Gulf War Air Power Survey
Figure 7 Joint Planning Summary
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- Planning for the Gulf War
- Concepts of Operation
- Logistics Support
- Responsibilities
- Fuels Support
- Comptroller Support
- Contracting Support
- Lines of Communication
- Exercises, Assessments, and War Games
Figure 7 Joint Planning Summary 10
The Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Version l, released in November 1989, was the first step toward a “true” joint operation planning and execution system. It started the process of bringing together the Joint Operational Planning System and the Joint Deployment System into a single system.96 It gave the user a single entry point to access either JOPS or JDS. Some JOPS files were on‑line, and there was one‑way interface between JOPS and JDS.97 JOPES Version 2, released in April 1990, made possible the crosslink between systems. It allowed users to sign on to one system (JOPS or JDS) and use data resident in the other, use applications programs in the other, or transfer control to the other without having to go through sign‑on/sign‑off procedures.98 Planning for the Gulf War In reality, crisis planning was used for the Gulf War because the actual situation differed substantially from the scenario postulated by the most recent planning for the area. Planning for the Gulf War was a challenge. CENTCOM's headquarters was thousands of miles from the theater. The Command had no standing forces or forward bases.99 The infrastructure of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) was intended to offset CENTCOM's adverse position of not having U.S. forward bases.100 A few key bases and airfields were available, but few formal country-to-country and host-nation agreements existed because of cultural reluctance to execute formal arrangements. In general, Arab nations were reluctant to allow permanent basing of U.S. forces within the AOR because they wished to keep non‑Arab influences at a minimum. Notable exceptions to this lack of presence were the long-established security assistance programs. Saudi Arabia and Egypt were two of our Nation's largest foreign military sales customers, and they were among our staunchest allies during the Gulf War. The Gulf States were blessed with abundant petroleum stores and the related income, leading to high standards of living. Local shops were well stocked with necessities and luxuries of great variety. Large pools of third-country nationals performed vital but menial services, and Saudi Arabia, in particular, was used to dealing with and supporting huge surges of exogenous population during holy seasons. Joint Logistics Doctrine, in draft format at the time of the conflict, stated: To exercise control at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war, commanders must also exercise control over logistics. For a given area and for a given mission, a single command authority should be responsible for logistics, especially in the joint operational environment. The logistics support system must be in harmony with the structure and employment of the combat forces it supports. This unity of effort is best attained under a single command authority...Commanders must be able to call forward in a timely manner those assets needed to initiate and sustain war.101 However, for reasons mentioned elsewhere in this report, CENTCOM theater logistics operations in support of available and draft plans were based on the premise that each service would train, equip, and sustain its own forces in the AOR.102 Common user support, (such as water, food, etc.) would be provided by the component having the greatest presence, which in most instances, was the Army.103 Host nations would also be called upon to provide support. The Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) maintained certain tools to use in planning for contingencies and executing war plans. The preparation of war plans was a cyclic process, and a plan was categorized and numbered on the basis of the theater, the threat, and the year. For example, U.S. Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command (USCINCCENT) OPLAN 1002-88 was the CENTCOM regional contingency involving Iran, while the USCINCCENT 1021-88 plan involved a global Soviet invasion of Iran. On 16 October 1989, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed CINCCENT to redirect planning from OPLAN 1021 (Soviet invasion of Iran) to a major revision of OPLAN 1002 (defense of the Arabian peninsula) with Iraq as the opponent. In November 1989, CINCCENT ordered the revision of 1002‑88 (Defense of the Arabian Peninsula). The first draft of the revised OPLAN was scheduled for completion in July 1990. On 16 April 1990, an outline plan for USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002‑90 (Operations to Counter an Intraregional Threat to the Arabian Peninsula) was published. The contingency embodied in the plan was an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The plan assumed [DELETED] warning and [DELETED] deployment time before the commencement of hostilities. The plan was completed in April 1991 (Draft USCINCCENT OPLAN 1002‑90 (S/NF), April 16, 1990). On the eve of the Gulf War, the second draft for OPLAN 1002-90 was circulating for comment. The plan was based on a regional conflict, did not involve the Soviets directly, and was to be executed with the assumption that all tasked forces would be available when required. It did not yet have a TPFDD. The TPFDD normally provides the deploying unit, the beddown location, and the supporting host. Because it was still in draft form, CENTAF had not developed its supporting plan.104 The Air Force was required to prepare several plans. MAC was tasked to prepare a plan in a supporting role context as one of the components of the mobility triad. CENTAF, a component of CENTCOM, was required to plan for its forces. SAC was originally tasked to prepare a supporting plan for managing and deploying its conventional forces, but over time, SAC forces were to “chop” to CENTAF. CENTAF was to provide for all forces under its immediate control plus support the Air Force component of Special Operation Forces (SOF). Concepts of Operation A review of OPLANs for the AOR indicates that the concepts of operation did not significantly differ logistically between versions. The basing might be different, or the numbers of aircraft might have varied, but the Air Force planned to support its units according to doctrine. A network of bare bases would be linked initially to homestation for support; each wing commander would make the decisions on support provided for the base. Follow-on support would be phased in as soon as possible. Aircraft maintenance was provided according to type of aircraft, but management was centralized at each base. The support concept was “remove and replace” for most aircraft and “remove, repair, and replace” for some. Basing The concept of theater support called for a network of bare bases with host wings predominating. These host wings would exercise authority over most functions for their respective locations. Host wings were required to support tenant wings and to prepare base support plans for bases to which they were deployed as hosts. The component headquarters staff, CENTAF, was very small and served primarily as advisor and monitor of functional areas. Most support would be initially furnished from homestation, but in any case, support remained linked to the CONUSthe reason why the lines of communication were of paramount importance. Although all plans assigned the lion's share of hosting responsibilities to 1 TFW (Tactical Fighter Wing) at Dhahran; other wings were also tasked to serve as hosts. Some air reserve wings were initially scheduled to host locations with active tenants. Many of those bases had no buildings suitable for air force base operations or for living arrangements. The concept of operations outlined in the basic plan stated that the Commander, Airlift Forces (COMALF), would establish an airlift control center (ALCC) at Dhahran, designate a host wing commander (for MAC forces) at a given base, and conduct intratheater airlift when directed. The Commander, Strategic Air Command was required to provide a Director of Strategic Forces (STRATFOR) and to designate host SAC wing commanders at two bases, usually Cairo IAP and Diego Garcia. Special equipment and portable facilities accommodating an austere desert environment were designed for CENTAF; they were called Harvest Falcon equipment. Much of the equipment was prepositioned in or near the AOR and was air transportable. It provided intermediate and organizational level support for power, water, facilities, and vehicles. Logistics Support The concept of logistics support in the basic plans stated that initial supply support was to be provided from deployed war reserve kits, mobility bench stock, and mobility equipment at theater locations. Resupply was to be from home supply units until supply accounts were established in the AOR. Airlift would provide resupply from around C+3 (three days after deployment) until the sea lines of communication were established. Supply support was to be provided by homestations. USEUCOM would provide lateral support until a supply system was established in the AOR. Regular supply accounts (SRANS) were to be established for each base; by the last period, mobile supply computers were to be deployed, with remote devices at operating locations. Accountability for all items remained with homestation until the theater supply system was established, although shortfalls were to be reported to CENTAF/ Logistics (LG), with an information copy for the Major Air Command (MAJCOM). A combat supply system (CSS) on microcomputers was to be used until a mobile computer mainframe was deployed.105 Three phases of Concept of Supply Operations were identified. The Initial phase consisted of using resources from war readiness spares kits, with mission-critical parts (MICAP) needs being filled from homestation. Information copies of messages asking for spares and other items from homestations were to be sent to CENTAF/ LG. The transition phase began when combat supply support activities (CSSAs) would be established. The CSSAs would operate manually, requisitioning both base and mission support items. Each CSSA was to be headed by a senior supply officer and comprised all supply personnel at the location, regardless of MAJCOM. The final phase occurred when the mainframe and remote devices arrived. Additional personnel also were scheduled to arrive to augment the CSSA and to make it automated and operational. Responsibilities Although the CENTAF/LG was charged with control and direction of CSSA units, the host wing CSSAs were the main players. They would maintain supply accountability, manage funds, obtain supplies, and function as chiefs of supply. Maintenance Maintenance support required units to be self-supporting because of bare base conditions. Maintenance organizations were to be aligned under AFM 66-1 procedures, and requests for depot level maintenance assistance would be routed through CENTAF/Logistics Maintenance (LGM). Oil analysis capability would be deployed in the initial maintenance support echelon. Aircraft and aircraft engine battle damage repair teams would be deployed by AFLC, would be under the operational control of CENTAF/LG, and would report to lead unit deputy chiefs of maintenance (DCMs).106 The CENTAF/LGM was a staff advisor to deployed wings. Each base/installation having more than one wing would have a lead unit DCM, who would appoint senior tenant wing maintenance officers as assistant DCMs. Collocated units were to be prepared to form joint maintenance operations centers (JMOCs) and job control (JC) units. Munitions Prepositioned munitions at Seeb [DELETED] Masirah and Thumrait was to be moved [DELETED]. Units were expected to account and prepare for munitions storage in their base support plans. Munitions being prepositioned in the AOR were to be air and sealifted to the AOR from the CONUS and other CINCs for use by CENTAF at specific employment locations. Air Force munitions were available on three prepositioned ships. The MAC airlift command element (ALCE) was scheduled to offload airlifted munitions at each employment location, while U.S. Army Forces, Central Command (ARCENT) was to line-haul munitions from seaport to employment location. Fuels Support Strategic airlift assets would arrive in-theater with sufficient fuel to return to points outside the AOR. CENTAF was required to coordinate requirements for intratheater airlift of bulk petroleum for the other components, and in turn was required to meet ARCENT's fuels ground transportation requirements. Units would deploy with packaged fuel products sufficient for thirty days. Commercial fuels could be used, and in anticipation of this, units were required to deploy with ten days supply of fuel additives. ARCENT was tasked to schedule fuels resupply shipments.107 Comptroller Support Deployed units would be fiscally sustained by home units until funding authority was granted to CENTAF. Support was to be limited to disbursing agents until comptroller operations would commence and sustaining personnel would be available at various theater locations. Units would be self-sustaining through their combat support elements (CSEs), and were required to deploy with funding documents and a recommended imprest funding document authority of $2,000,000 for CSE units and $1,000,000 for other units. Eventually, ARCENT would assume responsibilities as the central funding agent. Its duties consisted of obtaining U.S. currency and military payment certificates for the theater. Each component provided medical service for its own forces. Air Force care was organized into four echelons. Bases were responsible for the first echelon of care, and commanders were required to ensure that medical personnel deployed with the unit. Contracting Support Although CENTCOM was ultimately responsible for a properly coordinated acquisition program, the bulk of the contracting effort remained with each component. The Director of Contracting for logistics (CENTAF/LGC) performed staff functions in issuing policy, procedures, and guidance to base-level contracting officers, who performed work at their locations under the authority of the base combat support group commander. Contracting personnel were required to deploy as part of the combat support group UTC. At multiwing locations, the host wing was tasked to provide a senior contracting officer. Contracting officers were expected to deploy with their warrant and civilian clothing to counter the assumed reluctance of the host population to deal with the U.S. military. Lines of Communication Sea lines of communication (SLOC): As previously stated, bases/units were expected to be self-sufficient until the closure of the SLOC. Units were expected to be self sustaining for 30 days. During this window, and before the establishment of the SLOC, logistics supplies were to be transported via MAC airlift. By then, normal sustainment and resupply would be expected to have begun and would be furnished via SLOC. However, ARCENT was tasked to furnish supply classes I, III, IV, and V; all other classes would be furnished on a “pull” basis (i.e., they had to be requisitioned). The Air Force was tasked to furnish its own Class I until ARCENT was tasked to provide it. Transportation windows planning called for minimum windows between the earliest arrival date (EAD) and the latest arrival date (LAD). Five days were allotted for air movements and ten days for movement by sea. Theater stockage levels were specified for most classes of supply. No refrigerated rations were to be shipped for a specified time unless refrigerated storage was locally obtained.108 In Sealift/Water Port Operations, SLOCs were expected to close first. U.S. military and civilian ships would carry out sealift operations. Forces and equipment moving by sea would normally use surface transportation to reach beddown locations. Ninety percent of resupply was expected to move by sealift. Resupply cargo from seaports was to be moved primarily by surface transportation. Planning factors for air shipments intratheater were: TAC airlift would move twenty percent of resupply cargo coming from aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and a sea/air interface would be required for five percent of cargo coming from Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPODs). Vehicles were to be obtained from many sources: homestation, host nation, and war reserves. Host-nation support was the preferred means. Main operating base resources provided vehicle maintenance for geographically separated units. CENTCOM had a small joint staff to manage all of the responsibilities of the AOR from a great distance. CENTCOM had no forces assigned until C Day, at which time forces would be requested from the supporting components. As previously mentioned, the CINC planned to preposition assets in the AOR as an offset for the lack of presence.109 Also, host-nation support in the AOR was part of the CINC's plan for regional contingency planning, since he had confidence in the capabilities and willingness of the countries to provide this support, should it be required. In the draft OPLAN 1002-90, CINCCENT identified host-nation support that could be provided in the following categories: POL, water, food and messing support; long haul trucking and mission handing equipment at airheads, warehouses, and stevedores; buses for troop movement; and 3,000 hospital beds.110 CENTCOM was also forced by the lack of forward presence and small size to delegate many theater responsibilities normally provided by the CINC to its subordinate components.111 The CENTCOM components were CENTAF, which was derived from 9th Air Force, a numbered Air Force subordinate to Tactical Air Command. CENTAF had the responsibility for theater field exchanges, intratheater airlift, and the mail, plus sustaining and supporting its own forces.112 ARCENT was furnished by the Third Army and was subordinate to FORSCOM - the Army equivalent of TAC. With the largest representation in the AOR, ARCENT had the responsibility for planning and providing for common-user supply support, food, water, intratheater transportation, vehicles, engineering, fuels pipelines, and graves registration services.113 U.S. Navy, Central Command (NAVCENT) was originally to be supported by the Commander, Middle East Force (CMEF), and U.S. Marine Corps, Central Command (MARCENT) was furnished from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force.114 The Air Force Headquarters, USCENTAF ADVON (advanced echelon), consisted of 117 personnel in OPLAN 1021-88, later swelling to 314 in the later OPLANs.115 The ADVON was responsible for command and control of deployed air forces in the AOR. The size of the CENTAF staff, and particularly the Logistics staff, would figure prominently in the establishment of CENTAF (REAR) in the CONUS. Exercises, Assessments, and War Games The results of exercises, simulations, readiness assessments, wargames, and feedback to the planning process, all provided important windows through which to view logistics readiness as it was perceived before Desert Shield. Exercises SAC attributed one exercise as being particularly beneficial in terms of logistics equipage and training. The 1988 Bull Rider held at Clinton-Sherman AFB in Oklahoma led SAC to set up B-52 WRSKs configured for seven Primary Aircraft Authorized (PAA) aircraft packages rather than fourteen PAA packages. The smaller packages provided greater deployment flexibility. The Bull Rider exercises also provided an empirical basis for calculating wartime demand for shares. Further, Bull Rider taught SAC to develop a WRSK for consumables and to obtain spare parts for auxiliary ground equipment (AGE) and support equipment.116 The TAC equivalent to Bull Rider was Coronet Warrior. Three Coronet Warrior exercises represented the end result of a ten-year TAC effort to examine its ability to support a war.117 Complementing these efforts were two exercises called Leading Edge I and II in the 1983 timeframe, which had examined alternate methods for assembling munitions. The Coronet Warrior exercises were born out of a diversity of opinion on wartime spares requirements. Dyna-METRIC, an optimizing spares model developed by RAND, was perceived to hold promise for providing a more credible means of determining spares requirements. However, the model lacked a credible combat environment data base. The F-15 Coronet Warrior exercise in 1987 isolated an F-15 aviation package (i.e., aircraft, crews, maintenance, and other deploying resources) at homestation with a representative spares package and then tasked the unit at wartime sortie rates for thirty days. The F-16 exercise in 1988 and A-10 exercise in 1989 did likewise. The results were much better than expected as illustrated by Figure 8,118 primarily because the rate at which parts failed was much lower than expected and repair rates were higher than expected. In fact, demands for repairs were less than half of the expected number. Coronet Warriors II and III replicated these results, as summarized in Table 7, although the difference between prediction and actual fully-mission-capable rate was not the four-to-one ratio of Coronet Warrior I. The results foreshadowed those that would be achieved during the Gulf War. 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