeed important in determining sanction outcomes; however, the number of states participating in sanctions is not what matters. It's how strongly they uphold the sanctions laws. Now that we've developed this extremely accurate model, what will it say about Iran? Here are some simple analytics using findings from our research at UGA. Let's consider sanctions against Iran's oil supply. Iran is one of the world's leading exporters of crude, exporting roughly 2560 thousand bbl/day. Thirty eight percent of Iran's GDP is trade; eighty percent of Iran's exports are crude; therefore, roughly sixteen percent of Iran's GDP is oil exports. Now, let's consider three scenarios in which states agree to reduce their consumption of Iranian oil by various amounts. In the first, only states that strongly support stronger sanctions on Iran (as determined by coding statements made by public officials) give up twenty five percent of their Iranian oil consumption.In the second, the top ten consumers of Iranian oil give up 25 percent of their consumption. In the third, only states that strongly support sanctions against Iran give up all of their consumption. When these calculations are finished, and if the price of a barrel of oil is pegged at $90 (the average for the last year), the different sanction scenarios would impact Iranian GDP by following amounts: %GDP- 3.66 Effectiveness Score- 41.02. % GDP 2.36 Effectiveness Score- 26.71- % GDP 1.66 Effectiveness Score- 18.99. Since sanction success scores only go to 16, it's pretty obvious that sanctions against Iran, if legislated and targeted correctly, could have a serious impact on Iran's strategic calculus.