Gulf War Air Power Survey



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Gulf War
Air Power Survey

Volume III
Logistics
and
Support

Washington, D.C.

1993

Gulf War Air Power Survey
Staff

Dr. Eliot A. Cohen, Director

Col. Emery M. Kiraly Executive Director

Lt. Gen. Robert Kelley Senior Military Advisor

(Retired, USAF)

Dr. Wayne Thompson Senior Historical Advisor

Mr. Ernie Cruea ANSER Program Manager

Maj. Joe Patterson, Executive Officer

Mr. Lawrence J. Paszek Publishing Manager

Lt. Col. Dan Kuehl Chief, Statistics

Lt. Col. Robert C. Owen Chief, Chronology

Dr. John Guilmartin Chief, Weapons, Tactics and Training

Mr. Richard Gunkel Chief, Logistics, Space, and Support

Dr. Thomas Hone Chief, Command, Control, and Organization

Dr. Alexander S. Cochran Chief, Strategy and

Plans

Mr. Barry Watts Chief, Operations and



Effects

Dr. Thomas Keaney Chief, Summary Report


Gulf War Air Power Survey
Review Committee

Hon. Paul H. Nitze, Chairman

Diplomat in Residence

Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies


Gen. Michael J. Dugan (USAF, Retired)

Multiple Sclerosis Society


Adm. Huntington Hardisty (USN, Retired)

Center for Naval Analyses


Dr. Richard H. Kohn

The University of North Carolina

at Chapel Hill
Dr. Bernard Lewis

Princeton University


Mr. Andrew W. Marshall

Office of the Secretary of Defense


Mr. Phillip Merrill

Former Assistant Secretary General

for Defense Support, NATO
Dr. Henry Rowen

Stanford University


Hon. Ike Skelton

U.S. House of Representatives


Gen. Maxwell Thurman (USA, Retired)

Association of the U.S. Army


Maj. Gen. Jasper A. Welch, Jr. (USAF, Retired)

Former Assistant Chief of Staff (Studies

and Analysis)
Dr. James Q. Wilson

University of California at Los Angeles



Foreword

From 16 January through 28 February 1991, the United States and its allies conducted one of the most operationally successful wars in history, a conflict in which air operations played a preeminent role. The Gulf War Air Power Survey was commissioned on 22 August 1991 to review all as­pects of air warfare in the Persian Gulf for use by the United States Air Force, but it was not to confine itself to discussion of that institution. The Survey has produced reports on planning, the conduct of opera­tions, the effects of the air cam­paign, command and control, logis­tics, air base support, space, weapons and tactics, as well as a chronolo­gy and a com­pendium of statistics on the war. It has prepared as well a summa­ry report and some shorter papers and assembled an archive composed of paper, micro­film, and electron­ic records, all of which have been depos­ited at the Air Force Historical Research Age­ncy at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala­bama. The Survey was just that, an attempt to provide a com­prehen­sive and documented account of the war. It is not a definitive history: that will await the passage of time and the ope­ning of sources (Iraqi records, for example) that were not avai­lable to Survey researchers. Nor is it a sum­mary of lessons learned: other organizations, in­cluding many within the Air Force, have already done that. Rather, the Survey provides an analyti­cal and evidentiary point of departure for future studies of the air cam­paign. It concentrates on an analysis of the opera­tion­al level of war in the belief that this level of war­fare is at once one of the most difficult to character­ize and one of the most important to under­stand.


The Survey was directed by Dr. Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopk­ins University's School of Advanced International Studies and was staffed by a mixture of civilian and military analysts, including retired officers from the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. It was di­vided into task forces, most of which were run by civil­ians working tempo­rarily for the Air Force. The work produced by the Surve­y was examined by a dis­tin­guished review com­mittee that included schol­ars, retired gen­eral officers from the Air Force, Navy, and Army, as well as former and current senior gov­ernment officials. Throug­hout, the Survey strived to conduct its re­search in a spirit of impartiality and scholarly rigor. Its members had as their standard the observation of Mr. Franklin D'Olier, chair­man of the United States Strategic Bom­bing Survey during and after the second World War: "We wanted to burn into everybody's souls that fact that the survey's responsi­bility . . . was to ascer­tain facts and to seek truth, elimi­nating completely any precon­ceived theories or dogmas."
The Survey attempted to create a body of data common to all of the reports. Because one group of researchers compiled this core material while other task forces were researching and drafting other, more narrow­ly focused studies, it is possible that discrepancies exist among the reports with regard to points of detail. More importantly, authors were given discretion, within the bounds of evidence and plausibility, to inter­pret events as they saw them. In some cases, task forces came to differ­ing conclusions about particular aspects of this war. Such divergences of view were expected and even desired: the Survey was intended to serve as a point of departure for those who read its reports, and not their ana­lyti­cal terminus.
This volume concentrates on direct as well as indirect support re­quired to conduct air operations. The first report, Logis­tics, is primarily concerned with overall logistics plan­ning, supply and mainte­nance of the force, and its transportation neces­sary for war. The second report, Sup­port, con­cerns itself with the air base and airbase operations (e.g., civil engineer­ing, services, and person­nel). This is the dual theme of the volume.





Acknowledgments

The Survey's members owe a great debt of gratitude to Secre­tary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice, who conceived of the pro­ject, provid­ed it with resources, and set for it the highest standards of indepen­dence and objectivity. Many organizations and individuals gave gen­erously of their resources and time to support this effort. Various branc­hes and com­mands of the Air Force were particularly helpful in provid­ing material for and, in some cases, personnel to con­duct the study. The United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Army aided with this study in different ways, including the sharing of data pertain­ing to the air war. A number of the United States' Coalition partners also made available individuals and records that were vital to the Surv­ey's work. Many participants in the war, including senior political officials and officers from all of the Servic­es were willing to speak with the Survey and share their recollections of Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Private students of the Gulf War also made available their knowledge of the crisis and conflict. Wherever possible and appropriate such assistance has been acknowledged in the text.


The Survey's independence was its reason for being. Each report is the product of the authors who wrote it and does not necessarily rep­resent the views of the Review Committee, the Air Force or the De­part­ment of Defense.

Security Review

The Gulf War Air Power Survey reports were submitted to the Department of Defense for policy and security review. In accor­dance with this re­view, certain information has been re­moved from the original text. These areas have been annotated as [DE­LETED].




Gulf War Air Power Survey

Reports

Summary Report

Volume I:

Part I: Planning Report
Part II: Command and Control Report
Volume II:

Part I: Operations Report
Part II: Effectiveness Report
Volume III:

Part I: Logistics Report
Part II: Support Report
Volume IV:

Part I: Weapons, Tactics,

and Training Report


Part II: Space Report
Volume V:

Part I: A Statistical Compendium
Part II: Chronology

Contents

Foreword v


Acknowledgements vii
Security Review viii
List of Reports ix
Part I: Logistics
Index to Logistics Report
Part II: Support
Index to Support Report
Glossary

(Note: Each of the two reports retained pagination independent of the other. Accordingly, the table of contents for each report accompanies each report independently of this table of contents).


Part I
Logistics


Task Force Chief
Mr. Richard A. Gunkel

Principal Author
Mr. Richard L. Olson

Contributing Authors
Mr. Roger K. Coffey

Mr. Francis E. Cartwright

Mr. Dennis K. Dakan

Maj. Daniel L. Draper

Mr. James A. Forbes

Lt. Col. Constance D. Graham

Mr. John W. Schade

Maj. Gen. Click D. Smith, Jr. (Retired, USAF)




Contents
Report Acknowledgements xiii
Introduction xv
1 Logistics of the Gulf War 1
2 Preparation for a Southwest Asia Contingency 27
3 Deploying to the Theater 81
4 Intra-Theater Airlift 141
Appendix 4-A: Theater Prepositioned Equipment 169
Appendix 4-B: Theater Airlift Management 171
Appendix 4-C: Definition of Provisional Units Terms 175
5 Air Refueling 177
6 Arming the Force 221
7 Supplying the Force 259
8 Maintaining the Force 307
Appendix 8-A: Summary of Gulf Conflict

U.S. Air Force Battle Damage and Repair 365


Appendix 8-B: AOR Maintenance Population Analysis 373
9 Logistics Performance 381
Index 395
Tables
1 United States Air Force Aircraft Inventory versus

Quantity Committed to Gulf War 29


2 Air Force Active Basing Structure 36
3 Civil Air Carrier Volunteers Before CRAF

Stage I Activation 44


4 Aircrews Available for Desert Shield

on 2 August 1990 44


5 Worldwide Status of Prepositioning 46
6 Harvest Falcon Storage 47
7 Coronet Warrior Exercises Expected and Actual Number

of Fully Mission-Capable Aircraft 67


8 WMP-3 Forces Available for Regional Plan 1990

CENTCOM Region 69
9 Rated Air Force Units 73
10 Measured Area Summaries 73
11 Airlift Forces Beddown 146
12 Cumulative Desert Shield Totals 180
13 Cumulative Desert Storm Totals 181
14 Tanker Deployment at the Peak of Desert Storm 181
15 Total USAF Refueling Events and Receiver Onloads 183
16 Average Daily Air Refueling Statistics 199
17 Tanker Near Mid-Air Collisions 208
18 Munitions Nomenclature and Description 222
19 Munitions at Prepositioned Storage Locations 225
20 Critical Munitions Status, 10 August 1990 231
21 Munitions Requirements Growth 234
22 CENTAF Supply Support Activity Sites 276
23 Planned Versus Actual Supply Activities 283
24 CENTCOM Fuel Storage 287
25 Daily Requirements by Component 292
26 Daily Requirements by Product 292
27 Desert Storm Fuel Status 304
28 ILM (Avionics) Beddown 312
29 ILM (Engine) Beddown 313
30 Aircraft Battle Damage Repair Team Deployment 319
31 2951 Combat Logistics Support Squadron Deployment

to Desert Shield/Desert Storm 320


32 Queen Bee Engine Support 329
33 Intermediate-Level and Heavy-Maintenance Production

August 1990 - March 1991 335


34 C-5 Repairable Asset Flow Times 338
35 C-141 Repairable Asset Flow Times 339
36 Fully Mission-Capable Rates Compared 348
37 Rationale for Differences Between April 1990

OPLAN 1002-90 Assessment and Desert Shield/

Desert Storm Results 352


38 Summary Naval Aircraft Readiness Data 355
39 Percentage of Spare Parts on Hand During

Desert Shield/Desert Storm 355


40 Army Aviation Summary Mission Capability Data 356
41 Calculation of Expected Number of Maintenance

Personnel 375


42 Levels of War 382
43 Major Logistics Improvisations 390

Figures
1 USAF Fighter Aircraft: Type 1 Failures/Hour versus

Year of First Flight 31


2 Aircraft Spare Parts Funding FY 80-90 32
3 Exchangeable Repair Requirement/Funding FY 80-91 33
4 Tactical Operational Fighters Mission

Capability Rates 34


5 Munitions Funding FY 81-90 35
6 Deliberate Planning Process 52
7 Joint Planning Summary 55
8 Coronet Warrior 67
9 Lift Capability 76
10 Sustainability 77
11 Prepositioning 78
12 Desert Shield/Desert Storm MAC Missions

7 August 1990 - 10 March 1991 93


13 Desert Shield/Desert Storm MAC Cargo

7 August 1990 - 10 March 1991 93


14 Desert Shield/Desert Storm MAC Passengers

7 August 1990 - 10 March 1991 94


15 MAC Strategic Airlift Missions by Destination in AOR

August 1990 - February 1991 103


16 Mission-Capable (MC) Aircraft and Aircraft Flown

(Daily Averages) 105


17 Desert Shield/Desert Storm MAC Cargo:

Unit and Sustainment 112


18 NAVCENT Buildup: Fixed-Wing Aircraft 116
19 CENTAF Aircraft Beddown at End of Phase I 118
20 CENTAF Aircraft Beddown at End of Phase II 119
21 CENTAF Buildup: TAF Combat Aircraft 120
22 CENTAF Buildup: TAF Combat Support Aircraft 121
23 F-4G Air Refueling Track 124
24 CENTAF Buildup: SAC Aircraft 127
25 CENTAF Buildup: MAC Aircraft 135
26 CENTAF Buildup: AFSOF Aircraft 137
27 MARCENT Buildup: Fixed-Wing Aircraft 137
28 Coalition Member Aircraft 138
29 MAC Strategic Airlift Sorties by Aerial Ports of

Debarkation (Aug 90 - Feb 91) 142


30 Aerial Ports of Debarkation and

Prepositioning Sites 143


31 Tactical Airlift Forces Beddown Locations 145
32 Airlift Organizations, Bases, and Units 149
33 Camel and Star Routes 152
34 Theater Main Supply Routes and Logistics Bases 155
35 Principal NAVCENT Logistics Bases 157
36 MARCENT Area 161
37 Aeromedical Evacuation 162
38 Atlantic Bridge Air Refueling 190
39 Tanker Beddown in the AOR 195
40 Air Refueling Tracks and Anchors 198
41 KC-135s Deployed from CONUS 200
42 Air Refueling Sorties Flown 201
43 Munitions Storage Locations Prior to Operation

Desert Shield 227


44 United States Munitions Storage and Port Locations 238
45 Total Munitions Deployed 238
46 Munitions Storage Locations, 16 January 1991 240
47 AIM-7M Sparrow Missile 251
48 AIM-9M Sidewinder Missile 252
49 MK-82 Low- and High-Drag 500-Pound Bomb 252
50 M117 (750-Pound) 253
51 MK-84 (2,000-Pound Low- and High-Drag Bomb) 253
52 AGM-65 Series Maverick Missile 254
53 GBU-10 (Improved 2,000-Pound Bomb) 254
54 GBU-12 (500-Pound PGM) 255
55 GBU-24 (Improved 2,000-Pound Bomb 255
56 GBU-27 (2,000-Pound PGM for F-117A) 256
57 CBU-52/58/71 (Cluster Bomb Units) 256
58 CBU-87 (Combined Effects Munition) 257
59 CBU-89 (Gator Antitank Munition) 257
60 Desert Shield and Desert Storm Aircraft Status 260
61 CENTAF Supply Support Activity Configuration 275
62 DFSC Fuel Locations 288
63 ABDR Events by Aircraft Type 321
64 Damage Areas 321
65 Aircraft Battle Damage Repair Time 323
66 A-10 Aircraft Battle Damage Repair 323
67 MAC Maintenance Cycles 337
68 Surge Requirements and Production (Cumulative) 342
69 F-16 FMC Rate 347
70 F-15 Break and Fix Rates 350
71 Maintenance Population by Month 358
72 Maintenance Personnel by Base and Month 359
73 Maintenance Personnel: Planned vs Actual 362
74 Maintenance Footprint Analysis 374
75 Munitions Posture 387

Report Acknowledgements
The survey of logistics in the Gulf War brought together a formi­dable team with expertise that crossed every avenue of transporta­tion, supply, maintenance, and the myriad aspects of logistics planning and coor­dination. Mr. Richard Gunkel was the Logistics, Sup­port, and Space Task Force Leader, and Richard Olson led the authoring and development of the logis­tics report. The authors' efforts to sift, sort, analyze, and inter­pret were com­plemented by innumer­able contributions of members on the Air Staff, at MAJCOMs, and in base-level orga­nizations who man­aged and fought both within and outside the CENTCOM Area of Re­spon­si­bility and who shared their experiences for the bene­fit of those who follow. The study director, Dr. Eliot Cohen, provided a major challenge with his constant urging to describe the essence of logistics without turning the "hapless reader" into a techni­cian.
The authors met the challenge through a the­matic ap­proach by providing answers to questions of what hap­pened. The basis for the story was laid in describing preparations for the war by Connie Gra­ham, who provided new and original insights to the problems of theater logistics. Frank Cartwright pro­vided special expertise on material might that could be focused in building a foundation for the conflict. Roger Coffey brought first-hand airlift experi­ence to the description of deployment and position­ing the force. Click Smith described the in-the­ater transporta­tion and opera­tional sup­port with a special under­stan­ding of management and practice. Daniel Draper not only covered fuels, aerial refueling, as well as ground refueling, but brought reflections garnered from long hours in the Air Staff Logis­tics Readiness Center during the conflict. Dennis Dakan pro­vided notable expertise to the essential aspects of muni­tions and arming the force. John Schade's intimate under­standing of whole­sale and retail supply provides keen insights to a mas­sive under­tak­ing of provisio­ning. Jim Forbes, penetrating analysis tran­scended the whole of the Logis­tics survey to describe maintenance ac­com­plishments.
Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Anthony J. Burshnick contributed significantly through his introspective critiques of organization and content. Mr Alan P. Heffer­nan deserves real thanks for solv­ing automation challeng­es; Ms. Anne H. Predzin accom­plished inspired editing by reining in our propen­sity to be too technical; and Ms. Barbara L. Gardien brought imagi­native style for layout and design. The anchor in the process, from the beginning to the end, was Ms. Cecelia French, whose immea­surable support with answers, typing, organizing, and retyping sus­tained us with her energy.
Introduction

This report discusses logistics in the Persian Gulf War as it applies to all military operations and in particular to air operations. Simply put, how did the United States equip its forces for Desert Shield and Desert Storm? Logistics also includes functions for maintaining an air base and support services. These aspects of logistics will be covered in the two parts of this volume.


One of the simpler, but nonetheless compre­hen­sive, defini­tions of logistics was documented by Baron Antoine Henri Jomini subse­quent to the Napoleonic Wars, when he defined logistics as the "practical art of moving ar­mies."1 A Joint Chiefs of Staff definition expands on Jomini's version, express­ing logistics as
The science of planning and carrying out the mov­ement and mainte­nance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and devel­opment, acqui­sition, storage, movement, distribu­tion, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. move­ment, evacuation, and hospital­ization of personnel; c. acquisi­tion, or construc­tion, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnish­ing of services. 2
The Gulf War encompassed all of these aspects of logistics, and did so on a grand scale. One of the main reasons for suc­cess in this conflict was the ability of the U.S. military to re­spond logisti­callyto move, beddown, and sustain the combat forces. The prima­ry focus of our survey was to examine airpower applica­tion in a theater devoid of prior operational presence. This unique environment presented air­power man­ag­ers with severe challenges to assure efficient and effective applica­tion of combat force. We examine the state of logistics prior to the con­flict, the charac­teristics of planning, the efforts to put combat and support elements in place, the support of air operations during com­bat; and in partic­ular, how planners envi­sioned the role of logistics in supporting air forces to achieve Coalition objectives and execute military strategy.
We structured several specific themes in framing our review. Some of them sur­faced late in the 1970s after Viet­nam, and some were still pon­dered as the air campaign unfolded in January 1991. First is the nature and substance of the predeployment plan­ning and prepara­tion. A massive resource base, vastly expanded in prepara­tion for a global con­flict with the Soviets, served as a basis. How did this mass play in the Gulf conflict? Where was the mass? All of the forces and most of the assets required in the Middle East had to be moved into position. Mov­ing required lift resources as well as time. What then was the signif­i­cance of five and a half months to position, to set up, to orga­nize, to gain efficiency, and to train for what was to be accomplished?
A second theme focuses on planning that had been formulat­ed, al­though a current, approved, and detailed plan did not exist. What was the evolu­tion from the planning that existed, and what was the character of execu­tion actions that took place in establishing the Desert Storm support structure of January 1991? Research showed that, for this theater, logis­tics operat­ed without confirmation of priorities and with insufficient details to deploy effi­ciently. Was that impor­tant? If so, how were prob­lems corrected? Our examination of Gulf War planning and execution con­firms that the unique mis­sions and institutionalized support processes of the major com­mands produced individualized support and organiza­tional struc­tures. How did these unique structures make a difference, if at all? This theme also addresses the level of chaos that existed, the improvisation that ensued, and the degree to which readiness and sustain­ability were affected.
A third theme concerns the degree to which com­mand and control affected basic logistics concepts of operation. How did automated systems and equipment designed for de­ployed operations perform where called upon? To what extent were pace and effectiveness of specific logistics operations tied to availability of information process­ing and the accessi­bility of in-theater and global communications? Was informa­tion avail­able outside the area of responsibility to provide necessary assistance and sup­port?
Interwoven with these themes are some other fairly impor­tant ques­tions. For example: Did the desert envi­ronment present unique prob­lems? What were the relationships among the Services, and how were joint responsibilities for logis­tics in the theater assigned and accom­plish­ed? Since Gulf‑r­elated logistical efforts drained resources from other theaters, what were the airpower impacts outside of the Gulf War? How well were the forces prepared? What was the impact of precri­ses training on Gulf War logistics? Many examples show that training prac­tices and exercises prepared the United States well for the Desert Shield/Desert Storm task. At the same time, there are also exam­ples illustrating how lack of realistic conditions or overscripting of train­ing and exer­cise scen­arios masked problems later confronted in the Gulf. This is especially true for many areas of logistics.
As these themes suggest, the first report is focused on the sub­stance and process of the plan and the benefits of a robust resource base, as well as the innovation required to respond to unforeseen contin­gencies as they arose. The themes are addressed within the follow­ing structure.

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