Figure 8
Coronet Warrior
11
Table 7
Coronet Warrior Exercises
Expected and Actual Number of
Fully Mission-Capable (FMC) Aircraft
Coronet
Warrior
|
Predicted FMC Aircraft at the End of 30 days
|
Actual FMC
Aircraft
|
I (F-15, 1987)
|
4
|
17
|
II (F-16, 1988)
|
14
|
21
|
III (A-10, 1989)
|
18
|
27
|
Within CENTCOM, Exercise Internal Look was a command post computer-based exercise held in early July 1990 at Eglin AFB in Florida. Internal Look's scenario was an invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by an unnamed country from the north. Although military forces were not involved, the exercise provided “significant information on the flow, reception and beddown of U.S. air and ground forces in the AOR.”119 Internal Look was designed to test the operational concept of USCINCCENT 1002-90 and the outcome was timely and beneficial by testing the feasibility of 1002-90. In fact, while the plan had not been officially validated by the JCS, it was so organized and so specific in the requirements that its implementation would be a relatively easy matter.120
Assessments
The unit readiness assessment reporting system was called SORTS-the Status of Resources and Training System. Active and ARC unit commanders were required to assess their unit capabilities based on wartime tasking. SORTS was a method by which higher headquarters and the Joint Chiefs of Staff could determine which organizations were combat ready, were converting to another weapons system and therefore unavailable for tasking, and had readiness or training problems. SORTS required each unit commander to assess his readiness by comparing fully trained personnel, aircraft in commission, and personnel and equipment levels with certain standards. The standard for each unit was the most stringent designed operational capability (DOC).121 The commanders were required to assign C-ratings that reflected their best judgment of their capability to go to war. The commanders then sent the C-ratings, along with associated data to the JCS. Theoretically, SORTs would provide an accurate picture of the readiness of each unit.122 The following tables show the resources available to CENTCOM in 1990 along with their readiness ratings. Table 8 summarizes SORTS readiness ratings of seventy flying organizations.
Table 8
WMP-3 Forces Available for Regional Plan 1990
CENTCOM Region
And C-Rating for July 1990 compared to total MDS Rating Having C-1
|
MDS
|
PAA
|
UTC
|
Unit
|
Location
|
C-RAT
|
MDS
|
[DELETED]
Table 8 (Continued)
WMP-3 Forces Available for Regional Plan 1990
CENTCOM Region
And C-Rating for July 1990 compared to total MDS Rating Having C-1
|
MDS
|
PAA
|
UTC
|
Unit
|
Location
|
C-RAT
|
MDS
|
[DELETED]
Table 8 (Continued)
WMP-3 Forces Available for Regional Plan 1990
CENTCOM Region
And C-Rating for July 1990 compared to total MDS Rating Having C-1
|
MDS
|
PAA
|
UTC
|
Unit
|
Location
|
C-RAT
|
MDS
|
[DELETED]
Table 8 (Continued)
WMP-3 Forces Available for Regional Plan 1990
CENTCOM Region
And C-Rating for July 1990 compared to total MDS Rating Having C-1
|
MDS
|
PAA
|
UTC
|
Unit
|
Location
|
C-RAT
|
MDS
|
[DELETED]
Table 9 illustrates that in July 1990, the percent of flying units claiming C-1 status was sixty-nine percent.
Table 9
Rated Air Force Units
Rating
|
C-1
|
C-2
|
C-3
|
C-4
|
Number
|
582
|
159
|
97
|
5
|
Percent
|
69
|
19
|
12
|
1
|
The next table provides the July 1990 ratings for specific areas of personnel, supplies, equipment condition, and training.
Table 10
Measured Area Summaries
|
Personnel
|
Supplies
|
Condition
|
Training
|
C-1
|
721 (86%)
|
524 (64%)
|
699 (84%)
|
702 (84%)
|
C-2
|
104 (12%)
|
205 (25%)
|
123 (15%)
|
79 (9%)
|
C-3
|
7 (1%)
|
79 (10%)
|
7 (1%)
|
53 (6%)
|
C-4
|
0 (0%)
|
13 (2%)
|
0 (0%)
|
3 ( 0.3%)
|
SORTS was an ongoing, quite detailed, and fairly mechanical assessment process.
Command Assessments
The CINCs, on a yearly basis, also assessed readiness. General Johnson, who was CINCMAC and CINCTRANS, provided a TRANSCOM Preparedness Assessment Report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1989. This report was nearly identical to that of his predecessor in the preceding year.123
General Johnson assessed TRANSCOM as “Only Marginally prepared” to perform its mission, because all CINC operational plans were constrained by transportation. Some command plans were considered “grossly feasible” for transportation because planning estimates made adjustments for what was possible within lift and force constraints. Other plans were not adjusted and command assessments found “dramatic shortages in lift.”124
In TRANSCOM, lift concerns were divided into two categories, air and sea. It was pointed out that sealift suffered from a lack of a national policy and strategy to provide a viable U.S. maritime capability.125 Support for this rationale was the large percentage of sealift to be obtained through the civilian National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). A comparable analogy would be to have most of the Military Airlift Command's potential assets in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet. There were also concerns expressed about NDRF and RRF deterioration.
For airlift, it was noted an overall improvement in ton-mile capability had been realized, but the Military Airlift Command had still been unable to meet strategic airlift objectives. The CINCTRANS advocated acquisition of the C-17 as a solution to airlift needs.126 Another part of the TRANSCOM assessment noted the improvement of airlift command and control capability. To improve information support, however, funding was required for further Joint Operations Planning and Execution System updates.127 A major decline was noted in the number of trained pilots and merchant mariners. They lacked chemical/biological defensive protection, which further limited their capability. Finally, assessments indicated that the amount of prepositioned fuel in the AOR for jet aircraft was insufficient and posed a serious deficiency in strategic airlift capability.
CENTCOM assessments highlighted lift, sustainability, and communications issues as vital to successful defense of Southwest Asia. Examples were given by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USCINCCENT, when he presented his assessment of CENTCOM capabilities to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on 20 April 1989. These statements served as background for his 1990 budget submissions. While Gen. Schwarzkopf did not identify unit readiness problems, the status of other significant factors were of serious concern.128
CENTCOM assessments projected a shortfall in sealift and airlift that complemented the concerns of TRANSCOM. (Figure 9 illustrates lift resources.)129 It was estimated that CENTCOM planned deployments would use fifty percent of the 66 million ton-miles per day goal, even though only seventeen percent of the national force would be deployed to SWA. The large lift demand was exacerbated by the great distances involved. The CENTCOM assessment of sealift showed that only eighty-nine percent of the sealift requirements were available to move a million short tons of equipment to Southwest Asia within ninety days. It was further noted that because of the weight and cube of units and supplies, ninety percent of CENTCOM's requirements were expected to go by sealift. There were major concerns about the sealift shortfall as opposed to the airlift differences, since no projected long-term fix was available for sealift shortages.130
Due to strong congressional support for military construction (MILCON), much progress had been made in alleviating facilities shortfalls. From a CENTCOM view, the FY 88 program largely completed requirements at Diego Garcia and allowed a steady improvement in the prepositioning posture of the Gulf region. The proposed 1990 MILCON program had six projects totalling $53 million, which were to allow airfield deficiencies to be corrected at two strategic locations, and additional warehouses to be built for Army and Air Force needs. Additional hydrant fueling upgrades at Lajes would improve a critical strategic airlift and deployment enroute support location. In general terms, Central Command had reduced its facility deficit, which once stood at $1.4 billion to $200 million by the end of 1990.131
Figure 9
Lift Capability
12
CINCCENT defined sustainability as staying power, once a military force is deployed. The CENTCOM assessment indicated that there were shortages of major end items, medical supplies, repair parts, bulk petroleum, preferred munitions, and air-to-air missiles (Figure 10). A major shortcoming was a projected seventy percent shortfall in adequate medical facilities and equipment.132 Another area of concern was logistics over the shore (LOTS) capabilitythe ability to load, offload, and transfer equipment and supplies from ship to shore. The indicated capability was 9,800 short tons per day against the goal of 21,000 short tons per day.
Figure 10
Sustainability
13
On-going efforts were geared to improve CENTCOM's prepositioning posture by adding approximately 1.2 million square feet of storage space, 6,000 short tons of munitions, and 5 million barrels of petroleum.”133
In addition, prepositioning was employed to provide robust, survivable, theaterwide communications capability for effective command and control of assigned forces. Up to that time, the Defense Communications System Western edge had stopped at Turkey and the Eastern edge at the Philippines. CENTCOM, however, had successfully prepositioned equipment to support the Joint Task Force Middle East (JTFME) and United States embassies, among other units, in the AOR. The CENTCOM assessment presumed an actual deployment would be gradual and that the prepositioned equipment was located near planned communications sites.134
Figure 11
Prepositioning
14
War Games
In a prelude to the Gulf War, the Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare Studies developed a global war game scenario involving an invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in the year 1996. Saudi Arabia was threatened in this scenario, and the Saudis requested military assistance but did not offer access. Limited access was granted for tactical aircraft, the AWACS, tankers, and reconnaissance assets.135
The use of the time-versus-effectiveness quotient as a measure became a common thread in the exercise. Although economic measures were initiated early on in the crisis, the sanctions received only moderate support from the international community. Political considerations pro-
moted domestic and international support for overall U.S. objectives. Efforts to secure world cooperation became more difficult as the energy crisis continued.136
A key issue was the declaration of the national emergency and an associated partial mobilization of the reserves. Due to an increasing amount of combat, combat support, and combat service support being placed in the reserves:
[DELETED]137
The time-distance continuum was paramount to military options. Because the National Command Authority (NCA) did not decide to deploy military power immediately, Saudi oil production facilities could not be defended: this time-distance issue caused the CINC to reevaluate his course of action. [DELETED]138
Conclusions
Although preparation and planning efforts had been directed towards a rapidly diminishing Soviet threat, a war in the Persian Gulf area was
not unexpected. Due to political sensitivities, however, the United States was more constrained in this AOR than in most other theaters. Innovations and force multipliers were devised to offset this lack of presence. As an example, prepositioning of sustainment assets was designed to avoid approximately 10,000 airlift sorties.
CENTCOM and subordinate components were well aware of specific shortfalls in sustainment, lift, and impediments in force structure. Much of the logistics and lift support was available in the reserve components, and it was therefore imperative to mobilize those components early in the effort to allow CENTCOM plans to be viable. Although all similar conflict theaters rely on the military components to sustain operations, the Gulf theater required the entire force to “move in” before any operations could begin. The Army, in particular, would be hard pressed to provide theater support. Any war fought in CENTCOM's AOR would be fought under lean, austere conditions, and with a long logistics pipeline. Having completed a major global war game and Exercise Internal Look, in July, just before the Gulf War, the defense community was in the position to know that a gulf war would be a marathon and not a sprint. The exercises and war games had primed thinking for the Gulf War and provided opportunities to examine the “fitness” of the force. On the eve of the Gulf War, the United States was logistically prepared, albeit faced with a major challenge to transport the forces and support the operational campaign.
3
Deploying to the Theater
On 5 August 1990, Generals Schwarzkopf and Horner flew to Saudi Arabia as part of a team led by Secretary Cheney. There the team briefed Saudi officials, discussed deployment of U.S. forces, and worked out an agreement for those deployments. On 6 August, King Fahd formally requested U.S. help. Most of the team then returned to Washington. General Schwarzkopf would lead deployment execution from the continental United States (CONUS); General Horner, designated Central Command (CENTCOM) Forward Commander, remained behind to lead the effort in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR).139
The deployment wasn't a typical reinforcement of forward deployed forces; it was the movement of an entire fighting forceair, land, and seato an environment with many bare bases. The planning task was complicated by (at least) four additional significant factors.
First, there were no preexisting agreements for basing rights on the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations were somewhat reluctant initially, but they eventually approved basing of U.S. (and other allied) troops. Similarly, essential en route basing rights were not necessarily ensured. For example, before the invasion of Kuwait, Spain had authorized Strategic Air Command (SAC) basing for only five tankers (with five more allowed for short periods of training). On 8 August, Spain authorized basing for an additional ten, but ten was not enough to support upcoming fighter deployments. SAC advocated raising the total to fifty. On 17 August, following discussions with Air Force and State Department officials, Spain agreed to a total of thirty. Negotiating for bases and other support continued throughout Desert Shield and was often conducted on a case-by-case basis.140
Second, the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) file had not been developed for CENTCOM Operation Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90.141 Detailed transportation planning is accomplished during deliberate planning, where staffs for the supported Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and the Service components develop a flow of resources into the theater. If computer simulations indicate that forces and essential support cannot be moved to meet the CINC's timetable, planners revise forces, logistics, and transportation data until the TPFDD file supports a feasible and adequate OPLAN.142 TPFDD conferences for CENTCOM OPLAN 1002-90 were scheduled for November 1990 and February 1991, but they were, obviously, overtaken by events.143
Third, the Commander-in-Chief, Central Command's (CINCCENT's) preliminary force package overwhelmed MAC's airlift capability. On 3 August, General Schwarzkopf directed his staff to plan for an Army corps, a Marine Division, three carrier battle groups, the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing, and twelve follow-on fighter squadrons. The staff itself estimated that airlift requirements for the first few days exceeded MAC's organic airlift capability by a factor of six to seven.144
Finally, when faced with imminent combat, nobody wanted to “travel light.” Units rushed to enter deployment data into the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) database for Desert Shield. They started with what they already had, which in most cases was old information from old plans. As time passed, they tended to add to their deployment packages. Estimated airlift requirements for the first seven deploy-
units increased by sixty percent between 11 and 13 August. MAC had to schedule more sorties than originally planned for these units and delay airlift for follow‑on units.145
The deployment couldn't wait for these factors to be resolved, so CINCCENT presented Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) with a list of nine combat units to move. He wanted the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing and the 82d Airborne Division deployed first; the rest of the list was unprioritized. CENTCOM and its supporting commands set about the process of building a TPFDD file even as deployment was being executed. For the first week, the task was even more challenging. The initial deployment order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) did not allocate lift, so CENTCOM could not apportion lift to its supporting commands. TRANSCOM gave CENTCOM daily lift availability estimates until JCS began allocating lift on 13 August.146
CENTCOM planning cells started working on the TPFDD file in one-day and three-day increments. On 10 August, CENTCOM froze the TPFDD file for 12-17 August. For 18 August and beyond, CENTCOM froze the TPFDD files the preceding day. No changes greater than 2.5 tons or ten passengers were allowed without general officer approval. Even so, on 12 August, changes were still so numerous and frequent that JOPES operators could not maintain a current database. Nevertheless, planners had to continue. On 14 August, CENTCOM published a TPFDD file in enough detail to give TRANSCOM and MAC their first look at the full scope of the operation. CENTCOM acknowledged that its airlift requirements for 12‑15 August exceeded MAC's capability by 200-300 percent. In fact, CENTCOM airlift requirements continued to exceed MAC's capability for the first forty days.147
Problems keeping JOPES up to date can be attributed to several factors. The software was still under development, the system was not user friendly, and TPFDD preparation was a demanding process. Only a few operators were trained to use JOPES, and some became overwhelmed by the workload.148 And the workload was increased by the necessity to create new Unit Type Codes (UTCs) for the TPFDD file.149 Some units had to develop new UTCs because their deployments were not based on an existing OPLAN and TPFDD. Other units had to develop new UTCs because JOPES could not track partially deployed Unit Line Number (ULNs)JOPES considered a ULN either awaiting transportation or closed.150 As the deployment progressed, TRANSCOM directed MAC to give a unit only the airlift allocated by CENTCOM. Once the allocated airlift was used, a ULN was considered closed. Many units were not allocated enough airlift to move their complete deployment packages; they therefore created nonstandard UTCs to request airlift for the remaining passengers or cargo. Each nonstandard UTC had to be individually entered into the JOPES database, and detailed information was not available on the UTC's contents. Automatically tracking what was really deployed and what was left behind became impossible.151
Order came gradually. By 22 August, CENTCOM was able to validate requirements two to three days ahead. JOPES came back on line on 24 August. Around 28 August, the TPFDD was stable enough to use as a basis for planning, and JOPES could start being used for some of its
intended functions. On 10 September, airlift mission numbers could finally be matched against ULNs in the TPFDD.152
Executing the TPFDD necessitated obtaining diplomatic clearances for aircraft overflight and landing rights. The sudden increase in requests nearly overwhelmed the units that had to prepare the requests and the embassy staffs that received them. The process was expedited by international support for U.S. and Coalition action. Several key nations (France, Italy, Greece, and Egypt) en route to the Arabian Peninsula and on the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman) either issued blanket clearances or streamlined their procedures for granting permission to fly through their airspace.153 Switzerland and Austria also granted more frequent overflights. Later in the operation, several East European countries granted overflight rights.154 Thailand and India granted overflight rights for Desert Shield missions through the Pacific.155
Throughout the operation, Spain required individual clearance requests and standard lead times. For a time, France allowed into its airspace only two aircraft per hour departing from Rhein-Main. A “work action” in the Santa Maria Oceanic Control Zone (which included Lajes) slowed air traffic there. Italy required notice for any U.S. military flights through Sigonella.156
Germany restricted overflight and landing of munitions cargos to one ton per commercial flight and three tons per military flight. The German Government waived its restrictions for the first week of the surge, but
Spain had fewer restrictions overall; therefore, munitions were normally routed through Spain. Later in the operation, German authorities enforced noise abatement restrictions that limited twilight and night departures from several airfields. At civilian fields, departures to the AOR were limited because MAC had to share takeoff times with civil traffic.157
The Desert Shield deployment unfolded in two phases. Phase I lasted from 7 August until early November. It was designed to deploy enough forces to deter further Iraqi aggression, prepare for defensive operations, and conduct combined exercises and training with multinational forces. At the end of October, the President authorized building an offensive force capable of ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait with minimal U.S. and Coalition casualties. Phase II began on 8 November with the President's announcement that the United States would increase its presence in the theater by approximately 200,000 personnel.158
CINCCENT made a crucial decision early in Phase I. Because the Iraqis greatly outnumbered Coalition forces, he decided to accelerate deployment of antiarmor forces while delaying arrival of theater logistics forces and sustaining supplies. The decision placed arriving units in a somewhat precarious logistics position. Some ground combat units experienced supply shortages before the theater logistics structure matured in mid‑November. Phase II deployments saw a greater balance between combat forces and logistics support.159
The remainder of this chapter first describes MAC strategic airlift operations in support of deploying units from all U.S. military Services and then describes deployment of air power to the CENTCOM AOR. Deployment descriptions cover sea-based air power of the U.S. Navy and the land-based air power of the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Marine Corps, and Coalition allies.
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