Gulf War Air Power Survey
In the foreground, an A-6E provides fuel from a “buddy store” for an A-7E
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- Allied Receiver Aircraft
- Fuels: JP‑5 Versus Jet A‑1
- Table 18 Munitions Nomenclature and Description General Item Description Designation Comments
- Table 18 (Continued) Munitions Nomenclature and Description General Item
In the foreground, an A-6E provides fuel from a “buddy store” for an A-7E, while in the distance, an EA-6B receives fuel from an Air Force KC-135E. Initially, the air refueling tracks consisted of an anchor at each end. These anchors were built with fifty-nautical-mile legs (as per Air Force regulations). During Desert Shield, numerous air refuelings were accomplished with naval receivers in tanker cells. On several occasions, the naval receivers complained that they had trouble finding the tankers orbiting in a twenty-by-fifty-nautical-mile anchor pattern and missed refueling even though the tanker cell was in the assigned orbit. The tracks were later modified to include pre- and postanchors with thirty-nautical-mile legs. Even when the legs were shortened to thirty nautical-miles, naval message traffic included complaints about the size of the anchor pattern and the difficulty of locating the tankers. The final solution was to shorten the anchor leg length to twenty nautical miles. All pre- and postanchors were reduced in size to twenty-by-twenty nautical miles and tested in Imminent Thunder, a joint multinational exercise conducted in December 1990. Positive comments from the Navy carrier groups concerning the new track construction resulted in the modification of all Desert Storm tracks with anchor orbits to the twenty-by-twenty-nautical-mile anchors.421 AWACS The AWACS aircraft plays a critical role in the employment of Allied combat aircraft. Designed to provide early warning of airborne threats, the AWACS also provides controlling instructions to friendly aircraft. While not a complete air traffic control facility, it can provide limited flight-following and avoidance information. During Desert Storm, the AWACS was heavily involved in the detection, acquisition, and downing of enemy aircraft by Allied air‑to‑air systems. It provided command and control as well as real-time threat advisories to attacking Allied aircraft and assisted in the assembling of strike forces before border crossings. Air refueling and airspace deconfliction was an integral part of strike force assembly. Because of the heavily congested airspace over the Saudi Arabian peninsula and the criticality of air refueling to the overall air campaign, a joint agreement between the SAC planners in theater (STRATFOR) and the USCENTAF staff placed a tanker representative on the airborne command element (ACE) team aboard the AWACS. The ACE team, commanded by an Air Force colonel, was the USCENTAF Commander's airborne command element charged with carrying out real-time changes to the air war as well as providing overall guidance to airborne Allied aircraft. The tanker representativean individual familiar with air refueling procedures and the current ATO being executedon the ACE team could provide AWACS controllers with guidance on the best responses to air battle changes and to requests for emergency air refueling. ACE tanker representatives provided critical input to the successful execution of the air war. They advised the AWACS controllers on the movement of air refueling sources, provided threat advisories to the tanker crews, repositioned tankers for air refueling returning strike forces low on fuel, supported attacking aircraft missions generated on short notice because of real-time changes in the war, and planned fuel requirements for aircraft involved in the search and rescue of downed Allied aircrew members. They also provided input to the tanker planning process by reporting on actual utilization of air refueling assets, thereby improving the assignment of tankers in the ATO process. A source of confusion during Desert Storm centered on the AWACS' capability, or lack thereof, to function as a complete air traffic controller facility. Because the AWACS could view a large part of the air war with its radar, and because procedures were established for the tactical checking of aircraft, many tanker aircrews believed AWACS was functioning like an air route traffic control center in the CONUS. Limitations to the AWACS radar and computational capabilities plus the workload of the onboard personnel do not allow the AWACS to function as an air traffic controller facility. In some instances, tanker crews, mistakenly believing they were under full radar coverage and flight‑following protection, had near mid‑air collisions with other Allied aircraft. In most of these cases, the other Allied aircraft were not being viewed on the AWACS controller's radar scopes. An intensive educational process began to instruct tanker crews that even though they were being tracked by the AWACS, the system offered only a limited veil of protection.422 Radio Communications Tanker radio configuration posed some communication problems in the theater of operation. The KC‑135 deployed with two ultra high-frequency (UHF) and one high-frequency (HF) radios. Once in theater, one of the UHF radios was temporarily replaced with a very high-frequency (VHF) radio. The VHF radio was installed to facilitate communications with air traffic control facilities in the theater and surrounding areas. Following installation of the VHF radio and removal of the second UHF radio, the problem became one of too few radios with too many frequencies to monitor. An example of commonality problems surfaced with the Navy and involved the need for two UHF radios on each KC-135. Navy fighters do not have VHF capability. Without two UHF radios, the tankers could not arrange rendezvous with the Navy fighters. The prime UHF radios of the tankers were dedicated to conducting air refueling operations. No other type of communications could occur on the air refueling frequency for safety reasons. (The second UHF radios were later re‑installed, and permanent VHF radios are now being installed on all U.S. KC‑l35s.) VHF radios did improve tanker radio reception range. However, AWACS had only two VHF radios from which to broadcast. This made communications with AWACS difficult during time-sensitive periods. SAC bomber aircraft did not possess VHF capability either and were unable to communicate with foreign air traffic controllers; therefore, tankers were used to relay bomber clearances.423 KC‑1O VS KC‑135 The majority of the probe-equipped fuel receiver aircraft community prefers the KC‑l0. The drogue and basket assembly on the KC‑l0 features a longer hose and a softer basket as compared with those of the KC‑135. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, a large number of receivers requested KC‑10 rather than KC‑135 aircraft. The limited number of KC‑10s in theater were used for long-station-time and large offload requirements. Therefore, only a limited number of KC‑10s remained for allocation to those who wanted a KC-10 refueling rather than to those who needed a KC-10 refueling. Following the extensive program to train Navy receivers in using the KC-135 tankers for refueling, the “requirement” for KC-10 refuelings dropped dramatically as pilots overcame their preconceived prejudices. Follow-on examination of soft basket and longer hose drogue equipment and the benefits of additional tanker and receiver training may indicate potential solutions to the KC-10 versus KC-135 issue. Allied Receiver Aircraft Saudi E‑3 (AWACS) and F‑15 aircraft were air refueled throughout the entire operation. The U.S.-made aircraft were certified to air refuel with both the KC‑135 and KC‑10. Additionally, Saudi air crews maintain proficiency in United States Air Force air refueling procedures. Other aircraft requesting air refueling included Egypt's F‑4, F‑16, and Mirage 2000; UAE's Mirage 2000; Italy's IDS Tornado; Oman's Jaguar; United Kingdom's VC‑10; and Canada's CF‑l8, of these, only the U.S.-made F‑4, F‑16, and CF‑18 aircraft were certified for air refueling with United States Air Force tankers.424 Receiver Certification Receiver aircraft are normally certified to air refuel with U.S. Air Force tankers in a test process conducted by Air Force Systems Command. Certification results in validated air refueling procedures published in both SAC tanker and receiver air refueling manuals. Certification consists of a technical assessment of the tanker and receiver fuel systems, including the compatibility of tanker and receiver offload and onload systems, i.e., probe and drogue. The assessment determines if flight testing is required. In some cases, certification is based on flight test data for previously cleared aircraft, and additional flight testing is not required. The certification procedure for foreign receivers is funded by foreign governments through foreign military sales (FMS). Legal Issues Two options are available to refuel foreign receivers legally. In both cases, the receiver aircraft must be certified to air refuel with U.S. Air Force tankers. First, SAC can provide air refueling under a current FMS agreement written specifically to include air refueling. Second, SAC can provide air refueling under the 1986 Air Force-approved “Concept of Operations for USAF Air Refueling of Foreign Military Aircraft in Joint Exercises.” The concept permits air refueling during combined exercises to ensure compatibility among Air Force tankers and Allied aircraft. It does not address Allied air refueling in an actual contingency or crisis and imposes restrictions on Allied receivers participating in an exercise. In an exercise, Allied receivers must have a valid requirement for U.S. air refueling and must refuel on a noninterference basis. Allied pilots must be current and qualified in U.S. Air Force procedures. No initial or requalification training may be provided. The foreign government must pay for or provide the fuel offloaded. Neither option satisfied the requirements of Desert Shield. The exercise guidelines were too restrictive to allow timely training and subsequent support of Allied aircraft in Desert Shield. The certification process is both expensive and time consuming when conducted under FMS agreements. Joint Staff Guidance On 2 October 1990, Hq SAC/DO requested that Hq USAF/XOO clarify U.S. policy on Allied air refueling with a view towards providing USCINCCENT maximum operational flexibility in supporting Allied air refueling requirements for Desert Shield. On 17 October 1990, SAC requested that USCINCCENT/CCJ3 bring the operational requirement for Allied air refueling to the JCS' attention and request assistance in resolving policy issues preventing or limiting U.S. support to Allied receivers. On 20 October 1990, USCINCCENT requested that the JCS provide guidance to allow both air refueling training and operational support of Allied receiver aircraft. In November, the JCS authorized USCINCCENT to conduct air refueling operations with aircraft of Allied, GCC, and friendly nations in order to meet Desert Shield operational requirements. The following guidance was provided: 1. Potential liabilities must be addressed through a memorandum of understanding or other acceptable agreement. 2. Qualification/currency, briefings, and inflight procedures must be in accordance with Air Force regulations and manuals. 3. Allied forces must pay for U.S.-owned fuel offloaded to Allied aircraft. After the JCS authorized Allied air refueling, USCENTAF began limited air refueling operations with Allied receivers who had not been previously cleared. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) issued a limited air refueling clearance for the Omani Jaguar and Egyptian/UAE Mirage 2000 on the basis of technical assessments. These receivers were restricted to eighty percent fuel capacity because of incomplete data on their fuel systems. Additionally, the receivers were restricted to daytime air refueling because of their inadequate aircraft lighting. ASD issued an unrestricted clearance for the Italian IDS Tornado on the basis of previous flight test results provided the identical German IDS Tornado and unrestricted air refueling were involved in the tests. The initial assessment of the British VC‑10 required inflight testing. Flight testing was never initiated and VC‑10/USAF tanker air refueling was never conducted.425 Allied Interoperability The restrictions and delays involved in certifying Allied receivers and conducting subsequent air refueling operations impaired SAC's ability to provide timely support of joint and combined contingency operations. The FMS process is slow and requires Allied governments to pay all costs associated with the certification effort, even though certification is mutually beneficial. Coalition air warfare would have been better served if certification and training efforts of Allied receivers had been conducted in peacetime. Air refueling support of Coalition forces is vital if Coalition allies are going to play a major role in the next air campaign. The Air Force should pursue certification of Allied receiver aircraft, particularly French and British, to ensure interoperability in a future crisis. Fuels: JP‑5 Versus Jet A‑1 The U.S. Navy uses JP-5 fuel, which has a less volatile flashpoint than Jet A-1, the fuel used predominantly by the U.S. Air Force during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The less volatile JP-5 meets U.S. Navy carrier operation safety standards whereas Jet A-1 does not. Concentrated efforts to fulfill requests for JP‑5 to Navy aircraft were often negated by operational realities. In several instances, requests for Navy support were received too late to purge tanks and load JP‑5. Jet A‑1 was available at all locations within the AOR. However, Al Dhafra and Cairo West, which provided significant naval support, did not have a supply of JP-5. Logistically, JP‑5 was difficult to provide because it had to be trucked in from Alexandria and offloaded where tankers were located. Stock on hand was supplemented by establishing bladders, but the real limitation was resupply timewhich dropped to less than a day at some locations during the height of the air war. A supply of JP-5 was introduced in the theater for the air refueling of carrier-based aircraft. JP‑5 was available at Seeb and later at Jeddah. Operationally, Navy receivers onloaded any type of jet fuel available, including Jet A-1; then, if necessary, they corrected the flash point problem once back on the carrier (i.e., they dumped it over the side). The use of various fuels [Jet A‑1 (JP‑8), JP‑4, JP‑5] is a safety issue on the agenda of the Navy-Air Force Board as well as a concern of the Environmental Protection Agency, which prefers Jet A‑1 because it evaporates faster. The National Transportation Safety Board is also involved and prefers JP‑5 because of its greater safety margin. Summary Desert Shield and Desert Storm refocused attention on the tremendous value and contribution of the tanker force to U.S. and Allied worldwide military operations. U.S. tankers refueled both U.S. and Allied receivers using boom/receptacle and probe/drogue configurations. At first, receiver certification and other legal issues limited U.S. tankers in providing international refueling support. Then, flexibility in tanker-receiver scheduling was increased through extensive training efforts during Desert Shield. Differences in fuel requirements posed some problems and specific fuel requests could not always be supported. Tanker placement in theater often made economic transport of some fuels to specific operating locations difficult, particularly on short notice. Multipoint refueling capability could have enhanced scheduling flexibility in a few situations; however, the tanker force, as configured, was able to support the air operations successfully, both in theater and between the CONUS and Southwest Asia. It is imperative that tanker aircrews, as well as their command and planning staffs, continue to receive training that includes worldwide operations. 25 Mar 93‑‑changed header and footer, incorporated declass changes, put in single space. CeCe 6 Arming the Force The Munitions Story in Desert Shield and Desert Storm At the start of Desert Shield, a few older technology munitions were prepositioned in the area of responsibility (AOR). However, they were not at the location of the arriving operational units, and little airlift was available to move them. Total munitions requirements were unknown at that time because no agreed-to plan existed, and the size and mission of the force was changing rapidly. The movement of additional munitions to the AOR relied on a transportation system already heavily taxed with moving the operational units, and few places were available to store the munitions once they arrived in the AOR. These were the challenges facing men and women involved in arming the force. After the war, General Horner described the situation as: Initially our biggest problems from a logistics standpoint were munitions, fuels and bare base . . . but these were caused by the speed with which our fighter units deployed. We began the deployment under the auspices of one plan, . . . within the first day we switched to a second plan . . . and then abandoned all previously developed contingency plans and constructed one as we went along.426 Some 5,500 Air Force munitions personnel deployed in the AOR, and nearly 18,000 munitions personnel throughout the Air Force ultimately supported the Gulf War activity.427 The Air Force alone used over thirty kinds of munitions in Operation Desert Storm. U. S. Naval Air used nine varieties, and U. S. Army aviation units added thirteen to U. S. totals. Coalition air forces additionally employed some twenty-six unique types of their own munitions. Munitions is a collective term that includes: bombs, “dumb” or conventional unguided bombs, cluster bomb units, “smart” or precision-guided munitions, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, and special operations munitions. A great variety of specific nomenclature, such as MK-82 and M117, was involved, and the nomenclature is essential to a description of the complexity of arming the force. Therefore, Table 18 provides a brief description along with common government nomenclature of munitions items that were used against Iraqi targets during Operation Desert Storm. Table 18 Munitions Nomenclature and Description General Item Description Designation Comments Air-To-Air AIM-7 Radar Missiles AIM-9 Infrared
Missiles AGM-65 Maverick AGM-88 Harm antiradiation
ammunition 30 mm Gun GAU-8 Avenger Cannon ammunition General Purpose MK-82 Low Drag 500-pound MK-83 Low Drag 1,000-pound MK-84 Low Drag 2,000-pound
altitude delivery MK-84 Air Retard 2,000-lb high speed, low altitude delivery M117 bombs 750-lb Low Drag M117 Air Retard 750-lb high speed, low altitude delivery
(CBUs) CBU-58 Incendiary/frag bomblets CBU-71 Incendiary/frag bomblets CBU-87 Light armor/anti-personnel CBU-89 Antitank/antipersonnel
Combined Effects Munitions (CEMs) Rockeye MK-20 Anti-armor cluster bomb Precision-Guided Munitions GBU-10 MK-84, 2,000-pound (PGMs) also called laser- w/laser guidance and control guided bombs (LGBs) GBU-12 MK-82, 500-pound w/laser guidance and control GBU-10 (I-2000) BLU-109 w/improved penetration GBU-24 MK-84 low-level laser guidance GBU-27 BLU-109 for F-117A GBU-28 Hard target penetrating munition
GBU-15 Modular guided with either electro-optical or infrared capabilities
Cruise Missile missile w/conv warhead UK-1000 UK-1000 Runway cratering bomb built by British Background The munitions support story for Desert Shield and Desert Storm begins during the Carter Administration. In 1979, President Carter announced the doctrine of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to be used to meet contingencies anywhere in the world. The announcement signalled the start of policy development and programmatic actions that ultimately led to negotiations with the Omani Government establishing munitions storage depots in that nation and at Diego Garcia, a British-owned island in the Indian Ocean about 3,000 miles from the AOR. The Air Force was tasked to identify munitions stocks for the storage areas.428 The first U.S. Air Force munitions were positioned and stored in the Persian Gulf in support of Central Command (CENTCOM) missions in October 1983. These were existing munitions, since new funds had not been appropriated for additional munitions stocks for that theater.429 As a result of State and Defense Department negotiations with the Omani government, three munitions depots were established at Thumrait, Seeb, and the former Royal Air Force post at Masirah.430 Initial munitions for the new depots came from excess stocks of the primary warfighting commands, U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) and U.S. Air Force Pacific (PACAF), and thus did not include “preferred” munitions. Also, the State Department and the Defense Department jointly decided that the latest technology weapons would not be placed in the Persian Gulf region for security and safety reasons.431 The Reagan and Bush administrations continued and expanded the RDF doctrine for the Persian Gulf region with the advent of Afloat Prepositioned Ships in Southwest Asia. The ships were to be loaded with both Army and Air Force munitions stocks when the Congress approved funding. Directory: sgp -> library sgp -> Sgp country Programme Strategy for op6 sgp -> Itu-d study groups sgp -> Internship with Congressional Campaign Exploratory Committee — Only 4 spots left! sgp -> Using Well Logs in the Petroleum Industry sgp -> Telecommunication development bureau itu-d study groups Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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