Gulf War Air Power Survey
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- Table 1 United States Air Force Aircraft Inventory versus Quantity Committed to Gulf War
- Table 1 (Continued) United States Air Force Aircraft Inventory versus Quantity Committed to Gulf War
- Planned AOR 1 Aug 90 AOR 14 Jan 91
- Figure 1 USAF
- Figure 2 Aircraft Spare Parts Funding FY 80-90 (BP15,WRM) ($ in Millions)
- Figure 3 Exchangeable Repair Requirement/Funding FY 80-91 ($ in Millions) 7 Figure 4
- Figure 5 Munitions Funding FY 81-93 ($ in Millions)
- Table 2 Air Force Active Basing Structure
2 Preparation for a Southwest Asia Contingency, 1 August 1990 The introduction to this report defined logistics as “. . .planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.” This chapter focuses on precrisis actions with emphasis on creating forces and preparing for their sustained support in a Southwest Asia (SWA) contingency. Since air forces use complex weapon systems and are sustained from bases connected by lines of communication (LOCs),12 understanding air power logistics preparation involves examining the four components: forces, weapons, bases, and lines of communicationas well as planning for their employment in war. Preparation timeframes are relatively long, particularly for weapon systems, for which preparation takes decades rather than years. Because timelines are long, the historical horizon for this chapter stretches back to the 1970s and earlier. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on preparation per se. The second section describes planning for war and includes the planning process and the status of logistical plans for a war in Southwest Asia. The final part summarizes the results of late 1980s exercises and readiness assessments as a way of clarifying the prevailing perception of air power logistics readiness on the eve of the Gulf War. Preparation The introduction to the Planning report notes that planners viewed the Gulf as essentially the right flank of NATO and placed primary emphasis on a war with the Soviet Union. The 1987 USAF War and Mobilization Plan, in fact, defined the most demanding 1990 scenario for the Air Force as a worldwide war, centered in Europe, and involving the Soviet Union. Thus the U.S. force structure and resources to support it were oriented towards the Central European scenario. Table 1 compares the number of U.S. Air Force aircraft in the inventory with the number that were actually deployed and with the number projected to be used in the SWA theater during a worldwide war with the Soviets. The point of the table is that, in terms of the overall numbers, the Air Force had prepared for a much larger conflict than the Gulf War turned out to be. For example, only fifteen percent of F-15 aircraft in the force were deployed; the remaining eighty-five percent were a source of spare parts through cannibalization, and a ready maintenance manpower pool and other resources were available (not to mention enormous fire power). As the Support report and later chapters in this report show, however, important imbalances arose. Other reports (especially in the Weapons, Tactics, and Training report) discuss the direct combat capability implications of Coalition aircraft and munitions quality. The issue of quality has important meaning for combat support as wellparticularly quality as it is demonstrated through reliability and maintainability (R&M). Published reports generally credit R&M investments during the 1980s with reducing the investment needed in spare parts and other resources.13 Actually, sustained, successful investment in R&M goes back much farther. Figure 1 shows the failure rates of USAF fighter aircraft as a function of the year of introduction.14 The F-15E, with not quite double the reliability of the F-15A, is a product of the 1980s; the F-15C and F-16 aircraft were designed in the 1970s. All of the later designs are twice as reliable as Vietnam-era F-4 series aircraft. As is discussed more fully in the maintenance chapter, the improved reliability permitted planned and unplanned operation for 30 days or more without significant maintenance and resupply.
Note: These figures came from several sources. The fourth column, figures for 1 Aug are from “The Persian Gulf War, an Air Staff Chronology of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Volume on Desert Shield, p 5. The next two columns (Forces in the Gulf just before the war) are from the Statistical Compendium of this survey. The AOR forces are as of 14 Jan 90, the Proven Force forces are as of 19 Jan 90. The F-117 force went to 42 aircraft on the 26 of Jan. The B-52 force went to 36 on 19 Jan and 66 on 9 Feb. The figures for the planned European War, with the Soviets, are from the USAF War and Mobilization Plan dated 1 Jul 87, Volume 3, Part 1; specifically, the forces shown available for a war on 1 Oct 90 were used (pp e l 91-1 thru e l 91-40.) Forces were included if they were available on or before day 30. The figures in the Worldwide Inventory were provided by AF/PEI, the Programs Integration Division, Ms. Rita Johnson, 2 Oct 92. Figure 1 USAF Fighter Aircraft: Type 1 Failures/Hour Versus Year of First Flight 5
The 1970s after Vietnam have been aptly described as an era of putting rubber on the ramp while postponing procurement of support resources until later.15 That strategy was largely responsible for the aircraft inventory shown in Table 1. “Later” turned out to be the early through the mid 1980s, when the Air Force provided healthy funding levels for supplies. The results made the relationship between investment and capability abundantly clear. Figure 2 shows aircraft spare parts funding for fiscal years 1980 through 1990.16 The absolute level of funding is more important than the comparison between requirement and amount funded because in the early 1980s, requirements were computed by Figure 2 Aircraft Spare Parts Funding FY 80-90 (BP15,WRM) ($ in Millions) 6
using a simple “flying hours times usage factor” method; later in the decade, capability-based methods were introduced.17 Coincident with the wave of spare parts funding were increases in war readiness spares kit (WRSK) funding and in funding for exchangeable repairi.e., the repair of broken spare parts (Figure 3).18 The impact of changes in spares and exchangeables funding (both increasing and decreasing) is clearly evident in mission capability rates (Figure 4). The roughly three-year lag time between a change in funding and a change in capability is also evident.19 Funding peaked in the 1985 timeframe; capability peaked just before the Gulf War. This is one of many indicators showing that Iraqi leadership chose a propitious time (for the United States) to initiate hostilities. Figure 3 Exchangeable Repair Requirement/Funding FY 80-91 ($ in Millions) 7
Tactical Operational Fighters Mission Capability Rates 8
There was a similar investment in munitions (Figure 5) where the majority of the funding was in 1985, 1986, and 1987. The investment returns would prove to be vital to the supply of preferred munitions in the Gulf War. The Air Force formally recognized the concept of Bases and Lines of Communication as fundamental to combat support doctrine.20 Bases are the sites from which operations are originated or supported (or both), while the lines of communication (LOC) are the routes for transmitting resources between bases. Bases are the Figure 5 Munitions Funding FY 81-93 ($ in Millions) 9
critical junctures at which aerospace power is most dependent. For it is at the base that resources are concentrated in order to manifest combat power. The basing structure in existence on the eve of the Gulf War conformed to Air Force doctrine, which categorized bases as operational, support, or industrial. Strategic bomber bases and forward fighter bases were examples of operational bases.21 Operational bases did not sustain themselves indefinitely, but had to be supported by the other two categories of bases through the lines of communication. The Air Force active basing structure as of August 1990 is shown in Table 2. Table 2 Air Force Active Basing Structure
It should be clear from Table 2 that the extant basing structure was a product of the Cold War, with most of the bases either in Europe or in the United States proper. Although the basing structure was rich, it was substantially in the wrong place to support a conflict in Southwest Asia. U.S. Air Force, Central Command (USCENTAF) had identified 14 potential operational base locations within the area of responsibility (AOR) with a capability to support a population of approximately 30,000 personnel.22 All, however, were just that: potential locations. By comparison, there were 9 in-place U.S. air bases in the Pacific, 26 (some of which were in the process of being closed) in Europe, 2 in the Atlantic region, and one major base in Panama.23 Although no U.S. operational facilities were located in SWA, numerous facilities had been developed according to U.S. standards but used by Saudi Defense forces or for civilian purposes. The primary Saudi airbases and air logistics centers were built or augmented largely through long-standing security assistance relationships or with the backing of U.S. funding.24 Dhahran was even used during World War II as a resupply point for U.S. forces in Asia.25 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers rebuilt the Dhahran Airfield in 1956 and constructed a civil terminal in 1961.26 A formal agreement that the Corps would furnish certain support for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) was executed in 1965 and is still in existence at the time of this writing.27 The agreement paved the way for construction of the King Faisal and the King Abdul Aziz Military Cantonments and King Khalid Military City. Other key projects completed under this agreement included separate headquarters for the Royal Saudi Air Force and MODA, the port at Ras al Mishab, and several schools.28 A network of other facilities and bare base setups, too lengthy to enumerate, were constructed as part of an overall Saudi defense program. The details and existence of some of the facilities were unknown to the United States at the time of the Gulf War, and planning factors were not accurate for some of the known facilities.29 Although the United States did not have large, established bases in the AOR, it did have contingency sites, used largely by the U.S. Navy. A small U.S. Middle East Task force had been established at Seeb, Oman, since the 1940s, but it and other Navy activities were fairly low-visibility operations.30 Although not in the immediate vicinity, Diego Garcia was a prominent toe-hold in the region. Leasing facilities on the island from the British beginning in 1965 enabled the United States to build runways suitable for B-52 and C-5 operations as well as docks that accommodated prepositioned ships.31 The Air Force described support bases somewhat tautologically as representing the “depth of combat support activity.” Air logistics centers, program offices and laboratories, headquarters, ports, and training centers were considered support bases.32 In 1990, Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) designed and acquired aerospace vehicles and systems. Air logistics centers (ALCs) were responsible for supply, repair, distribution, and sustaining engineering under the direction of Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC). The Miliary Airlift Command (MAC) was responsible for peacetime management of various aerial ports worldwide,33 while the training centers were managed by Air Training Command (ATC). AFLC and its ALCs provided supplemental logistics support to the operational commands. ALCs released materiel to base supply (thought of as a wholesale transaction); in turn, base supply released the materiel to consuming organizations on base (retail). AFLC defined requirements for weapons systems support and obtained resources from the national industrial base. During the decade before the Gulf War, AFLC made organizational changes and significant investments to better serve the needs of combat and support forces. AFLC had combined its heavy maintenance organizations with buying agencies and those that provided technical support. This “integrated” management approach was intended to ensure that all logistics needs were considered for a particular aircraft type; one individual for each major system was accountable for ensuring integration.34 During the 1980s, AFLC invested over $130 million in aircraft maintenance facilities. At Warner Robins ALC, new hangars were constructed for performance of heavy maintenance and modification on C‑141B aircraft. The new construction enabled aircraft repairs around the clock during the Gulf War. Expansion of engine overhaul facilities at San Antonio and Oklahoma City expedited Gulf War aircraft engine overhaul.35 Two air logistics support bases were located in the AOR. The first, called PM-SANG, resulted from a U.S. Air Force-sponsored program to help the Saudi Air National Guard (SANG) develop an industrial-level ALC similar in function to Air Force ALCs.36 The second, the Defense Fuel Supply Point in Bahrain, was managed by the Defense Logistics Agency. The next nearest industrial-level support base to the AOR was RAF Kemble in the United Kingdom. It was home base for the European Distribution System (EDS), which routed high-priority cargo through the European Theater. RAF Kemble was in the process of being closed. The final type of base, the national “industrial base,” included government and private research institutions, industrial plants, transportation and communications systems, the civilian labor force, and raw materials.37 The industrial bases of the United States, its allies, and SWA countries were favorably postured to support a gulf war.38 SWA countries had rich, oil-based economies; NATO Allies had a high level of preparedness; and Japan was a major provider of important technologies.39 Tying the bases together in peace and war were lines of communication.40 Air Force Combat Support Doctrine identified four LOC types: land, sea, air, and space.41 Two LOC types, sea and air, were part of a mobility triad of airlift, sealift, and prepositioning.42 After World War II, the primary strategic sealift mission was to move men and equipment to Europe rapidly for defense against a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack. Sealift was a Navy responsibility, and sealift in support of the central front was to have been provided by over 600 NATO merchant vessels combined with the U.S. merchant fleet of 578 major ships (as of 1978). On the eve of the Gulf War, however, this figure had dropped to 367 active ships despite an investment of $7 billion in sealift during the 1980s.43 As a result, the goal set for sealift in moving materiel to the AOR would be difficult to achieve, given the decline of capabilities.44 Sealift was grouped into three categories: prepositioned, surge, and resupply. Assets prepositioned in ships close to the conflict allowed for near-immediate access, while surge shipping allowed for the movement of most of the equipment and initial sustaining supplies from the continental United States (CONUS). In resupply shipping, where the sea lines of communication (SLOC) figured prominently, shipments followed surge shipping to provide sustainment stocks at rates determined by growth of force levels.45 The Military Sealift Command (MSC) operated peacetime shipping and provided the nucleus of sealift capability. The Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) was a voluntary commitment of some carriers to contingencies. During emergencies, the President could authorize the Secretary of Transportation to draw on additional U.S. flag shipping for crisis or wartime needs. The next source of support beyond the MSC and U.S. charter assets was the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships. The Maritime Administration managed the RRF for the U.S. Navy. The force was part of the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), and its assets were categorized in incremental readiness statuses of five, ten, or twenty days notice. RRF ships were activated by a request from the Navy to the Maritime Administration. There were two other sources of sealift. The first, the aforementioned 600-ship NATO pool, was managed by the NATO National Shipping Authority, which was authorized to reallocate ships among NATO member nations. The second was called the “Effective U.S.-Controlled Fleet” ships. These ships were owned by U.S. corporations although registered under the flags of Liberia, Panama, Honduras, and the Bahamas. They were available to the United States because the countries of registry did not have laws precluding the requisitioning of ships.46 The air lines of communications were an Air Force responsibility through its Military Airlift Command.47 They were designed to “close”48 first but with a lesser throughput capacity than sealift. The 1981 Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS) established an airlift goal of 66 million ton-miles per day, which represented a target objective for effectively executing four specific warfighting scenarios developed in conjunction with the study.49 In 1987, considering all available airlift (including the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, discussed below), only 48 to 51 million ton-miles per day were achievable.50 Moreover, the CMMS pointed out that one-third to one-fifth of the needed airlift would not be available for the first fifteen days for any of the four scenarios analyzed.51 In light of the diminishing Soviet threat, the Secretary of Defense revised the goal to 48 million ton-miles per day in April 1990. The new goal was not incorporated into long-range planning efforts before the Gulf War but made capability and requirements essentially the same.52 The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was a significant part of airlift. When Desert Shield began, CRAF comprised five segments: long-range international, short-range international, aeromedical evacuation, domestic, and Alaskan. CRAF was further organized into three stages that could be activated incrementally to support DOD airlift requirements. The successive stages, each with an increasingly larger number of aircraft, were intended to enable the Commander in Chief Military Airlift Command (CINCMAC) to tailor the size and composition of the strategic airlift force to meet expanding transportation requirements.53 CINCMAC was authorized to activate CRAF Stage I. Upon activation, Stage I carriers had twenty-four hours to respond to HQ MAC tasking. 54 Stage II, which the Secretary of Defense was authorized to activate, had 177 aircraft enrolled. It was to augment MAC organic aircraft for the next higher level of emergency. Stage II carriers also had twenty-four hours to respond to airlift tasking. Stage III had 506 commercial aircraft at the end of fiscal 1990. Following a Stage III call-up, the commercial carriers had forty-eight hours to begin supporting DOD airlift requirements. Stage III would only be activated “short of a defense oriented national emergency” as determined by the President or the Congress. Even without activating any stage of the CRAF, member airlines often volunteered aircraft when military airlift requirements became especially great. MAC paid for these flights using MAC uniform negotiated rates.55 Civil air carriers electing to participate committed varying numbers of their aircraft to the CRAF, sometimes in return for a proportionate share of DOD peacetime airlift contracts. If the entire CRAF had been activated in late 1990 to support military transportation requirements during a major national emergency, its aircraft would have formed more than thirty-two percent of MAC's cargo transport capability and ninety-three percent of the Command's passenger airlift.56 On 2 August 1990, the day Iraq invaded Kuwait, MAC's strategic aircrews available for mission tasking were as shown in Table 4.57 As can be seen, almost half of the strategic airlift aircrews originated from the reserves. Directory: sgp -> library sgp -> Sgp country Programme Strategy for op6 sgp -> Itu-d study groups sgp -> Internship with Congressional Campaign Exploratory Committee — Only 4 spots left! sgp -> Using Well Logs in the Petroleum Industry sgp -> Telecommunication development bureau itu-d study groups Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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